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This dissertation shows how after the Second World War and the Holocaust, both the 
communist East Germany and the liberal democratic West Germany appropriated the media as a 
tool in the Cold War struggle for hegemony. It examines how both states used illustrated 
magazines to define themselves anew and to demonstrate they were the “better” Germany to 
foreign audiences sympathetic to Germany. In particular, it focuses on the two main state-
sponsored magazines at the heart of this propaganda campaign, Scala International in West 
Germany and its East German counterpart, GDR Review. These magazines, designed particularly 
for Western and non-aligned countries, covered a number of similar themes including the state of 
the economy, rebuilding after the war, and women’s role in society. The dissertation combines a 
study of messages from the magazines and the intention behind their creation through an 
institutional analysis.  
One of the key tasks of this dissertation has been to show that both German states looked 
to each other when competing for international acceptance. Thus, it challenges the conventional 
narrative that West Germany cared little for East Germany’s efforts to gain international 
acceptance. In fact, East Germany’s early initiation of this propaganda competition spurred West 
Germany to redouble their efforts. Additionally, while many historians have focused on high-
level diplomacy and the role of the Cold War superpowers in redeeming Germany for 
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international audiences, this dissertation demonstrates that the German states and people had a 
great deal of agency. By constructing their image in relationship to the neighboring other and in 
juxtaposition to the Nazi past, both German states developed their identities in highly visual 
presentations that sought to subvert seemingly incontrovertible Cold War divisions. The ossified 
nature of bloc division in this period led to an increasing importance in attempts to convince 
foreign populations of the superiority of one’s system. This shows that the German states’ efforts 
to recruit grassroots level support reflects this broader trend of diverse efforts and messages 
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Portraying major political moments in German history intended for distribution abroad in 
service of a broader foreign cultural objective was not a new tactic for the German Foreign Office 
(Auswärtiges Amt in the West and the Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelgenheiten in the East). 
Indeed, the first mentions of foreign cultural policy, or Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, originated as 
early as 1912 in lectures by historian Karl Lamprecht and in communication between Lamprecht 
and Bethmann Hollweg, who agreed that “soft power” could solve some of Germany’s over-
reliance on force in foreign policy.1 Foreign cultural policy continued to develop in the Weimar 
Republic, albeit in at times contradictory directions, both as an independently evolving cultural 
project and as a tool for power politics and commercial interests.2 The Nazi period halted and 
reeled back much of the Weimar era reforms of foreign cultural policy. The Gleichschaltung of 
National Socialism and the German state incorporated foreign cultural policy and mobilized it to 
make the regime appear less offensive and more humane, as seen in the publicity for the Berlin 
Olympics of 1936.3 With the division of Germany in 1945 and the founding of separate states in 
                                                             
1 Hans Arnold, Foreign Cultural Policy: a survey from a German point of view, Keith Hamnett, trans. (London: 
Wolff, 1979), 14. 
2 Ibid., 15. 
3 Ibid., 16. 
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1949, foreign cultural policy gained a new important task of justifying the new governments and 
ideological camps of both West and East. 
Foreign cultural policy originated, at least in part, as a way to preserve German 
emigrants’ connections with their former homeland through concrete organizations such as 
German schools and German libraries, but this task grew to encompass a broader objective of 
improving the image of Germany and Germans abroad.4 The creation of a specific department in 
the Foreign Office, the Abteilung für Deutschtum im Ausland und kulturelle Angelegenheiten, as 
well as the formation of intermediary organizations such as the German Foreign Academic 
Exchange Service and the Goethe Institute in the early part of the 20th Century, facilitated the 
development of a broader approach to foreign cultural policy.5 After the Second World War, the 
FRG and the GDR had to choose which example they would follow in their foreign cultural 
policy: the semi-private efforts of the Weimar Republic or the state and party centralization of 
Nazism. The German Democratic Republic started from a much more difficult position as a 
smaller state that could not lay claim to the former German state’s international legitimacy, but 
was also much more aggressive and coherent in cultivating its self-image. The Federal Republic, 
conversely, cared much less about its image initially and instead focused on high politics and 
Western integration. The development and comparison of the image creation process in foreign 
cultural policy, the role of each state’s government and non-governmental institutions, and the 
actual media produced by these organizations are the topics of this dissertation. 
In the context of an emerging Cold War, a competition emerged between the FRG and 
                                                             
4 Barbara Lippert, Auswärtige Kulturpolitik im Zeichen der Ostpolitik: Verhandlungen mit Moskau, 1969-1990, 
(Münster: Lit, 1996), 10. 
5 Ibid., 9. 
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the GDR over their political and cultural legitimacy based upon their mutual goals of leaving the 
Nazi past behind and offering a more promising, yet distinct, model for the future. In their 
struggle for the hearts and minds of foreign audiences, each state pushed their own ideological 
vision for a “better” Germany that could redeem their national image abroad and show their 
superiority to the neighboring other. As time passed, the Federal Republic of Germany pointed to 
its economic miracle, successful Western integration, and its developed democratic society. The 
German Democratic Republic, in contrast, emphasized the successes of the “revolutionary 
tradition” and the “liberation from fascism.” 
In a time of relatively static high-level politics and alliance blocs, the two German 
foreign offices turned to a cultural diplomatic approach designed to provide foreign audiences 
with a more positive “Deutschlandbild”6 (image of Germany) superior to that of their competitor. 
The GDR turned to this approach much earlier than the FRG in an effort to break out of its 
diplomatic isolation, but both states understood that a divided Germany could not rely on power 
politics to determine their course in a bipolar world largely defined by the overarching conflict 
between East and West. Instead, in producing their materials for foreign audiences, the foreign 
offices and intermediary organizations of the states created representations of an idealized state 
image that hoped to influence foreign populations and make Germany more appealing. 
The competition for the title of the superior Germany required developing a 
complimentary self-representation constructed within certain limits of believability and ideology 
that was necessarily placed in opposition to the other Germany. These representations were 
designed for multiple societies and the FRG and the GDR crafted their image to appeal to three 
                                                             
6 This term was used fairly often by both sides and serves as a useful point of connection in showing the driving goal 
of both the East and West German states.  
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levels of states: their own bloc, the enemy bloc, and the nonaligned countries. Within each of 
these states, specific groups were targeted with special interests in mind. For example, the social 
welfare programs of the GDR were attractive to leftist groups in Western states, while the 
political liberalism and economic success of the FRG appealed to states emphasizing market 
principles and parliamentary democracy. There is also an essential element of a German-German 
dialogue within these discourses that evolved over time, in which the very essence of Germany 
became contested even as it remained feared and hated by parts of the international community 
during the early stages of the Cold War. Each state focused intently on the other’s messages, 
campaigns, and methods and altered their own plans accordingly. In fact, personnel were often 
directly tasked with observing and reporting on the German other as a means by which the state 
could respond to attacks, such as those of the Federal Republic on the Berlin Wall, or develop 
better media to compete. 
  The self-representations (Selbstdarstellungen)7 seen in the media sponsored by the FRG 
and GDR sought to promote a vision of a peaceful Germany to replace former images of 
aggression and militarism. While techniques, audiences, and messages shifted over forty years of 
division in response to international and domestic conditions, a general desire to present the 
image of a “better” Germany persisted in both states. These representations were certainly 
ideological and often propagandistic8, but they were also presented over time with greater 
                                                             
7 This term was used frequently in social scientific literature more contemporary to the events at hand that has been 
cited below. The idea of self-representation to produce a more positive image of Germany is the essential element of 
cultural diplomacy or the related German language term Auswärtige Kulturpolitik that I will be examining in my 
dissertation. 
8 Propaganda as a term was most often used in reference to the enemy state’s campaigns, messages, and materials. 
One of the interesting points of the development of terms for self-representation (Auslandsinformation, politische 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Kulturpolitik, etc.) in each German state was the deliberate attempt to denigrate the opponents 




awareness of audience reactions and the desire to cultivate a more cultured and diverse image. 
These attempts displayed the constant tension between culture and politics inherent in state-
directed foreign cultural policy and while they were essentially political, they were also 
importantly cultural in their attempts to show what each Germany salvaged from a shared past, 
all that was rejected from National Socialism, and what was new for each state in the second half 
of a most destructive twentieth century. 
My dissertation project aims to explore the competing practices of cultural diplomacy of 
the FRG and the GDR though an exploration of their distinct, yet closely connected and 
interacting, self-images from the states’ foundation in 1949 until the fall of the GDR and German 
reunification in 1989/1990. These images were created under different terms such as Politische 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit9, Auswärtige Kulturpolitik10, or more vague terms like 
Auslandsinformation11, but the central drive of each was the creation of a more positive view of 
each German state among foreign audiences. To examine this expansive project, I have 
conducted a layered approach focusing on the foreign offices, intermediary institutions, and 
media. These levels provide a clearer picture of not only what the Deutschlandbild was, but how 
and why it changed over time. Furthermore, by providing a comparative analysis of each German 
state from similar points, I present a narrative that shows how each state came to be viewed 
                                                             
9 This term, perhaps best translated as political public relations work was used primarily in the FRG prior to 1970 
and refers to information work designed to provide foreign audiences with knowledge about German history, 
culture, and current events. In many ways, it was the forerunner to the later campaigns of Auswärtige Kulturpolitik 
and had similar goals in terms of improving the image of the FRG abroad if not as much of a focus on exchange, 
audience cultivation, and with a much narrower approach to “culture” restricted to art, theater, and literature, etc. 
10 The direct translation here is foreign cultural politics, but the closest approximation in English language scholarly 
literature is cultural diplomacy. The term Kulturpolitik was in use for some time prior to the Cold War, but often 
referred to high culture and scholarly exchanges rather than broader attempts at relationship and image-building. 
11 Auslandsinformation was the standard term for Kulturpolitik and cultural diplomatic activities in the GDR, though 
it was occasionally used in the FRG to describe informative media campaigns that lacked a distinct cultural element. 
Unlike in the West, there was not a change in terminology over time to encompass new techniques and foci. 
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internationally and interacted with the other through alternative diplomatic channels. This large 
project is further divided temporally to highlight coherent trends and developments in FRG and 
GDR foreign cultural policy embedded in broader historical developments. 
Historiography 
While there is a significant historiography of German foreign cultural policy, particularly 
in the German language, my study of cultural diplomacy differs from the earlier historiographies 
of foreign policy and diplomacy between the two Germanys in several ways. Most studies 
examine the cultural politics or representation as a distinct part of their analysis of foreign 
policy.12 Others look only at one German state or only look at a particular time period. In fact, 
according to historian Johannes Paulmann, there has not yet been a systematic historical study of 
both German states’ foreign cultural policy (auswärtige Kulturpolitik) that expands beyond a 
study of either the institutions or the basic conceptions of policy.13 I use the pre-existing 
historiography to help contextualize some of the information on foreign cultural policy within an 
international Cold War context and a domestic political context as well as for useful concepts to 
analyze image creation. 
The early narratives of the Cold War approached each German state’s foreign policy as 
an extension of their respective superpower allies. Political scientists like Frank R. Pfetsch, who 
were close to the period they were studying, focused on the institutions under concern, explained 
                                                             
12 Joerg Schumacher, Das Ende der kulturellen Doppelrepräsentation: Die Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR am Beispiel ihrer Kulturinstitute 1989/90, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang, 2010). 
13 Johannes Paulmann, “Auswärtige Repräsentationen nach 1945: Zur Geschichte der deutschen Selbstdarstellung 
im Ausland,” in Auswärtige Repräsentationen: Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945, ed. Johannes Paulmann 
(Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2005), 8-9. 
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the core actors, or examined the diplomatic agreements of the period.14 Others, such as Hans 
Arnold or Barbara Lippert, focused more on foreign cultural policy, and are important for my 
dissertation as they provide a great deal of contextual information in the development of the 
foreign offices and the relationship between the governments and the intermediary organizations. 
These works fall short for my purposes, however, in that even when explicitly focused on foreign 
cultural policy, they mostly restrict their analysis to institutions and government offices rather 
than examining the specific images that were produced over the course of German division. 
When developing my focus on image creation, I borrowed some of Anita Mallinckrodt’s 
ideas that focused on the self-representation of the FRG and the GDR. Mallinckrodt argued that 
the image produced by these states cannot simply be interpreted in the same way as a public 
relations manager that advertises a product or a political campaign candidate. Instead, it is a 
broader, more complex, and more nuanced cultural image of a state that, while certainly 
manipulated by its creators to be presented positively, is vitally important in the creation and 
maintenance of international relations. For the FRG and GDR, she focused primarily on the 
institutions involved in creating these representations, as well as a case study of German foreign 
policy materials aimed at American audiences.15 Historians have also examined the foreign 
policy of the FRG and the GDR extensively. Most have tended to be monographs examining the 
foreign policy of one of the German states that interprets them solely within a broader Cold War 
context or in relation with their superpower ally.16 The small amount of literature on foreign 
                                                             
14 Frank R. Pfetsch, West Germany: Internal Structures and External Relations, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1988). Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Gert Leptin, eds., Drei Jahrzente Außenpolitik der DDR: Bestimmungsfaktoren, 
Instrumente, Aktionsfelder, (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979). 
15 Anita Mallinckrodt, Die Selbstdarstellung der beiden deutschen Staaten im Ausland: ‘Image-Bildung’ als 
Instrument der Außenpolitik, (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1980). 
16 Gregor Schöllgen, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, 
(München: C.H. Beck Verlag, 1999). Benno-Eide Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR 1976-1989: Strategien und 
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cultural policy explores different themes and approaches them in a variety of ways. Especially 
useful for this project is Johannes Paulmann’s framing of auswärtige Repräsentationen (foreign 
representations). Paulmann’s work is useful for this project due to his framing of the cultural 
representations of each side in a Cold War context as a “mirror image of the unloved other” in 
relationship to the national socialist past and a divided Germany.17 Frank Trommler’s integrative 
history of policy and institutions describes the steady development of German foreign relations 
in a cultural context and demonstrates how the FRG developed a series of Mittlerorganisationen 
(intermediary organizations) that served as semi-formal ambassadors to foreign countries as the 
GDR centralized their efforts towards legitimacy through government organizations. 18 These 
studies provide essential background material, but also provide a great deal of room for further 
analysis in to the media that conveyed the image each state wished to convey. 
More narrow studies, such as Jörg Schumacher’s work, often focus specifically on 
foreign cultural policy in an isolated place or time. Schumacher compared the politics of a 
“double representation” at the end of the Cold War, during 1989-90, through a largely 
institutional study of the League for Friendship among the Peoples (Liga für Völkerfreundschaft) 
                                                             
Grenzen, (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999). Joachim Scholtyseck, Die Außenpolitik der DDR, (München: R. 
Oldenbourg, 2003). Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign 
Policy, 1945-1995, (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1999). 
Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent, (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). 
Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc, 2006). 
17 Johannes Paulmann, “Auswärtige Repräsentationen nach 1945: Zur Geschichte der deutschen Selbstdarstellung 
im Ausland,” in Auswärtige Repräsentationen: Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945, ed. Johannes Paulmann 
(Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2005), 8-9. 
18 Frank Trommler, Kulturmacht ohne Kompass: Deutsche auswärtige Kulturbeziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert, 
(Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2014). 
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from the GDR and the Goethe Institute in the FRG.19 While his analysis is helpful for my own 
perspective because it serves as an excellent example of the benefits of a comparative 
institutional study in different national and ideological contexts, it also lacks the broader 
contextual information that a more expansive study can provide. Still more studies tend to 
restrict their study to one side of the iron curtain. For instance, Brian C. Etheridge argued that a 
relationship between West German and American memory culture developed over the course of 
the Cold War, and that state power in particular influenced these memories and the images of the 
states they conjured. This study, while useful and important, ignored the East German case and 
thus missed key aspects in the German-German debate influencing each state’s self-image 
creation. 
The contextualization of my own study necessitates an examination of the historiography 
on Kulturpolitik/Selbstdarstellung within each Germany and a further broad historiography of 
the FRG and the GDR. These larger historiographies are also important to my study because they 
are essential to any attempt to produce an integrated postwar history of Germany. The historical 
grounding of these states did color their cultural diplomacy. For example, my study proceeds 
with an understanding of the GDR as a “welfare dictatorship,” which then helps to interpret the 
materials coming from the GDR as demonstrations of moral superiority through social welfare 
programs even in the context of an essentially dictatorial society.20 Furthermore, a broader 
historiography of divided Germany is essential in examining the context of a dialogue between 
                                                             
19 Joerg Schumacher, Das Ende der kulturellen Doppelrepräsentation: Die Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR am Beispiel ihrer Kulturinstitute 1989/90, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang, 2010). 
20 Konrad H. Jarausch, “Care and Coercion,” in Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of 
the GDR, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 59. 
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the two German states within their cultural diplomatic materials when interpreting the 
relationship between each Germany’s self-representation.21 
While the above historiography provides an excellent starting point for my analysis, the 
studies lack sufficient comparison of East and West German foreign cultural policy, they focus 
specifically on government institutions or intermediary organizations and don’t examine media, 
or they focus on a narrow period of time. I aim to solve these issues with a two-level study 
focused on the high-level government decision makers and intermediary institutions within each 
state in tandem with a systematic analysis of two representative state-sponsored foreign cultural 
policy media productions. This structure focuses explicitly on the media in an effort to determine 
the message of each state’s foreign cultural policy, but also contextualizes the broader process of 
the construction of institutions dedicated to foreign cultural policy and the intentions of its 
messages that can contribute to a more sophisticated methodological analysis of image/text 
conjuncture/disjuncture. Furthermore, by developing a comparative and “entangled” narrative, I 
offer a study that helps to illustrate not only the image of each Germany in an international 
context, but also how different ideologies approached the image-building process in the Cold 
War. 
The first level of analysis in my dissertation is an examination of FRG and GDR 
government foreign policy. Consequently, this project looks at the AA for the FRG and both the 
MfAA and the Department of Foreign Information of the Central Committee of the Socialist 
                                                             
21 For example, studies such as Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist, eds, Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in 
Deutschland 1945-1970, (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1997) help to explain the roles of the superpowers in the 
cultural and political development of divided Germany. 
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Unity Party.22 A policy study provides a background in the specific goals of higher levels of 
government in the FRG and the GDR that characterized the more practical developments of their 
foreign policy such as recognition and trade and establishes the highest levels of government that 
presided over the creation of each state’s image abroad.  
The second level of analysis is examining institutions such as the BPA in the West and 
the Liga für Völkerfreundschaft in the East. These institutions and associations played a very 
important role as carriers and actors of state policy in the development of West and East German 
cultural diplomacy. The general relationship between these governments and related institutions 
and the foreign offices was complicated and at times competitive or contradictory. Some authors 
have drawn out government institution flowcharts for the FRG, for example, and have often 
shown that the BPA is nearly entirely separate from the AA in decision-making, but they were 
forced to cooperate/plan together in the production of foreign cultural policy. The BPA was the 
specific organization responsible for the creation of Scala International, and as such is an 
essential link in understanding general FRG policy. The BPA also needed to cooperate with the 
AA for policy decisions. The Goethe Institute and the LfV were somewhat below the major 
government institutions in the flow of power and information, but still served relationship-
building and distributive roles. The LfV was the organization specifically in charge of GDR 
Review after the reorganization of the Gesellschaft für kulturelle Verbindungen mit dem Ausland 
in 1961 and is thus similar in some ways to the BPA, though it was not a government institution. 
                                                             
22 It’s necessary to look at both institutions in the GDR due to the split responsibilities/decision-making apparatuses 
of state and party that occurred throughout the GDR. At times, the lines of control are somewhat blurry, but the 
party organization (Abteilung Auslandsinformation) tended to take precedence. 
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Rather, it was an umbrella organization for the various GDR Friendship Societies that sought 
recognition and better relations with foreign nations. 
The BPA played an important role as the liaison between the Auswärtiges Amt, 
Mittleroganisationen such as Inter Nationes that provided translations of press material, the 
Goethe Institute, and finally the actual magazines like Scala International and German 
International. The various Goethe Institute centers around the world served as distributors of 
magazines like Scala International, as well as parts of the broader spectrum of politische 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit and later Auswärtige Kulturpolitik. Other studies have done specific work 
on the Goethe Institute, and it will not be the primary focus of this level of analysis. Instead, it 
will enter the narrative where it is particularly relevant, such as when they served as distributors 
or vectors to help acquire audiences for media, and then fade to the background when their roles 
are less directly applicable to my study. 
The Liga für Völkerfreundschaft was certainly less independent than its West German 
counterpart, but it is one of the best organizations for comparison as it had similar cultural and 
international relationship goals to those found in West Germany. The LfV, under the direction of 
the MfAA and the Abteilung Auslandsinformation, focused on the production of materials sent 
abroad that could be placed under the umbrella of cultural diplomacy in ways somewhat similar 
to the BPA Auslandsabteilung. The LfV worked to acquire audiences for magazines like GDR 
Review and to build up cultural connections with foreign states.  
The third level of analysis is cultural diplomacy media such as magazines from the Liga 
für Völkerfreundschaft and the BPA. The magazines GDR Review and Scala International show 
how “the desires, the lines of policy, the targets, and the very definition of state interests become 
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blurred and multiply.”23 The media provide a simultaneous confirmation and, at times, 
complication of official policy in that they allow for different interpretations, and were at times 
not always directly responding to the goals of the AA or MfAA/Abteilung Auslandsinformation 
Thus, while these productions presented an idealized image, they also show that there were both 
contradictory images and room for change over time in the FRG and the GDR due to differing 
ideas and individual action within these institutions. Furthermore, this media analysis will be 
placed in broader context with the institutional decisions that led to the campaigns, topics, and 
themes within the magazines to provide a clear vision of the flows of power/direction in this 
realm within each state. 
Magazines such as GDR Review and Scala International reflected a discourse constructed 
out of memories of the Nazi past and the promises of the present. Other scholars have conducted 
studies of postwar German memory, and this study is not an attempt to develop that 
historiography, but it is nonetheless important to understand the relationship of these materials to 
the past as it was mediated in the present.24 For example, images of East German Nationale 
Volksarmee troops on the Berlin Wall were used by the West to show the ongoing legacy of 
fascism in the East, while images of Western right-wing political rallies were displayed as 
resurgent Nazism. 
                                                             
23 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “What Are We Searching For? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents and the State,” in 
Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, eds. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (New York, Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2010), 10. 
24 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1997). Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for A Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). For an innovative study that integrates the built environment, 
national identity and memory, see Rudy Koshar, Germanys Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in 
the Twentieth Century, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
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My focus will be on print materials and, most notably, two magazines (GDR Reivew and 
Scala International) that served as major sources of information and presentations of a 
Deutschlandbild that both affirmed each state and criticized the other. These images of Germany 
were designed to cultivate particular impressions from foreign audiences articulated in broad 
policy ideas by the AA, MfAA and the Abteilung Auslandsinformation. Images could be quite 
broad, such as showing NVA troops in maneuvers to illustrate the power of the GDR military, or 
much subtler, such as showing the interior of new apartments in Berlin constructed for young 
families. There was no single unambiguous image at any time, rather a mosaic of images 
coalesced to provide an impression of each state and to demonstrate its relative superiority to the 
German past and the neighboring other. While print media was only a portion of the broader 
constellation of exchange programs, language learning, radio, television, books, art, and 
exhibitions, the images of the two German states can most consistently be found in print media. 
The magazines had long print runs of great consistency that lend themselves to a rigorous 
analysis and offer an excellent opportunity to see the image of both the FRG and GDR built into 
words and in actual photographs provided in highly illustrated journals. These magazines were 
also highly visual and thus provided literal images of each German state that were contextualized 
and described by articles and captions. 
Central Questions  
To develop a comparative study of the cultural diplomacy of the FRG and GDR that goes 
beyond the work of prior scholars, I have explored three major lines of inquiry regarding West 
and East German developments in their foreign cultural policy. First, what was the role of the 
state, especially the foreign office, in the production of the cultural diplomatic material, such as 
the magazines GDR Review or Scala International, and to what degree were they produced or 
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supported by each state? This question speaks to the role of the state in constructing a self-image 
of the nation and the state. Additionally, it helps to discover important structural distinctions 
between the FRG and the GDR, and to address assumptions about the approaches of each state. 
Next, what role did state-controlled and non-state institutions, such as the Federal Press and 
Information Office (BPA) in the FRG as well as the Foreign Information Department of the 
Central Committee and League for Friendship Among the Peoples (LfV) of the GDR, have in 
mediating the policy directives of their respective foreign offices, and what kinds of material did 
they produce with which message? Whom did they address with the material, and in which ways 
did they distribute this material? These questions help to explore key intermediary institutions 
that worked to implement the goals of the foreign office while working with media producers. 
Third, what did it mean for both states to be the “better Germany,” and how did they 
attempt to prove its superiority? To understand this question, I will need to examine how the 
narratives for the FRG and the GDR were constructed in the respective media productions and 
how they developed over time in response to domestic and larger geopolitical events. This 
question will work to establish key distinctions in the message of German cultural diplomacy 
that can provide the basis for a strong comparison in examining a German-German dialogue.  
The cultural diplomacy of the GDR was characterized by an early lead in development 
due to the need to establish an entirely new state buoyed by a centralized political apparatus that 
could provide a coherent message to assist in the GDR’s recognition by other countries and the 
United Nations. After this brief period of parity, however, new developments in the image-
building of the Federal Republic—including a more self-critical approach facilitated by an active 
civil society—made the FRG’s image both more believable and more attractive to the 
international community. By positioning this analysis in a comparative context, I do not propose 
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a single definitive image of Germany for each state, but rather different representations that 
evolved over time in relationship with a broader historical context and political/institutional 
developments. This competition of images was not purely an attempt to gain practical advantage 
such as trade or diplomatic relations, although it did those things, but also a search for a national 
image that could convince foreign audiences that their Germany was the “better” one. 
 Over the course of the Cold War, the Federal Republic’s Foreign Office continued to 
guide much of the policy and thus the narratives that were presented in the image-building 
process of the FRG, despite repeated attempts at a broad level of privatization and independence 
in media productions such as Scala International or institutions such as the Goethe Institute. The 
GDR, while obviously much more centralized with a great deal more control over explicitly state 
and/or party-controlled organizations, maintained a clear hand at all times in the cultivation of its 
image abroad. However, the differences between the two countries emerge in particular in the 
1970s with the western shift to auswärtige Kulturpolitik and a greater responsiveness to 
recommendations from other western journalists and advertising figures. The FRG was often 
subtler in its message as time went on, and later, through the actions of the Bundestag and 
numerous recommendations by scholars writing on the topic of auswärtige Kulturpolitik, they 
managed to produce an image of Germany that demonstrated their successes and relationships 
with other nations in a positive light. Of course, the late 1960s and early 1970s that formed the 
context for this reversal saw significant policy changes in the rise of Ostpolitik, détente, and real-
existing socialism. By many metrics, including membership in the UN and international 
recognition, the GDR had reached parity in international standing with the GDR by 1973. I argue 
that the GDR began in a relatively weaker place internationally and used tools such as foreign 
cultural policy to push ahead and draw even in the early 1970s. Furthermore, while the FRG 
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started in a somewhat stronger position, it was later to develop foreign cultural policy methods 
and tools, but ultimately developed a more flexible and self-critical system capable of adapting 
to changing international climates and conditions within Germany that could appeal to and 
convince broader swathes of international audiences. 
Methodology and Theory 
Of the several terms used to describe the process I discuss in my dissertation, the term 
“cultural diplomacy” has received particular attention and use by several scholars in an English 
language context. For instance, Manuela Aguilar defines cultural diplomacy as “the way a 
government portrays its country to another country’s people in order to achieve certain foreign 
policy goals.”25 Less specifically, cultural diplomacy has also been defined by Jessica C.E. 
Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried as a form of “soft power” where ideas and cultural 
exchange could replace military and economic influence.26 Studies by authors such as these and 
others have been termed the “new international history.” They offer an interesting approach for 
analyses of topics outside traditional diplomatic history. German language literature on this topic 
has mostly used the term “auswärtige Kulturpolitik” to convey a state’s attempt to portray itself 
abroad.27  
Scholars of cultural diplomacy like Gienow-Hecht proposed the new concept “nation 
branding” as another alternative for understanding these efforts. This concept “does not 
                                                             
25 Manuela Aguilar, Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German-American Relations, 1955-1968, (New York: 
Peter Lang Publishing, 1996), 8. 
26 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy: Power, Distance, and the 
Promise of Civil Society,” in Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, eds. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. 
Donfried (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 21. 
27 For example, see Johannes Paulmann, “Auswärtige Repräsentationen nach 1945: Zur Geschichte der deutschen 
Selbstdarstellung im Ausland,” in Auswärtige Repräsentationen: Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945, ed. 
Johannes Paulmann (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2005). 
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distinguish between ‘good’ cultural diplomacy and ‘bad’ propaganda. Because democratic and 
authoritarian states likewise pursue nation-branding strategies, this practice is also indifferent to 
the political ideology of a state and does not analyze or judge the legitimacy of the sender or 
their initial intention.”28 While this concept is useful because it avoids the pitfalls of dismissing a 
given self-image due to ideological bias, it lacks a full understanding of what a “brand” 
constitutes. In the case of the FRG and GDR, the ideologies of the states were fundamental to 
their images, and the intentions of the authors of magazines and articles were vitally important to 
readers. As was seen in the 1990 issues of GDR Review, readers who felt they had been deceived 
by the authors questioned their integrity and rejected any attempts by the magazine to regain 
credibility. Thus, while interesting, “nation branding” falls short of the usefulness of the broader 
category of cultural diplomacy. The approach of cultural diplomacy offers a new perspective on 
a German search for legitimacy and broader public acceptance abroad and is a major defining 
characteristic of my dissertation.  
I primarily examine the discourses of cultural diplomacy sent from each side, often 
operating within the frame of Cold War ideologies and mentalités.29 This form of diplomatic 
history, discussed by Akira Iriye in “Environmental History and International History,” proposed 
a shift “from considerations of “realities” (military power, geopolitics) to an interest in 
intangibles (“discourses”) such as images, visions, and ideologies,” and seems particularly 
fruitful as long as the broader historical context is not lost.30 Thomas W. Zeiler offers an 
                                                             
28 Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, Marcel K. Will, “Beyond Marketing and 
Diplomacy: Exploring the Historical Origins of Nation Branding,” in Nation Branding in Modern History, eds. 
Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, Marcel K. Will (New York: Berghahn, 2018), 2. 
29 Here I use mentalités defined as “ideas and ideologies” in Thomas W. Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History 
Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” The Journal of American History 95 (2009): 1056. 
30 Akira Iriye, “Environmental History and International History,” Diplomatic History 32 (Sept. 2008): 643. 
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important corrective by emphasizing the continued importance of the state and state power to the 
study of diplomatic history even as less concrete discourses compose new areas of analysis.31  
A comparative project of the FRG and the GDR requires a methodology that can 
demonstrate the cross-national features of their interaction(histoire croisee or entanglement)  
while also allowing for broader causal analysis like that conducted by more traditional 
comparative historians. Benedicte Zimmerman and Michael Werner offer a highly useful 
approach of histoire croisee that emphasizes cultural and social connections between nation 
states and that understands the comparative categories of analysis as “entangled” products of 
national crossings.32  While this approach is undoubtedly useful, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and 
Jürgen Kocka make a convincing argument for the inclusion of a more “entangled” approach to 
more traditional comparative history that can place greater emphasis on national difference and 
seek out causes for divergence.33 The approach of this dissertation is to show an entangled 
history while seeking sources of divergence and causal explanations for transformation, thereby 
absorbing the best features of both approaches. 
By embracing this method of comparison and interrelationship, my dissertation further 
develops the narrative struggle for the title of the “better” Germany to include both what was 
said in public channels and what was discussed about the other within each state. For example, a 
great deal of discussion about each state’s cultural diplomacy media occurred on both sides with 
                                                             
31 Thomas W. Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” The Journal of American History 
95 (2009): 1055. 
32 Michael Werner and Benedicte Zimmerman, “Verglich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der Histoire croisee 
und der Herausforderung des Transnationalen,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002), 607-636. 
33 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, “Comparative History: Methods, Aims, Problems,” in Comparison and 




significant analysis on everything varying from amount of color photography to how subtle their 
messages were. In fact, the magazine Scala International was founded explicitly in the FRG in 
1961 as a response to the high quality GDR Review that had been successful from 1956. Within 
these institutional discussions, a fascinating narrative that shows the influence of what was seen 
to be effective in one state was often embraced or designed to be explicitly countered by the 
other. 
For my analysis of the media, I will use the approach of “intermediality” that combines 
textual and image analysis to examine media representations of the FRG and GDR. This 
interpretive methodology allows the researcher to examine both the textual and the visual and 
helps to see how they relate, disagree, and reinforce each other.34 The promise of using such 
source material is that it provides new and different illustration than what has thus far been 
available in archives. Images that were produced for public consumption, such as posters and 
newspapers, help the historian to gain a greater understanding of the visual and informational 
context of their subjects’ lives. The institutional study adds another layer that shows how these 
messages were designed, as well as how they were developed and articulated. 
The first definition of “intermediality” that is useful for this study is offered by Christian 
J. Emden and Gabriele Rippl, who understand it as a method that “seeks to stake out the space in 
which images and texts, visual culture and print culture, collide, refer to each other, and even 
converge.”35 The approach of “secondary intermediality” offered by Birgit Neumann and Martin 
                                                             
34 For more on this methodology see Peter Wagner, ed., Icons, Iconotexts: Essays on Ekphrasis and Intermediality, 
(New York: W. de Gruyter, 1996) and W.J.T. Mitchell, Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual 
Representation, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
35 Christian J. Emden and Gabriele Rippl, “Introduction: Image, Text and Simulation,” in ImageScapes: Studies in 
Intermediality, eds. Christian J. Emden and Gabriele Rippl, Cultural History and Literary Imagination vol. 9 (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2010), 10. 
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Zierold is also useful, as it concerns itself with “the interrelation of aesthetic forms, topics or 
motives between different media offers and different media systems.”36  
Intermediality is a method that examines messages, ambiguities, and representation in an 
inherently comparative manner even while maintaining a baseline of continuity within a single 
source, such as a magazine. GDR Review and Scala International were glossy magazines with 
many text illustrations and other forms of images. Together they form the core component of the 
media analysis portion of my project. For their analysis, I will borrow Jefferson Hunter’s 
observation that words “relegate” and “categorize” while photographs “assimilate” and 
“connect” in order to read these relationship “against the grain.” 37 Furthermore, censorship, 
manipulation, and unconscious construction of media “offers”38 occur on different levels in 
textual and visual materials that will allow for a multi-level comparison of diplomatic materials. 
To this point, historians have largely used images as simply another source, if one that requires 
different interpretive methods. Instead of merely adding images to my analysis, I propose to 
conduct an explicitly “intermedial” study that seeks to use intermediality as a method through 
which the diplomatic media materials I analyze can be accessed as a comparison of image and 
text that can explore the ambiguities and ambivalences of these materials rooted in their political, 
institutional, professional, and even artistic contexts. 
                                                             
36Birgit Neumann and Martin Zierold, “Media as Ways of Worldmaking: Media Specific Structures and Intermedial 
Dynamics,” in Cultural Ways of Worldmaking: Media and Narratives, eds. Vera Nünning, Ansgar Nünning, and 
Birgit Neumann (New York: De Gruyter, 2010), 106. Here media offers refers to the actual product that is produced 
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Intermediality offers an essential component to the media content analysis that serves as a 
major component of my project, but a more general approach to follow image-building 
campaigns as seen in the media material is also vital. The campaigns, first developed by the 
Auswärtiges Amt/Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten and then later guided by the 
BPA/Abteilung Auslandsinformation, found expression in the magazines discussed above. 
Identifying how the ideas of the government agencies were applied and interpreted over an 
extended period of time shows both the role of the state in the creation of these materials and 
how at least somewhat independent organizations in charge of the magazines interpreted and 
designed the image of the state. 
While the contextualization of the project on the first levels uses primarily archival 
research, the second and most innovative portion of the project looks at two magazines: GDR 
Review and Scala International. Both were prestige magazines to present their respective 
German state abroad and were highly illustrated with photographs. This project focuses 
explicitly on print media, but should be understood to fit within a broader constellation of media 
varying from DEFA Films to Deutsche Welle that aimed to present the states and regimes to 
internal audiences, the other Germany, and international audiences. The advantage of print media 
with a great deal of photographs can be found in the comparative methodology of intermediality 
and also a consistent and long print run that allows for systematic analysis of change over time. 
Furthermore, an analysis of reader feedback in the form of surveys and letters to the editor 
facilitates an interpretation of the impact of the material as well as internal conversations and 
feedback loops based on this reader response that show the reaction of each state to audience 




Temporal Division and Structure 
 When faced with such a broad topic involving three levels of analysis over an extended 
(41 year) period of time, the approach I decided to take was to divide the time period into critical 
junctures with points of transition as well as calmer periods of more gradual development. These 
were first hypothesized based on major international diplomatic events, such as the construction 
of the Berlin Wall in 1961 or major political regime change such as Erich Honecker’s 
assumption of power in the GDR in 1972. From these starting points, I began my research and 
identified a series of three to four major temporal points on which to focus and narrow down my 
research. The first of these is 1949-1959, followed by the 1960-1968, 1968-1979 and finally 
1980-1990.  
I chose this periodization because these intervals were characterized by a few factors, 
including significant development in cultural diplomacy strategy in each state, changes in topics 
presented within the printed material, shifts in audience focus, and also critical broader political 
events that were originally hypothesized. Each state’s image-building projects often reflected 
periods of turmoil, such as the intermediate range nuclear missile crisis of the early 1980s. Great 
successes, such as the Basic Treaty of 1972 and the acceptance in to the UN in 1973, were 
similarly seminal moments for foreign cultural policy, as major policy issues like these were 
often the goal of informal foreign cultural policy seen in media like GDR Review and Scala 
International. In developing the periodization for events in 1972 and 1973, however, it is 
important to consider the precursors to these achievements, and what campaigns were organized 
to support them. Some periods also showed development much more gradually, such as the mid-
late 1960’s, when a great deal of professionalization in both East and West occurred that would 
continue to characterize each state’s work from that point on.  
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 The initial period I define from 1949-1955 includes the initial foundation of the states in 
1949 up to the creation of the magazine GDR Review and the Hungarian Revolution. The late 
1940s and early 1950s of FRG and GDR cultural diplomacy were largely defined by their role 
within their respective Cold War alliance blocs. For the most part, early efforts in this direction 
by the GDR were focused on building connections with the Soviet Union (the Gesellschaft für 
Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft) and other members of the Eastern bloc such as Poland with 
the Helmut von Gerlach Gesellschaft (later the Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaft). In the FRG, 
early efforts in this direction were focused on the goals of Westbindung with the United States, 
Great Britain, and France. Also, organizations such as the Goethe Institute focused on language 
learning and developing cultural bonds with international audiences. At this point, the 
nonaligned states had not really entered into the focus of either the FRG or the GDR. Both 
needed to cement their position in their respective blocs because the Cold War boundaries were 
still in the process of being defined. In terms of diplomatic competition, the FRG’s Hallstein 
Doctrine of 1955, which regarded the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR as an 
unfriendly act, was a major strain in relations between the two states and sharpened the 
competition between them. Thematically, much of the material from this early period worked to 
counter the immediate legacy of the Second World War among audiences who had only recently 
been enemies. More specifically, it described the rebuilding of each state and adherence to 
international treaties such as the Potsdam Agreement. 
 From 1956-1961, events such as the Hungarian Revolution and the building of the Berlin 
Wall heightened tensions between the cold war blocs as well as each German state. The GDR, in 
an attempt to earn a stronger international position, aggressively pursued a program of 
Auslandsinformation that can be considered image-building. It pushed magazines such as GDR 
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Review into production to convince both Western audiences and non-aligned states that the GDR 
was not only there to stay, but a vibrant state more than the equal of its Western counterpart. The 
image of the GDR in these early publications sought to diminish impressions of dictatorship and 
violence that were prominent in the public eye around sites of conflict like the Berlin Wall, and 
instead pushed the anti-fascist purges conducted in the state, which were embedded in a broader 
narrative of antifascism as a counterpoint to the supposedly still fascist FRG.  
The primary foreign policy goal of the GDR at this point in time was diplomatic 
recognition by as many states as possible, while the FRG, having assumed the role of successor 
state to Nazi Germany, did not have to focus on this task as much. Instead, much of the FRG’s 
diplomatic efforts were primarily focused on larger scale issues such as building connections 
with the West, integration in NATO (1955), and the Wirtschaftswunder. Thus, the GDR’s efforts 
at image-building at this time were much more focused and driven than the FRG, which was 
demonstrated by the GDR’s lead in producing material such as the GDR Review and the creation 
of friendship societies. In the early 1960’s, however, the FRG began to recognize that an effort at 
creating a better image of West Germany could help expand their high-level diplomatic 
successes to approach a broader subset of people abroad. The magazine Scala International was, 
in fact, produced to serve as a direct counter to the work of the GDR in GDR Review, which was 
viewed as a high-quality magazine to both emulate and supersede. Because of the clash of the 
FRG and the GDR at this time over diplomatic issues like the Berlin Wall and the Hallstein 
Doctrine, the conflict in image-construction was particularly embittered with charges of Nazism, 
crimes, and of the other Germany being a puppet to either the United States or the Soviet Union. 
 After this heated period of development, similar topics were explored in the mid-late 
1960s that were characterized by a general campaign of professionalization on both sides. In the 
26 
 
East, systematic surveys over workers in the Abteilung Auslandsinformation des ZK were 
conducted to not only determine educational expertise or prior work experience, but also 
background and ideological reliability. Courses were organized to educate workers on 
ideological issues and on critical work issues as determined by the ZK and also the MfAA. In the 
West in this period, much of the work on improving image-building material was guided by 
questionnaires sent to readers as well as a great deal of recommendations from professional 
advertising firms in Great Britain and the United States. These figures tended to argue for a 
subtler approach to presenting Germany and to concentrate on first interesting the reader in a 
particular topic and then sliding Germany and Germans into focus. While this period was not 
characterized by the sweeping transitions of earlier years, the form presented markedly increased 
in quality with more color photographs, better paper, more sophisticated articles, and a generally 
superior product. 
 This time of more gradual change was altered in the early 1970’s due to major 
governmental changes , social change accelerated by the movements of 1968, and diplomatic 
exchanges. For example, in 1972, Erich Honecker rose to become the leader of the SED over 
Walter Ulbricht in large part due to his commitment to a hard Moscow line of communist rule, 
and his assumption of power involved a shift to an emphasis on improving the quality of life of 
East Germans and a focus on the triumphs of “real-existing socialism.” In the West, with the 
assumption of power of the SPD (Sozialdemokratistische Partei Deutschlands) came a desire to 
change from the hostile rejection of the Hallstein Doctrine to a greater spirit of compromise and 
of “normal” relations that came to be referred to Ostpolitik. While Ostpolitik did much to change 
the complexion of the competition for the mantle of the “better” Germany, neither state gave 
ground in their pursuit of this goal. Relations between the states did improve, however, with the 
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signing of the Basic Treaty of 1972, which established normal relations between the states but 
stopped short of the GDR’s goal of full diplomatic recognition from the FRG. While the GDR 
earned de facto recognition and made much of this achievement in their materials, the perhaps 
greater coup of this time was the acceptance of both German states in to the UN. For the GDR, 
this marked major acceptance on an international level and showed that they, as a state, had 
become part of the larger community of nations. Recognition from major Western powers still 
waited, but the campaigns of both high-level diplomacy and lower level image-building had 
succeeded in developing a sufficiently normal, if not positive picture of the GDR which led to 
this moment.  
In the FRG, a major transition was underway in its approach to cultural diplomacy. Prior 
to the early 1970s, the term politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit was the one used for image-building 
abroad, but a new focus on Auswärtige Kulturpolitik emphasized interrelationship, exchange, and 
communication over the one-way messages that were focused on in earlier periods. A further 
essential point to Auswärtige Kulturpolitik suggested Kulturpolitik should not simply be a tool of 
high culture to connect with elites, but could also be for mass consumption by targeting specific 
groups in foreign societies. To develop new techniques and push this forward, the Bundestag 
conducted an Enquete Kommission39 through much of the 1970s with advising from the 
Auswärtiges Amt on how to improve the image of the FRG abroad, with many arguing that the 
Mittlerorganisationen needed a freer hand. With the relatively equal playing field established in 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the Basic Treaty, many figures in the 
Bundestag and even the Auswärtiges Amt desired to embrace an image of greater 
                                                             
39 An Enquete Kommison is the inquiry of the Bundestag in to a particular topic or theme of long term interest in an 
attempt to resolve an issue.  
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interrelationship internationally. In 1972, Scala International rebranded itself to simply Scala 
and changed its design to incorporate some of these new principles. The non-aligned countries 
became more of a focus of the journal because it was thought that Western audiences were less 
likely to be persuaded by these types of publications. Consequently, BPA officials determined 
the messages needed to remain somewhat heavy-handed so as to be comprehensible to audiences 
in Africa and Asia considered to be less sophisticated. A stronger attempt to connect with 
audiences in Eastern Europe also began to develop as another component of Ostpolitik.  
In large part, the trends of the early 1970s remained consistent in both policy and design 
through the late 1970s and early 1980s in the FRG and the GDR. New topics certainly developed 
with important effects on each state’s image, such as the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and their 
focus on human rights issues or the GDR’s emphasis on its increasing standard of living and its 
role on the world stage as a major economic power. While my research has not yet been pushed 
far into the 1980s, my initial impression is that these policies continue and were an ongoing 
source of divergence in both form and content of each state’s cultural diplomacy. While the GDR 
continued its ideological emphasis and presenting itself as a “normal state” to the masses and 
intellectuals, the FRG attempted a simultaneously broader project of cultural exchange with a 
narrower focus on specific interest groups in categories like sports, academics, and technology. 
Conclusion 
 The competition for the “better” Germany ended in 1989/90. With the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc and later the Soviet Union, it became 
apparent that the Federal Republic had won. This does not mean, however, that West German 
Auswärtige Kulturpolitik had won the fight for them or that FRG material and policy was better 
at all times than that of the GDR. In fact, the competition in general was characterized by a 
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clearly better organized and superior product produced in the GDR up to at least the mid-1960s, 
after which the FRG had to catch up. When the images of the GDR in magazines like GDR 
Review began to look worse and worse when compared with the markedly better material quality 
of life in both West Germany and other Western industrialized nations, the GDR, which had 
been placed by the SED and Erich Honecker in a struggle for material superiority, began to lose 
face. Images of crumbling facades, antiquated technology, and small and characterless 
Plattenbauten jarred sharply with proclamations of “real existing socialism” and the paradise that 
was being developed in the media. Attempts to show concerns for the environment and efforts to 
clean up the pollution of the GDR in volunteer youth campaigns seemed odd when paired with 
images of factories spewing smog from the highly pollutant brown coal of the GDR. Of course, 
the FRG productions were not entirely free of such disconcerting incongruence, but on the whole 
they lacked both the ideological focus and often more critical audiences that GDR publications 
encountered. 
 The campaigns of the FRG and the GDR were not conducted in isolation nor were they 
exclusively pursued in the form of media or even the broader category of cultural diplomacy. 
What these materials and institutional studies show, however, is a relationship between two 
Germanys concerned with a shared past and a neighboring rival within an often-hostile bipolar 
world. Both states attempted to improve foreign audience’s perception of them by constructing a 
more positive image of Germany. Regardless of whether or not these campaigns precipitated the 
ultimate collapse of the GDR—and it seems very unlikely that they did—the fact remains that 
each state viewed their image-building as an essential component of their foreign policy and a 
means to normalize Germany in the eyes of regular citizens of foreign countries. When 
considering the success of these campaigns and their efforts to present themselves in a better 
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light, one should consider that today’s Germany is almost universally perceived as a “normal” 
and stable state in the eyes of the world. Part of this process can certainly be attributed to 
integration within Cold War blocs and the simple fact that so much time has passed since the 
Second World War, but this project also shows that Germans themselves played an essential role 
in presenting themselves abroad and in creating a much more positive image of Germany. Thus, 
although it was often a bitterly-fought competition over the forty years of division, Germans 




























 SOVEREIGN STATES AND SEPARATE CULTURES: 
 FOREIGN CULTURAL POLICY IN 1950S DIVIDED GERMANY 
 
 By the middle of the 1950s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR had come to 
realize that their efforts to obtain recognition would require more than traditional measures of 
diplomacy. They became convinced that they needed to conduct a less formal diplomacy directly 
to new audiences composed of citizens of foreign countries outside the Eastern Bloc due to an 
increasingly confrontational Cold War environment. To that end, foreign policy leaders in the 
GDR focused on finding new support in the West and among non-aligned states, often in places 
where they had no official diplomatic ties. The key institution implementing this policy and 
tasked with creating media materials for this purpose, the GKV was told that “In the countries 
without diplomatic missions of the GDR, the goal must be the winning over of the mass of the 
population for friendship with the GDR.”1 The GDR began this grassroots strategy due to the 
internal leadership pressure to gain support abroad, which stemmed from chronic insecurity 
about the state’s smaller size, resource base, and population, even as it faced the challenge of 
emerging from the ruins of Nazism.  
Simultaneously, the GDR’s great rival, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), bore 
both the burden and the advantages of its role as successor state to Nazi Germany. At first, it too 
sought to redevelop and maintain ties to its Western allies and, most importantly, the United 
                                                             
1 PA AA MfAA/A/8892 Report Reviewing the Gesellschaft für kulturelle Verbindungen mit dem Ausland (GKV) by 
the Foreign Policy Commision. July 15, 1957. 
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States. That said, concerns emerged over time when the GDR began to assert itself in areas that 
the FRG felt were safely “theirs.” Indeed, the efforts of the GDR in this early period would 
define the struggle for image cultivation between both Germanys and would set the stage for the 
FRG’s own developing program as each state worked to emerge from a problematic past. 
 The legacy of the Nazi period is difficult to overstate in postwar divided Germany. 
Large-scale emigration, destruction, and—perhaps most importantly—loss of trust had heavily 
damaged opinion of Germany abroad. Furthermore, the consequences of the Nazi period led to 
the division of Germany that required the creation of new institutions, structures, and plans. Each 
state had to determine the best way to respond to its challenges and to the actions of the other 
when many states and peoples were profoundly disinterested in any state’s attempt to brand itself 
as a distinct form of Germany. By the middle of the 1950s, the GDR in particular sought to break 
out of a restrictive diplomatic environment. It started to court Western powers including France 
and Great Britain as well as various new states emerging from imperial rule in Africa and Asia. 
Strategically, the GDR promoted its claims of mass denazification and the communist pedigree 
of antifascism. 
Newly developed or reconstituted state and non-state institutions in relationship with 
their respective foreign offices became the key actors in cultivating these new policies to respond 
to the problematic German legacies. In the GDR, for instance, the MfAA served an important 
role in helping to implement general foreign policy goals, while some figures in the ZK tended to 
make the central decisions that then trickled down. However, the front-line institution for the 
GDR, the GKV, was kept as a non-state and non-mass organization intentionally that would 
implement policy and coordinate friendship societies, but would have some limited autonomy. 
The GKV’s independence was presented in GDR Review, the GDR’s flagship informational 
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magazine, as an asset to further reinforce the GDR’s counter-narrative that the state did not, in 
fact, run everything in the GDR. This tactic fit with the broader effort to show that there were a 
number of “independent” political parties and no restrictions on religious organizations presented 
conspicuously in a series of articles throughout the 1950s.  
The Federal Republic had a somewhat similar structure for its foreign cultural policy, 
although the role of its non-state organizations differed. These institutions, such as the Goethe 
Institute and the Deutsche Akademische Austausch Dienst were, in keeping with the democratic 
structures of the state, much less dictated by the two central state institutions for foreign cultural 
policy in the Federal Republic: the Foreign Office and the BPA. However, tension between these 
intermediary organizations’ independence and the wish of the state to present positive images 
persisted. These central actors in both German states experienced a tumultuous beginning as 
people and organizations challenged the lines of authority in the 1950s when each institution 
sought to stake claims for its preeminence. 
New tactics were sought, in particular by the GDR, to define themselves as a different, 
better Germany that would help them acquire greater international recognition and prestige. 
Much has been written about the role of the superpowers and the Cold War environment in 
reshaping a divided Germany, and their efforts to set restrictions and tone was important, but 
equally important was the role Germans themselves played in establishing new narratives and 
images that could challenge Nazism’s legacy among foreign audiences and undermine their 
neighboring rival.2 Unsurprisingly, the Cold War diplomatic struggles of divided Germany and 
                                                             
2 For more information on this topic see Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist, eds. Amerikanisierung und 
Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945-1970, (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997). Others have focused more specifically on 
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Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German-American Relations, 1955-1968, (New York: Peter Lang, 1996). 
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its role in the superpower struggle has been heavily studied by scholars in overviews seeking to 
show how German foreign policy developed over time. Most, however, tended to focus on one 
German state or the other, or to consign the GDR to a customary single chapter in a multi-
chapter text.3  
To this point, the period of the 1950s has gone relatively unexplored by those interested 
in primarily West German foreign cultural policy, who instead look primarily to the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.4 Some broader studies, such as those conducted by Frank Trommler and 
Johannes Paulmann, have explored the foundations of postwar German foreign cultural policy as 
well as representations.5 Trommler’s work, however, focused largely on a broader scale 
examining programs and institutions, while Paulmann explored specific campaigns that tended to 
be large public relations events or heavily cultural in nature. I propose instead a close analysis of 
image campaigns from two magazines, GDR Review and Scala International spanning much of 
the period of divided Germany in addition to an institutional analysis.  
 The foreign cultural policy institutions of the GDR in the middle of the 1950s challenged 
the established Cold War status quo where each Germany could rely on relationships within its 
respective bloc and largely ignored the other. The emerging competition between the states in 
                                                             
3 Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent, (New York: Vintage Books, 1993); 
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4 Brian C. Etheridge, Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory, (Lexington, Kentucky: 
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foreign cultural policy and more specifically image creation pushed even greater urgency, 
leading to constant evaluations of their opponent’s aims, plans, and media productions. These 
critical evaluations lend themselves particularly well to a comparative methodology that not only 
places the foreign cultural policy of each state next to each other, but also sees them as 
fundamentally entangled. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the GDR, starting from tenuous 
ground, sensed that it was behind the West in international opinion and recognition and thus 
sought to improve its image through coordinated campaigns, which the Federal Republic saw as 
a vital threat to its diplomatic interests. This sparked a serious image competition between the 
German states striving to be the “better” Germany. 
Legacies of National Socialism 
 The costs of the Second World War and the crimes of National Socialism are well known 
to scholars of German history as images of the city of Dresden or the ubiquitous “rubble women” 
can attest. Foreign policy experts in the new Germanys, while certainly conscious of these 
realities, sensed that the destruction moved far beyond physical destruction. Perceptions of 
German culture, prestige, and honor abroad, particularly in former enemy states, had been 
severely undermined, if not obliterated by outright hatred during the years of conflict. 
Consequently, the newfound states of divided Germany had to find ways to rebuild the image of 
Germany abroad, to cultivate new allies or bring back old ones, and to define themselves against 
their emerging rival. The GDR will be discussed first as the primary initiator of the image 
competition, followed by an examination of GDR Review. 
The Nazi period cast a long shadow in foreign cultural policy creation among both states. 
Despite the GDR regime’s claims of having broken with the regressive aspects of the German 
past by virtue of embarking upon the path to communism, the ghost of Nazism lingered and 
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continued to affect its foreign cultural policy. Furthermore, bold assertions could not hide the 
facts: the fledgling GDR state faced material issues such as the lack of embassies or trained 
propagandists. Creating new state apparatuses and hiring new cadres for the propaganda and 
foreign policy work required an additional layer of political screening, since the new employees 
needed to be reliable communists. In addition, there was the challenge of rebuilding connections 
with a justifiably resentful Eastern Europe. To convince their new socialist brethren in the 
Eastern Bloc that “good” Germans could once again be trusted, the GDR argued that only by 
maintaining separate Germanys could war in Europe and the world be avoided.  
 To create distance from Nazism, the GDR often turned to an ideological rigidity that 
served as a catechism in responding to Western criticisms of the GDR’s dictatorial nature. The 
Soviet Union had, after all, liberated Eastern Europe and much of Germany during the war and 
had thus shown communism to be antithetical to Nazism. Furthermore, the traditional communist 
narrative that Nazism was simply a culmination of capitalism helped the leaders of the SED to 
show that there was no fear of the GDR slipping into aggressive/imperialistic ideologies capable 
of mobilizing the German people to once again attack their neighbors. Of course, the implicit 
statement within this narrative was that the Federal Republic remained very much capable of a 
similar descent to that which had occurred in the collapse of the Weimar Republic.  
In the Federal Republic, government figures debated how to approach image-building 
and the state’s role in foreign cultural policy in light of the authoritarian and propagandistic 
structures of National Socialism. As the successor state, the Federal Republic benefitted from 
some pre-existing infrastructure, and was much more concerned with “rescuing” German high 
cultural traditions. Most political figures in the FRG, at least initially, remained convinced that 
political stability and economic success would be sufficient to revive the appeal of Germany. 
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Only after seeing how few people were learning German or exploring German art and literature 
did some foreign policy observers begin to see the potential value of the GDR’s efforts to win 
over foreign populations via magazines or other informational campaigns. For example, Foreign 
Minister Brentano wanted to demonstrate that the new FRG could produce work worthy of 
international respect, so he emphasized promoting new, independent artists in the FRG. The Nazi 
legacy thus played a clear role in establishing structural constraints on both the GDR and the 
FRG. In addition, both states’ foreign cultural policy would inflect their productions with themes 
and images designed specifically to counter Nazi stereotypes and to show the rebuilding process 
taking place after the war. 
 The most fundamental legacy of National Socialism for both states was the division of 
Germany after the war. Although involving both, this consequence had particular ramifications 
for the GDR because it refused to be the successor state to the defunct Third Reich in 
international relations. As the successor, the FRG was able to claim embassies and formal 
diplomatic relations with Western countries that the GDR could not. The issue of recognition and 
the creation of formal diplomatic relations became even more contentious when the Hallstein 
Doctrine of 1955, which regarded any state’s recognition of the GDR as an unfriendly act, 
became unofficial FRG policy.6 This act often proscribed efforts by the GDR to connect with 
other countries, who were anxious to trade with an economically ascendant West Germany. The 
simple reality of lacking an easy route to establishing formal diplomatic relations pushed the 
GDR to cultivate unofficial channels toward their official goals through organizations like the 
GKV. MfAA officials thought the GKV could be used to establish friendly relations or even 
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facilitate setting up local friendship societies “which could carry out specific tasks for the 
establishment of cultural relations in the country.”7 MfAA officials expected the GKV could be 
successful in these endeavors because it was a “social institution” rather than a “state institution” 
that could be accepted by foreign governments without earning the ire of Bonn.8 Furthermore, 
this effort built on pre-existing communist tactics of working as opposition networks around the 
world. 
 The first priority was to create strong connections with their socialist brethren throughout 
the Eastern Bloc, which despite having a shared ideology and “big brother,” still required 
attention to distract from the legacy of a bitter war and occupation. The earliest effort in GDR 
foreign cultural policy with the East was the creation of the Society for German-Soviet 
Friendship in 1947. Other friendship societies also began to grow, without the explicit mass-
organization focus of the German-Soviet friendship society and thus more focus on specific 
cultural exchange, such as the Helmut von Gerlach Gesellschaft that became the German-Polish 
Friendship Society.9 These societies held events celebrating their relationship, such as festivals at 
the Oder-Neisse line that was the new Polish-East German border or facilitated cultural and 
academic exchanges. 
Despite the transitions of the mid-1950s, foreign cultural policy work within the socialist 
bloc was essential after the Second World War for the GDR. Although the expansion to Western 
audiences had already begun, the GDR’s efforts for 1958 focused a great deal on deepening 
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friendly relations within the socialist camp through raising the quality of promoting mutual 
achievements, scholarly exchange, and in knowledge-sharing. The main goal, as stated in their 
report for their cultural work in 1958, was “to protect the unity of the socialist camp through 
friendly ties, the protection of peace, and the development of socialist culture as a whole.”10 
Although not clearly stated, the legacy of the Nazi period looms large here as the GDR needed to 
cultivate close allies among its socialist neighbors and to work cooperatively despite historical 
animosity. 
The consistency with which the need for better and more organized relations was 
emphasized continued to imply a degree of tension between the GDR and socialist countries. For 
example, while the focus for foreign cultural work would shift to Western and non-aligned 
countries, Ewald Moldt, an employee of the MfAA and later ambassador to Romania and 
Poland, reported on Engel’s experiences at the Prague Conference. This conference had been a 
meeting between foreign office officials from countries in the Eastern Bloc, where officials from 
the GDR determined that “relations within the socialist countries will not be expanded, but 
should rather be better organized.” At the same time, Engel emphasized that the cooperation 
among the Eastern Bloc in foreign cultural policy also extended to planning methods and 
approaches in improving their foreign cultural work and in sharing experiences to facilitate this 
process. Thus, the “principle with the socialist exchanges must still be the further development of 
unity and strengthening of the socialist countries.”11 
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 The foundational purpose of the GDR’s foreign cultural policy was to provide new and 
alternative narratives to help establish the GDR as superior to and distinct from Nazism and the 
FRG. More concretely, in 1954 the MfAA began to refine the purpose and tasks of the GKV to 
include supporting, organizing, and evaluating the cultural relations with countries other than the 
Soviet Union. The GKV was also given general suggestions to focus on “enlightening” foreign 
populations about the GDR and in particular its cultural achievements. Perhaps the most central 
feature of this plan, however, was to present the GDR as a “sovereign” state that would endure as 
opposed to the FRG.12 While the topics regarding the GDR’s cultural achievements—such as the 
plays of Bertolt Brecht—could be mobilized for audiences within the socialist bloc, they were 
also sent to the “capitalist world” as a means of establishing common ground that could cut 
across increasingly stark political and ideological lines.  
 The GDR worked to cultivate messages capable of transcending fundamental Cold War 
ideological cleavages via universally appealing presentations of the GDR as a bulwark for peace 
in Europe. These presentations claimed the existence of the GDR precluded another war in 
Europe by preventing a unified, and potentially revanchist Germany from taking aggressive 
action. For example, in 1956, the GKV claimed to have made some meaningful progress in 
cultivating foreign relations due to the “relaxation” of the international situation largely 
attributed to the ascendance of the “world peace faction” of the Eastern Bloc.13 In this narrative, 
the GDR attempted to share in the celebratory story of a disarming Soviet Union in contrast to 
the re-arming of the Federal Republic and the creation of the hydrogen bomb by the United 
States and furthermore to hide the establishment of the GDR’s own military, the Nationale 
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Volksarmee (National People’s Army, NVA). The GKV’s hope was that this would ignite fears 
of a West Germany aggressively seeking to rebuild a military that could retake territories lost 
after the Second World War. The comparison of the GDR to the FRG in materials sent out to the 
United States, Great Britain, and France was meant to start conversations among the general 
population that could then place elected officials under pressure to reduce their troop strength.14 
This message played upon an understandable nervousness among Western audiences, 
particularly in France, that the FRG was gaining economic strength very quickly, which could 
turn to military strength. Thus, the GDR’s emphasis, according to the bi-annual review of the 
GKV, was to be on “peaceful co-existence” over confrontation that could play on fears of 
another war.15 
The still somewhat insecure internal existence of the GDR plagued MfAA and SED 
officials’ efforts to demonstrate the solidity of the GDR internationally. For example, the actions 
of the GDR’s own people reinforced the SED regime’s insecurity through the protests and 
uprising of 1953. Workers upset with reduced pay and increased work expectations took to the 
streets in action against the regime that was meant to represent their interests above all else. 
After being crushed by Soviet tanks, the uprising left a lingering fear in the minds of GDR 
officials as well as an embarrassing topic to explain for propagandists. Beyond fears of 
revolution, the SED leadership also worried about Soviet abandonment in some kind of deal with 
the Western powers such as those hinted at in the Stalin Note of 1952. 
 In an effort to simultaneously mask the domestic upheaval and to advertise the superior 
socialist way of life, the MfAA and GKV worked to inform foreign populations about everyday 
                                                             




life in the GDR. Among these institutions, there emerged new goals to normalize the GDR in the 
eyes of foreign audiences. In addition to fear mongering about West Germany and highlighting 
the grand cultural achievements of the GDR, news articles and magazines provided information 
to foreign audiences about how people in the GDR lived. The goal, while still propaganda, was 
to “impart an all-around political enlightenment abroad about the GDR and about all life and 
development in Germany.”16 
GDR Review 
To further this goal, the GKV began publishing a magazine in 1956 entitled DDR Revue, 
or GDR Review in its English version. The magazine was created to “give you a picture of the 
new democratic Germany and so build a bridge to you, to the people all over the world.”17 
Furthermore, DDR Revue was founded as a press organ working towards peace, and through this 
hoped to “help win new friends for the GDR” and “succeed in contributing towards the peaceful 
sleep of children everywhere.”18 Beyond these rosy claims, DDR Revue functioned as another 
star in the constellation of GDR foreign cultural policy, and one that aimed to gain the favor of 
Western audiences in particular. Its forerunner, DDR im Aufbau, had not succeeded in this aim 
because it lacked sufficient sophistication and variety in topics.19 The magazine was, in 
particular, to be a connection-building tool for audiences potentially interested in the GDR and to 
offer narratives that contradicted Western assertions of dictatorship and oppression.  
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GDR Review was produced monthly from 1956-1990, first by the Gesellschaft für 
Kulturelle Verbindungen mit dem Ausland (Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries) until 1962 and then by the League of the German Democratic Republic for Friendship 
Among the Peoples. “DDR Revue” appeared monthly in (initially) German, English, French, 
Swedish, and Spanish with a distribution of 600,000 copies. “DDR Revue” was sent primarily to 
France, England, Sweden, and India as well as all trade 
missions of the GDR. In an effort to improve its materials, 
the GKV emphasized the need to make the content and form 
more appealing as well as increasing the speed of 
production. The amount of time to publication was a major 
issue because, up through 1958, the materials could only 
contain articles on long-lasting or persistent themes (thus 
becoming stale) because printing and manufacture took 
months. Each issue was published with a large photograph 
on the front cover that most often included smiling East Germans and images of collectible 
stamps on back and included a wide variety of images portraying East Germany abroad.20 
The format of the magazine changed over time, reflecting attempts to garner greater 
interest. For instance, the magazines varied in length over its duration, but after an expansion of 
both size and page numbers in 1960, they typically were around 62-65 pages, except for the 
occasional double issues or end-of-year specials which could be approximately 80 pages and 30 
pages, respectively. The use of color steadily increased over time, with color sometimes used as 
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a tool to present favorable images of GDR citizens while making Americans and West Germans 
more ominous in black and white. The paper was, for the most part, high-quality and glossy 
throughout its production with numerous photographs and illustrations. Black-and-white 
supplements were often printed in the journal with titles such as “News and Views” that 
provided more typical newspaper stories and often included articles from press productions from 
socialist sympathizing western newspapers and Neues Deutschland. Article series appeared and 
disappeared over time, such as “Interviews with Carla” and “International Mail Call.” In 
addition, many article series would extend for a few issues or even for a full year if the topic was 
considered particularly important for the magazine. In this way, GDR Review could convey 
certain themes that the GKV, MfAA, and the ZK had all determined were important to 
emphasize. Free copies or low-cost subscriptions were also intentionally designed to move 
copies of the magazine. When not obtaining free copies from embassies or libraries, readers were 
charged nominal subscription fees that changed over time from their original price in 1958, 
which was $0.14 an issue or $1.50 for a year in the US, to $ .80 for a single copy in the US or $8, 
$14, or $18 for one to three years, respectively in the 1980s.21 
In GDR Review, as in many state-run propaganda magazines, censorship was 
omnipresent. According to Susann Kowatsch, a former employee, the magazine was subjected to 
review by the editorial board and the Central Committee of the SED Agitation and Propaganda 
Department.22 Interestingly, the issue of state control was discussed in the journal, stating that all 
press in the GDR was run by publicly owned publishing houses and differed from their western 
                                                             
21 Susann Kowatch, “Propagandablatt ‘DDR-Revue’ – die Imagepflege der DDR,” November 11, 2009, NDR 
Fernsehen, Deutschland. 




counterparts due to their coordinated correspondence and relationship with the masses.23 GDR 
Review defended its truth claims from the inevitable skepticism in the question “can there be 
anything better than to fight for the truth? For truth leads to understanding…that is the aim of 
every word which appears in GDR Review.”24 Censorship was addressed directly later, with the 
statement that it did not exist in the GDR, but that “the owners of the Press, the people, watch out 
that this true freedom of the Press is not misused by anybody for war propaganda or the 
spreading of racial hatred and the like.”25 These restrictions, however, “should not be confused 
with a Press censorship.”26 It is likely that, given the degree of emphasis in this article, and GDR 
Review’s focus on providing a “truth” claim to “reality” in the GDR, this article reflected a large 
degree of self-consciousness for journalistic integrity and the importance of maintaining its 
illusion for public consumption. 
 The organization of contents varied in each issue relevant to the topics being discussed, 
current events, and time period. Structure was one of the more variable aspects of the journal in 
that some article series would continue for some time, then disappear and occasionally be 
resurrected. Some consistent overall themes in GDR Review were the use of foreign authors and 
the importance of reader interaction. The use of foreign authors varied over time, but included 
writing articles, being interviewed, or simply penning a brief letter to the magazine. This was 
likely designed to bolster the “truth” claim of the journal as foreign observers would be 
considered less likely to deceive in their analysis. Of course, this was not always the case. 
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Instead, these articles very often presented extreme viewpoints the Socialist Unity Party agreed 
with but hesitated to present officially. That being said, it is also likely that these letters were 
either edited versions of actual reader letters or were, in fact, entirely created by the GDR Review 
for a particular purpose. Interaction varied in form, including editors calling for more letters from 
readers to article series where readers were invited to comment on particular issues, and articles 
dedicated to answering common reader questions such as “Are there political parties in the 
GDR?” There were also several sections dedicated to questions sent to GDR citizens from 
abroad and interviews of travelers to the GDR (from the various Friendship Societies) 
demonstrating a commitment to the internationalization of the GDR as a peaceful and friendly 
state. 
Articles in GDR Review during the time period from 1958-1960 showed the GDR as it 
attempted to build up an impression of a Rechtstaat, a legitimate state, despite the challenges of 
the era, through the moral foundation of antifascism, the building of a socialist, “superior” polity, 
portraying the GDR as a ‘normal’ state, and providing adequate responses to the “German 
question.” All four of these themes are dominant throughout the years in this period and through 
a variety of articles and messages, they advanced a narrative of the GDR that claimed to be not 
only more accurate than Western ideas, but also less biased. 
Antifascism in the GDR referred to the legacy of resistance to National Socialism 
conducted by communists and some others under communist leadership and the ongoing 
embodiment of the antifascist ethos in GDR politics. The GDR blanketed victims of the Third 
Reich under the term “victims of fascism” where resisters were antifascists (including many of 
the major leaders such as Erich Honecker) and eligible for special state benefits over those 
categorized as mere “victims,” such as Jews. The importance of an antifascist narrative can be 
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seen in Alan Nothnagle’s argument that “the myth of the GDR’s ‘antifascist legacy’ was the 
raison d’etre of both the Party and the state from beginning to end.” Similarly, Konrad H. 
Jarausch argued that “such debates about fascism were never just about the past but also about 
the present” and antifascism “was instrumentalized from the start to justify the role of the new 
communist elite.” During this foundational period of the journal, GDR Review used antifascism 
primarily to discuss three subjects: the cleansing of the fascist legacy in the GDR, the powerful 
remnants of fascism in the FRG, and what these dual legacies meant for these two states moving 
forward. 
The antifascist denazification representations of this period highlighted the earlier 
excision of all fascist elements in GDR society. GDR society commemorated antifascism 
through a variety of programs, including a focus on remembering the heroes of the antifascist 
resistance and a redefinition of the understanding of the legacy of fascism. For example, an 
article in GDR Review showed that the citizens of the GDR rejected fascism in Obersdorf, where 
East German ski jumpers refused to participate in the awards ceremony (despite winning) when 
the band played the old German anthem “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles.” The article 
referred to the song as “that ominous hymn with its associations of rapine and murder committed 
by the Hitler regime.”27 The divergence between the two Germanys in this time period on the 
question of antifascism was even further demonstrated when young people from Essen (FRG) 
and Halle (GDR) were asked “Who was Hitler?”. When FRG respondents could only weakly 
identify him as a “conqueror” in Germany’s past compared to the representative of capitalist and 
militarist interests as in the GDR, the divergence between the two group’s narratives of German 
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history ostensibly became clear.28 The images that these narratives conveyed formed the 
ideological basis for establishing broad impressions of what life in the GDR was actually like as 
an attempt to break through fearful Western impressions of a totalitarian, militaristic society. 
Structural issues repeatedly hindered the initial development of the GDR’s foreign 
cultural policy. The lack of sufficiently trained personnel plagued the development of the GDR’s 
foreign cultural policy as well, in no small part due to the flight of young people to the West and 
the purges of former Nazis who had positions in the propaganda ministry. In the mid-1950s, the 
MfAA consistently evaluated the functioning of the GKV, leading to a reorganization in 1957. 
One persistent problem was the lack of trained cadres to work in developing foreign cultural 
policy at the GKV or in the MfAA. They often recommended better coordination, instruction, 
and control of their work by having a more methodical qualification and selection of workers, 
but ran into serious difficulties.29 The problem, however—according to the MfAA Mitarbeiter 
and liaison to the GKV, Rudi Engel—was that these cadres had to have extensive language, 
cultural, political, scholarly, and artistic knowledge in order to be effective in their work in 
foreign cultural policy and to push it out of its still “subordinate role.”30 
 Beyond the need for training, however, there was also the issue of lacking sufficient staff 
at all. In the yearly internal evaluation of the GKV, of the 150 workers there were twenty 
disabled people (Invaliden)31, thirteen pension recipients, and thirteen workers that in the last 
three years had been ill two to three weeks each year. This personnel constraint led to there being 
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a constant loss of strength of approximately 10-12% according to the report.32 Indeed, in reports 
evaluating the work of the GKV in particular, the problem of not having trained officials was 
placed in the forefront along with some technical issues.33 To respond to this challenge, the GKV 
even proposed special schooling for their workers in 1959.34 Nonetheless, issues with personnel 
remained a common refrain in many meetings between the GKV and the MfAA in the 1950s. 
West German Approaches  
The legacy of National Socialism continued to serve as a driving force in the cultivation 
of a particular West German approach to foreign cultural policy. Debates about how to contend 
with the Nazi past tended to be more public than in the GDR, where communist dogma ruled, 
and controversies over the organization of institutions emerged early on in the Federal Republic. 
Increased public dialogue on this issue, as seen in radio interviews, and lectures demonstrates a 
qualitative difference of contending with this legacy in a democratic society that also needed to 
create new institutions and structures. Furthermore, although the Federal Republic did not 
necessarily have the structural problems of the GDR in needing to create unofficial organizations 
or being unable to obtain diplomatic recognition among the Western powers, there were still very 
real issues of regaining the trust of foreign populations and of redeeming a German culture that 
Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) officials viewed as fundamental to its heritage. 
An early controversy over the legacy of the Nazi period emerged in the creation of a 
centralized German Information Ministry in 1953. Former Staatssekretär of the Federal 
Chancellery, Dr. Otto Lenz, criticized the public wrangling over the centralization of the 
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Information Ministry when he participated in a radio interview on the show “First Hand Politics” 
in October 1953. According to Lenz, the general public outcry against the creation of a 
centralized German Information Ministry that had emerged and ultimately derailed the 
institution’s creation was misguided. He denied the German press criticism that such a ministry 
would be along Goebbels’ pattern, stating that the comparison was “as obvious as it was 
inaccurate.”35 Instead, according to Lenz, such a centralization would allow the numerous 
separate institutions that dealt with publications for Germany abroad and at home to have a 
cohesive message and waste fewer resources duplicating each other’s work. Furthermore, he 
argued that an information ministry would in fact promote and strengthen German democracy at 
home and build a better image of Germany abroad. After all, “a democracy must constantly 
promote itself and its politics, especially a young democracy like ours, which has not yet been 
consolidated.”36 Ultimately, despite these objections, the project was abandoned and the 
controversy died down. 
 Of course, the conflicts over approaches to cultural foreign policy went beyond simple 
institutional organization to include the central issue of the time: how could Germans redeem 
their culture, so recently tainted by Nazism, in the eyes of the world? The Foreign Minister of the 
Federal Republic in 1958, Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, offered some suggestions in a speech he 
gave to Christian Social academics at Munich University. Consistent with the general thrust of 
Chancellor Adenauer’s foreign policy, Brentano began his talk by emphasizing that the Federal 
Republic belonged in the Western world and its general cultural environment. The Nazi period, 
according to Brentano, had, “in its arrogance and racial conceit made German culture despised.” 
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As a result, he argued that many countries, such as Sweden, had reoriented themselves away 
from German culture and language, but the worst issue was the destruction of trust between 
Germans and foreign audiences. More practically, during the war years, German schools abroad 
were closed and the property of German cultural institutions and buildings was expropriated.37 
Thus, while the Federal Republic may have kept embassies, it still had real problems of lacking 
property and reaching foreign audiences as a result of the Nazi period. 
 Foreign Minister Brentano argued that the Federal Republic could overcome the dire 
position of German culture abroad only if there was first a cultural renewal within Germany. 
Traditional German high cultural achievements were still appreciated abroad, in his mind, but the 
general impression was that more current German cultural efforts were simply not worth the time 
and were unable to overcome the skepticism of foreign audiences induced by the actions of the 
Third Reich. Germans, according to Brentano, were reluctant to build on past cultural traditions 
because they had not yet settled with the time behind them. Instead, they were trying to 
overthrow this memory psychologically or deny the Nazi period as simply a historical accident. 
This reluctance was the reason that a similar Kulturwunder (cultural miracle) did not accompany 
the “poorly labelled” Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). In his lecture, he argued that a 
similar cultural renewal that flourished after the First World War did not follow after the Second 
because Germany had lost too much through death, extermination, and emigration. Brentano 
further emphasized that the struggles of the postwar period endured because the emergencies and 
daily tasks of existence still required for some years left little room for “spiritual things.” If 
culture was to be seen as more important to society than “jewelry or luxury,” then it needed to be 
supported in some way by the state. This, as Brentano knew, was a central problem for the young 
                                                             
37PA AA B 90/610 
52 
 
democracy because a justifiable fear of an overreaching state endured well past the 1950s. In 
fact, he argued against a state that interfered too much, like the GDR, because the state could not 
determine “whether an artist is an artist” and that this was only done in “totalitarian” states.38 
 The place of foreign cultural policy in German cultural renewal would be to demonstrate 
the free and democratic “essence” of the Federal Republic. Brentano’s far-ranging speech 
included a vital quotation from former Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, who in 
1913 argued that the achievements of France and Great Britain were not the accomplishments of 
governments, “but rather of national unity, the unity and cohesion of their culture.” Germany, 
according to Bethmannn Hollweg, was insufficiently “certain and purposeful in our culture, or 
inner essence, our national ideas are not deliberate enough.” In a prophetic nod to the wars that 
would come, he further stated that “We [Germans] are a young people, we have maybe all too 
much of a naïve belief in violence. We underestimate the means and do not yet know that what 
violence obtains, violence alone can never preserve.”39 Brentano sought to embrace this lesson 
and to use foreign cultural policy as a tool by which the Federal Republic could encourage a 
cultural renewal and avoid the mistakes of past German militarism in order to raise its national 
prestige among foreign audiences. 
 The Third Reich’s legacy endured throughout the 1950s in both the GDR and the FRG as 
a haunting specter, determinedly lingering as each state strove to define itself anew. The creation 
of new institutions, the constant pointing to their neighboring rival as the inheritor of Nazi 
traditions, and the desperate need to develop new narratives of cultural renewal and 
achievements characterized both state’s policies. They perceived themselves as falling behind the 
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other because the competition between them was dependent upon which could better rid 
themselves of the stain of the Nazi past. Skeptical foreign audiences had barely come to 
understand the division of Germany, and debates over sensitive topics like rearmament in the 
Western world necessitated responses from both states, whether it was to allay fears of 
revanchism or to state common interest by joining in collective security agreements like NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact. The GDR took a more aggressive tack in cultivating its image abroad, in 
particular when it began a transition to focus on the Western world starting in 1954 and really 
ramping up in 1956 with the creation of DDR-Revue, while the foreign cultural policy of the 
Federal Republic was still nascent in this period. The Nazi burden was a shared one, approached 
differently, but often for the same ends, but the GDR increasingly pushed the issue and drove the 
conversation. 
Approaches to Foreign Cultural Policy in the GDR 
 While the Nazi legacy formed an essential background for both German states, their 
approaches to foreign cultural policy diverged. The German Democratic Republic began serious 
campaigns to obtain Western support while maintaining relationships within the socialist bloc, 
while the Federal Republic did relatively little beyond support for German language programs 
and institution building. The increasing support for foreign cultural policy in the GDR was not an 
entirely smooth process, however, as the new state struggled with funding, institutional overlap, 
and in finding ways to apply a rigid plan to a highly variable field of image-building and cultural 
relations. The Federal Republic, for its part, grew increasingly alarmed at the efforts of the GDR 
and began organizing its own efforts to create a better image abroad in the later 1950s. 
 Despite a clear emphasis on foreign cultural policy in the middle of the 1950s, the 
coordinator between the MfAA and the GKV, Rudi Engel, found that this work still played far 
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too much of a subordinate role within the foreign policy of the GDR.40 Engel, a KPD member 
since 1929, had published an underground communist newspaper in the Saarland, fled to 
Moscow, and served in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War before his 
internment in France and subsequent escape to assist in the French resistance from 1941-1944. 
He joined the SED in 1946 before working for the Deutsche Verwaltung für Volksbildung, which 
primarily sought to purge former Nazis from schools and universities and to replace them with 
reliably socialist teachers and professors. From there he worked at DEFA before joining the 
MfAA and then becoming the head of the Kulturpolitische Abteilung (Cultural Policy 
Department) from 1956-1963. As a long-time communist and “true believer,” Engel argued that 
the foreign cultural policy of the GDR was essential to the general foreign policy goals set out by 
the ZK. In particular, he highlighted foreign cultural policy as a tool to use in carving a path to 
obtain recognition and in concluding cultural agreements with foreign countries.  
As part of the shifting landscape in GDR foreign policy, in July 1957, the Working 
Group reviewing the GKV published a report identifying a key change in the institution’s role in 
foreign cultural policy. The GKV was to undergo a shift in emphasis from “cooperation in the 
implementation of cultural agreements” to publishing “the foreign propaganda of the GDR.”41 
The goal of this shift was to win mass influence, construct friendship committees, and to do so 
often through efforts such as the creation of publications that could reach large audiences and 
hopefully gain the GDR sympathy or at least rework its image to cultivate more favorable 
impressions.42  
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Characteristically, the foreign cultural policy of the GDR inextricably linked politics and 
culture in keeping with its Marxist traditions. In identifying issues at the Prague Conference of 
1958, where representatives from the foreign offices of socialist bloc countries met, some 
officials emphasized that it was necessary to maintain “a clear and consistent attitude in all 
ideological questions, including in cultural matters” and in the promotion of the GDR.43 
Participants at the conference intended to demonstrate the importance of ideology to the cultural 
question to counter “the undermining of culture as an important factor of consciousness 
building” and to solidify its important role in the larger framework of foreign policy, despite 
strong traditions of Marxist materialism.44 In effect, this meant that while some exchanges such 
as orchestras or opera could be viewed as less political, the more specific image construction that 
went into developing publications like DDR Revue was thought to need a consistent political 
character. Thus, foreign cultural policy and image-building in the GDR, when viewed through 
official publications, existed in the border regions where propaganda, culture, and politics 
overlapped. 
 The implementation of foreign cultural policy in the 1950s by the GDR involved a 
mixture of institutions and responsibilities, but also maintained relatively consistent emphasis on 
establishing relationships and then later propaganda. What changed during this period, however, 
was the geographic focus of this process. As early as August 1954, the MfAA altered the tasks of 
the GKV to reflect new foreign policy goals for the GDR to include general enlightenment about 
the GDR in the “capitalist” world. The development of key publications mirrored this trend, as 
the earliest goals for the new publication DDR-Revue (was to appeal to audiences in the Western 
                                                             




and non-aligned world by providing a magazine of the highest quality. The hope was that this 
new magazine could build on the success of prior efforts such as DDR im Aufbau, which had 
distributed 120, 000 copies and Von Peking bis Tirana which had distributed another 40,000 
copies and become a much more popularly read magazine. Furthermore, a learning process in the 
creation of early exhibitions had shown the MfAA that the GKV’s efforts to produce highly 
political materials had failed, and that success would require a focus on culture and lifestyles as 
an indirect approach to more subtly convey political propaganda.45 
The transition to focusing on the “capitalist” world pushed the GKV to look for more 
cultural agreements and connections in places where the GDR was far less welcome than in the 
new people’s democracies of Eastern Europe. Predictably, this was a struggle, and the MfAA 
reviewed the GKV’s work and found it unsatisfactory. The MfAA stated that cultural agreements 
were behind schedule, planning and work were not always in line with foreign policy priorities, 
and even the publications were insufficient. In this way, the MfAA looked to find reasons for 
why connections to the capitalist world were so slow to develop, and while they did not fully 
blame the GKV, the resulting re-organization of the institution indicates a strong frustration with 
their effectiveness.46 The funding in particular for Auslandspropaganda efforts by the GKV was 
found to be lacking, as its amount varied from 11.6% to 16.2% of the requests. For example, in 
the production of special brochures to be distributed abroad, the GKV received 33,000 DM out 
of the proposed funding amount of 323,800 DM. Funding by itself, however, was seen as an 
insufficient explanation for the GKV’s failings as the focus shifted to the Western world. The 
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expectations from the MfAA were that the GKV would succeed despite any lack of funding and 
that the issues must be organizational or personnel-oriented.47 
As a result of these failings, a Foreign Policy commission suggested a reorganization of 
the GKV in December 1957. The Commission that reviewed the foreign cultural policy of the 
GDR was composed of representatives from a number of ministries including Culture, Trade, 
Finance, Foreign Affairs, and some education divisions. The recommendations proposed that the 
GKV should be put further under the control of the MfAA and have its central task shifted to be 
the promotion of the GDR in non-socialist countries.48 The intent behind placing the MfAA in 
charge of the budget and having a larger role in overseeing the GKV was to lead to budgetary 
savings and higher political success. The MfAA further defended this plan by claiming that this 
direction was not intended to prevent the initiative in manufacturing international relations, but 
to provide central support and stimulus to make it more effective. The GKV, although nominally 
a non-state and independent organization, was thus firmly placed under the oversight—and really 
control—of the MfAA, since a less centralized version was unsuccessful in acquiring Western 
sympathy. Although MfAA and GKV task and work reviews consistently presented the focus on 
the “capitalist” world as a new departure through numerous files in the mid-late 1950s, the 
process had already begun in 1954. Of course, the GDR continued to fail to properly meet its 
standards in the “capitalist” world, so the efforts of the GKV that were blamed on organizational 
issues found their explanation in that the GKV must have been focusing too much on the already 
befriended socialist countries rather than the capitalist world. The explicit “new” direction of the 
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GKV was to make strong connections in non-socialist countries with progressive circles, people, 
and institutions and win cultural cooperation.  
The approach for acquiring audiences among non-socialist countries was to be a 
comprehensive informational campaign about the GDR and all questions of life and development 
in Germany. The GKV was meant to facilitate this work, along with the MfAA, through 
publications, press work, exhibitions, trade shows, film, book exhibitions, the creation of cultural 
and information centers, and the construction of connections with German speaking populations 
abroad.49 The MfAA identified specific countries to focus on, including France, Italy, the Baltic 
countries, India, Indonesia, and the Near East. In addition, the propaganda and cultural 
connections work of the GDR targeted intellectuals in particular in an effort to draw on the 
appeal of antifascism and resistance to Nazism. For example, as Ulrich Pfeil showed, a GKV 
Mitarbeiter met with Professor Jaques Nicolle at the College de France to discuss French 
perceptions of the GDR. According to Nicolle, the French people largely thought of all Germans 
as “the Boche” and cared little for differentiation. On the other hand, Pfeil argued that “in 
intellectual circles, the GDR was in many ways considered the ‘better’ Germany.”50  
The MfAA would budget and fund the necessary foreign cultural work in the targeted 
capitalist and non-aligned countries according to a report from May 1957.51 The goal for these 
lands was the conclusion of cultural agreements or the construction of an organization that could 
serve the ongoing purpose of cultural relations. The existence of minority groups abroad in a 
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number of countries was also to be exploited as a potential source of dissatisfaction with the 
foreign relations of the majority group because many had only re-established relationships with 
Bonn.52 By May of 1957, the GDR had worked to establish the Thomas Mann Center in Italy and 
the Heine Society in Paris to serve as cultural centers that could be a base of operations and 
distribution for foreign cultural policy work in these countries by providing printed materials and 
offering language courses.53 The focus on the “capitalist world” had become increasingly 
apparent in the general framework of East German foreign cultural policy and had become, if not 
a direct threat to West German interests, nonetheless something that required not only close 
observation, but a response. 
Approaches to Foreign Cultural Policy in the FRG 
 At least prior to the late 1950s, the Federal Republic did not prioritize foreign cultural 
policy. Complaints over insufficient funding peppered numerous reports from the Foreign Office 
and the Federal Press and Information Office, varying from concerns that federal funding could 
not keep up with the demands of foreign audiences to fears that high quality East German 
materials would outshine a more economically prosperous, but less aggressively advertised 
West. This demonstrates that the thesis by Frank Trommler, which suggests that foreign cultural 
policy did not have a particularly high priority in the Federal Republic even up to the 1970s, was 
indeed accurate.54 The lack of funding and general lack of focus belies, however, the remarkable 
frequency with which this topic was mentioned at high-profile events such as speeches to 
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academics, radio programs, or newspapers. Furthermore, figures within the Kulturabteilung 
(Cultural Department of the Foreign Office) in their communications with other government 
branches, such as the Bundes Presse und Informations Amt (Federal Press and Information 
Office, BPA) or the Center for Tourism, showed that there was a strong understanding of the 
need for the Federal Republic to begin to cultivate a more comprehensive policy to compete with 
the campaigns emanating from the rival East. 
 Even at this early and relatively undeveloped stage, foreign cultural policy in the Federal 
Republic was a constellation of different media platforms, strategies, and activities, among 
which self-image-promoting print material was relatively underdeveloped. In fact, the single 
most subsidized field was the construction and support for German schools abroad, which 
received 14 Million DM in the 1957/58 budget for the Foreign Office while all other activities 
received a lump sum of 18 million DM.55 That said, Brentano argued this budget was far less 
than required and was much too low compared to other foreign countries, especially given the 
added burden that Germany would need to begin anew in constructing cultural centers, 
developing contacts, etc. A central component in the development of such cultural bonds was the 
cultivation of multilateral agreements through organizations like UNESCO, Europarat, and 
NATO, as well as bilateral agreements through cultural agreements that were often essential for 
the creation and support of German schools abroad. The general lack of funding, however, meant 
that resources in this area had to be concentrated where they would have the most impact, 
emphasizing economical means such as inexpensive print material like newspapers and 
magazines.56 
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 Typically, West German depictions of East German foreign cultural advertising activities 
criticized the messages and the clearly ideological approaches, but expressed a degree of 
admiration for their production value. In their criticisms of East German ideological productions, 
West German bureaucrats in the Foreign Office highlighted their own commitment to 
democracy, freedom, and German independence. Brentano criticized East German efforts in this 
vein as they merely created a “shoddy effort, a soulless nationalism or a cheap personal or party 
cult like Hitler would have wanted and how today exists in the new halls of the Tretjakow-
Galerie in Moscow.”57 Foreign cultural policy, in this vein, was to be kept free of politics and 
remain purely cultural. Of course, this was an impossibility. Brentano discussed the difficulties 
of remaining neutral and proposed that cultural foreign policy should put political meaning in the 
back seat and, in the act of self-representation, build international cooperation and finally “seek 
to make itself superfluous.”58 The issue with print media for consumption abroad was that it was 
designed to appeal to audiences certainly, but also to inform them about the Federal Republic in 
a favorable way. Thus, early print media productions from the Federal Republic were forced to 
tread a thin line of being pretty but uninformative—such as heavily illustrated advertising for 
tourism—or of being overly political, text-driven, and ultimately unappealing. In fact, in the 
many reports coming from different embassies, a pattern emerges with suggestions for an 
improved print media campaign that, despite Brentano’s reservations, clearly emphasized the 
political nature of building cultural connections. The Foreign Office’s dissatisfaction with such 
productions became increasingly clear over time. 
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 Thus, foreign cultural policy in the Federal Republic existed in an odd state. Viewed as 
dangerously close to propaganda in some circles, it faced criticism given the legacy of Goebbels’ 
in German consciousness. Brentano criticized some in the Bundestag who set the budget for 
looking for a more economic approach to things desired to see a clear return on investment that 
was nearly impossible to measure directly. “It should be kept in mind that this activity – like all 
intellectual activity – cannot always be measured in terms of benefits that become immediately 
apparent.”59 The upshot of this meant that the Federal Republic continued to not provide a great 
deal of funding to this sector of foreign policy. However, within the Foreign Office, especially 
the Kulturabteilung and reports from embassies, there was a clear demand for better print media, 
more funding, and more sophisticated responses to East German attacks and efforts to build 
connections with non-aligned countries. As time went on, these efforts even extended to the 
West. 
The GDR’s distinct lead in foreign cultural policy emerged from a need to establish a 
new state on highly uncertain ground, while the Federal Republic initiated its own efforts in this 
area largely in response to East German campaigns. This meant that, while there were public 
conversations about West German culture and its relationship with foreign policy, there was not 
a similar discussion of specific methods, tasks, and institutional roles. Ultimately, it took the 
GDR’s transition to focusing on the “capitalist world” to shake members of the West German 
Foreign Office sufficiently for them to push for similar efforts like a magazine to combat DDR-
Revue. 
 The German Question, or more specifically the issues of division and potential 
reunification, played a dominant role in foreign cultural policy, but was approached from 
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opposite directions in the German states. The GDR presented itself as fundamentally sovereign 
and separate, which image-building was meant to reinforce, while the FRG continued to push, at 
least nominally, for reunification. Consequently, an effort to cultivate a distinctly “West 
German” culture found less traction, especially since there was no corresponding “capitalist” or 
democratic revolution in the West that could mirror the radical departures in the East which 
separated it from older “bourgeois” culture. More practically, this meant that major foreign 
policy figures like Foreign Minister Brentano proposed reunification and the security of freedom 
as the points of departure for the Federal Republic’s foreign policy.60 Furthermore, the Federal 
Republic should rejoin the community of nations as an equal while serving as the sole voice of 
the German people in the non-communist world.61 This pronouncement is representative of the 
general thrust of the Federal Republic’s foreign policy, but also of the disdain for an attempt to 
build cultural relations with the Eastern Bloc. The culture coming from that part of the world, 
according to the Foreign Minister, simply “lets the party book be presented” and lacked any 
inherent value.62 This seemingly comfortable position was threatened as the German Democratic 
Republic contested the Federal Republic’s focus on the Western and non-aligned world with an 
increasingly assertive cultural foreign policy. 
Institutional Foundations and Relations in the GDR 
 Foreign Office observers in the FRG tended to assume that the GDR’s lead in producing 
foreign cultural policy materials was largely rooted in ideological cohesion and strong state 
centralization. The reality of the situation was that, while ideology certainly played a major role 
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in guiding and restricting the GDR’s plans, a great deal of institutional confusion pervaded the 
early years of GDR foreign cultural policy. In the particular relationship between the MfAA and 
the GKV, responsibilities sometimes overlapped and the non-state organization of the GKV at 
times operated with what was seen as unacceptable degrees of independence. Despite these 
pitfalls, centralized planning certainly guided the GDR’s efforts, including directives coming all 
the way from the ZK der SED and increasing oversight from the MfAA over the GKV. In the 
Federal Republic, there was a degree of similar institutional conflict, as both the BPA and the 
AA tended to claim responsibility for foreign cultural policy even as the general understanding 
was that they were to work together. In general, however, this relationship did not evolve a great 
deal until the 1960s when the FRG began implementing its own programs to counter the 
dominance of the GDR in foreign cultural policy. Instead, this early period largely involved the 
AA and its review of GDR tactics along with desperate calls for new media to combat the 
messages of the GDR in the Western world and among non-aligned countries. 
 The Gesellschaft für kulturelle Verbindungen mit dem Ausland was founded on June 7, 
1952 with the specific intent of supporting and organizing cultural connections with “befriended” 
socialist, countries other than the Soviet Union. While the GDR had a penchant for creating mass 
organizations such as the Kulturbund, the Freie Deutsche Jugend, and the Freie Deutsche 
Gewerkschaftsbund, the GKV was not intended to be a mass organization. Rather, it was an 
umbrella organization (Dachorganisation) for newly forming friendship societies other than the 
Society for German-Soviet Friendship, such as the Helmut von Gerlach Gesellschaft (Poland) 
and others. In this role, it served to care for cultural relations with foreign countries and spread 
knowledge about the GDR. Furthermore, it also facilitated bringing in cultural organizations and 
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organizing exchanges with other countries to edify the GDR’s populace and to favorably dispose 
them towards their socialist brethren. 
 The initial organization of the GKV involved the creation of a secretariat, country 
departments, and a cultural department. The secretariat organized the work of the GKV 
according to their development plan. The individual country departments oversaw all operative 
tasks and they determined what the friendly country wanted in terms of material. The cultural 
department educated, guided, and supported the work in the professional sections.63 The 
magazines produced by the GKV were not directly in the apparatus of the society, but were 
guided by it, which is how the initial publications, DDR im Aufbau and Von Peking bis Tirana, 
were produced and the impetus for DDR-Revue was generated.64 
 The key institutional relationship in the field of GDR foreign cultural policy was between 
the GKV and the MfAA. The MfAA, founded in 1949 along with the GDR itself, had the 
responsibility of overseeing and organizing the activities of the GKV. To that end, the MfAA 
was given increasingly greater control over the GKV, including reviewing the GKV’s activities, 
planning its budget, and coordinating its objectives such as naming which countries were 
important for the GDR’s foreign cultural policy. Within the MfAA, Department IV Press and 
Information and more specifically Department II Foreign Information had the primary 
relationship with the GKV. The foreign information department’s task was to inform foreign 
people about the GDR and via these efforts improve their relationships. The major method of 
                                                             




their work was guiding the press departments of the GDR’s embassies and working with the 
GKV.65  
Other, less formal networks tended to play an important role in navigating the confused 
relationships, as Rudi Engel—technically a simple Mitarbeiter in the MfAA until 1956 when he 
served as head of the Cultural Policy Department—served as the primary intermediary between 
the two organizations. Engel often communicated not only with other officials in the MfAA and 
the GKV, but also with personal letters to members of the ZK der SED, with whom he had a pre-
established relationship.66  
 Over time, the MfAA sought to restructure its relationship with the GKV to assert clearer 
control. While in some reports, such as financial evaluations of GKV activities, the GKV was 
said to fulfill its tasks “independently and on its own responsibility,” at several other points, the 
MfAA sought to have greater authority.67 In a review about the fulfillment of the foreign cultural 
policy plan of 1957, the MfAA criticized the coordination efforts in general and tried to clarify 
that the fundamental task of the MfAA was foreign political guidance and consultation, while 
tasking organizations such as the GKV with implementation.68 The plan to facilitate better 
organization going into 1958 included improving the work of subcommittees through 
cooperation of department leaders of the MfAA, creating shared points of emphasis along with 
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fellow institutions, and the creation of a Kommission beim MfAA for foreign cultural policy.69  
 Beyond cooperation with the GKV, the MfAA also expressed the desire to improve 
reporting coming from their consulates in other countries so that the MfAA could have better 
information about cultural and political events in the host country.70 Other institutions within the 
GDR also faced issues related to institutional overlap. For example, the Cultural Ministry and the 
GKV often both participated in exhibitions, but the GKV’s material at the Menzel-Exhibition in 
China was almost purely cultural without politics or focused on foreign propaganda, which was 
more the purview of the MfK. The MfAA was thus tasked with defining the responsibilities 
between the MfK and the GKV in this area.71 
 Frustration with confusing institutional relationships culminated in the creation of a 
working group that evaluated the GKV at the decision of the Aussenpolitische Kommission 
(Foreign Policy Commission) in 1957. According to the Commission, the central issue was that 
the GKV has been “in an in between role since its founding, it is neither a social organization, 
since it has no members, nor a state institution.”72 The other problems included that the GKV, 
despite acting as “the extended arm of the MfAA,” lacked sufficient leadership from the Office 
and thus did not receive necessary guidance, particularly once the GKV’s responsibilities had 
shifted to focusing on the Western world. A key point in the report was the stipulation that the 
GKV would coordinate efforts among some different institutions according to the plan generated 
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by the MfAA, but would have no decisional authority (Weisungsrecht).73 The leader of the GKV, 
Dr. Carlfriedrich Wiese, disputed this new direction of the GKV and argued that it should 
become an official state institution directly subordinate to the Presidium of the Council of 
Ministers and governed by a statue drawn up by the Society’s management. In defending this 
perspective, Wiese claimed that the tasks of the GKV within the Auslandspropaganda (foreign 
propaganda) of the GDR would only be possible with the GKV having official status. 
Furthermore, he argued that institutional confusion was largely due to the fact that the GKV 
lacked the necessary authority to coordinate on an equal level with other state institutions. In 
trying to keep the support of the MfAA, Wiese attempted to clarify that this new status would not 
alter the relationship between the GKV and the MfAA, leaving formal decisional authority with 
the latter. Ultimately, Wiese’s arguments were rejected, and he was replaced in the following 
year as the leader of the GKV. 
As the central institution meant to implement the GDR’s foreign cultural policy, the GKV 
played a pivotal role. However, it was often unclear to the leaders of the GKV precisely what 
their role should be in relation to the MfAA, and often unqualified workers hurt their work 
product. This led to the reorganization of the GKV starting in 1957, led by the Foreign Policy 
Commission.74 A report identified some critical issues in the GKV stemming from the 
Information Office, founded in 1956, where emphasis had shifted from obtaining cultural 
agreements to producing foreign propaganda. In this newly developed field, the Publication 
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Department was found to be successful, but other divisions had not held up their end of the 
bargain.  
A further issue in the development of foreign propaganda in the Information Office of the 
GKV was that getting approval for a given publication could go to a number of separate possible 
locations. A brochure could be sent for appraisal from the Long Term Propaganda Sector, to the 
leader of the Information Office, the Departmental Leader of Afro-Asiatic Countries, or an 
official of the Central Department Press and Propaganda of the MfAA. This meant that workers 
in the Information Office could turn to MfAA employees without going through a department 
manager within their own organization, thus creating unclear paths of approval and evaluation in 
the hierarchy.75 This confusion filtered down to daily work products as well, where workers were 
criticized for “doing whatever was in front of them.”76 Although the MfAA was meant to 
coordinate the work of the GKV, the report found that its direction was, quite simply, not 
working for the organization and that more direct oversight was needed. The MfAA planned to 
have some additional control over the GKV by requiring twice-yearly plans from the GKV and 
centralizing efforts more by having the MfAA define the focus of the campaigns as well as long-
term plans and only then entrusting the GKV to carry it out. The MfAA also took over funding 
and centralized resources to serve as responsible political leadership.77  
 The transformations of the GKV continued in to 1958 as the MfAA increasingly asserted 
its supervisory role. Part of this new procedure meant that the GKV was required to send their 
materials to Engel and Hauptabteilung IV in the MfAA to facilitate better communication 
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between different groups and to ease ordering from the article service and the photograph 
collections. The GKV and the MfAA also planned to work together on magazines like DDR 
Revue especially in editorial work. In practice, this editorial work appeared to mean largely 
“expunging” (Streichung) problematic passages. Also, the GKV materials were to be proofread 
twice in the future, once from the corresponding Fachministerium (ministry) in charge and once 
from the HA IV, in respect to their political functionality. The MfAA’s assertion of control over 
the print materials produced by the GKV thus became increasingly important because the MfAA 
desired to have a stronger hand in clarifying the message and ensuring that the magazines were 
on message politically. The functional division of roles would have the MfAA in charge of 
foreign policy and Auslandsinformation, while the General Secretary of the GKV would focus on 
the form and methods of Aulandspropaganda.78 Going forward, future problems with the work 
of the GKV and Auslandsinformation in general would be evaluated by the Kommission für 
Kulturelle Beziehungen zum Ausland, which had already designed the first reorganization of the 
GKV. 
 The leadership of the GKV, and in particular its General Secretary Herbert Meyer, were 
against the removal of much of their autonomy. Herbert Meyer, a former Wehrmacht solider and 
Soviet POW, had joined the SED in 1946 upon his return to Germany and had experience in the 
diplomatic service, in particular with inner German trade and relations with India in the 
Ministerium für Außenhandel und Innerdeutschen Handel until he joined the GKV as General 
Secretary in 1958.79 To that end, General Secretary Meyer wrote to Koll. Heymann, a longtime 
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communist from before the war and the department head of the Press and Information 
Department of the MfAA, and protested what he perceived as a tutelage of the GKV that would 
give much of the responsibility in shared tasks to the MfAA and would shrink the responsibilities 
and joy of work in the GKV.80 This protest, as well as the earlier suggestion by the former 
General Secretary of the GKV, Wiese, that the GKV become an official state organization were 
rejected and the MfAA maintained its role in supervising and organizing the work of the GKV. It 
also approved new leadership, such as when Meyer succeeded Wiese. Thus, although it could 
potentially reap some benefits of unofficial status abroad, the consequence was that the GKV had 
relatively little autonomy in the general structure of the GDR’s efforts in fostering better foreign 
cultural relations. Unsurprisingly, the authority of the MfAA and party leadership remained 
unquestioned. 
 The ZK served as the central leadership of the GDR, and although they were not often 
directly involved in the decision-making process of the GDR’s foreign cultural policy, their high-
level directives were regarded as binding. Oftentimes, criticism of the work being done at the 
lower levels led to new plans from the ZK that would then guide policy going forward. For 
instance, in the Review of the GKV, the working group determined that the production of the 
Publication Department of the GKV was not up to the standards as written in the Resolutions of 
the Secretariat of the ZK. In September 1956, the Resolution stated that “the contributions and 
materials provided for foreign countries must be excellent in terms of printing technology, 
image, and language.”81 The top-level recommendations of the ZK were thus binding, if often 
more abstract than the critical mid-level reviews of the GKV conducted by the MfAA. 
                                                             




 The role of the ZK often involved recommendations or evaluations filtering down to the 
MfAA to be implemented. Certain ZK departments, for example, the Abteilung für Aussenpolitik 
(Foreign Policy Department) and the Abteilung Auslandsinformation (Department of Foreign 
Information) decided on personnel questions, work plans, and decision-making by organizations 
like the GKV and the MfAA.82 This leadership, however, was not always clear on the flows of 
responsibility between these constituent organizations. For example, Genosse Florin of the ZK 
asked Rudi Engel who had the highest authority in the cultural policy aspects of foreign policy 
and asking what the role of the MfAA was.83 Engel wrote in 1956 to ZK member Otto Winzer, a 
ZK member from 1946 and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, to ask what independence 
cultural attaches of the MfAA had in cultural policy and also questioned to what extent the 
foreign office was authorized to give instructions in cultural policy.84 In general, the early period 
of foreign cultural policy in the GDR did not follow archetypal lines of a highly disciplined and 
structured organization, but rather developed on an ad hoc basis where even the leaders of 
various key institutions in the ruling structure were unclear over how specific institutions were 
meant to interact. 
 Despite the confusion of the day in foreign cultural policy, the ZK had significant input in 
pushing for change and in clarifying some of the institutional roles. For example, in a classified 
document from the ZK on the improvement of the literary work of disseminating institutions, the 
ZK began pushing for a review to improve foreign propaganda. These suggestions included first 
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a foundational analysis of previous methods and a look at which literature tended to find success, 
which would culminate in analysis and recommendations for newspapers and magazines in key 
countries of focus.85 The ZK also criticized the GKV for having the independence to 
occasionally take action without notifying the state apparatus. To that end, a committee with the 
cooperation of Genosse Berogld of the Foreign Policy Department of the ZK suggested 
improved cooperation between the MfAA and the GKV in 1959, which showed that the 
reorganization of the GKV had still not been fully satisfactory.86 
 The ZK of the SED maintained clear control over the general course of foreign cultural 
policy through regular reports from the MfAA. The Cultural Work Plan would be completed at 
the end of each year to be submitted to the ZK Abteilung Aussenpolitik and Peter Florin, the head 
of the department (and later the GDR’s permanent representative to the UN and President of the 
UN General Assembly from 1987-88), for approval.87 Through these plans, general suggestions 
would filter down to the MfAA Kulturreferenten and then to the GKV. For example, the 10th 
anniversary celebration of the GDR’s founding was to be a focus for embassies and the GKV in 
all of their productions.88 According to further plans for 1959, the GKV intended to emphasize 
the key importance of concluding a peace treaty and exposing the “militaristic” Adenauer-
Regime. The departure point for all of these conversations, however, was to be the 10th 
anniversary.89 For example, the October 1959 issue of GDR Review showed how the GDR 
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worked to distance itself from its West German rival. In an article uncreatively titled “Peace, 
Peace, and Peace Again,” author Peter Florin stated that “the GDR does not merely exist, it has 
become an independent international factor increasingly influencing the international scene, 
thanks to its economic and social power and its peace policy.” Furthermore, it argued “the 
German Democratic Republic’s foreign policy distinguishes itself fundamentally from that of 
German governments of the past and of the present government of West Germany” because “the 
former German governments directed their foreign policy towards attaining supremacy first in 
Europe and then in the whole world.”90  
 In the more specific field of publications, the GKV produced reports on their yearly 
activities to the MfAA to celebrate achievements, self-criticize, and to provide quantifiable data 
on their work to demonstrate the fulfillment of the plan. For example, in the report on 1958, the 
GKV rooted their actions in the restructuring of 1954, which changed the GKV’s focus to a 
“general political enlightenment abroad about the GDR and all questions of life and development 
in Germany.”91 The GKV saw the acquisition of new Cultural Agreements as a success, but still 
identified a struggle in popularizing the GDR’s political, economic, and cultural achievements, 
particularly in the Western world. They saw the Publication Department, founded in 1954, as a 
potential remedy to their issues because it could centralize the propaganda and article office for 
magazines and bulletins produced for foreign audiences.  
 The GDR’s efforts in producing publications in the 1950s showed an impressive 
commitment to this form of propaganda. For example, in 1958 the GKV produced 32 different 
thematic brochures and distributed 600,000 copies in sixteen languages, 67% of which were in 
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German, English and French. Of these, half were on political themes and questions, while the 
others spanned economic, social, and cultural issues.92 The two primary ongoing publications, 
“DDR” and “DDR Revue,” were also broken down in this report. “DDR” was primarily 
distributed to socialist countries with a yearly circulation of approximately 1.5 million copies in 
Russian, Chinese, Polish, Czech, and German. The Soviet Union was the primary consumer of 
this magazine. 
 Ultimately, the ZK, MfAA, and the GKV in the 1950s grew and developed in fits and 
starts that struggled to identify how best to organize their work. Although the party and state 
structures maintained clear control over the production of publication materials like DDR Revue, 
it was only observed through layers of bureaucracy and changes were relatively slow to take 
effect. The restructuring of the GKV and general curtailment of its independence reflect the 
ideology and reality of the state, and the layered editing ultimately created publications that 
would reflect the goals of the state. This is not to say that there was no room for materials that 
could break the mold, as repeated complaints over independent and unapproved actions 
demonstrated. Furthermore, a relatively confused and overlapping system of approval led to a 
degree of inconsistency. The foreign cultural publications of the GDR were, in the opinion of 
GDR leadership, highly important to the regime’s image and success abroad, as seen in the 
significant money investment and impressive distribution numbers. This ongoing surge from the 
mid-1950s necessitated action from the Federal Republic who had observed, with alarm, a clear 
transition from engendering good will within the bloc, to an effort to obtain allies in the 
“capitalist” world. 
 




Institutional Foundations and Relations in the FRG 
The Federal Republic of Germany lacked the same initiative in cultivating foreign public 
opinion. The first barrier was that the Auswärtiges Amt was only re-established in 1951 due to 
Allied, and in particular French, resistance to a resurgent West Germany. The two critical 
government organizations that would first notice the East German foreign cultural policy 
campaigns and then seek to counter them were the Foreign Office and the BPA. The Foreign 
Office played a central role in re-establishing diplomatic relationships with other states, and, for 
the purposes of foreign cultural policy, in gathering information from embassies and providing 
distribution centers. The BPA was less directly concerned with foreign policy, but had a specific 
department focused on producing materials for foreign audiences. The BPA also tended to have a 
more direct relationship with the third layer of the Federal Republic’s slow-to-emerge foreign 
cultural policy, intermediary organizations such as the Deutsche Akademische Austausch Dienst 
and the Goethe Institute. In addition, the BPA had close relations with Inter Nationes which 
printed most of their materials. 
Due to the Federal structure of the West German regime, the flow of power was perhaps 
even more confusing than in the GDR. For example, the BPA was a part of the Chancellery, 
while the AA was a separate ministry. Power struggles somewhat inevitably emerged between 
them, as well as funding conflicts. In general, this relationship gradually evolved to have the AA 
setting general policy and goals that the BPA would then translate and seek to implement in 
cooperation with intermediary organizations and in the production of print materials. While this 
structure formed the general pattern, the BPA did retain a fair bit of autonomy in their work, and 
cooperation between the organizations continued to be strained through the 1970s. A further 
complication in a democratic society was also the Bundestag, which served as a key force in 
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guiding policy development, culminating in the late 1960s and early 1970s with a full review of 
the FRG’s foreign cultural policy. Prior to this, however, the Bundestag also formed a rotating 
Commission (Ausschuss) that reviewed the foreign cultural policy work of the FRG and offered 
suggestions for improvement in conjunction with the AA.  
Frequent reports, interdepartmental memos, and meetings of related government 
institutions, such as the BPA and the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office – AA) highlight just how 
ahead of the game the GDR was in the creation of a state image and building relations. At a 
meeting of Kulturreferenten in Bonn from January 31 – February 2, 1956 on the issue of the 
“Cultural Offensive in the Cold War,” representatives from thirteen states discussed the new 
aspect of the “psychological” war the East was waging wherein worldviews struggled on the 
“battlefields” of radio, television, magazines, newspapers, theater, ballet, film, and sport among 
others. According to the Kulturreferenten present at this conference, West Germans found 
themselves in an especially difficult spot because they lived on the border with communist-
controlled lands and could explain how life there really was. They experienced the totalitarian 
system from 1933-1945, and the Eastern “Zone93” was particularly active in their propaganda. 
Their conclusions about the emerging situation called for action on the part of the Federal 
government and cited the difficulty of separating the cultural and political in a democratic, if not 
in a totalitarian, society.  
According to observers in the AA, the critical shortcomings of FRG foreign cultural 
policy included a lack of observers, general staff, funding, and planning. In their minds, the cost 
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of this “psychological” war was minimal by comparison to a hot war. Thus, the Federal 
Government should recognize that the increasing cultural activity of the GDR was a part of a 
planned offensive that must be answered first through observation and reporting and then by 
advertising the achievements of the FRG, particularly in the English-speaking world.94 Indeed, in 
an AA review of the GDR’s foreign cultural policy, observers stated that “the head start and lead 
that the Zone has in in the influence of public opinion of foreign lands vis a vis the FRG is 
already achieved and cannot be taken seriously enough.”95 
The activities of the GDR grew more alarming for members of the foreign office when 
they received reports from their embassy in Australia that the GDR had begun distributing print 
media, which the embassy lacked the means to combat. Mr. Voos of the AA wrote the to the 
BPA regarding this very issue, requesting material to combat the cultural and economic 
advertising magazine “German Democratic Republic in Construction.” According to Voos, Inter 
Nationes, a major FRG media distributing organization primarily contracted by the BPA, had not 
offered sufficient options. Instead, Inter Nationes had merely producedF BULLETIN, a plain 
news text given to all embassies or “German Review,” a magazine that focused much more on 
tourism propaganda than cultural advertising, both of which he found lacking. Instead, they 
needed something informative and well-made like the GDR magazine distributed at no cost to 
subscribers.96 Professor Dr. Arntz of the BPA, in responding two weeks later, agreed that an 
illustrated magazine was important to the BPA and had been a goal for some time, but it was 
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actually the responsibility of the Foreign Office to make it, not the underfunded BPA.97 In 
another response from the BPA, Dr. Kayser informed the AA that BULLETIN was not 
calculated for the same readership as an illustrated magazine, but they would need to build up the 
cultural and economic policy portions of a magazine to court the Zentrale für Fremdenverkehr 
(Center for Tourism – ZF) into contributing financially.98 
 The fears of members of the Foreign Office, Embassies, and the Information Office were 
confirmed in December 1956 when first reports of a new magazine, DDR Revue, reached them. 
Hess from the FRG Embassy in Australia reported that the GDR had produced DDR Revue as a 
follow up to the earlier “German Democratic Republic in Construction” and had begun 
distributing it to the same subscribers at no cost. The magazine had also taken out numerous 
advertisements in major Australian daily periodicals such as the Sunday Morning Herald during 
the Olympic Games to solicit additional subscribers. Hess further assumed that because importer 
Joseph Weterns had set up the location of his business in an expensive part of town that the 
company had considerable money available. Furthermore, the contents and style of 
contemporary editions of DDR Revue in Australia led Hess to argue that its advertising would be 
quite successful in Australia.99 
 In practice, the response of the FRG’s AA and BPA was mediated through a steady 
process of internal bureaucratic debates based on this emerging threat. In the 1950s, many of 
these discussions concerned what type of system for foreign cultural policy the FRG would 
institute. The former Staatssekretär, Dr. Otto Lenz, framed the Federal Republic’s efforts to 
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promote better understanding between West Germany and the rest of the world in context of the 
US Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which authorized the US Department of State to conduct public 
diplomacy with foreign audiences.100 The United States, however, was not the sole model for the 
Federal Republic’s plans to implement a new foreign cultural policy. Foreign Minister Brentano 
identified two extreme possibilities where the state and political purposes were somewhat less 
evident and the actual work was carried out by individual cultural organizations without a 
cultural department in the Foreign Office directly overseeing. This example, according to 
Brentano, could be found in the British Council. The advantages of using independent actors in 
the cultural field allowed those actually familiar with culture to avoid oversight from “false 
experts” and could be more effective when the state and politics stepped back. The other method 
utilized state power through a cultural department in the AA and cultural attaches abroad. This 
approach, however, pushed the state further into view in foreign cultural policy generally. 
Brentano saw the hybrid West German model, which had a degree of government control via the 
AA but also semi-independent intermediary organizations, as an excellent solution and as the 
best way to counter mistrust of Germans abroad.101 The Federal Republic essentially sought to 
build anew a system with an urgent purpose, made more so by the ongoing efforts of the East to 
not only aggrandize themselves but to criticize the West at all costs. 
 Although the design and system of the Federal Republic’s foreign cultural policy could 
be considered advanced, it struggled in general to oppose the more active efforts of their 
counterparts to the east. These struggles were rooted in general dissension less over strategy than 
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over tactics. For example, in a 1958 meeting of representatives from the AA, the BPA, and the 
Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (Federal Ministry for Intra-German Relations – 
BMG), there was relatively little agreement on precisely how it was best to counter the activities 
of the GDR. Despite general consensus that the “zone” had better advertising due to the 
centralized nature of a dictatorship, there were no calls for altering the heavily decentralized, and 
at times overlapping, responsibilities of the departments in attendance. Instead, they could agree 
that it was necessary to counteract the GDR’s efforts through new campaigns, but still using their 
own system and methods, which they viewed as ideologically and creatively superior, if less 
organized.  
Dr. Fechter of the AA opened the meeting with a common complaint of both East and 
West German officials working on foreign cultural policy: a lack of proper funding. According 
to Fechter, the AA had little resources for this purpose and that another organization would need 
to provide support for materials. Despite this claim, Dr. Kunisch of the BMG argued that the AA 
had to take the lead in this field and to acquire a sufficient amount of money to not only produce 
materials, but to produce them of the best quality, because an inferior product would have the 
opposite of the intended effect. Fechter agreed that the AA should lead this effort, but claimed 
that funding had already been diverted to the BPA for their printing of materials. Fräulein 
Müller, a representative from the BPA, proposed that individual departmental resources and 
contributions from industry along with some capital from the Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie and the Deutschen Zentrale für Fremdenverkehr should contribute. Professor Arntz, 
also of the BPA, stated that they had been given 500,000 DM for publications, which he was 
unsure about how precisely to spend given a lack of clear agreement on geographic areas of 
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focus.102 Funding was thus spread a bit thinly, and the BPA lacked clear direction from the AA, 
who attempted to clarify that the BPA was supposed to take contracts from and follow the 
initiatives of the AA.103 
 The issue of geographic focus was particularly contentious in regard to the materials sent 
to developing countries and the Third World. Some, like Dr. Steinmann of the AA, argued that 
large brochures such as “Facts about Germany” were ineffective in the US, while others like 
Professor Arntz of the BPA argued that brochures such as “Germany in a Nutshell” had been 
requested by embassies (Vertretungen) in the US and were effective investments. That said, the 
BPA pushed for a focus on “essential Western lands” over “derelict countries.” Müller of the 
BPA pushed against focusing on the US with the Federal Republic’s limited budget because the 
“zone” had not directed much of their attention towards the United States. AA official Fechter 
proposed that presenting West Germany in a positive light was about more than simply 
countering the work of the German Democratic Republic. Instead, it was important to establish a 
positive description as a way to clarify the West’s perspective on reunification. In fact, Arntz 
argued that the US was an important audience because there was significant demand for 
informational material, not propaganda, about West Germany. For example, the magazine 
“Germany” with articles from well-known authors had been in demand.  
 AA officials like Steinmann argued that there were some specific approaches that could 
help the image of the Federal Republic within the US. The AA had three central 
recommendations. First, that the American public relations firm, Roy Bernard—which had been 
hired to help present the FRG in the most positive light possible and to give recommendations on 
                                                             




the FRG’s publications—should be relieved of its obligation to leave political themes out of its 
advertising for the FRG. Secondly, the reaction against anti-FRG hate films in the US should be 
intensified through presenting results of investigations into the films to the US State Department. 
Thirdly, the topic of the purpose of NATO should be published often and exploited as a 
favorable approach to alter public perception.104 Of concern particularly into the 1960s was an 
upsurge in anti-German television and film productions. For example, CBS published The 
Germans, which examined life in Nuremberg and emphasized the potential for neo-Nazism in 
the city. Also, popular Hollywood films such as The Battle of the Bulge, The Blue Max, Is Paris 
Burning? The Ship of Fools, and Judgment at Nuremberg worried foreign office officials.105 The 
US was clearly of central importance to the FRG, but it was not the only foreign relationship that 
the FRG valued and sought to cultivate an improved image with. Instead, the FRG gradually 
adopted a more expansive approach to include non-aligned countries as potential audiences to 
court. 
In particular, Dr. Krause-Brewer of the BPA argued that while the US could be 
important, developing countries should not be forgotten, because in general the publications were 
well received there.106 Different narratives were more important in these contexts; for example, 
these officials understood that arguments that the sub-standard living conditions in the GDR 
(compared to Western countries) demonstrated critical ideological and economic failings would 
fall on deaf ears in developing countries, whose people often lived in even worse conditions. 
More effective narratives, according to these officials, would focus on the imperialist nature of 
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Soviet ideology to be presented with specific attaches at consulates that could provide 
information of the “Ostfragen” (Eastern Question).107 A further general suggestion from this 
committee for future publications was to include more pictures to prevent overwhelming readers 
with text or very thick brochures. 
The story of foreign cultural policy in the Federal Republic did not really pick up steam 
until the middle of the 1950s. Although the Kulturabteilung had been founded as a separate 
department in the AA in 1951, it received very little funding until January 1955, when the budget 
was doubled for foreign cultural policy and German schools abroad.108 But funding was not the 
only obstacle. Institutional overlap and confusion, at least partially stemming from the AA’s late 
creation (two years after the founding of the rest of the FRG’s government) dogged efforts to 
centralize and to adequately present the FRG abroad. Attempts to target audiences and to tailor 
appeals to specific groups further complicated early efforts by both states, but particularly the 
FRG, which lacked the dogmatic ideological cohesion of the GDR. Ultimately, the pressure from 
the East proved a sufficient motivator to push the FRG to develop a counter to what they saw as 
relatively sophisticated and high-quality productions coming from the East. 
Conclusion 
Despite vastly different political and economic systems, comparable problems in the 
GDR and FRG provoked at least somewhat similar initial responses. Each state started from a 
position of weakness with foreign opinion largely concentrated against it, a handful of key allies 
notwithstanding. The general enmity brought on by the Nazi period as well as the rival other 
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German state created a series of complications that the foreign policy of each state had to 
address. The East, starting from a somewhat weaker position, began to pursue a more aggressive 
foreign cultural policy earlier than the West and sought to cultivate new relationships that could 
recognize the legitimacy of their state. The West ultimately rose to respond to the challenge but 
did so with less of a clear focus. The institutions developed by each state exemplified the 
ideologies of their respective systems, certainly, but also mirrored each other in that there was a 
great deal of confusion, overlap, and unclear lines of command in foreign cultural policy.  
While the FRG argued that the dictatorial nature of the SED government put the GDR at 
a distinct advantage, it was not actually much more organized or regimented than similar 
Western efforts that would emerge slightly later in the 1950s and the early 1960s. Indeed, the 
bureaucratic chaos that characterized both of the foreign cultural policy programs in the German 
states was unsurprising in light of the new foundations of the states and their emergence from the 
destruction of the Second World War. The upshot of the internal wrangling, however, was the 
creation of some key media productions, like GDR Review and its later West German 
counterpart, Scala International.  
The institutional and political foundations from which these magazines emerged showed 
that the GDR developed clear goals and strategies for breaking out of diplomatic isolation, and in 
particular in wooing Western and non-aligned countries via projecting the positive attributes of 
GDR society. The institutions, often operating on somewhat unsure ground in the GDR, 
nonetheless maintained a clear and coherent ideological identity, and were also able to tap into 
pre-existing networks of individuals sympathetic to communist thought. The profound structural 
disadvantages facing the GDR in general, including diplomatic isolation, small size and lesser 
population, and low industrial output were certainly not offset by these minor advantages in 
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foreign cultural policy. However, it does explain why, to an extent, the GDR would place so 
much emphasis on these programs and on developing them. Their success, while unsatisfying to 
some figures in the GDR, should be understood not entirely in the context of how many 
countries recognized the GDR or even subscription numbers. Instead, the very fact that West 
German observers grew so concerned about East German productions and ultimately developed 
their own responses and techniques shows that GDR Review and the image-building campaign 
more broadly was and should be taken seriously. 
In the 1950s, however, the West German responses remained internal and conflicted. The 
apparent success of the GDR’s acknowledgment of the need to court foreign audiences through 
less formal means, due to their lack of diplomatic recognition, and a willingness to pursue this 
through media campaigns culminated in the creation of Scala International. What would emerge 
beginning in the 1960s would be much more of a true competition between the states for public 
opinion in foreign countries through a proxy media and image war that would serve to determine 
the “better” Germany in the Cold War. This new phase opened up new themes and avenues of 
debate and conflict that pitted alternative economic and political systems against each other in 
ways that would mirror the broader Cold War struggle, but also show the struggles of East and 















HOUSING AND HOUSEWIVES:  
DEFINING PROSPERITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN THE 1960S 
 
 In January 1962, GDR Review published an article entitled “The Way We Voted: What 
We Voted For” celebrating the election of deputies to local parliaments on September 17, 1961. 
The election, in the article’s words, “represent[ed] an overwhelming support for the government” 
even as it demonstrated how “every citizen had, and has, the right and the duty to speak his mind 
and to take a hand in shaping state policy.”1 Furthermore, GDR Review claimed that these 
elections showed the confidence and optimism of the population in the government because 
“never before had elections in the GDR so impressively demonstrated the active participation of 
the whole population in solving political issues.”2 In this way, GDR Review attempted to present 
the GDR as a true democracy where citizens were involved in decision-making and approved of 
the government. This narrative sought to contradict West German accusations that the GDR was 
a repressive dictatorship, a claim which only grew stronger after the Berlin Wall was constructed 
in 1961 to stop the hemorrhaging of East Germans fleeing to the West. The cultivation of an 
image capable of showing the GDR as the “better” Germany spanned numerous topics. Often 
articles in the magazines attempted to demonstrate how the attacks of the other or even the 
other’s positive self-representations could be warped, co-opted, or disproven. 
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The GDR did not have a monopoly on efforts to adapt and alter key narratives of the 
FRG. To that end, an October 1966 article in Scala International, “Work Without Worry,” 
showed how the FRG had established laws to protect workers from employment concerns. 
“These laws exist in the Federal Republic of Germany to guarantee the social existence and 
standard of living of the individual. It is their object to ensure that in this respect at least the 
individual is free from worry.”3 The article described how workers in the Federal Republic had a 
dependable social safety net, strong 
worker protection laws, and great 
prosperity. The dominant image 
accompanying the article was a 
drawing by Käthe Kollwitz, 
“Weavers on the March” 
commemorating the famous 
Silesian weavers uprising of 1844. 
This image coopts one of the 
foundational narratives of the GDR by laying claim to a key moment in workers’ rights that the 
GDR used to root socialism in Germany while justifying their own trajectory as the inheritors of 
all that was progressive in German history. These two narratives, first of the GDR as a 
democracy designed to counter accusations of dictatorship and second of the FRG as the German 
workers’ paradise, were not the core to each state’s self-identity. In fact, they were representative 
of key narratives of the other Germany. What these articles show, however, is the intimate 
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interconnection of each Germany’s identity and self-representation, as well as the intense 
competition that would emerge in the 1960s Cold War where each state worked to top the other. 
Cold War competition manifested itself in divided Germany in various ways. Physical 
division through creation of border zones and the Berlin Wall mirrored ideological and political 
confrontation and hostility. East Germany dominated in terms of foreign cultural policy during 
the 1950s, but by the early 1960s, a genuine rivalry emerged between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic Republic. West Germans became determined to both 
combat negative impressions of their state fostered by the East and to promote themselves abroad 
as the “good, rich uncle from Europe.”4 Although the East/West German rivalry in foreign 
cultural policy reached full expression only in the 1960s, the legacies of the 1950s endured. 
Thus, the earlier battlegrounds of Western audiences—and also the so-called “Third World” and 
non-aligned countries—continued to serve as important markers for the success of German 
image creation. In tone, Eastern accusatory and inflammatory articles criticized the West for 
revanchist militarism, which in turn provoked Western derision and dismissal of the East as 
totalitarian propagandists. 
Although less terrifying than nuclear weapons, the cultural struggle of the Cold War was 
nonetheless a fierce point of contention between the two blocs. Ideology, via culture, fought for 
the “hearts and minds” of people throughout the world, and the Germanys provided a clear 
microcosm of the Cold War “as an ideological struggle for competing visions of modernity.”5 
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This struggle involved one side pitting its vision of “socialist development as the path for nations 
to gain wealth, power, security, and justice” while the other focused on liberal development 
though “stages of growth.”6 According to Michael Hunt, ideology is an “interrelated set of 
convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexity of a particular slice of reality to easily 
comprehensible terms and suggests and appropriate way of dealing with that reality.”7 Naoko 
Shibusawa offers a further inflection to argue that ideologies are personified “binary, 
anthropomorphic figures. This is how an entire country could be depicted and acted upon as if it 
were a singular, developing human being.”8 These conceptions show how ideology and culture 
become deployed simultaneously in foreign cultural policy and magazines like GDR Review and 
Scala International. These magazines utilized an “everyday operationalization” of standard 
practices, events, and life, often portrayed in photographs, in their countries to reflect their 
culture and ideology, and ultimately, in some sense, deployed them as tools for their own 
interests.  
Article topics and themes varied somewhat in GDR Review and Scala International both 
between issues and between the magazines, but two central markers of difference received 
consistent emphasis in both publications during the 1960s: redevelopment/rebuilding of a 
prosperous society and women’s role(s) in society. Despite a mutual rhetorical commitment to 
gender equality, ideological distinctions regarding gender roles resulted in different policies. 
Whereas a traditional ‘male breadwinner, female homemaker or part-time worker’ model was 
championed in West Germany by family, social and labor policies, in East Germany a dual-
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earner family ideal was fostered that expected full-time work even from married women and 
mothers and was supported by social and educational programs such as all-day childcare.9 Of 
course, this did not mean that the societies differed fundamentally in their gender division of 
labor the everyday life, as several studies demonstrated recently; women still were responsible 
for household and family also in the GDR.10 Despite lagging legal and practical movement 
towards gender equality in household and family in the 1950s and 1960s, the magazine articles 
show that rhetorical and political distinctions remained central to each state’s competitive 
articulation of their different identities. Several articles throughout the 1960s demonstrated this 
ideological and social wrangling, and in their contestations addressed broader political goals of 
the period including economic systems, modernization, prosperity, consumerism, and differing 
conceptions of freedom. 
The reconstruction and redevelopment of cities and industry in divided Germany 
unsurprisingly became a key theme of GDR Review and Scala International in the 1960s. 
Although the immediate rebuilding process was of critical importance in the 1950s, full 
rebuilding was hardly complete by that time. Historians of GDR housing reconstruction, such as 
Eli Rubin, have argued that building housing after the war in communities like Marzahn was 
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both an attempt to solve an acute and long-lasting housing crisis and a “manifestation of a 
utopian and modernist desire, especially intertwined with twentieth-century socialism.”11 Others, 
such as Emily Pugh, have examined how the construction of the built environment both 
influences and expresses the national identity of the two German states as they diverged from a 
shared history.12 The historiography on rebuilding and architecture offers a starting point from 
which the description of the rebuilding programs can proceed. The housing programs and the 
reconstruction of industry were key narratives for both the GDR and the FRG in their efforts to 
present a better Germany and establish a basis from which to further cultivate international 
connections.13 Furthermore, rebuilding homes, politics, and industry offered a similar everyday 
operationalization as the issue of women’s role in society. However, instead of different 
conceptions of gender roles, there was a competition on ideological lines to show which 
Germany had better redeveloped industry, cared-for workers, and established democracy. The 
mixed private/public model of the FRG and the public model of the GDR for reconstruction 
established a concrete ideological battleground situated in something fundamental for daily life: 
the home.14 
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By examining a key theme in the magazines—the roles of women in society—it is 
possible to see how an “everyday operationalization” of these images can reflect broader 
political and ideological concerns and goals for the German states. Women’s roles in society, 
shown via articles about fashion, housework, careers, etc., struck at the very core of identity for 
each state and presented a key point in the anthropomorphized representation of the GDR and 
FRG as understood by the readers of the magazines. Of course, clear political, ideological, and 
cultural issues were also important to the presentation in each magazine. At the same time, 
however, the creators of the magazines were strongly concerned with being dismissed as 
propaganda, and thus they tried to shift to issues that were less overtly political/ideological. 
Thus, everyday concerns and presentations of daily life were manipulated to somewhat more 
subtly demonstrate the political/ideological method. 
The relationship between the magazines, like the broader relationship between the 
German states, was fraught with multi-layered concerns including the need to pursue primary 
political goals, present a pleasant image of life in Germany, criticize the neighboring other, and 
address issues of concern for an international audience. To that end, the magazines had to work 
to fulfill these goals by presenting political goals via an “everyday operationalization” of articles 
and images on key themes that ostensibly informed the reader about life in Germany while they 
pushed an agenda. Over time, general themes emerged in the writing of the magazine that served 
to not only present positive and informative images, but could also be inflected with key political 
messages that served to advance foreign policy goals vis-à-vis the German other. In the 1960s, 
the competition for the mantle of the “better” Germany began in earnest. The new efforts of the 
FRG to combat the GDR-accentuated narratives of superiority spurred a mutual mirroring and 
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constant wrangling over image cultivation that found expression both in Scala International and 
GDR Review. 
Institutional Developments in the GDR 
Stefan Heymann, Head of the Press and Information Department of the MfAA, suggested 
to the ZK that there existed a number of problems in the general structure of the GDR’s foreign 
cultural policy. These issues included “the still insufficient coordination of the state offices and 
the social organizations” of the GDR and the lack of differentiation of foreign propaganda to 
specific countries and contexts. Among the “most important deficiencies” were also the 
“insufficient attention paid to West German foreign propaganda in our own work” and the “still 
insufficient mass appeal” of the GDR’s foreign propaganda. The key suggestion for resolving 
these issues was the adoption of a Foreign Propaganda Commission capable of bringing together 
different bureaucracies and forming a cohesive plan. When suggesting how to improve the 
appeal of foreign propaganda print publications, the memo was clear that there needed to be a 
greater focus on the specifically targeted countries and that the media should “in its presentation 
represent the GDR more so than heretofore.” The Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries (GKV) was assigned responsibility for this particular set of tasks and was to further 
increase circulation as well as offer some new publications for countries in Southeast Asia and to 
the Nordic Countries. This task was later to be absorbed by GDR Review as it expanded its print 
languages to include Indonesian, Norwegian, and Danish in the early 1960s. 15 
The response to some of these issues led to the development of a Commission for 
Cultural Foreign Relations under the direction of the Central Committee of the SED. This effort 
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began in 1958 and involved a series of conversations between different institutions, most often 
under the aegis of the MfAA. The prime objective of the Commission was to “coordinate all 
undertakings in the area of foreign cultural relations.” The Commission was also “authorized to 
give instructions to all state organizations with respect to these questions [cultural foreign 
relations].” Further, the commission served a key role with institutions like the GKV by setting 
up an organization that “counsels the social organizations with their planning and 
implementation” in line with the plans laid out from above. Finally, it also “determine[d] the 
cultural policy priorities in the nonsocialist foreign countries, confirm[ed] the work plans and the 
funds available for them.”16  
The commission was composed of members from a number of state organizations in the 
GDR, but was led by two representatives from the MfAA: Otto Winzer and Rudi Engel. The 
other organizations included the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of National Education, 
Ministry for Foreign Trade, Ministry for Inner German Trade, the Press and Information 
Department of the MfAA, Foreign Department of the ZK, the GKV, the Free German Trade 
Union, the State Sport Committee, and others. This constellation of institutions demonstrates the 
commitment to and complexity of GDR foreign cultural policy even as it shows the degree to 
which its efforts both required and were centrally coordinated under the supervision of the ZK. 
The key institution for the production of GDR Review in the 1950s and early 1960s, the GKV 
and later the League of Friendship Among the Peoples (LfV), were also to be “instructed directly 
through the task force [of the Commission],” which places this group’s work even closer in 
relation to GDR Review.17 
                                                             




The role of the GKV shifted with the founding of the so-called “umbrella organization” 
of the League for Friendship Among the Peoples on December 15, 1961.18 At this point, the LfV 
took over much of the responsibilities of the GKV in coordinating with the Friendship Societies 
that the GDR had formed with various states throughout the world, with the notable exception of 
the mass organization of the Society for Soviet and German Friendship.19 The GKV continued to 
coordinate and work in countries where it was not possible to create a friendship society, but the 
LfV handled the rest. The foundational tasks of the LfV were many, but the key directive was to 
“contribute to the realization of foreign policy tasks and in particular to strengthen the 
international reputation of the GDR abroad and to normalize inter-state relations.”20 While one of 
the key responsibilities of the LfV was to maintain coordination with the different friendship 
societies, it was also to be responsible for the “production or provision of publications…and 
other materials and for their distribution,” thereby replacing the GkV as the key coordinating 
social organization working with the state publisher of GDR Review, Zeit im Bild. While it was 
not an explicitly state-run organization, its place in the foreign policy pecking order of the GDR 
was clear: it was to take orders from the state and party institutions of the GDR because “its 
activity is based on the principles of foreign policy of the GDR and the corresponding decisions 
of the responsible bodies.” Thus, the key intermediary organization underwent a transition in the 
early 1960s, but much of the structures of the 1950s where decisions were centrally made and 
                                                             
18 “League of the German Democratic Republic For Friendship Among the Peoples Founded,” GDR Review, 1/1962. 
19 BArch Lichterfelde SAPMO DY 30/ J IV 2/3/777 Protokoll Nr. 60/61 of the Sitting of the Secretariat of the 
Central Committee, Attachment 3, November 21, 1961. 
20 BArch Lichterfelde SAPMO DY 30/J IV 2/3/777 Nov 21, 1961 
97 
 
implemented by social organizations at least generally remained the same, with the notable 
exception of a drive for greater coordination. 21 
While institutional changes marked a departure for the GDR, the thematic shift of the era 
occurred in the late 1950s and endured through to the middle of the 1960s. One of the 
motivations for this adaptation was the foreign minister conference at Genf where representatives 
from the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France met to discuss the German 
Question in the spring and summer of 1959. According to a report suggesting improvements to 
foreign propaganda, the Geneva conference had resulted in a situation where the “constantly 
growing superiority of the socialist camp over the capitalist states found its expression in the de 
facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic.” Although the GDR still lacked official 
diplomatic recognition from much of the world, the report claimed the movement of the Western 
powers towards de facto recognition was due to the growing influence of the Soviet Union and 
the GDR in the “Bandung states” (Indonesia) and the Nordic countries. To further the 
recognition, approval, and international legitimation of the GDR, it sought to first double down 
on the narrative that the GDR was a key factor in preserving international peace “against the 
aggressive West German militarism.”22  
The GDR’s thematic approach to foreign cultural policy was further subdivided 
according to Cold War geopolitical distinctions. The GDR’s approach to image presentation 
towards the socialist countries was to emphasize that if the GDR were to achieve the primary 
economic tasks of 1961, then it would be a boost for all socialist nations and to further 
popularize and demonstrate the socialist character of the GDR. Among non-aligned countries 
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(referred to in the GDR memo as non-socialist, anti-imperialistic states) the objective was to 
show that the GDR was a key force for the preservation of peace. In addition, the GDR claimed 
that “for those states who won their freedom and independence against imperialism and 
neocolonialism and especially for those still struggling, the new position of the GDR will be an 
important help” because the government of the GDR supported them. At the same time, the 
suggestions recognized that many of these countries had normal diplomatic relations with the 
FRG and not the GDR. The MfAA argued that unilateral relations with the FRG served only to 
buttress the forces of militarism and revanchism and to weaken their true supporters, the GDR. 
For capitalist countries, the key was to emphasize the emerging economic strength of the GDR 
“as the fifth industrial power in Europe” and to advocate that the GDR must be present and 
agreeable to any decisions made regarding the German Question.23 
In the competitive Cold War environment of the mid-1960s, GDR Review—along with 
the GDR’s foreign cultural policy more generally—sought to tip the strategic balance in their 
favor by maintaining connections within the socialist bloc and expanding efforts with capitalist 
and non-aligned countries. According to the “Plan for Strengthening of the Political and Cultural 
Work of the GDR in Socialist Countries,” produced in 1964, the primary goal was “the winning 
of as broad as possible support of these countries [socialist] for the GDR.” When focusing on 
socialist countries, GDR foreign cultural policy tended to emphasize economic growth. For 
instance, in a listing of key factors in improving the relations of the GDR to the socialist bloc, the 
GDR was to appeal to socialist community via “the explanation and concrete demonstration, that 
the economic competition between the GDR and West Germany is a nexus of the economic 
competition between both world systems.” Furthermore, the plan argued that the key point was 
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convincing socialist countries that if the “GDR can prove its superiority on an economic level 
over the imperialist Western Germany it would be of great significance for all countries in 
COMECON.” At the same time, the GDR sought to exploit fears of West German militarism and 
revanchism among the socialist countries. For instance, it claimed that “Bonn’s revanchist policy 
[was] the primary reason for tension in Europe,” citing the potential for atomic arming, 
multilateral agreements (almost certainly NATO), and the refusal to recognize and accept the 
GDR. West German efforts in socialist countries, according to GDR reports, included the attempt 
to show West German companies as more dependable and better trade partners. They 
strengthened this attempt with print material and production magazines sent to the socialist 
countries. Further, the GDR was greatly concerned about radio, film, and newspapers coming to 
the socialist countries from the FRG. 24  
In the middle of the 1960s, the struggle sharpened between the GDR and the FRG due to 
broader Cold War competition such as a shift in West German policy to Ostpolitik and the 
Vietnam War. The GDR attempted to forge a balance in its foreign cultural policy between 
positive propaganda for the GDR and attacking propaganda against the FRG to the ratio of 
75:25.25 GDR Review was one key magazine with the broadest readership focused on the 
Western World and Asia, while other magazines focused on different geographic areas. GDR 
Review had 65,000 copies produced in 1966. DDR, the magazine for the socialist countries, had 
the highest total with 130,000 copies. Other magazines for Africa (News with 32,000 copies), 
Arabic countries (Al Matschalle with 50,000), and Latin America (Puente with 10,000 copies) 
provide a further glimpse in to the areas in which the GDR worked to place the majority of its 
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influence. As the 1960s wore on, certain topics were also of key importance in the presentation 
of foreign cultural policy. Berlin as the capital city remained central to the GDR’s self-definition, 
while celebrating the twenty years of the GDR’s existence offered a chance to reify foundation 
narratives and also further demonstrate the strength and longevity of the GDR in the face of FRG 
attempts at delegitimization. 
As the 1960s wore on, members of the MfAA recognized that the Cold War contest 
between themselves and the FRG was intensifying. In the Foreign Policy Conception for 1966, 
the MfAA identified that the power of socialism in the world was growing, but that it faced 
significant challenges. At the same time, great opportunities emerged for the GDR, and the 
socialist bloc more generally, to expand their influence to newly founded nation states in Asia 
and Africa that “are stepping in to the second stage of their revolution and with a non-capitalist 
path received a qualitatively higher level of their development.” At the same time, the report 
cited “progressive interior developments in the imperialist powers” including “massive solidarity 
actions” that could also offer opportunities for the GDR to target new audiences. In keeping with 
Marxist conceptions of development, the report argued that 1966 marked the high point of 
capitalism and that these powers “will not become stronger, but more aggressive” as they sought 
to keep their place in the world. Further optimism was warranted because “the intensification of 
the internal contradictions could open up, in certain circumstances, new opportunities to further 
develop contact and the improvement of the political, economic and cultural relations of the 
GDR to these countries.”26  
The GDR’s conception of the Cold War contest between not just the superpowers, but 
also the German states as a key component profoundly influenced some of their presentations in 
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foreign cultural policy that emerged in the mid-to-late 1960s. Key political objectives that would 
frame the articulation of the GDR’s image and foreign cultural policy included, among others, 
helping Vietnam while showing the aggression of the USA, the coordination of further actions 
against atomic weapons and revanchist politics, rejecting the Hallstein Doctrine, and countering 
“cultural-ideological diversion attempts in the socialist countries, and resolving issues over West 
Berlin.” For African, Asian, and Latin American states, the report argued the GDR should focus 
on the “basis of objective development facts” like social and economic development process and 
an understanding of class power. The plan for non-aligned countries had shifted to a clearer 
focus on economic development even as it maintained arguments for class solidarity. When 
targeting Western Europe, it focused on “the further development of the policy of the GDR 
towards European security and cooperation.”27 
In effect, this referred to efforts of the GDR to peel West Germany out of NATO, to 
prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons in the FRG, and to present themselves as a safeguard 
for peace. The hope was to work towards a further isolation of the FRG in regards to Western 
European allies by attacking the FRG over former Nazis, economic expansion to Western 
Europe, and the supposed military danger of the FRG in its complicity with American 
imperialism. The plan for Western Europe thus remained largely the same, but had an added 
dimension of sowing dissension within the Western Bloc. The interaction between foreign 
cultural policy and domestic policy in the GDR was simultaneously developed through an 
argument that the GDR worked “for the national interest of the German people” by “opposing 
Bonn’s anti-national policy with our [the GDR’s] constructive peace policy.”28 Through these 
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efforts, the “state consciousness of the citizens of the GDR is further strengthened, the policy of 
the GDR is made more convincingly clear to West German citizens” and the GDR became a 
“more visible as a real anti-imperialistic, anticolonial, and peace-maintaining alternative to 
Bonn’s policy.”29 
To convince capitalist countries that the GDR’s claims were correct and that the GDR 
would and should provide a positive alternative to the FRG, the GDR doubled down on their 
efforts of foreign cultural policy. For instance, when sensing that the French were pulling away 
from the Western powers, the report suggested, “all forms, means, and ways have to be used in 
order to bring on our suggestions to the public of capitalist countries.” This was to be done via 
the “manufacturing and development of semi-official political contacts and relations as well as 
official state relations in the areas of trade and culture.” When these connections were not 
available, the GDR turned to “Auslandsinformation” that was more controlled by the MfAA than 
it had been before to allow for a “more purposeful and differentiated foreign information in order 
to achieve a unified, corresponding international political orientation and maximal concentration 
of means.”30 The presentation of the GDR in this campaign was to focus on the economic 
development and its nature as the peaceful and anti-imperialistic state, even as it presented the 
neocolonialism and revanchism of its German rival. The persistent emphasis on the need to 
differentiate the GDR’s approaches to foreign cultural policy based on local contexts further 
illustrates the extent to which this effort, first identified in the 1950s, remained an aspiration 
rather than a reality. More concrete campaigns in foreign cultural policy for the GDR included a 
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commemoration of anniversaries, the celebration of Berlin as the capital of the GDR and the 
achievements in the socialist education system and socialist mass production.31 
In sum, the GDR’s institutional developments represented a general drive towards 
refining, centralizing, and better articulating the same core goals of the 1950s, with some 
alteration in image and message presentation. The GDR was still not recognized by most 
countries in the world throughout the 1960s, and its rivalry with West Germany was, if anything, 
more strained by issues such as the construction of the Berlin Wall and a global rise in Cold War 
antagonism. At the same time as the GDR worked to establish its own connections in the 
capitalist world, it grew concerned about West German efforts to make inroads in the socialist 
bloc. This sense of insecurity fed an increasingly acerbic series of attacks on the FRG as 
imperialistic, revanchist, militarist, national socialist, and more. These articulations set up a 
narrative by which a “better” Germany could be defined. If one was oppressive, exploitative, and 
militaristic (the FRG), then the other that opposed it was to simultaneously reject those features, 
at least in propaganda like GDR Review. The global nature of the Cold War also paved the way 
for the GDR to use the East/West ideological, economic, and even cultural divide as a means 
through which it could encourage otherwise disinterested states that the German Question, and 
more importantly the recognition of the GDR, mattered. To the degree that it could convince 
readers of this, the presentation of the GDR as a progressive state with a thriving economy could 
then serve as a basis for establishing deeper relations which could culminate in full diplomatic 
recognition and a further rebalancing of the international diplomatic scales with West Germany. 
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Institutional Developments in the FRG 
The Federal Republic correctly identified the GDR’s distinct early advantage in the 1950s 
when it came to producing high-quality publications in the area of foreign cultural policy. The 
emerging GDR campaigns, which were significantly higher in both quality and quantity than 
West German efforts, stimulated corresponding operations in the BPA and the Foreign Office. 
Specifically, this goal crystallized into a plan for a magazine that could counter GDR Review. 
While calls for this response were bogged down in budgetary and departmental conflicts for 
many years, in 1961 the BPA, in conjunction with the Foreign Office, began to produce what 
they called a “prestige magazine” named SCALA International. Modelled after Life Magazine, 
this production aimed to be of higher quality than GDR Review while making its messages more 
subtle.  
Scala International emerged in 1961 as the Federal Republic’s direct response to the 
threat posed by GDR Review. The magazine was contracted out to the Frankfurter Societäts 
Druckerei (FSD) by the Bundes Presse und Informationsamt in 1961. In the contracts between 
FSD and the BPA, the magazine’s distribution was set to be a range of 340,000 to 400,000 
copies per month. The magazine typically had forty-eight pages, thirty-three in one color and 
then fifteen more in four-color print format.32 FSD published Scala International in English, 
French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and Indonesian in the 1960s.33 The distribution of 
Scala International varied from those copies distributed freely to West German consulates and 
other locations and those that were commercially distributed. For example, in October 1963, the 
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Foreign Office placed an order for 8,050 copies to be distributed in a month in German, English, 
French, and Spanish at their various consulates.34 In June 1964, another 100,000 were 
commercially distributed, some 78,000 in individual sales and another 22,000 in regular 
subscriptions.35  
Scala International operated with a different understanding than GDR Review when it 
came to how to approach issues of the day. Instead of overt political goals covered by a thin 
veneer of life in the GDR, Scala embraced a style that used international topics and issues 
designed to win over broad swathes of readers to an appreciation of West Germany. While the 
FRG remained a key topic and was always at least a background to all articles, there was in 
general much greater variety seeking to include, for example, women discarding the veil in 
Afghanistan or new farming technologies being adapted in various postcolonial African states. 
The intent with these articles was primarily audience appeal, but also an attempt to demonstrate 
West German largesse, advancement, and cosmopolitanism.  
In July 1963, Werner Wirthle, editor of Scala International, wrote to Dr. Zühlsdorf of the 
BPA to explain that while Scala International was a political magazine, it still needed to be 
interesting enough to read. The root of this discussion was from a conversation with 
Staatssekretär von Hase, who told Wirthle “there are critics who are of the opinion that ‘Scala 
International’ has too few political topics and that it is too entertaining in character.”36 Wirthle 
countered by stating that Scala International was explicitly a “political magazine” and that “if a 
consumer publication should be successful, it must be designed so that the reader willingly picks 
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it up, and wants to read it.”37 The central goal of Scala, as Wirthle identified it, was certainly that 
it should “advertise the free Germany,” but he argued that strategically this did not mean that all 
articles could or should be about the Federal Republic. 
The inclusion of articles on topics outside of the FRG was meant to make the magazine 
more appealing for international audiences and to further demonstrate the modernity of West 
Germans. Wirthle stated that Scala “should incorporate international topics not only to 
compensate for the political objectives that we bring in to the magazine with generally 
interesting material, but also to show that in the German Federal Republic a cosmopolitan [open-
minded] spirit predominates.” Further, according to Wirthle, there was the baseline issue of 
likeability (Liebenswürdigkeit) such that he and others “know which prejudices about us 
Germans prevail in the world and it must be one of the tasks of such a magazine to refute these 
prejudices through an example.” Wirthle goes on to cite “a well-known maxim for all 
propaganda is that propaganda is good if it is, as much as possible, not noticed by the public and 
perceived as propaganda.” To that end, he proposed that “for likeability, the substance should 
appear as light as possible and not ponderous. The so-called ‘human interests’ should be fostered 
and maybe let us appear in the eyes of some readers as sympathetic.” Further, by citing certain 
locations in the magazine, readers would be more likely to identify with the magazine, and by 
extension, the ideas it espoused. There was no mention of attacking the GDR in Scala, despite 
AA discussions of counter-propaganda campaigns. Instead, as was seen in the magazine’s 
content, the GDR was only very obliquely referred to and it was, for the most part, left out 
entirely.38 





While international issues and topics were to be the focus of Scala International, 
according to Wirthle, this did “not stop handling international topics from a German 
perspective.” The aim was to be convincing in this international style with topics that would 
guide readers to “begin with my perspective” and thus come to support West German efforts. To 
defend the magazine from criticism, Wirthle cited general strategic approaches, the labor and 
sophistication of his editors, and the great deal of reader feedback from articles published in 
1961 and 1962. For example, Wirthle suggested that the magazine reoriented some of their 
strategy from the early years where letters stated that “Scala International was a magazine that 
wanted to prove the saying: ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles.’” To avoid this issue, the 
magazine transitioned to “being more careful and letting German achievements be presented in 
relation to or in the middle of achievements of other peoples.” For example, reader feedback on 
the article “Auf Europas Wasserwegen” was highly positive because it was sufficiently 
internationalized and “readers were interested in European topics.” Furthermore, Wirthle 
characterized certain article types as appealing to different groups internationally. For example, 
technical and medical topics appealed to readers in developing countries, while articles about 
schools and the elderly were equally important to show off the Federal Republic to other areas. 
In concluding, Wirthle identified that Scala’s goal was not to practice cultural propaganda, but to 
provide a complete image of the Federal Republic.39 In short, Wirthle provided Zühlsdorf with a 
comprehensive look at the strategic philosophy of Scala International in the 1960s. It moved 
from being overtly focused on propagandistic topics in the early 1960s to a cosmopolitan 
presentation inflected with positive views of life in the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
process of justifying these approaches to government officials demonstrates the complex 




interplay inherent to a semi-privatized state propaganda magazine. The expert, Wirthle, 
contended that propaganda needed to be delicate, nuanced, and sophisticated while tailored to 
appeal to broad and varied audiences. This was in opposition to those in the Federal Republic 
looking for a clear tool to provide overt and glorifying images of the “free” Germany. 
Other pressures outside of the Foreign Office also guided the design of Scala 
International, including private industry comments and attacks from the GDR. For a good 
portion of its funding, Scala International relied on advertisers such as Mercedes, Nikon, 
Datsun, Sharp, and more. In a budget report in October 1964 from Winter of the Foreign Office, 
he stated that industry representatives in the FRG desired that “the magazine should report on 
fewer international issues, but rather should inform more than heretofore about Germany and its 
relations with the world.” Further, “it should not be ‘scala international’ but rather ‘scala 
Deutschland.’”40 In particular, these industry representatives were frustrated by the presence of a 
large number of advertisements for Japanese firms such as Nikon showing up in the magazine, 
because they detracted from a focus on German brands. 
This objection did not stop some, such as Dr. Fehr, the head of Inter Nationes, from using 
Japanese advertisements as a model for Scala to follow. For example, he stated that “the 
Japanese send out their foreign advertisements with the understanding that their greatest 
handicap is the antipathy against the ‘image’ of the japs.”41 The tactic that Fehr latched on to in 
his suggestions for German advertising was the greater presence of people in the advertisements 
over machines, and, in particular, the need to “emphasize charming young women as a trick to 
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convey a sympathetic perception of Japan.” According to Fehr the result was “an increase in 
consumer willingness to buy Japanese products,” that he hoped would make it so that “our 
advertising bosses could be convinced to help with conveying a sympathetic image of 
Germany.”42 This holistic approach to incorporating corporate advertisements as a necessary, 
natural, and useful tool in the presentation of the Federal Republic is representative of a general 
strategy hoping to bind government and private industry for a hybridized approach to cultural 
diplomacy. Tactically, it also showed a clear understanding of how images of women could and 
did play a vital role in presenting a new, sympathetic Germany abroad. 
The strategies of the GDR also played a central role in guiding the approaches of the 
FRG to cultural diplomacy, and in particular, Scala International. A report from the Foreign 
Office to all the diplomatic embassies of the FRG in May 1962 identified the primary goals, 
strategies, and topics of GDR propaganda vis-à-vis the FRG as well as some ideas on how to 
combat the GDR’s attacks. The memo cited the construction of the Berlin Wall as a key event in 
this new wave of propaganda as an attempt “to divert the attention of the worldwide public that 
has been especially critical since the construction of the wall.” According to the memo, the 
campaign was designed “in order to undermine the esteem and trustworthiness of the FRG by 
Western allies and neutral peoples and in order to build stronger connections with Eastern 
European satellite peoples through fear” of West German renazification and remilitarization. 
More specifically, in the West “the propaganda is aimed at the FRG as a risk zone exiting from 
NATO and therefore collapsing European defense and integration.” In the “Bloc-free” nations 
and the Eastern Bloc, the key of GDR propaganda was to show “the Federal Republic as an 
instrument of the steady decline of doomed capitalism that wants to bring the young states in to 




neocolonial dependence and rearming for a revanchist war against the East.” The general arc, 
according to the report, was to “divert all sympathy to the Soviet Zone, which is camouflaged 
under the ‘German flag.’”43 
To counter these approaches, the report suggested that the FRG should show the 
totalitarian similarities between the “SBZ” and Hitlerism. As examples it proposed the 
prosecution of political opponents, concentration camps, militaristic upbringing of youth, 
coordination [Gleichschaltung] of press and radio, state unions as instruments of the Socialist 
Unity Party, and more. Furthermore, it tried to turn the Weißbuch/Braunbuch narrative on its 
head by arguing “these examples also clarify why the communists in the zone are successful 
because a great amount of former Nazis became functionaries of this system.” A juxtaposition of 
these characteristics with the “rule of law character” of the Federal Republic rooted in its 
foundation on a “classical basis of basic rights, free and secret voting, press freedom, and 
autonomy of trade unions” offered a way to combat GDR accusations. While the Foreign Office 
recommended these strategies to counter the negative propaganda of the GDR, it was also aware 
that the attacks should not be addressed directly. In fact, they recommended that “As far as 
possible, the foreign consulates (Auslandsvertretungen) should avoid justifying themselves in 
public against…claims from the zonal regime.” Instead, there could be reporting on radical right 
groups within the FRG that could show “the actual ‘Nazis’ do not sit in leading government 
positions like communist propaganda claims, but rather lead a meaningless, isolated existence 
separate from democratic society.” By offering indirect responses, the FRG hoped to counter the 
work of the GDR, who they claimed “act according to the pre-existing practiced recipe of 
Goebbels, through constant repetition of the same themes that rely on the contexts of public 
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opinion and seek to influence people in the desired sense.”44 Of course, in 1962 Scala 
International did not yet exist, but it was known in foreign policy circles that this magazine on 
the horizon would become a necessary counter to the propaganda of the GDR. The tactics and 
strategies laid out here show a close watch and keen awareness of GDR plans and strategies that 
would influence the material presented in Scala.  
The correspondence between the producers of Scala International, Frankfurter Societäts 
Druckerei, the Federal Press and Information Office, and to a lesser extent the Foreign Office, 
shows a close relationship between the public and private nature of the magazine. In fact, the 
magazine, while remaining in tone somewhat distinct, took BPA requests quite seriously and 
tended to follow them. For example, in a letter to Dr. Zühlsdorf of the BPA, Wirthle stated that 
he changed the copyright in Scala from “Printed in Western Germany,” because “we have 
discussed your request and in number five that is going to print now, the designation of origin is 
changed to ‘Printed in Germany.’”45 Other correspondence, such as a January 1965 letter from 
Wirthle to Ministry Director (Ministerialdirigent) Günter Diehl of the BPA, focused on article 
topics. In this letter, Wirthle asked for approval from Diehl regarding an article about the shifting 
borders of Germany over the last 100 years. Wirthle claimed it “is already the most difficult and 
awkward topic that we handled in ‘scala,’ probably because the border came in to policy 
discussion.”46 Wirthle had already consulted an academic, Professor Freud, about the contents, 
who informed him that “from a scholarly perspective there is no objection to the text,” but the 
key issue was that Wirthle did not want to publish the article before he had Diehl’s agreement. 
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This was largely due to showing Germany’s borders in a series of maps, including one from 
1866, 1871, 1914, and 1918, and “present day Germany.”47 More concretely, funding also played 
a key role when, for example, Werner Wirthle requested support of a prize competition in Scala 
International for its readers with the argument that “For this we represent the FRG abroad with 
our magazine, especially in the developing countries as the so-to-say good, rich uncle from 
Europe.”48 These examples demonstrate that the BPA played an intimate role in guiding and 
overseeing the production of Scala, the language of its presentation, and article topics. This, 
especially when paired with the issues of attracting advertisers shows how the interplay between 
private business, government directives, and specialized publishers culminated in the production 
of Scala. More importantly, it shows that Scala International was not an entirely independent 
entity and that much of its material was determined from above, albeit with a great deal of 
general latitude. This room to maneuver was, however, sufficient to make asking the BPA 
leadership about a specific article something of an exception. Politically sensitive topics were, 
unsurprisingly, of greater interest to the BPA, and thus Wirthle made sure to clear issues with the 
BPA leadership and independent experts. 
As the 1960s wore on, the FRG conducted further analyses of GDR propaganda, seeking 
to discover where the material was sent, what the GDR’s arguments were, and how effective 
they were. The analysis was gathered from three studies conducted by The Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung to examine the principles and methods of the foreign propaganda of the Soviet Bloc. The 
GDR’s claims that the FRG was both revanchist and a neocolonial power persisted in this report 
from February 1966. Revanchism tended to target “old Nazis” in politics as well as refugee 
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groups. The report cited two texts: “Braunbuch: Kriegs- und Naziverbrecher in führenden 
Positionen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” and “From Ribbentrop to Adenauer.” The 
revanchist argument cited the FRG as “the only state in Europe with territorial claims” that “they 
want to assert with military means.”49 The neocolonial argument took a new approach, however, 
by attacking FRG development aid as “an instrument of political paternalism (Hallstein-Doktrin) 
or an instrument of exploitation and plunder.”50 
 FRG evaluation of GDR “positive propaganda” identified a series of “apologetic” efforts 
and connection building via friendship societies. According to the FRG’s evaluation, “in their 
[the GDR] apologetic portion regarding the charge of the terror system and the construction of 
the wall, the SBZ justified its activities by claiming that each nation has the right to protect itself 
against provocation, sabotage, aggression, and entitlement.” This strategy dovetailed nicely with 
the efforts of the GDR to portray the FRG as an aggressive state seeking to upend the postwar 
order. At the same time, by cultivating friendship societies, economic connections and 
demonstrating GDR interest in foreign cultures, the evaluation found that some GDR efforts had 
become stronger and more effective. For instance, with the founding of the journal Neue Heimat, 
GDR efforts to form bonds with Germans abroad had improved.51 At the same time, the 
conclusion of city partnerships and intense focus on states like Chile, Mali, VAR, Syria, India, 
and Indonesia indicated an attempt to undermine the Alleinvertretungsrecht of the Hallstein 
Doctrine through informal means.  
                                                             
49 BArch Koblenz B145/2389 Band VI Attachment to short minutes about House Meeting on 2.21966 “Synopsis of 





Subverting the diplomatic isolation imposed on the GDR by the Federal Republic was 
quite difficult, as the FRG report found “the non-aligned countries have, in general, little interest 
in inner-German differentiation and the defamation of the Federal Republic of Germany.” The 
key point of exception to this issue, however, was in the “defamation campaign against the 
foreign policy of the Federal Republic in respect to the non-aligned countries” which was 
“fruitful” when considering issues such as the armament aid of the FRG to Portugal and South 
Africa. The Federal Republic attempted to impose its will to combat these efforts through 
diplomatic intervention in the Third World such as when it asked Burma’s government to cease 
distribution of the pamphlet “Neokolonialismus der BRD.”52 That said, the GDR would then 
further emphasize their friendship societies to use locals to speak against the FRG, and had some 
success with societies closer to home in France and Greece against the Federal Republic. 
The Federal Republic was aware that the GDR’s emphasis on and funds for propaganda 
proved much greater than those of the FRG. When writing about these findings, the report 
identified economic, political, and cultural funding as all contributing to propaganda. By making 
these claims, the report bolstered the funding interests of the AA and the BPA, but was also not 
factually inaccurate given the ideological and strategic efforts of the GDR’s propaganda. But, in 
the final evaluation, the Federal Republic found that “the expectations that the Zone established 
have not been met, irrespective of the amount of resources given.”53 The report stated the 
findings for success of GDR propaganda among the Auslandsdeutschen, particularly those in the 
USA, Canada, and South America, was not sufficient to make a judgment, but they were still 
quite concerned about the GDR’s efforts in the non-aligned countries. 
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Though in general Scala International worked to avoid the overtly political tones of its 
East German counterpart, it nonetheless had key political purpose. For instance, in the early 
editions of 1961/1962, Scala-published articles like “When Stones Scream” had “an 
overwhelming picture of the wall and a caption that limited itself to facts clearly pointed out the 
illegality of the Berlin Wall.” Further, “the problem of the partition of Germany is always 
discussed in ‘Scala.’ For example, in the major article ‘They Chose Freedom’ (Three million 
Germans fled from the communist ruled part to our lands in the Federal Republic.)” However, 
these topics diminished as the sixties wore on, and instead the BPA recognized that “one of our 
tasks is also to point out the social progress of the German Federal Republic and the great 
success of our reconstruction.”54 
 (Re)construction and (Re)development in Divided Germany 
 The rebuilding of both Germanys after the destruction of the Second World War and the 
parallel development of industries there served as a key theme in both GDR Review and Scala 
International. In GDR Review, articles demonstrated that advanced industries including plane, 
ship, and automobile manufacturing were well-developed and sophisticated. In Scala 
International, the chemical industry, automobiles, and trade fairs were promoted, as well as a 
softening presentation of worker welfare, such as articles about trade unions. These articles on 
one level provide a general image of development, prosperity, and productivity. On another, they 
developed key political messages to international audiences clearly inflected by concerns over 
opposing messages promoted by the neighboring other. 
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Rebuilding the GDR 
 In the January 1958 article, “Turbo-Jets Invade Civil Aviation,” GDR Review presents a 
developing industry that places the GDR near the forefront of airplane manufacturing despite 
serious structural disadvantages. This fits with the general narrative promoted by the GDR about 
how they had to overcome severe deficits, such as when the skilled Dresden worker Richard 
Kurth was forced to participate in “improvisations” and to “put aside his spanners and wrenches 
and exchanged them for pick and shovel.”55 The burden of the Nazi past was also evident in the 
article, as Richard Kurth “frustrated the blowing up of the Klotzche airbase installations ordered 
by the Nazis.”56 Or when the magazine discussed how “the subsequent ten years [after 1945] of 
enforced idleness in the field—brought on by the German people themselves as a result of the 
war—had made them lose touch with the stormy advance of aircraft design in the intervening 
period.” In overcoming these obstacles, GDR Review clarified that the Soviet Union, as 
benevolent brother, “gave our specialists an opportunity of studying the most recent 
developments in Soviet aircraft factories and so catch up with the rest of the world in technical 
know-how.”57 
 The article also demonstrates a key transition of the Eastern part of Germany to a 
peaceful power. Heinz Korwitz, the foreman of the Wing section, who had been an apprentice in 
the factory in 1944, stated, “‘Formerly we used to build bombers and fighters.’”, but that “‘today, 
I help to make passenger planes in which I may one day fly myself.’” The cultivation of a new 
civilian jet plane “is but a reflection of the fast all-around advance of the GDR as a modern 
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industrial state,” demonstrating not only the rebuilding of the GDR, but also its capacity to 
produce advanced technology. Furthermore, the jet plane model 152 was “the first built again in 
Germany since the end of World War II and, after over twenty years, the first model of a civil 
aircraft and not of a warplane.”58 
 The photographs accompanying the article further 
reinforce key political messages while also developing other 
agendas. For instance, several images of airplane manufacturing 
show the highly technical and advanced stage of GDR 
manufacturing. Most portray passenger planes in various stages of 
construction, but some also push the topic a bit further. For 
example, one image demonstrates how “Improved types of 
revolving equipment make work easier” where a man and a 
woman screw bolts on. Another accompanying image shows a 
woman working on a plane with the caption, “Women workers are no rarity in Dresden’s aircraft 
industry,” placing an even earlier point to the narrative about women’s role in society found later 
in the 1960s.59  
 Put shortly, the GDR advances its narratives about progressive women’s work in society, 
its peaceful aspirations, its profound economic recovery, and a clear demarcation from the Nazi 
past even as it builds connections with the West. Passenger jets shown in the article serve to 
connect to cities like Warsaw and Moscow, but also placed its factory as “the biggest steel 
structural shed in Western Europe.” The Stakhanovite Kurth from the article serves as the 
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consummate worker willing to do whatever work was necessary to rebuild the GDR, while new 
cadres of engineers and pilots leave behind the fascist legacy to transition from bombers to 
civilian jets. The image one gets here does not refer specifically to West Germany, but places the 
GDR quite clearly at the forefront of the German-German conversation by demonstrating its 
significant advancement and preeminence in creating the “first” German jet plane since the end 
of the war. Narratives of the West German Wirtschaftswunder further inflect the depictions here, 
and the GDR allows for both why they are behind, “because where in 1954 the farmer was 
driving the plough across the fields, large factory buildings have risen,” and how they are now 
reaching parity through “the combined efforts of enthusiastic and devoted scientists, engineers, 
and workers.”60 
 In the article “City With a Future,” GDR Review showed that great cities in the GDR 
faced enormous challenges in rebuilding after the destruction of the Second World War. The 
author, Herbert Schneider, 
the chief architect of the 
city of Dresden, set up a 
clear comparison to the 
West in the opening line, 
stating: “It is hardly 
surprising to note the 
considerable interest 
which the Dresden 
rebuilding plans have 
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evoked, not only in the German Democratic Republic and in West Germany, but also abroad.” 
The aerial bombing of the city in February 1945 led to massive destruction, which (according to 
the article) killed 35,000 people. Within a 5.8 square mile area, “every sign of life was 
extinguished and there seemed little hope of recovery.” Industrial, residential, and craft areas 
faced “utter devastation,” according to the narrative. Among this destruction were 75,358 
dwellings totally destroyed, 11,500 seriously damaged, and 7,106 with medium damage, and 
80,936 with minor damage. However, the key turning point in the discussion was that “this 
gruesome scene of desolation, instead of throwing the mass of citizens into despair, it filled them 
with the desire to help with and take an active part in shaping the future character of the city.”61  
 The reconstruction of Dresden was heavily debated, but according to the article these 
arguments ended with “full agreement that it must be cast in a mold essentially its own.” 
Dresden required particular considerations due to features like “a number of outstanding 
architectural monuments that are worth preserving,” its role “as an important industrial town,” 
and the existence of a number of colleges and research institutes there. With these considerations 
in mind, the chief architect set out an “overriding principle that guides all architectural 
planning,” which was “to preserve the typical profile of Dresden and, where possible, emphasize 
it and unite it with the new spirit of our epoch.” Thus, the rebuilding of Dresden was an attempt 
to unify socialism with the pre-existing character of the city. The initial period of reconstruction 
focused on the outlying residential and industrial areas which had been destroyed, but now much 
of the progress was shifting to the city center. Schneider emphasized employment to demonstrate 
the reconstruction of industry to show that while in 1945 16,000 people were employed in 
industry in the city, by 1955 over 270,000 were. Dresden “recaptured its former position as an 
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important manufacturing center specializing in machine building, electrical goods, precision 
engineering and optical products, cigarette making, and the production of furniture.”62 Dresden, 
standing in as representative for the broader GDR, experienced an industrial boom from the 
ashes of the Second World War even as it ostensibly respected the past character of the city. 
 Some areas of Dresden were not rebuilt, however, such as those between heavily 
residential areas and the city center. These were planned for later in the 1950s. The 
reconstruction was able to proceed with such rapidity for two reasons, according to the article. 
The first was the employment of “industrial building methods” via “the use of large size 
prefabricated concrete slabs and wall sections.”63 The second was the volunteer capacity of the 
population, whom in 1950 put in 585,042 hours of voluntary labor, which in 1955 was extended 
to 1,561,716 hours “so that the process of transformation might be accomplished earlier.”64 The 
article attempted to show that the unification of citizen volunteer labor with the mass 
reconstruction of the city further demonstrated that the socialist character of the GDR had taken 
root such that actions like this were possible. Further, by focusing on statistics such as the depth 
of destruction, employment, and volunteer hours, Schneider avoided awkward comparisons to 
the rebuilding statistics of the FRG. 
 The images in the article tell a somewhat different story than the text. While the core 
cover image of the destruction of the city center and its reconstruction provide a positive 
impression of the progress of construction, the other images primarily focus on Dresden as a 
cultural center within the GDR. For instance, the photograph of dancers at Café Prague in the 
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Altmarkt with a band playing, visitors to the Zwinger 
Gallery looking at the State Porcelain Collection, and the 
large color photograph of the Theaterplatz with the 
restored Hofkirche Church. These images served to 
contrast with the dismantling of palaces in Berlin and 
Potsdam and attempted to display the appreciation of 
cultural heritage in the GDR. Other images show the 
technological prowess of the GDR such as those showing 
the use of prefabricated construction or the testing cascade 
at the Dresden Transformer and X-Ray Works. Together, 
these images do reinforce some aspects of the article, such as the successful rebuilding of 
industry and the continuities of some aspects of construction with Dresden in the past. At the 
same time, they offer a softening and qualifying message to common impressions about the GDR 
that were less pronounced in the article. For instance, the images emphasized leisure time and 
classical architecture. Individuals and small groups are shown relaxing and enjoying life, not 
contributing to the remarkable amount of volunteer hours conveyed in the article. This presents 
the GDR as a place of culture, class, and leisure, even as the article conveys the profound 
difficulties found in rebuilding a destroyed city. These contradictions offer insight in to the 
duality of the reconstruction process. It was onerous, incomplete, and often led to character-less 
prefabricated housing that would replace classical structures. At the same time, this message 
would not resonate in the positive fashion that GDR Review was created to provide for foreign 
Figure 5 The Life of Dresden citizens is not dull 
work, GDR Review, 2/1958 
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audiences, thus the images gave the reader a distinctly different impression that challenged 
notions of life in the GDR or socialist states more broadly. 
 In a similar vein to the reconstruction of Dresden, another article published in October 
1964 offered a celebration of the GDR through a heavily 
illustrated presentation of an article entitled “Facts-
Prognoses-Realizations – 15 Years of the GDR reflected in 
the Western Press.” The article celebrated the 15th year 
anniversary since the founding of the GDR and presented 
first a large number of images, and then quotations from a 
wide variety of sources of foreign media. This article 
follows up on a general spread of issues to be found in the 
GDR that the magazine felt was necessary to address, 
varying from the German Question to the economic success 
of the GDR, all rooted in the self-conception of anti-fascism, 
socialism, and progress. 
 Following the typical model of the GDR’s self-
presented origin story, the article begins with a discussion of 
the profound difficulties facing the new state in 1949. 
According to Ernst Eppler in an article in the Vienna paper 
“Die Volkstimme,” the GDR “was one vast potato field, for the most part on sandy soil, with a 
sprinkling of industry-chemicals, precision engineering, textiles – but deprived of its former 
basis, the ore and hard coal of the Ruhr.” Simultaneously, however, East Germany had worked to 
overcome the past; according to a Berlin correspondent of Le Monde, “disappeared completely 
Figure 6 Once Again the Dresden Zwinger Gallery with 
its valuable art treasures attracts visitors from near and 




has the former German attitude of mind, the warlike sentiments and the readiness to die for the 
glory of Prussia.” Other reports about Berlin and the GDR argued that much of the description of 
a decrepit and failing GDR economy, and restrictions on freedom were propaganda. For instance, 
a group of tram drivers and conductors from the FRG (Cologne) visited Berlin. They “had 
believed that the German Democratic Republic was one large prison,” but upon their arrival in 
East Berlin they “were able to move about free and unhindered.”65  
 The article displayed the economic success underpinning the GDR’s self-conception. 
While persistent narratives of the FRG’s economic miracle were widely known in the public 
consciousness, the GDR attempted to demonstrate their own economic redevelopment. Under the 
subheading “East German Economic Miracle,” GDR Review quoted a “Die Zeit” article stating, 
“already the GDR has risen to the position of the world’s sixth largest industrial state.”66 Further, 
in this development of economic production, the GDR claimed to have “No Economic Crises” in 
another subtitle, by quoting a Parisian newspaper Le Combat “In order to achieve their still 
distant aim of a fully satisfying material and intellectual life under the system of Socialism, the 
leadership pays special attention to the development of science and to economic planning.” 
According to the quote, this meant that economic crises were completely avoided. Economic 
production and prosperity in the GDR did not, however, raise prices on some consumer 
necessities, as a report on a Münchener Illustrierte visit in 1959 showed. The author stated “our 
preparations for the journey to the other Germany were like those of a man visiting poor 
relations. But when we arrived there they looked quite different…many food items are 
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considerably cheaper over there than in our economic miracle country.”67 The presentation of the 
GDR in this manner echoed the strategy espoused by the MfAA stating that often the most 
effective anti-FRG propaganda could come from voices within the FRG that were critical of their 
own state. Further, the intermingling of economic production and the low cost of living echo 
earlier presentations in GDR Review such as “What Price a Baby?” 
 Furthering the social welfare argument, the article focused on categories such as housing, 
health care, and education. For a housing example, this article cited “Tatsachen” from Duisburg, 
stated that, “Whereas by the end of 1961 there were in the Federal Republic 202 housing units 
per 1,000 population, this compared with 327 housing units in the GDR.” Duisburg, a port and 
steel city in decline, worked as an ideal foil for GDR arguments. In another effort to trump the 
FRG, a subsection “Everything for the children" stated that “the money spent on schools, 
playgrounds, homes for after-school hours and so on, is proportionally greater than in almost any 
other country.” Workers were also the beneficiaries of the GDR’s focus on cultural programs 
where they were able to perform in musicals which, according to a West German Newspaper 
showed “the best Threepenny Opera I have ever seen.”68 Bourgeois West Germany no longer 
had a monopoly on cultural activities in this view, and it further offered evidence that the GDR 
provided for workers and their families in more than just hard times. 
 Throughout the article, the supposed duplicity of Bonn’s diplomatic strategy of isolating 
the GDR and its propaganda was attacked. For example, a quotation from “Die Tat” that stated 
“The West German press still has the tendency to carefully and painstakingly register all 
economic failures and difficulties of the GDR, but to gloss over with a few vague and general 
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remarks all that has been achieved there.” Similarly, another excerpt made the argument that “we 
in the West are the victims of our own propaganda, which reports on the miserable position of 
the GDR economy.”69 The presentation of West German attacks as unreasonable and 
propagandistic further served to buttress the idea of a reasonable GDR that would be around for 
longer than the fifteen years of its existence. 
 The images in this article portrayed a wide variety of themes and ideas, but they 
culminated in a kaleidoscopic presentation of life in the GDR as happy, progressive, and 
prosperous. The first image offers the standard starting point of all GDR self-conceptions: the 
rubble after the Second World War. From there, however, the reader sees industrial workers, 
farmers, advanced equipment, sports, and cultural activities. The dominating images of workers 
fits the rebuilding and productivity narrative of the GDR. The large images of beaming citizens 
undermine FRG arguments of an imprisoned and policed populace with one of relaxed and 
pleased community. The cultural activities and sport also work to soften the image of the GDR 
from that of monolithic production to a society not only capable of leisure activities, but one that 
ensures the welfare of its workers. In this way, the images both contradict potential attacks from 
the Federal Republic and serve to show the diversity of life in the GDR. Notably, the images 
deliberately eschew negative propaganda of the FRG and instead emphasize a positive image of 
the GDR. This makes sense for a fifteen-year anniversary celebration, and also a demonstration 
of the need to take the GDR on its own terms and not purely defined vis-à-vis the Western other. 
The text continues this clear juxtaposition, but the images offer, to an extent, an independent 
presentation of the GDR.  
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 Although construction of housing and the development of industry were dominant 
narratives in the self-conception of the GDR, the international public remained profoundly 
interested and 
repulsed by the 
construction of the 
Berlin Wall. Feeling 
defensive, GDR 
Review offered no 
large-scale comment 
on the barrier until 
July 1964, in the 
article “The Best and 
Least Known 
Frontier in the 
World.” The article 
cited that reader 
questions had pushed 
them to address the 
topic of the Wall. In 
this heavily pictorialized article, GDR Review interviewed Major General Helmut Poppe of the 
National People’s Army and City Commandant of the capital of the GDR.  
In the article, the commandant attempted to demonstrate that the wall was not a 
threatening object, but that it was a necessary and natural protection of the GDR’s border. He 
Figure 7 No Caption, GDR Review 10/1964 
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first articulated a straw man argument of “western opinion,” stating “Many people in western 
countries and overseas believe that our anti-fascist protective wall is a frontier which 
hermetically seals off East from West and behind which Soviet soldiers are posted.”70 When 
referring to violent incidents at the wall, he argued, “we naturally do not deny the fact that we 
have sometimes been forced to use our weapons. We must maintain a certain order on our 
frontier, just as is necessary at the frontiers of other countries.”71 He further equivocated on the 
topic of violence at the border by stating, “Whoever keeps to our legally-established rules is 
welcomed in a friendly and polite way, as is our custom with guests.”72  
The violence at the wall was framed in multiple ways to try and put it in a more positive 
light for the GDR. This included an attempt to portray it as a result of West German 
provocations, such as supposed shots fired by West German police on East German border 
guards. Another framing was deliberate obscuring of whom that East German border guards 
were firing at. The article does not identify the reality that those individuals who had the most to 
fear from East German border guards were East Germans seeking to flee to West Germany. To 
that end, the article included an excerpt about the iconic incident at Bernauer Strasse, a point in 
the Berlin Wall where individual residences had their doors walled up and some East Germans 
escaped by jumping out of windows to the West. In this brief excerpt, entitled “The Story of a 
Cross,” Major Günter Ganssauge of the NVA claimed that a group of West German journalists 
and firemen continually called for an elderly woman to jump out of the window of her apartment 
while the journalists’ “cameras purred”. The framing of the story attempts to show that it was a 
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dangerous spectacle for the benefit of the West German media that ultimately led to the woman’s 
death because “she showed no signs of life when they took her out of the net.”73 In general, the 
misrepresentation surrounding events at the Wall worked to delegitimize and undermine Western 
criticisms of the abuses the Wall and the border guards committed against the East German 
population. The conclusion of the article shifted the conversation to focus on the issue of German 
unification and placed the blame not only for the construction of the Wall, but the division of 
Germany at Bonn’s feet. 
The images accompanying the article at times confirm the narrative presented by the text. 
At other times, they serve to undermine the presentation of a harmless “defense wall.” For 
example, the images of young people 
throwing objects at the Wall could be 
interpreted to fit the narrative of 
“provocations” that the caption and 
article offered. According to the 
caption of the photo, “more than 
18,000 provocations against the ‘Wall’ 
have been registered since August 13, 1961; stones and bottles of petrol have been thrown more 
than 1,500 times.”74 It further tried to discredit the protestors against the wall by arguing that 
they had not only solved no problems with these actions, but they also “have endangered the 
world 18,000 times. Just think of the fact that in a heated atmosphere any spark can start off an 
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 uncontrollable conflagration.”75 
In this vein the article tried to discredit 
the protestors, but at the same time 
further verified that there was popular 
antagonism towards the Wall such that 
individuals were willing to risk serious 
reactions to protest it. 
One of the most interesting image presentations of the Wall was a page that presented 
three different photographic perspectives. The largest and most dominant image was taken at an 
extreme angle above the Wall from the Brandenburg Gate showing observers gathered on both 
sides. This perspective serves to dramatically reduce the impression of the size of the Wall and 
makes it look like a very minor barrier. The Wall at this portion appears quite short, if thick, and 
shows no guard towers or additional fortifications. At the same time, a much smaller photograph 
in the bottom right corner offers and entirely different perspective, a “worm’s-eye view” 
according to the caption. In this image the Wall nearly disappears and it shows the barbed wire 
top obscuring the Brandenburg Gate. The caption argued “thoughtful organizers have provided 
several rolls of barbed wire for just this purpose and placed them near the platform for Wall-
visitors on the West Berlin side.”76 This menacing image, ostensibly from a “West Berlin 
advertising folder” works to undercut the article’s goal of presenting the Wall as a minor object 
meant to secure the border. The caption clarifies this by stating that extreme perspectives distort 
the impression of the Wall, but then uses this technique in the opposite direction trying to 
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minimize the height of the Wall in 
the photograph taken from the 
Brandenburg Gate. The final image 
showed retired US General Lucius 
Clay doing a chin-up at the Wall to 
peer over it. This image offered 
several interpretations. First, it is 
somewhat comical and relaxed, and 
this helped to make the reader feel 
the Wall was less imposing. 
Second, the news cameras in the 
background serve to further push 
the GDR narrative that much of the 
Western coverage of the Wall was 
a publicity stunt and an attempt to 
delegitimize the GDR in the eyes of the world. Still other images tried to convey the normalcy of 
the Wall by showing casual border crossings where drivers could pass through the Brandenburg 
Gate. In general, however, the article and images appear less convincing in such a way that other 
articles did not in GDR Review. Many other articles presented facts and figures about social 
welfare, shifting gender roles, and celebrated economic success that conveyed a positive image 
of the GDR as the better Germany. In this article, the magazine attempted to turn West German 
and other state’s criticism against them, but there was little to no positive quality in discussing 
the Wall because even claims that it defended peace or society against fascism rang false and 
Figure 10 The Wall looks different, GDR Review 7/1964 
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were far less concrete than data like economic rankings or the cost of health care. 
Rebuilding the FRG 
In West Germany, different narratives of building up society predominated. Some 
focused on the construction of industry, such as in the August 1963 edition of Scala 
International, when the article “The struggle for the secrets of nature” celebrated the 100th 
anniversary of Bayer Leverkusen—formerly a subsidiary of the large chemical combine IG 
Farben, infamous for its production of the poison gas Zyklon B. The article provided a general 
description of the modern new plant on the Rhine between Cologne and Düsseldorf, a history of 
Bayer Leverkusen’s development, and discussed its current enterprises. The article continued the 
trend of linking current developments in the FRG with aspects of the German past that could find 
purchase with an international audience, like social welfare programs, international aid, and a 
company caring for its workers. 
According to the article, at the new central buildings of the factory, “Everywhere there is 
still a faint smell of fresh paint. The age of the slender building is still counted in terms of 
months.”77 This sense of newness is further balanced with descriptions of the 36,000 people 
working at the factory transported in to work on 250 buses or driving one of 6,000 cars that 
commute to work each day. A large image showing the commute to work demonstrates the 
vastness of the enterprise, and also the prosperity of the workers, one sixth of whom drive their 
own car in to work.78 In general, however, the key emphasis is on Bayer AG’s success: “second 
                                                             
77 “The Struggle for the Secrets of Nature,” Scala International, 8/1963, 14. 
78 Ibid., 14-15. 
132 
 
among the chemical factories in Europe and is the eighth largest enterprise of the world’s 
chemical industry.”79 
 The rebuilding narrative so central to that of GDR depictions in the reconstruction of 
their jet plane industry emerges somewhat in this article as well. For instance, the article cites 
various economic downturns in the market, the upheavals of the wars vaguely discussed as 
“reflected in the annals of this company,” and discussions of the disbanding of IG 
Farbenindustrie by the Allied 
Control Council in 1945.80 More 
important than just commercial 
success in this narrative, however, 
is the essential political goal of 
demonstrating that Bayer AG, one 
of its successors, cares for its 
employees, because “Without 
human ideas, will power, 
imagination and industriousness a plant is just an empty shell.”81 
 The history of Bayer AG and its activities of the 1960s found overlap in employee 
welfare. The article argued, rather disingenuously, that “As early as 1873, at a time when such an 
idea would not have occurred to any German politician, Bayer set up a benevolent fund for 
workers.” Furthermore, the reduction of work hours from ten per day to nine per day, as well as 
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Figure 11 36,000 people work in Leverkusen. 250 Buses transport the 
employees from distances up to 25 miles from the city. 6,000 drive their own 
cars. Scala 8/1963 
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the company’s decision that worker committees would be “allowed,” all were meant to serve as 
markers of how companies like Bayer AG took care of their employees explicitly without the 
intervention of the state. In this narrative, Scala provides a clear description of a company 
concerned with its workers’ well-being that anticipates state action out of the goodness of its 
heart. The further sponsorship of “ten different sports clubs, eight art clubs, four animal breeding 
clubs, photography clubs, shorthand clubs, chess and stamp collector clubs” also served as a 
clear marker of the various options for a full life that a company offers its employees. This serves 
as a clear juxtaposition with the GDR, where social welfare and organizations were coordinated 
through the state and the FRG both provides an alternative model and shows that it works in their 
society. 
 Beyond just demonstrating economic success and worker welfare, the internationalization 
of the FRG’s success remained a key theme. By presenting a German business as focused on 
employee welfare and on aid projects to the “Third World,” Scala attempted to show German 
economic interests as simultaneously robust and non-threatening. The heroic actions of Bayer 
were demonstrated in the article’s description of its efforts to deliver insecticides to Cairo and 
drugs to Somalia in 1961 to prevent epidemics. A further poignant example was provided when, 
“A few weeks ago heavy lorries, driving day and night, delivered an urgent consignment from 
Leverkusen to Teheran. Iran’s grain crop was seriously endangered by plant pests. Bayer 
pesticides saved the situation.”82 The paternalistic concern for the “Third World” and the FRG’s 
philanthropy were a deliberate attempt to not only win sympathy among these countries, but also 
to counter narratives of a cutthroat capitalist and revanchist society presented in East German 
attacks. Images of German engineers educating other men from different countries show a 
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transfer of knowledge that West Germans could generously bestow on those willing to do 
business with them. Furthermore, they continued to place the FRG in a positive light 
internationally and put further peaceful linkages in the spotlight. 
 The construction of housing for both German states was simultaneously a pressing 
domestic political issue and a point of international propaganda. In a Scala International article 
from February 1965 entitled 
“From Chaos to Order,” author 
Gerhard Mersigner provided a 
remarkably reactionary 
discussion of the Federal 
Republic’s rebuilding program. 
While the central thrust of the 
article was the progress in rebuilding housing and constructing new urban areas in Western 
Germany, it was inflected with territorial claims over the lost Eastern territories and glossing 
over of the Second World War. The overarching characterization of the article, however, was of 
the benefits of an individualistic, liberal society guided by a desire for general social good. Thus, 
the construction of housing served as a further example of the boons of a social market economy 
because of the high number produced, quality of the unit, and modernity of the architecture. 
 On a base level, the article’s central claim was that the construction of housing in West 
Germany since 1949 had been successful. Over 8.3 million homes had been constructed from 
1949-1965 in the Federal Republic and West Berlin. According to the narrative set out in the 
article, “order grew out of chaos, and on the ruins a new country grew up, a country which is 
girding its loins to deal with an even greater task…a reorganization of the whole living space in 
Figure 12 Year after year trainees from all over the world are trained in the 
Bayer plants and laboratories. Scala 8/1963 
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the Federal Republic of Germany.”83 Mersinger framed the problem in terms of the influx of 
refugees after the war, the destruction of housing during the war, and the general trend of 
increasing industrialization and urbanization. He celebrated the Housing Law of 1950 for laying 
the groundwork of housing reconstruction, but emphasized the role of construction workers, the 
taxpayers, political parties, and the trade unions for their success. This clarification served to 
separate the social market economy from the state-controlled economy from the East German 
rival, while also disregarding the East’s problems because West Germany faced “an unparalleled 
housing shortage caused by war damage and the influx of refugees.”84 The mixed economic 
system was further demonstrated by citing that four million of the 8.3 million homes constructed 
were under the state-supported social housing construction program. 
 Looking ahead to further difficulties, Mersinger cited the growing problems of 
urbanization and congestion in major cities and industrial areas. For example, the Federal 
Ministry for Housing, Town Planning, and Living Space Organization was reorganized in 1962 
to conform to “modern ideas of urban and rural unity.”85 The problem, according to the article, 
was rooted in the “age of early capitalism and the Industrial Revolution,” but advanced planning 
and a more humanistic focus could overcome the overpopulation resulting from industrialization 
and traffic congestion from the large number of automobiles. The planning proposed by 
Mersinger was to include demolition of large swathes of constructed areas. For example, “much 
that was built in the past will have to be torn down in the course of this reorganization, many 
farms and enterprises will have to be moved, new communications will have to be created and 
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hospitals, schools, churches, shops, and parking lots will have to be included in any planning.”86 
Scala International qualified West German centralized state planning for housing development. 
According to the article, “these gigantic plans are not intended to serve society as an anonymous 
mass but rather to serve the individual human being, whose most precious resource is, and 
remains, his personal freedom.”87 This clarification set the West German model clearly in 
juxtaposition to the monolithic planning of the East which, according to Mersinger’s 
understanding, did not truly serve the interest of the people as individuals. 
 The images included with the article tell a story of remarkable construction of modern 
high-rise apartments and shops. The first image shows an aerial view of a “demonstration 
building project” in Fürstenried near Munich. According to the caption, the image shows how 
residential areas 
are being created 
“outside 
overfilled towns, 




image conveys a 
sense of grand, 
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Figure 13 Aerial Photograph. Max Prugger, released by BStMWV. Nr. G 30/106, Scala 2/1965 
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ambitious, and profoundly modern construction that borders tree-lined streets and individual 
houses. The core message of rebuilding comes across quite clearly in the image, but the 
juxtaposition of the quaint housing on the side with the high rises central to the photograph 
conveys the challenge of making housing for the population fit with pre-existing structures and 
communities. The next page is a fairly simple infographic with houses being used as bar graphs 
that shows the Federal Republic as having built the second-most homes among thirteen European 
countries and the United States. Notably, no statistics were included from the Eastern Bloc and 
East Germany was left off the list entirely, indicating that the standard by which the West hoped 
to be measured was to be found to the west, not the east. The last image of the article gets closer 
to addressing the difficult transition being made in modernization and reconstruction. The highly 
modern building in the Zollhaus area of Nuremberg filled with quaint shops, such as the grocery 
store in the foreground, provides a sense of a mixed modern and classic style of life. The image 
also only has one person in it, which helps to convey that the new planned style has worked to 
solve issues of congestion in the city. The impression of success, prosperity, and the future 
comes across quite clearly in the images, but, the first image in particular serves to indicate 
tensions in the rebuilding process even as it celebrates them. The planning of these buildings as 
undertaken by the government serves to further complicate their presentation, as it is difficult to 
avoid the comparison with the centrally planned construction of the GDR. Thus, the shops in the 
third image soften that impression by bolstering the new construction with consumerism, and 
individual selection. The article thus serves several purposes. The first is to present the 
challenges of rebuilding housing in West Germany while showing the profound success of the 
FRG’s construction programs. The second is to show how a balance of planning and individual 
needs serves to best provide for the population. The third is to place the Federal Republic on an 
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equal or superior level of modernity and prosperity to other major Western European states and 
the United States. The images largely reinforce these messages, but if read against the grain, also 
serve to show the tensions the article conveyed about problems of modernization, planning, and 
new construction.  
The semi-revanchist tone of the earlier part of the article disappears from the images, but 
necessarily places a further edge to the issue of housing construction and needed room for 
dwellings due to overcrowding. When Germany “lost” land to Poland and then was divided, 
housing and planning becomes a more pressing issue, particularly when more people decide to 
settle in the West or flee to it later. The implicit issue, then, is that the West faces these particular 
struggles because living there is more desirable than in the East. 
Figure 14 Shops in the new “Zollhaus” residential area in Nuremberg, Scala 2/1965 
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 The idea of rebuilding the Federal Republic manifested in physical terms but also in 
political ones as the FRG worked to show continuity with German democratic traditions. In an 
article published in March 1963, entitled “The German Reichstag,” the reader was given a brief 
history of German democracy through buildings. The dominant opening image of the article 
showed a still-ravaged Reichstag building mostly repaired, but with the iconic words “to the 
German people” emphasized. The Reichstag serves as centerpiece for the historical article that 
attempts to show the winding road of German democracy through a sanitized narrative. The 
difficulty in repairing and restoring the Reichstag building, which began in 1958, was further 
complicated by the need for “scaffolding reaching right up to the wall which has divided Berlin 
into two parts ever since August 13th, 1961.”89 
 After recounting the process of rebuilding the German Reichstag, the article gives a brief 
history of German democracy starting in 1918 to describe the challenge the German emperor 
offered to the inscription “Dem Deutschen Volke” that was overcome by former Chancellor 
Bethmann Hollweg in December 1916. The article focused on the constitutional changes 
developed after 1918 while emphasizing the democratic tradition in Germany by arguing “it 
would be out of place to describe the 1871 constitution drawn up by Prince Otto von Bismarck as 
autocratic because the practice of making the government responsible to parliament was 
introduced so late in Germany.”90 In fact, the article argued that “the law under which the 
deputies of the Imperial diet were elected in the old, Imperial Germany was one of the most 
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liberal in the world and had its origins – improbable as it may seem – in the revolutionary events 
of 1848 with the institution of universal male suffrage.”91 
 The recounting of the history of free elections in Germany was meant to show the 
democratic pedigree of Germany in the article. The German Imperial Diet was juxtaposed first 
with the three class voting system of Prussia, but then it was later argued, “many of its sessions 
differed in no way from the great debating duels in the parliaments of France, Britain and other 
parliamentary democracies.”92 From there, the article discussed how in 1848 the Frankfurt 
National Assembly attempted to lay out electoral laws and even the “‘Basic Rights of the 
German Nation’ which closely resembled the famous and almost identical declaration of human 
rights in the United States and France,” but found itself without real power. While the article 
concedes that Prussia fought a war against Austria, it then goes without preamble to the creation 
of the German Reich in 1871. According to the article, “What the parliamentarians in Frankfurt 
had striven for in vain…was to become a reality on January 18, 1871 in the Hall of Mirrors of 
the Palace of Versailles.” No war with France was mentioned. And while this state had a 
powerful emperor, the article argued nonetheless that the liberal electoral law, “did not fall short 
of the electoral laws of democratically ruled countries, which in fact outdid them in many 
details.”93 In this way, the article attempted to demonstrate a lasting democratic pedigree while 
erasing former German militarism. Furthermore, it continually linked Germany with the 
humanistic and democratic traditions of Britain, France, and the United States in a deliberate 
attempt to appear as not just a peer, but a nation born with the same traditions and ideals. 
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 The model of democratic institutions was not the only focus of the article, which instead 
included key legislation such as the advent of social welfare programs. These programs included 
laws on health insurance (1883), on accident insurance (1884), on old age and invalid insurance 
(1889), on workers protection (1891), the complete ban on child labor (1903), and on white 
collar workers insurance (1911).”94 The article’s description of the creation of a German Civil 
Code in 1896 and the creation of regulations for criminal proceedings in in 1872 further 
exemplified the creation of a Rechtstaat (a state under the rule of law) or, in other words, a 
legitimate state. The dissolution of the Reich’s government with the end of the First World War 
was covered only insofar as to convey the unity of German society upon the declaration of war, 
the loyalty of the Reichstag up through November 9, 1918, and the betrayal of the Socialists in 
the uprising and revolution that followed. 
 Certain important distinctions emerge from the discussion of the revolution of 1918 that 
served to celebrate the development of the FRG while criticizing the historical trajectory 
promulgated in the German Democratic Republic. For instance, the article states that the 
revolution began with the “mutinous sailors at Kiel,” which did not reach Berlin until November 
9th, where Karl Liebknecht “did not proclaim a republic in the Reichstag, but from the balcony of 
the imperial palace.” The efforts of Social Democrat Phillip Scheidemann to declare a Republic 
were wasted on the radical wing of the party. This struggle ultimately led to the creation of the 
Weimar Republic, which, according to the article, faced great difficulties due to the “tough 
conditions of the Versailles Treaty” that “made all economic and political planning difficult.” 
The consolidation of Weimar, however, led to successes, such as “generous social legislation, 
which was later to be continued in the Federal Republic of Germany, nationalization of the 
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railways and by uniform tax legislation.” The parallels between the FRG and the successes of 
Weimar were pushed even further by the “miracle of the Rentenmark,” which “was the 
beginning of Germany’s economic recovery.”95 This framework closely identified with the 
introduction of the Deutsche Mark in the FRG of June 20, 1948 which in some ways marked the 
beginning of the “economic miracle” upon which the FRG based much of its credibility. 
Simultaneously, the collapse of Weimar served as a parallel to the Unrechtstaat in the East. The 
article argues that the Weimar Republic did not collapse due to too many political parties, but 
rather due to the “enormous economic difficulties” and the “uninhibited agitation of a party, 
which did not seek objective discussion, but wanted power at any price.”96  
In this article, there is a clear inversion of common GDR claims to be the inheritor of all 
that was progressive in German history. Instead, the Federal Republic offers a narrative that 
shows a strong democratic tradition struggling against authoritarian rule, and coming out ahead 
through parliamentary negotiation and a commitment to humanistic social welfare policies. 
Further, the attempts at revolution, such as in 1918 or in the machinations of the National 
Socialists in 1933, were shown to parallel the power of the SED in the GDR which, according to 
the FRG, did not follow German democratic traditions, and were instead the inheritors of an 
authoritarian strain that had done so much damage.  
The images serve to further develop the parallel of the FRG and the democratic traditions 
of the German past. The clearest example of this is the dual image of the Paulskirche (St. Paul’s 
Church) in Frankfurt. The first meeting of the German National Assembly drawing shows a large 
procession entering a building, while the accompanying photograph shows the rebuilding of the 
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church in 1948 with large crowds surrounding it. The image conveys the FRG’s respect for 
history, religion, and democracy, and further emphasizes how intertwined these features are. The 
juxtaposition to the atheist communist regime claiming to depart from much of German history is 
also apparent. At the same time, the article sought to soften the impressions of the FRG by 
emphasizing social welfare programs and care for the workers. In the below image, West 
Germans gathered on May Day with posters advocating “Solidarity,” “Social Progress,” 
“Freedom and Peace for the Whole World,” and “Through Deeds [Action?].” On the one hand, 
this image conveys a sense of community and democratic engagement and identifies the FRG 
with the ideals conveyed in the slogan. On the other hand, the appearance of these people on 
May Day does not seems to give the impression of a “meeting” but rather that of a 
demonstration. The potential that it was a protest of certain groups could provide a mixed 
message in regards to the contented prosperity of the Federal Republic, or further solidify its 
nature as a democratic state willing to accept peaceful protest. The co-opting of the still-
destroyed Reichstag building as a demonstration for workers also further shows how an old 
symbol of democracy could be rebuilt, redeveloped, and could become a rallying point for 
progressive elements in German history that were considered safe by the Federal Republic.97 
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Figure 15 A meeting held on May Day in front of the ruined Reichstag in Berlin, Scala 3/1963 
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The rebuilding process in the FRG was not limited to constructing new physical 
buildings, but included a redevelopment of the economy, housing, and government. Thus, when 
the FRG portrayed this process, it included these various narratives under a general umbrella of 
reconstruction, rooted in positive elements of the German past that would appeal to international 
audiences. It was not enough to simply show economic prosperity, although that was a key 
foundation. Instead, the image presented was that of a nation rebuilding itself in the image of its 
better nature. The FRG was shown to be a state that cared for its people through social welfare 
programs but was sufficiently economically dynamic that many of its citizens could own 
automobiles. The FRG could use the powers of the state to plan and develop massive housing 
programs to fulfill key needs, but 
bore in mind the needs and wants 
of individuals. Scala and the 
presentation of the rebuilding of 
the FRG on these levels showed 
that the GDR did not have a 
monopoly on criticism of the 
German other. In fact, implicit 
messages critiquing an 
authoritarian, undemocratic, less 
prosperous, and Godless East Germany were embedded throughout these articles, but they were 
veiled in subtle messaging and offhand comments rather than overt attack articles. This strategic 
model fit with the institutional directives from the Foreign Office and the BPA that understood it 
Figure 16 In 1848 the first German National Assembly met in the Paulskirche in 




was better to not recognize the GDR as a legitimate challenger, even as they knew it was 
necessary to challenge its conceptions and presentations.  
Rebuilding Germany, both East and West, was a dominant theme in both Scala 
International and GDR Review. Although much of the damage of the Second World War had 
been repaired in the 1950s, structural reconstruction continued long in to the 1960s, and less 
concrete areas of rebuilding, such as industry and democracy in the FRG and culture and the wall 
in the GDR, showed divergent paths for the two states. Each sought to demonstrate the positive 
endeavors of their society for the wellbeing of their people, but this tended to be inflected quite 
differently. For example, when discussing the reconstruction of the city of Dresden, the GDR 
focused on how much of the center had been rebuilt, and the reconstruction of museums in 
addition to the rapid redevelopment of housing. What comparisons existed in this article focused 
on how the GDR had more dwellings per citizen than the FRG. When the FRG discussed the 
reconstruction of housing, it focused the comparison on Western European countries and the 
United States while completely ignoring the GDR. Furthermore, the article sought to show that 
much of the challenges facing the FRG in housing were due not just to the destruction of the 
Second World War, but also the profound difficulties found in the increasing modernization, 
industrialization, and urbanization of the country. Challenges were thus presented as a kind of 
backhanded strength. 
Taking a broader view of rebuilding offers a way to examine how each state interpreted 
its origin story and then worked to project an image of newfound strength. While physically 
reconstructing housing and destroyed cities offered a clear opportunity to show a prospering 
society, a more holistic view of rebuilding “Germany” offers a way to see each state’s definition 
of a better Germany. The rebuilding of the Reichstag article and the accompanying tale of 
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German government rooted the FRG in a long tradition of democracy and tried to set up an 
equivalence with other traditional Western democracies such as France and the United Kingdom. 
The GDR offered a different impression of a state founded anew from great challenges, but 
successfully meeting them and offering their citizens a fuller life outside of simple economic 
prosperity through community activities like worker’s theater in the 15-year anniversary article. 
While the construction of the Wall does not offer a positive view of the GDR in the 1960s, it was 
nonetheless a dominant image and symbol in the story of German and, more broadly, Cold War 
division. Thus, the GDR’s attempt to show the Wall as a normal feature of a state and as 
something that was not only non-threatening, but actually served as a guarantor of peace, was an 
attempt to defeat the criticisms from the GDR and to build its image as a normal, legitimate state. 
While images of life in each state compose the predominant focus of this time period—
and indeed the content of the magazines—both Scala and GDR Review remained political tools. 
In practice, this should be understood as a path to analyze what subtler articles and images 
intended to express, but the magazines themselves provide powerful indicators of the political 
strategies guiding their production. These political goals changed over time and often responded 
to challenges from across the border. The well-known narratives of antifascism, recognition, and 
socialist community pervade overtly political articles in GDR Review¸ but can be found in subtler 
presentations as well. Scala also had some more explicitly political articles on economic 
construction, social welfare programs, and international reconciliation. Taken together with 
archival work conducted on these magazines in the 1960s, it becomes apparent that this was a 
period of broad experimentation and intense contestation.98 
 




Women’s Role(s) in GDR Society 
In GDR Review, women living in the GDR were portrayed as fully emancipated 
contributors to the work force and public sphere, while in Scala International, women in the 
FRG were presented as free consumers of an advanced capitalist economy unburdened with paid 
work, who could focus on housework and childcare. A key complication in this polarized 
description was that each German state was acutely aware of the tactics and presentations of the 
other, and to that end, had to tailor their own narrative in such a way that could counter even 
implicit criticisms stemming from the other side of the Iron Curtain. Several articles throughout 
the 1960s mirror this ideological and social conflict, and in their contestations addressed broader 
political goals of the period including economic systems, modernization, prosperity, 
consumerism, and differing conceptions of freedom. 
In January 1961, GDR Review published an article “Is the woman’s place in the kitchen?” 
in response to a letter from a man in Norway who argued that a woman should work in the home 
and that a man’s wages should be sufficient to support the family.99 The sardonic smile on the 
face of the woman on the cover of the article as well as the structure of the response—snippets of 
interviews of regular GDR citizens responding to this topic—gives the reader a sense of 
community, and immediately pushes the reader to see the Norwegian man’s argument as absurd. 
From there, the interviews evoke not only the central theme of demonstrating that women in the 
GDR participate in the workforce quite happily, but also inflects this issue with key political 
themes of the period. For example, one interviewee, Kurt Novak, emphasizes that his salary was 
more than enough to support his family alone, which was meant not only as a response to a 
reader’s question, but also as a way to show the prosperity and wage security of the GDR. Later, 
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Frau Gisela Körner argued that “I could not possibly consider it the height of my ambition to 
spend the rest of my life in the kitchen.”100 Thereby showing that women in the GDR shared 
ambitions with men, and were sufficiently emancipated to make their own choices, rather than be 
penned in by domestic pressures. 
The issue of childcare comes up a great deal, as the more general domestic role 
symbolized by “the kitchen” is discussed in the article. Most of the women interviewed have had 
a child, and they talk about the kindergartens and the community building that it engenders in 
their society. The kindergarten, according to Frau Margarete Müller, is good “because it has been 
proved that life in a community has a favorable effect on the development of children.” This 
argument not only anticipates common West German attacks of “Who cares for the child?,” but 
also emphasizes the community aspects of life in a socialist society. Freedom becomes redefined 
in this context to a different conception than that of Western democracy and consumerism to 
mean emancipation from burdens. Women no longer were forced “to become bored with doing 
domestic chores all the time” in this presentation of life in the GDR. Furthermore, the article also 
contests the Western claim to labor-saving technology with Gerhard Fichtner’s claim that “there 
are enough modern household machines and gadgets available so that the modern housewife 
does not have to run around the house all day with a duster in her hand.” Others emphasize how 
“old-fashioned” the idea is that women belong in the kitchen, while also sliding in other 
progressive GDR projects, such as old-age pensions. The article concludes with Frau Erika 
Hilbig’s recognition that “’Many men still hold the wrong, selfish view that a woman’s place is 
in the kitchen, but I think we women have laid that ghost long ago.’”101  
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Images of many of the women, and some of the men, interviewed emphasize their 
professional roles and their appreciation of the structure of the GDR economy. Outside of the 
first image, all of the women are shown in their professional roles and are quite happy. The 
ironic and critical picture of idealistic domesticity 
on the first page of the article is still the dominant 
image, even as it criticizes the implicit West 
German social structures for being behind that of 
the progressive East. The image does more than 
simply criticize, however. Instead, it operates in an 
implicit dialogue that demonstrates that the East is 
equally as technologically advanced and 
prosperous as the West, and when paired with 
several comments emphasizing a woman’s choice 
to go to work or to stay home, shows that East 
German women could bake their cake and eat it too.  
Themes also frequently overlapped in GDR Review as key messages could often be best 
conveyed in relationship with one another. For example, an article on “Children, Radios, and 
Working Women” demonstrated not only the liberation of women from exclusive household toil, 
but also the humanity of factory production in the GDR. In the article, Herr and Frau Linsenbart 
discuss her career goals when she wants to work at the factory. Although Herr Linsenbart argues 
that “‘You [Frau Linsenbart] have the house to take care of and you know I like a tidy home,’” 
he also understands that he “is not the kind of man who sees nothing in his wife but someone to 
Figure 17 No caption, GDR Review 1/1961 
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keep the house clean for him.”102 Consequently, Frau Linsenbart went to work 45 hours per week 
at the Erfurt Radio Factory. 
 The article “Children, Radios, and Working Women” is largely shown from the 
perspective of Herr and Frau Linsenbart’s daughter, Marion. As such, the article is able to 
convey a great deal of factual information to the audience about what Marion does not know 
about the East German radio industry while also providing more personal detail about the 
deftness of her mother’s hands. Indeed, the article emphasizes that the work in the radio factory 
is explicitly “women’s work” because it requires “great delicacy of touch,” and thus the factory 
employs mostly women. Rhetorically, the article sets up a nice explanation of how a woman not 
only could come to work in the factory but should. It argued her work would be valued and was 
not something a man could do at all, which certainly reads as patronizing, but nonetheless was 
their claim. 103 
 On balance, the images in the article convey a mixed message. On the one hand, they 
reinforce that women do work in the factory, as no male workers are shown, but on the other 
hand, women are shown in either cramped working conditions or with their children observing 
them. The information on the after-school center at the factory, which was the key to allowing 
women to work in the GDR, clarified that children visited their working mothers as a kind of 
field trip. The discussion on the progressive use of the children’s after school center run by the 
factory deliberately juxtaposes the paternalistic balance of socialist society with the callous 
capitalism of the West. Thus, the image of the children visiting their mother provides an 
ambivalent look at GDR society, where it’s intended to demonstrate progressive feminist values 
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and humane working conditions, but it also opens the GDR to criticism. For instance, a Western 
society preoccupied with family values and traditional social roles would find children in 
factories repugnant, or else be concerned that their children were being raised communally. 
 GDR Review attempted to manage the potential ambiguities in both the images and the 
articles for foreign readers by emphasizing their progressive values for women and the 
workplace. Later in the same issue of March 1960, a small sidebar entitled “Did You Know?” 
provided general social information on the GDR where women select women’s committees to 
represent their interests. These committees were to help them “look after the vocational 
qualification of women, help them cope with the organization of their household duties by 
providing labor-saving facilities, set up social welfare schemes, [and] assist women with the 
education of their children,”104 The development of new nurseries, kindergartens, and other state-
run labor-saving organizations was meant to show that women were empowered in their work, 
but also reinforced the dominant gender role paradigm of the time that women were meant to 
take care of the home, with the assistance of state-run programs, even as they worked full-time 
shifts in the factory.  
 The equality of women, understood through their equal pay and more equal 
representation in the workforce, also found emphasis in reader letters. For instance, in one 
International Mail Call section of GDR Review, Mr. Jagota was quoted as writing, “During my 
stay in East Germany I noticed that women were no longer treated as inferior beings as during 
the days of Hitler. They had become man’s equal…. They could learn the trade of their 
choice…”105 Reader feedback continued to serve an essential role in GDR Review by providing 
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both confirmation of the GDR’s claims and, at times, a necessary foil for further explanation, as 
seen in “Is the woman’s place in the kitchen?” In comments in the International Mail Call 
section of June 1961, one French woman responded that this topic had been dealt with in many 
other periodicals, and that while she agreed that all women should be able to learn a trade and 
work, she also argued that having women in the workplace was unrelated to the cultivation of 
awareness of broader events in society among women. In the response, a GDR Review section 
editor responded that the goal of the article was to “show that the kitchen and nursery alone are 
no longer the be-all and end-all for the majority of women today.”106 It further indicated that 
France was not necessarily the primary target for this article by stating that “In many countries, 
though, it is still difficult for women to learn a trade or profession: many trades are still 
exclusively reserved for the men.” To further emphasize this point, the section cited a note from 
a reader in India who they claimed “indicate[d] surprise” by stating “From reading GDR Review 
it becomes apparent that women find places as skilled workers and foremen in your 
industry….”107 Another response in the next issue had a journalist from Oakland, California 
stating that “So, then, under socialism, we see that woman’s place is one of an equal, a full 
citizen of a new society which wants and needs every ounce of human talent and energy.”108 
The feedback here indicates that topics could work, and, indeed, were designed to work 
on more than one level. One the one hand, there is a clear focus on showing the equality of 
women in their ability to join the workforce that appeals on a mainstream level to advanced 
Western societies. On the other hand, by emphasizing this feature of GDR society to developing 
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countries, the GDR placed itself at the forefront of social and economic development and as a 
model for which these countries could aspire. 
In March 1960, GDR Review published an article entitled “What Price a Baby?” as an 
explicit counter to and development of an article entitled “Parental happiness a costly business” 
in the West German magazine Bunte Deutsche Illustrierte.109 The GDR Review article used the 
West German article’s own self-criticism to further critique the West for its expenses. For 
example, the cost for “parental happiness” was 1,018.05 West Marks or “‘Enough to buy a 
television cabinet or run a car.’”110 Following this criticism of the commodifying nature of West 
German society, GDR Review established that it only cost 48.44 Marks in the East to have a 
newborn baby. The costs were further broken down by charts identifying where the money went.  
The charts not only demonstrate that the GDR offered a great deal more free services, but also 
that the state provided generous contributions for future children that would even further defray 
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costs. In this manner, the author clearly hoped to provide a “balanced” perspective that pushed 
the GDR’s narrative in such a way that could easily be construed as “objective.” 
 To further the key theme of developing women’s role in society, the text of the article 
elaborates on services in the GDR, particularly for expecting mothers and families with 
newborns. These services include “instruction courses in mothercraft and courses in painless 
birth techniques” as well as constant medical supervision. The state also was stated to provide 
nineteen different pregnancy homes for roughly 10,000 women per year with difficult medical 
circumstances. The article goes on to cite the Law on the Protection of the Mother and Child, 
which guaranteed women employment after their pregnancy and gave them five weeks before 
pregnancy and six weeks after delivery as time off.111 Fathers also were given small grants of 
money during the mother’s maternity leave. The baby wear required is shown in a picture, and in 
the article it once again references Bunte Deutsche Illustrierte as a foil which stated that West 
Germans could only look forward to more affordable secondhand clothing. In the GDR, 
however, “the care of the state makes itself felt from the very first day there is certainty about the 
impending arrival of a new member of the family- and this care accompanies him or her 
throughout life.”112 The welfare state built up in this narrative demonstrates low costs, 
opportunities for women to have painless births, and financial security. It shows that women 
could genuinely be able to work in a factory and have children because the society was 
structured in such a way to enable that to succeed. 
 The images in the article in large part reinforce the arguments within the text. The first 
shows an information session, while the second portrays a newborn baby. The third shows a 
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newborn surrounded by all the material trappings of new clothes, toys, medicine, and crib. The 
material cost is clearly demonstrated, but is then offset by an infographic demonstrating the 
largesse of the East German state, as opposed to the West. On a deeper level, the images convey 
additional messages. The image showing an information session is composed of women meeting 
with a female medical professional, seemingly a nurse. The model of the uterus as well as the 
surrounding environment indicate a high degree of scientific advancement and also a community 
of knowledge-sharing and education when paired with the educational posters in the background. 
The second image, showing the father, the newborn and another nurse indicates that in the GDR, 
the father plays an important role with the children, as reinforced by the absence of the mother 
and pointed emphasis on the father.  
The final image is certainly the most important. Here, the baby is shown surrounded by 
the necessities and trappings of a materially well-outfitted family, including a car conveniently 
located in the background. The crib, tub, pram, medical supplies, baby clothes, medicines, and 
even the teddy bear serve to preempt and counter common impressions of the GDR’s lack of 
basic necessities for its people. The clear juxtaposition in the article of East and West Germany 
followed by this image shows that the GDR is willing to compete with the FRG on certain terms. 
The GDR here claims material equivalence, cheaper costs, greater state support, and also a moral 
high ground. The clearly staged idyllic setting of the child, paired with the text referring to the 
amount of both maternal and paternal leave, reinforces the image of a benevolent state, and the 
pleasant existence of a life with all the trappings of a car, yard, child, and belongings.  
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Of course, to a questioning observer, the image here bears some heavy criticism. For 
example, the image is very obviously posed, as these belongings would not be displayed in such 
a way in a normal household. 
The conspicuous gap in the 
washing filled by a personal 
car also shows the 
magazine’s attempt to 
compete with Western 
standards of vehicle 
ownership. Ultimately, to 
foreign audiences willing to 
accept the statistical analysis 
placed in the charts below, 
the image likely reinforced 
GDR claims, but the prosperity shown here was somewhat ham-handedly forced. Rhetorically, 
the GDR Review article provides a convincing juxtaposition with the West by emphasizing costs 
and downplaying income, a field in which the GDR would inevitably lose. 
 The article “What Price a Baby?” was a test piece for GDR Review where readers were 
asked what they thought of it in comparison with other recent articles such as “Children, Radios, 
and Working Women,” “On Silent Wings,” “How the Peasant Women of Burgtonna Saved 3,700 
Days,” and “Worker Writers at School.” The editors posed the issue as a request: “We are asking 
you to help us improve the contents of this magazine by telling us which of the six contributions 
found in this issue and listed below you liked the best.” Later, in the September 1960 issue of 
Figure 20 No Caption, GDR Review 3/1960 
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GDR Review, the results of the poll showed that “What Price a Baby?” was the best-liked 
article.113 The editors then asked for more feedback from the previous six months of issues and 
which was the favored article. The techniques found in “What Price a Baby?” had already been 
implemented earlier than the publishing of these results, however, as in the July 1960 issue 
where an article “What does the Flu Cost?” followed nearly the same exact pattern with similar 
charts and comparison of costs in the two German states.114 Reader feedback also helped to guide 
the production of certain kinds of articles and also pushed rhetorical techniques that allowed for 
seemingly objective, but obviously favorable, comparisons to the West.115 In September 1960, 
readers wrote in regarding the article celebrating it for its ability to “give the opportunity of 
making comparisons and judging the progress of the GDR in recent years” according to M.R. 
Colliat of France. Mr. K. Rickiö of Finland also claimed, “this article shows very clearly the 
social security enjoyed by the population of the GDR!” via “hard statistical facts about a vital 
manner, which convinces more than mere general opinions could do.”  
The key issue in these reader feedback presentations is, of course, whether or not these 
are actual readers writing in and if these comments were actually their words. While this could 
not be verified, the comments remain useful if for no other reason that they show what the 
journal thinks its articles should be focused on. Furthermore, GDR Review followed up this 
favorable feedback with other articles, such as “What Price the Flu?” or “What Price a Flat?” 
following the same structure of examining a social welfare program or normal human costs that 
compared the GDR with the FRG with hard numbers where the GDR once again came out on 
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top. If nothing else, this rhetorical strategy was thought to be convincing and successful, which 
underscores the positive reader feedback that GDR Review claimed. This shows a clear feedback 
loop from reader response, and how GDR Review attempted to use Western information against 
itself and to not just attack the West on moral grounds, but also to continue to doggedly attack 
the West on points where the GDR could be considered stronger in caring for its citizens and in 
providing better opportunities for women in particular. 
Women’s Role(s) in FRG Society 
 In West Germany’s Scala International, portrayals of women differed greatly from those 
of the East. The article in the April 1963 issue of Scala International, “Industry without 
smokestacks,” evokes common impressions of West German views of gender roles in society 
through a discussion of the West Berlin fashion industry.116 Scala portrays women in the article 
primarily as consumers, thrilled with variable fashion and glamour. The text conveys that West 
Berlin is “today Europe’s producer of women’s outerwear” and provides a history of the 
development of the Berlin women’s fashion industry starting in 1837 with Valentin Manheimer 
from Magdeburg, who won the lottery, moved to Berlin, and started selling women’s dressing 
gowns in his shop. From there, the article conveys how despite strong competition, and the 
destruction of the Second World War, the industry remained strong in divided Berlin. A fashion 
show of “mannequins,” or models, further demonstrates that West Berlin remains a center for 
women’s fashion. From there, the article describes how the industry in West Berlin remains 
focused on quality but is gradually transitioning from its old model of individual sewing of 
garments to a more organized, industrial form. 
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 The article, while generally 
informative, offers a subtle yet important 
look into how a specific topic such as the 
women’s fashion industry in West Berlin 
could serve as an entryway to discuss a 
number of political issues. On one level, 
the article explicitly states that West 
Berlin should, at least on this level, be perceived as an equal to that of London and Paris, thereby 
placing West Berlin, and by extension the Federal Republic firmly within the West. The 
narrative of rags-to-riches business success present in the story about a young German man 
winning the lottery, and responding to the business success of selling women’s dressing gowns 
emphasizes how successful businesses can grow in response to market conditions. The 
description of modern-day trendy parts of Berlin such as Kurfürstendamm also serves to show 
that West Berlin was an active part of modern international fashion and a consumer society. 
On another level, however, these more specific political messages are interwoven with 
and inflected by the overarching presentation of women’s roles in the modern Federal Republic. 
The article presents women as value-conscious consumers preoccupied with maintaining style 
and having their dresses look more expensive than they are, “Not so that they can save money, 
but so that they can buy something new more often.” Women, then, are the consumers of this 
story, liberated from the supposedly much more serious male concerns of fiscal conservatism. In 
seven of the eight images accompanying the article, mainly young women are shown in 
productive roles in the industry including as models, saleswomen, and as factory workers. These 
young women fit the lifestyle of the West German system of the early 1960s where young, 
Figure 21 Sixty thousand people are working in the service of fashion 
in Berlin, Scala 4/1963 
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unmarried women were supposed to work full time until marriage, while for married women 
now part-time work was accepted, which did not challenge the male breadwinner family model, 
but allowed them to earn a “surplus income” for the family consumption.117 While this portrayal 
fits the dominant West German ideal of the family, it is also an example of how the magazine, its 
editors, and ultimately the decision-makers at the BPA were aware of East German emancipatory 
narratives about freeing women from domestic oppression and the importance of women’s 
employment opportunities within the GDR. In this way, a blend of overarching political ideas 
with specific themes portraying a self-representation abroad, such as women’s role in society, 
could become more than just a German-German debate about social and political policy, but also 
a competitive demonstration of one system’s superiority over the other.  
 At times, Scala International became nearly as overt as GDR Review in its presentation 
of social issues. For example, in a March 1964 article entitled “Eva 64,” where the author asked, 
“What is the position of the women in the world today?” The article follows the archetypal 
structure of Scala in that it focuses the article on a general international issue, slides in references 
to the Federal Republic and implicitly criticizes the GDR. For example, much of the article 
discusses how women, over time, gained equal rights with men. Starting with the understanding 
that “Until far in to the 18th century, women accepted as a matter of course the distribution of 
roles which made public life the business of men and the family the business of women.”118 
From there, the narrative shifted to focus on “middle-class” women who “began to grow bored; 
they did not know what to do with their leisure time” because household tasks began to be 
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outsourced from the home.119 Most statements in the article focus on other countries and 
women’s roles there in 1964 and earlier in history, such as how fifty-one “ladies are seated in the 
Palais Bourbon.” The only specific reference to the Federal Republic is that women compose 
30% of employed people in the country. To undermine the GDR’s narrative of women seeking 
employment due to boredom with housework, the article sets out that women’s emancipation has 
been achieved, but that we should “avoid going to extremes with it.” In particular, the article 
pushes against the idea that “the work done by women in the home and in the family is less 
interesting, less worthy of recognition and less important than the work done by men in 
workshop and office.”120 In other words, women thus had a significant complementary role to 
play according to West German articulations. 
The images accompanying the article offer a further international flair by showing 
women in different professions. For example, a Spanish dancer, traffic policewoman in Nigeria, 
and a French lawyer showed that women were capable of any number of occupations. This was 
balanced out, however, by a single image of an Ethiopian woman with an infant child along with 
the caption, “woman’s eternal calling.”121 The combination of historical narrative, 
internationalization, and pushback against the GDR’s narrative of female emancipation 
culminate in an apparently “reasonable” middle ground for approaches to women’s equality and 
role in society. For example, caring for one’s children is placed on an equal level with work in 
the public sphere, while emphasizing that the key battles in the struggle for women’s 
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emancipation had not only already been fought, but been won. More importantly for the 
comparative Cold War context, these battles had been won in the West and by bourgeois women. 
Internationalization as a tactic in Scala International offered, on the one hand, the ability 
to connect with broad foreign 
audiences who could see 
themselves in certain topics. 
On the other hand, it enabled a 
casual distancing from an 
incestuous German-German 
conversation that, while still 
revealing of prevailing 
attitudes, tended to hide overt 
political messages better. For example, an article entitled “Everything is the Work of Women” 
discussed how the life of “Turkish women has changed in an almost unimaginable manner in the 
last forty years.” The title is a quote from former Turkish President Ataturk who, according to 
the article, engineered reforms in Turkey that enabled women’s equality. The approval of Scala 
fits the West German understanding of women’s role in society seen in other articles. For 
example, the Turkish woman is presented as “in no way different from her European sisters 
today; she is a fashionably dressed lady, a model mother or a young girl with a profession.”122 
Not all articles discussing women in society focused explicitly on an international 
context; instead, some chose to focus on general human-interest stories. The discussion of Berlin 
women profiled a particular mentality that showed they were of an equivalently cosmopolitan 
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nature to those women of other European cities. An article entitled, “A quick tongue and a warm 
heart,” offers a mixture of famous writers’ opinions and juxtaposing Berlin women with their 
rural counterparts. On balance, it argues that Berlin women are different. This difference 
manifests in their dress and way of speaking. In a sense, Berlin women’s “feminine wit” makes 
them vivacious counterparts to their provincial sisters. According to the article, these differences 
further manifest in heightened political awareness and activity based on their correct responses to 
a poll regarding the 1966 Bonn elections. While the article concedes that some of this political 
cognizance is “partly the consequence of Berlin’s special political position,” it continues to argue 
that this heightened political awareness is not a result of a movement, of a broader political 
awakening, and instead should be understood as a manifestation of “the long existing interest on 
the part of the women of Berlin in all questions of public life.”123 
The images, frozen by the nature of their medium, portray relatively little of the “quick 
tongue” expressed in the articles. Instead they portray thoughtful, expressive, and, of course, 
highly stylish young women. Some show women listening in groups, perhaps in class, others 
show them sewing, or in conversation with other young people. There are a few images that 
show women in more active and strong poses seemingly demonstrating their thoughts and 
arguments. For clarification, the reader is given only two captions for eight photographs, but they 
convey a similar theme. The first places Berlin women “on the front line of the East-West tug-of-
war,” where she “takes a lively part in the political life of the divided German capital.” 
Importantly, she is framed as having “her own opinions in politics and private life and defends 
them with her quick wit and ready answers.”124 The following caption works particularly well 
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with the image below. The caption stated, “The young women of Berlin are passionately fond of 
this city which their mothers rebuilt with their very hands from the ruins of the war. The Berlin 
woman’s lively political consciousness is something which marks her whole life – at work and in 
her leisure hours – and gives her poise and self-confidence.”125 The image accompanying this 
caption shows an attractive woman gazing in to the distance, appearing calm and confident with 
immaculate hair and dress. The background provides the key juxtaposition, that of the Kaiser-
Wilhelm Gedächtniskirche, shows that the past is 
remembered and honored. It also demonstrates that 
West Germany has moved profoundly into the future 
in a confident, self-possessed manner, and this can be 
seen in the social position of FRG women. The 
caption refers specifically to the efforts of women to 
rebuild, but the image instead focuses on a young 
woman and her thoughts and appearance. Thus the 
emphasis moves beyond the past to focus on the 
future.  
The caption and the article in general provide 
a narrative of female political activism in the city of 
Berlin accompanied by an embrace of common 
stereotypes regarding feminine behavior that makes quick wit, political awareness, and passion 
for public concerns exceptional when these traits find expression in women. Further, it 
demonstrates that women both can and do have political voices and active roles in West German 
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society, which is a marked departure from much of the early 1960s writing on West German 
women in Scala International. This political voice, however, was presented as entirely neutral. 
This departure provides insight into the political currents and motivation of the time. While these 
young women, who were not radicals, were likely motivated to express dissatisfaction with the 
policies of the Bonn government, the magazine instead spins this in a way that makes the women 
appear passionate rather than combative. The apolitical nature of their presentation further 
juxtaposes with the presentation of politically active women in the GDR, who were clearly 
socialist. What had not changed from the early 1960s, however, was the emphasis on youth, 
appearance, and core foundational narratives, such as the reconstruction of Germany in the form 
of the iconic Trümmerfrauen.  
While women in GDR Review were often presented in advanced positions such as 
scientists and engineers as well as factory workers and nurses, Scala International rarely showed 
women in this capacity. Most women in careers were shown in traditionally feminine career 
paths as seamstresses, nurses, students, mothers, etc. A notable exception, however, was seen in 
a Scala – Portrait article entitled “Lady Shipowner.” In this article, Liselotte von Rantzau-
Essberger was presented as a unique heiress to the oldest German shipping line operating 
between Europe and Africa, the Woermann Line founded in 1848 and the German East Africa 
Line founded in 1890.126 This article, while somewhat unique in its portrayal of a woman owner 
of a major business in the FRG, continues to demonstrate some of the key tactics in Scala 
International more broadly; for example, by working to appeal on multiple levels to different 
audiences. On the one hand, this narrative of a woman’s profound business recovery from losing 
all of her ships during the Second World War appeals to common capitalist tropes of the 
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advanced Western world. On the other hand, the naming of cabins after African countries and 
regions like “Nigeria” and “Urundi” showed a commitment to Africa and profound trade 
connections that would appeal to newly independent countries seeking stronger trade 
relationships with an ascendant West German economy while continuing the colonial legacy. 
The images tell a familiar story of a woman rebuilding Germany. While not a 
Trümmerfrau, Frau von Rantzau is shown at two different ship construction sites giving a 
profound sense of reconstruction and development. Surrounded by her all male “co-workers” in 
two different images, she retained the central role and figure in them. These images fit and 
reinforce tropes of women in Germany rebuilding the country, but also works to offer an 
alternative impression of women in the magazine. Virtually all women pictured in Scala were 
young, and most did not have such a prominent role in their professions. Frau von Rantzau, 
however, is not meant to be a path breaking figure in the magazine, or to present a vision for a 
new, more progressive society. Her conservative dress, and position as an inheritor of a great 
company serve instead to demonstrate that women such as her could control large companies, 
but more importantly that they should be privately held and that the Federal Republic was 
committed to ongoing trade with Africa via enterprises such as this one. In this way, the brief 
portrait provides a kind of microcosm of goals for Scala, which had to work to be popular among 
a variety of audiences, and participate in multiple narratives, even while embedded in cultural 
and organizational tropes and ideas. 
Scala International was quite straightforward in conveying changing social attitudes 
about women’s role in FRG society. The transition in portraying women was overtly displayed in 
the prominent table of contents page at the front of the magazine, where the editor would 
commonly comment on general issues of the day. This article, entitled simply “Women,” 
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credited women themselves with “carrying on an unrelenting social revolution in Europe and 
North America.” Further, the article claims that society has advanced so much that “the presence 
of women at universities, in public life, in the diplomatic service or in business has become such 
a matter of course that we forget how little time has gone by since women first broke out of the 
thousand-year prison of their lives.” The article further cites that Germany “gave women the vote 
after World War One” to demonstrate long-lasting German credentials in this area. Following the 
pattern of internationalizing such issues, the article also stated, “Even the countries of the Orient 
find themselves increasingly affected by this social revolution, which is providing problems for 
the old family and household arrangements in a number of Asian countries.”127 The pattern of 
attributing problems of social developments, such as women’s liberation, to the Third World is 
another common feature of Scala. 
In both GDR Review and Scala International in the 1960s, images and articles defined 
women’s role in society anew. In the GDR, this model fit a particularly socialist articulation of 
women’s roles as understood by a labor-starved GDR society. In the Federal Republic, this 
articulation expanded on a single-earner home, with some potential for young women to earn 
some additional funds on the side. Furthermore, the departures from this narrative, such as the 
article “Lady Shipowner,” were juxtaposed with states in the developing world, rather than with 
the GDR. This deliberate externalization of debates about women and their social roles enabled 
an attempt to appeal to foreign states as a model of development and continued the Federal 
Republic’s general strategy of ignoring the German Democratic Republic as a method to 
delegitimize its existence. Women’s roles, as a core marker of progress and difference in society, 
found overlap in a large number of other categories of the state. For example, the article “What 
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Price a Baby?” showed how the GDR placed greater emphasis on social programs and costs as a 
way to combat the West’s clear economic production and wage advantage. The GDR, however, 
claimed more than just greater material advancement, and instead articulated a vision of a society 
that due to its socialist ideology was morally superior. The GDR argued it enabled broader 
swathes of society (most importantly women) to achieve life goals outside of the proverbial 
“Kinder, Küche, Kirche.”   
Conclusion 
The early development of foreign cultural policy in the middle 1950s, followed by the 
aggressive demarcations of the 1960s, put the GDR and the FRG in the difficult position of 
having to present themselves positively vis-à-vis a shared past and a divergent future. The 
magazines GDR Review and Scala International attempted to carry each state’s message to the 
international public and in so doing to push through negative opinions past and present. The most 
convincing way to do this in magazines meant to portray everyday life in divided Germany was 
by threading political messages through lifestyle articles that could be of interest. The “everyday 
operationalization” concept becomes particularly potent when paired with an analysis of images 
provided in the magazines as illustration of an article, or sometimes as a parallel story of their 
own. Images of housing construction in GDR Review became a broader symbol of the GDR’s 
prosperity, modernity, and concern for its citizens’ welfare. At the same time, an image of a 
woman working in an aircraft factory, as a seamstress, or as a model served to reify the GDR’s 
self-conception of gender egalitarianism and fulfillment. A similar process emerged in Scala 
International, where both German concerns and international issues with a German flavor 
presenting a female owner of a shipping company could represent the promise of capitalist 
prosperity and also the impression of a successfully adapted gender order. Similarly, the images 
169 
 
of mass reconstruction and modernization worked to show that it was the Federal Republic, not 
the GDR, that existed at the cutting edge of social welfare and technology.  
Economic development in the GDR and FRG diverged, as the GDR pushed to have its 
economy taken seriously, while the FRG, riding narratives of the Wirthschaftswunder, was more 
concerned with showing how good and kind companies could be to their workers even as they 
succeeded in business. However, rebuilding, as a broad image, was not a simple category. 
Instead it involved a careful reconstruction, and in some cases, new development of homes, 
business, factories, democracy, social welfare programs, and more. Women’s role in German 
society was also interpreted differently by the GDR and the FRG, and this battleground inflected 
a very large number of topics in both magazines and was a key battleground in the Cold War. 
Women, as markers of progress in society, were thus presented in archetypal fashions often 
undermined by photographs that destabilized the political messages. The narrative of the 1960s 
for both states brought Germany back into the world, vying for international acceptance. In short, 
the GDR and the FRG emerged from the 1950s with institutions working to direct foreign 
cultural policy in a way that could fit their key narratives and funneled their narratives to 
convince casual observers of their political goals, but in the 1960s they developed their core 
images and self-narratives as defined according to their own ideology and structured defensively 
to both respond to and anticipate challenges from the neighboring German other. 
The mutual competition for international acceptance for both German states in the Cold 
War was viewed by each state as a zero-sum game. This was true in the GDR because it faced 
what it saw as an existential challenge against the enforced diplomatic isolation of the Hallstein 
Doctrine. At the same time, the Federal Republic feared that a surge in popularity for the GDR 
could undermine the business and diplomatic contacts abroad that had extricated the FRG from 
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the shadow of the Third Reich. The development of both states’ foreign cultural policy reflected 
the upsurge in intensity that occurred through the 1960s that led on the one hand to the GDR’s 
triumph in obtaining international recognition and on the other hand to broad scale rethinking 
and development of foreign cultural policy in the Federal Republic. The 1960s were key in 
determining the path for both of these states that would follow, and they laid the groundwork for 




























WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND YOUTH PROFILES: FINDING EDGES AMIDST PARITY 
DURING THE 1970S 
 
 The classic, if simplistic, contrast of freedom and equality in capitalist and socialist 
countries applies a great deal to the FRG and the GDR in the 1970s. For instance, the GDR could 
tout women’s equality in the workplace and in salary, while the FRG could celebrate the freedom 
of young women to choose to be homemakers. During this period, both Scala International and 
GDR Review sought to present stories that stood out as unique while also being believably 
representative. In so doing, however, the presentations of Germans on both sides came to 
transcend simplistic ideological categorization. The nature of Cold War competition and the 
inevitable comparison between the two Germanys forced each state to modify their messages and 
images in a way that served to narrow the ideological gap. To contribute to this strategy, the 
magazines presented an everyday history of ordinary East and West Germans. This made it 
possible for historical analysis to tap in to a contemporary reader’s understanding of both what it 
meant to be German and why one might be better than the other.  
 The 1960s marked the first period of great confrontation in foreign cultural policy and, in 
particular, the dissemination of the image of a “better” Germany. By contrast, the 1970s marked 
a period of global transition which found profound expression in the magazines. The events of 
1968 in both the capitalist and socialist world shook each bloc. Youth demanded change, and 
governments and ideologies were forced to reckon with these issues, even if some of the dreams 
of the 68ers remained unfulfilled. Both Scala International and GDR Review embraced a sense 
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of transition in the 1970s, although for different reasons. The political transition from Walter 
Ulbricht to Erich Honecker, marked by dramatic efforts like a new constitution, pushed the GDR 
to present itself as a worker’s paradise capable of challenging the living experience of the West. 
Progressive goals like the legalization of abortion or of establishing women’s equality in 
employment and pay served to demonstrate that the GDR was a locus of German progressivism 
concerned with serving their population.1 West Germany underwent its own dramatic political 
transition when the Social Democratic Party (SPD) assumed power for the first time since the 
Weimar Republic. The diplomatic policies of SPD leader Willy Brandt towards Ostpolitik forced 
a reckoning between East and West Germany. Should there be rapprochement and a convergence 
of the two Germany’s (Annäherung) or a further demarcation (Abgrenzung) between them? 
These domestic political issues met with further international upheaval, but also triumph, when 
both states were admitted to the UN in 1973 and the Basic Treaty between the German states was 
signed. The GDR, waxing triumphant, had achieved many of their goals of recognition central to 
their foreign cultural policy, but now had to find new meaning and purpose for their efforts. The 
FRG, at the same time, finally discovered the power of auswärtige Kulturpolitik and identified it 
as the “third pillar” of foreign policy. 
 While grand political transformation was the order of the day, the portrayal of everyday 
life in Germany remained tantamount to each state’s image. Issues central to a state’s identity, 
such as how families should be structured, became sites of contestation for a “better” approach. 
Simultaneously, a new generation of Germans, raised in a divided Germany and entering 
maturity, were identified as key figures in debates about which system produced the better, more 
                                                             
1 For more on “real existing socialism” see Andre Steiner, The Plans that Failed: an economic history of the GDR, 
trans. Ewald Osers, (New York: Berghahn, 2010) and Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German society 
from Hiter to Honecker, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2005). 
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adjusted, and vibrant youth capable of better demonstrating the merits of their society. The GDR 
tended to emphasize their commitment to gender equality a great deal more than the FRG, and 
they certainly did so much earlier in GDR Review than in Scala International. By contrast, the 
FRG took a far more active approach with the youth and new generation issues that spanned the 
1960s and 70s by producing multiple article series and attempting to explain why the younger 
generations felt the way they did.  
In keeping with the trends of the 1960s, the magazines oftentimes tended to mirror each 
other’s themes, even as they were inflected differently. Furthermore, domestic politics played a 
key role in how each state worked to redefine themselves in this moment of transition. The key 
question for this period, however, is how each state would handle their images in response to the 
challenges posed by Ostpolitik, mutual admission to the UN, and, at least in some respects, 
international parity. How could the GDR, once they obtained key objectives in international 
recognition, continue to present themselves as the better Germany? Furthermore, how could the 
FRG respond to the end of the economic miracle and define itself on new levels beyond simple 
prosperity, especially when faced with an ascending GDR? 
International Conditions of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
 The relaxing of Cold War tensions over the course of the 1960s and the resulting détente 
influenced the specifically German developments of Ostpolitik. In this process, West Germany 
continued to refuse to officially recognize the GDR, but gradually worked towards developing 
somewhat warmer relations with the East. Major international incidents supported in part by 
NVA troops, such as the violent shutdown of the Prague Spring, threatened to destabilize a 
relaxation in relations. Despite this, the German states gradually began to broach some of their 
differences. According to Helga Haftendorn, the “ultimately decisive event was the formation of 
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the Social-liberal coalition government under Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister 
Walter Scheel in October 1969 in Bonn.” Because Brandt was willing to accept the principle of 
“two States in Germany,” he set a new tone that contradicted the harsh restrictions of the 
Hallstein Doctrine. Walter Ulbricht, however, continued to demand guarantees for the GDR from 
the FRG and worried that Soviet Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev would make a deal with the 
FRG behind his back. Because of his demands to the Soviet big brother, among other reasons, 
Walter Ulbricht was replaced by Erich Honecker on May 3, 1971. A series of international 
negotiations culminated with the Basic Treaty of December 21, 1972. In the treaty, the two 
German states “agreed to develop normal, neighborly relations based on equal rights and to 
establish ‘permanent representations’ rather than embassies.”2 Concern over too much closeness 
between the FRG and the GDR shifted GDR policy to developing a totally distinct socialist 
German culture. Later, this culture would still try to lay claim to some aspects of the German 
past that could safely be deemed progressive. The Federal Republic eschewed ongoing attacks 
towards the GDR and sought to internationalize and refine their presentations, even as the GDR 
reached its primary goal of international recognition. Both states reached a state of relative parity 
in international relations in September 1973 when they were both accepted as full members of 
the United Nations General Assembly. 
 “Foreign cultural policy is not a step child of foreign policy”: Adaptation in the FRG 
In May 1969, West German Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor Willy Brandt declared 
foreign cultural policy a “third pillar of foreign policy.” Ascendant politically in the grand 
coalition of his party, the SPD, and rival to the CDU/CSU, Brandt identified foreign cultural 
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policy as an essential component of modern German diplomacy. He argued that “it is not just a 
question of showing what has been saved by tyranny and war, but also of paving the way for the 
new.”3 His office had expanded the Foreign Office budget allocation to foreign cultural policy 
from 50 Million DM in 1958 to 224 Million DM in October 1968.4 In the fall of 1969, the 
Bundestag announced a full evaluation of West German foreign cultural policy. The new 
priorities and strategies of the late 1960s and the early 1970s entailed a shift in the FRG’s 
strategy to develop more nuanced, sophisticated materials for export to the world. It would be 
too much to claim, as some Foreign Office officials did, that the FRG was now dedicated to 
presenting purely the truth in foreign cultural policy. Nonetheless, a more concentrated focus on 
“believability” and a greater capacity for self-criticism, as well as adaptations to cultivate more 
sympathetic audiences, created a superior product of West German diplomacy.  
The Foreign Office’s increased priority on foreign cultural policy extended well beyond 
funding debates to include fundamental questions as to what kind of image of Germany should 
be sent abroad. In December 1967, a meeting for the Coordination of Foreign Cultural Work 
showed that officials were unsure “which image of Germany [they] wanted to convey to foreign 
countries,” but agreed that it should be differentiated on a country-by-country basis. In addition, 
Luitpold Werz, the leader of the East-West Department of the Foreign Office, argued that “one 
should by no means import a self-absorbed Germany cliché, but also, quietly, something about 
the intellectual conflict that is taking place in our country.” He argued that “Europe is of cultural 
interest precisely because new spiritual forces are constantly stirring in it.”5 Though not a 
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particularly remarkable claim by itself, this statement indicated a profound divergence from 
more saccharine descriptions of prosperity and success that dominated GDR Review, and to a 
lesser extent, Scala International.  
A more varied image of Germany demanded a great deal of analysis from Foreign Office 
officials. For example, during the Meeting of the Cultural Policy Council in October 1967, one 
report engaged with the overarching question: “What is our image of Germany?” After wading 
through a series of stereotypes, the report argued, somewhat poetically, that their image of 
Germany was “a product made up of countless mosaic pieces which, over a long period of time 
are compiled by the participants to the best of their knowledge and belief and constantly revised 
on the basis of new experiences and insights.” In addition, it argued, “the image of Germany 
must constantly change. Only a strongly oversimplified image of Germany can claim validity 
over a longer period. The most important basic requirement for this mosaic work is sincerity; 
beautifying, hushing up and exaggerating must be avoided under all circumstances.” This 
sentiment did not, however, preclude a “short form” image of Germany, which claimed, “the 
FRG, the free part of divided Germany, is a modern, democratic, highly-industrialized and 
dynamic state. Its social, scientific and cultural achievements are based on a long tradition. 
People and government are taking positive conclusions from the negative lessons of the past for 
the development of the family of nations and for the preservation of peace.”6 
Changing from a somewhat static and complimentary image of Germany to one that 
changed based on the recipient country’s context and took in to account domestic unrest and 
criticism did not go without challenge. A more conservative response to the report of the Cultural 
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Policy Advisory Board emerged from the ZAB (Central Office for Foreign Education). It argued 
that “the image of Germany abroad must be less ‘true’ than it is believable and interesting.” In 
addition, it “must be applicable worldwide” because “the attempt to offer each nation its tailor-
made image of Germany leads to global disbelief.” The central claim here was that “our self-
esteem should forbid us from accepting local color for the sake of local success.” It went on to 
claim “Germany is a very interesting nation. An old cultural landscape after total destruction, the 
site of the largest migration of peoples of modern times by the stream of refugees, lives today 
with a fivefold increase in social product in half the houses.” Finally, it challenged the mosaic 
approach that worked to present a more varied and critical image abroad as a travesty. The 
“unprecedented reconstruction [of Germany] is being torn apart by a skeptical, wealthy, alienated 
young generation.”7 
Though more conservative elements attempted to shift the terms of the debate, the tide 
was against them. After the 1969 Bundestag elections, Willy Brandt became Chancellor of 
Germany, and those like Luitpold Werz who worked to reform West German foreign cultural 
policy finally had a leader sympathetic to their goals. In a letter sent on October 18, 1969, Werz 
reminded Brandt of his perspective on foreign cultural policy when he was Foreign Minister and 
attached his recommendations “for increasing the importance of culture in our foreign policy.” 
Werz stated that “our conception of cultural policy assumes that through our cultural work a 
representation is to be given of what cultural achievements past Germany produced and what it 
in the present provides.” In addition, this presentation “should not try to show a rose colored and 
unbelievable image of Germany. Rather it must also convey something of the unrest [Unruhe] 
and discussion that prevails in our country, although within certain limits.” This first component 
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of cultural policy was joined by two more in Werz’s conception, including a focus on reciprocity 
and the effort to help other countries. In his mind, “the possibility of winning understanding for 
Germany and supporting our political goals through cultural work is great.”8  
Institutions outside the Foreign Office, like the BPA, agreed with much of these 
conceptions. For example, a December 1970 Bulletin stated, “we must convey an unvarnished 
picture of our spiritual and cultural reality without self-centeredness.” This was particularly 
necessary because “we must depart from the often over-emphasized self-representation of past 
years that was certainly offered first after the war in order to work against a distorted image of 
Germany.” The Bulletin went on to quote an unnamed leader of a Goethe Institut giving a speech 
in a western capital city: 
1.We can only convince with quality. 
2. Our offerings must possess originality. 
3. The work must have an international bearing. 
4. We must be up-to-date and place even more weight on the problems of the present.9 
 
This perspective was further confirmed in January 1971 by a minister10 at the meeting of the 
cultural policy advisory board who argued, “foreign cultural policy is not a stepchild to our 
foreign policy.” Instead, “foreign cultural policy is sovereign and complimentary at the same 
time” and “belongs at the core of our foreign policy.”11 
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A series of reforms in foreign cultural policy developed from the late 1960s into the 
1970s from both government figures and academic experts. This integrative relationship between 
those involved in foreign policy and those seeking to improve it showed the capacity of the FRG 
system to absorb criticism and to evolve. Influential figures such as former Parliamentary State 
Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ralf Dahrendorf and Professor Hansgert Peisert 
emphasized a new set of guiding principles for foreign cultural policy. For example, Professor 
Peisert wrote a memo entitled “Foundations for realizing a new concept of foreign cultural 
policy” in which he argued for an expansion of “culture” to go beyond “traditional cultural terms 
of literatures, music and fine arts.”12 When responding to this development, the Foreign Office 
immediately acknowledged it was “of the highest importance” for them. Foreign Office officials 
did not agree that the former foreign cultural policy was primarily self-representation, as Peisert 
had argued, but did agree with Peisert’s emphasis on the principles of exchange and cooperation 
with foreign audiences. Regardless, Foreign Office officials still felt that there was an 
“inherently natural task of informing foreign countries about essentials” that was not “an 
exaggerated desire for self-representation.” Providing this information was important because, 
“if today there still exist firmly rooted prejudices about Germany, this is not least due to the lack 
of an objective self-representation in the past.” Finally, it agreed that “self-representation must, if 
it would not be misunderstood, orient itself to its partners, it must try to carve out an identity, 
common interests, common goals, and as far as historical factors go, ‘what binds us.’”13 This 
shift in focus was also emphasized by Foreign Minister Walter Scheel of the Free Democratic 
                                                             
12 PA AA B90/1118 Hansgert Peisert, “Foundations for realizing a new concept of foreign cultural policy,” 1971. 
13 PA AA B90/1118 Dr. Fehr, “Expert Report of Prof. Peisert ‘Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
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Party (a part of the allied SPD/FDP coalition government), who believed there remained much 
work to be done, but identified the positive development of a broad “new conception for our 
foreign cultural policy.” In addition, he too argued for an expansive understanding of the term 
“culture.” He stated that “it encompasses the entire intellectual debate of our time and thus also 
social policy and social issues.” The benefit of the expanded definition was that it would “put the 
weight of [the Foreign Office’s] work more on contemporary issues, without forgetting the great 
masters of the past.”14 
The various debates about the development of foreign cultural policy in the FRG 
culminated in the Report of the Study Commission (Enquete Kommission) for Foreign Cultural 
Policy in 1975. The Study Commission originated after the 1969 Bundestag elections and 
evaluated the efforts, tasks, and goals of West German foreign cultural policy and sought to 
develop the approaches for the future. In 1975, the report of the Study Commission was released. 
It largely “agreed with the report that Professor Hansgert Peisert submitted to the Foreign Office 
on the reform of foreign cultural policy.” It established goals and tasks of foreign cultural policy 
in rather general and abstract terms. For instance, it emphasized the vital importance of 
reciprocal exchange between nations in cultural policy. In its view “there is no isolated 
coexistence of close cultures anymore” and as a result “this experience leads to an opening and 
expansion of our culture.” Furthermore, this approach required an expanded definition of culture 
outside of the traditional boundaries of high culture. As stated in the document, “today culture 
embraces all the expressions of the life of a people, their spiritual tradition and the resulting 
civilization. Economics and politics can therefore no longer be seen independently of cultural 
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traditions, but as sectors of an overall behavior determined by culture.”15 
The Study Commission did, however, provide some concrete suggestions. For example, it 
made the argument that Scala did not properly present culture. Thus, “the commission therefore 
recommends the publication of a cultural magazine in cooperation with a competent publisher so 
that it can better serve the cultural interested foreign public.” The production of media more 
broadly received special attention in the report. It emphasized that “the deployment of German 
media in the course of the foreign cultural policy of the Federal Republic can only partly be 
controlled through the state because the media is either entrusted to independent public 
institutions or mostly produced from private companies.” This was not, however, an obstacle to 
overcome. Instead, the report argued, “the independence of the media and accordingly their free 
opinions must be maintained,” which limited the state to “contract out tasks to independent 
media carriers or to suggest certain products.” One of the major concrete media adaptations from 
this period was an explicit focus on “the different purpose and the necessary differentiation 
according to target groups” which “makes an appropriate diversification of the offer of written 
information necessary.” 16 The principles of exchange thus manifested clearly in the creation of 
narratives tailored to specific foreign audiences. 
In addition, the report heavily criticized the lack of cooperation between the Foreign 
Office and the BPA, which began coming to a head in 1970. A series of reports from the Foreign 
Office directly discussed the issue with respect to print materials. For example, in March 1970, a 
report from the Foreign Office stated, “the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Press Office 
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have so far worked without a system and therefore not satisfactorily together in the field of 
distribution of German printed products abroad.” In general, “cooperation usually did not take 
place until there was external pressure, meaning too late.”17 
The indication appeared to be that the Study Commission prioritized the position of the 
Foreign Office, which had been fighting turf wars with the BPA for two decades. Though the 
report praised the BPA for their work which “provide[d] information of the entirety of political, 
social, economic and cultural life in the Federal Republic of Germany,” it also decried the BPA’s 
independence from the Foreign Office. When discussing the efforts of the Foreign Office and the 
BPA to link up, the report put it shortly, “unfortunately that is missing.” In addition, it placed the 
Cultural Department of the Foreign Office in charge of planning and coordination for foreign 
cultural policy, pushing the BPA to place their efforts under Foreign Office direction. 
For some in the Federal Republic, the new approaches in the Study Commission report 
did not go far enough. For example, State Minister Dr. Hamm-Brücher argued that the 
“significance [of foreign cultural policy] is unfortunately being underestimated, especially in 
Germany.” Furthermore, echoing Willy Brandt’s earlier statements, she asked if foreign cultural 
policy was actually a “third pillar or a fifth wheel.” She emphasized that “foreign cultural policy 
is not one-sided self-representation or only propaganda. It provides the exchange and encounters 
of cultures.” At the same time, however, she did not state that efforts to present Germany abroad 
should be abandoned because “a balanced cultural exchange can never completely renounce self-
presentation if it is to lead to a real encounter between two cultures.” Her concern, in particular, 
was that the Federal Republic still had to fear “the resurrection of the image of ‘loathsome 
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Germans’” that once again demonstrated “that political stability and economic success alone are 
insufficient foundation for the prestige of a state in the world.” Minister Dr. Hamm-Brücher 
articulated an ongoing concern with foreign cultural policy, which had only recently emerged 
from contentious debate in the Bundestag, particularly with respect to the amount of funding it 
received. Skeptics in the Bundestag looked for concrete results, but, as Minister Dr. Hamm-
Brücher demonstrated, this was not an easy thing. She stated, “the truth is: spectacular successes 
are generally not expected from foreign cultural policy; it has a long-term effect. But without 
political exchange, personal encounters, partnership-based cooperation in as many cases as 
possible, political and economic relations will remain without the ultimately decisive human 
dimension.”18 
Competing with the GDR in a time of Relative Parity 
 By May 1968, figures in the Cultural Policy Committee feared that regardless of the 
success of the GDR’s recognition policy, “the GDR has become stronger in international 
discussion.”19 Despite the cooling of tensions between the two countries, the FRG maintained 
observations of GDR foreign cultural policy efforts and image campaigns. For example, in June 
1970, Foreign Office Official Dr. Döring produced the “Report of the Federal Government 
“Political and Cultural Public Relations Work of the GDR Abroad.” This report condescendingly 
identified that the GDR “uses the same media as western industrialized states for their cultural 
and public relations work.” Then it went on to break down the narratives the GDR focused on for 
their presentation abroad. For instance, in non-communist countries, “the basic principle of GDR 
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activities in non-communist countries is the peaceful coexistence and the peaceful competition of 
differing social systems.” In so-called Third World countries, the GDR focused on “the support 
of the national freedom movements and the struggle of formerly oppressed peoples for the 
security of their independence.” Ultimately, the report stated that “the basic goal [of the GDR’s 
foreign cultural policy] remains unchanged: the establishment of relations serves the goal to be 
accepted as a state and finally to be recognized as a subject of international law 
[Völkerrechtssubjekt]” Furthermore, the report differentiated between GDR and FRG systems 
because “[the GDR] places media more strongly and consciously in service to its political 
objectives.”20 
 In Europe, which was a primary market for GDR Review, the GDR worked to convince 
European states of the importance of its role as a trade partner and to show the FRG “as 
militaristic neo-Nazis and revanchist.” Their targets in these areas were, in particular, left-
leaning journalists and political figures. After 1968, however, new struggles emerged for GDR 
foreign cultural policy. According to the report, “the orthodox hardness of the regime and, since 
1968, the active participation of the GDR with the invasion of the CSSR, strongly impaired the 
effectiveness and broad appeal of these endeavors.” In fact, the report argued “in the 
Scandinavian countries, Holland, and Belgium, countries still critically-oriented towards 
Germany, the believability of the GDR propaganda shrunk a great deal.” In places like Italy and 
France, the Foreign Office was concerned somewhat more because “20-25% of the population 
see the GDR as the ‘better German state.’” The report conceded that the GDR had succeeded in 
convincing many states that it was “the second German state” and that “efforts of the FRG to 
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change this will probably have little success.” At the same time, however, “in most countries of 
the world…the FRG is as before the real Germany.” The threat of the GDR was not wholly gone 
because “in priority countries, GDR public relations work and cultural work functions elastically, 
impactfully, and generously.” Finally, the report suggested that “we should not reduce our 
endeavors to carefully instruct the governments, the press, and the population of the world about 
us and maintain cultural relations with them.” With respect to the GDR, it suggested, “we should 
and we will continue to not polemicize against the other German state and to react to their 
attacks only where our reputation and our interests are absolutely required.”21 
 Strategically, the FRG worked to operate via an indirect competition with the GDR. As 
Professor Peisert recommended, “the demand for an active competition with the GDR will bring 
disadvantages for the cultural foreign work of the FRG so long as the central control of the 
foreign cultural policy of the GDR and its absolute subordination under the primacy of policy is 
not loosened.” Instead, he suggested “the best form of competition is likely to be an unerringly 
absolute truth-based information policy.” This truth-based presentation should, in addition, rely 
on “a number of ‘International Interests’ (pedagogy, sociology, economics, women’s issues and 
youth issues).” This strategy represented a more explicit turn to the cosmopolitan tactics of the 
1960s wherein magazines like Scala could show “that it is much simpler, from a German side, to 
assemble and sell interesting material for this subject to groups as it is to try and do something 
similar in terms of regionalization.” By internationalizing its message, West German foreign 
cultural policy cultivated a more attractive presentation of issues and showed how the 
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competition between the two Germanys relied partly on an inter-German conversation, but as 
both sides became more sophisticated, increasingly on international issues and publics.22 
 By the later 1970s, the preponderance of funding in the FRG, its greater responsiveness, 
and its focus on believability had paid some dividends. According to a meeting between the 
Foreign Office and representatives in the Bundestag, the Foreign Office argued “the scope and 
effectiveness of the cultural-political activities of the GDR abroad are consistently 
overestimated.” And the efforts of the FRG were “much broader, more differentiated and thus 
more efficient in terms of quality and quantity than the cultural activities of the GDR abroad.” 
The attempted differentiation of the GDR (Abgrenzung) tried to show the “cultural task of the 
GDR not in the presentation of the German cultural tradition, but in the development of a 
‘socialist national culture.’” According to the Foreign Office officials, “in such an understood 
cultural exchange on the part of the GDR, a true competitive relationship in the field exists only 
in the rarest of cases.”23 
“Recognition of the GDR Now”: Institutional Developments in the GDR 
 Unlike the seemingly more conciliatory designs of West German foreign cultural policy 
starting in the late 1960s, the GDR worked to stay on the offensive and to portray their rival 
negatively while raising their own status. In an Action Plan for Foreign Information Campaigns 
(Auslandsinformation) from March 1970, the plan was to increase efforts for world recognition 
of the GDR even more. This push had already been given greater impetus by the Politburo on 
November 11, 1969, leading “to a new climax on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the 
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liberation from fascism” which showed that the quest for recognition “is now at a higher level, 
and is using the positions gained to continue more diverse forms, with a larger mass basis.” 
Strategically, the GDR sought to show “the recognition of the GDR is part of the worldwide 
struggle of all progressive forces for peace, democracy and social progress and the struggle of 
the peoples for European security.” In addition, it planned to use “the pressure of public opinion 
and all democratic forces on governments that have not yet established full diplomatic relations 
with the GDR to strengthen [their connection], with the aim of establishing such relationships or 
to take important steps.” In addition to seeking recognition for the GDR, another key component 
of the campaign was to “expose the aggressive policies of West German imperialism” and West 
Germany’s attempts to maintain “exclusive representation.” 24 
 Foreign cultural policy figures in the GDR, including those in the SED and 
representatives from the MfAA, grew increasingly concerned over new developments in West 
German efforts in the late 1960s. In a report from 1968 on the “New Aspects of West German 
foreign propaganda,” the adaptations of the West German foreign cultural policy system 
threatened the GDR’s own efforts. For instance, the “content, forms, and methods of Bonn’s 
foreign propaganda were quickly aligned with the political tactics of Bonn’s rulers” including 
Ostpolitik and the improvement of propaganda aimed Eastwards “to be made more elastic and 
sophisticated” and avoided “clumsy indictments.” Through its strategy of working more with the 
GDR, the FRG “was interested in ‘relaxing’ the relationship with the GDR in the interest of the 
‘German people’, but not at the price of recognition as an equal, sovereign state, as foreign 
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countries.” In addition, the report stated, “as long as the leadership in the GDR is not prepared to 
grant its people the right to self-determination, [the FRG] sees the ‘government of the grand 
coalition’ as a moral duty to represent this part of the German people and to stand up for its 
welfare.” The new tactics of the FRG to appear as the reasonable German state willing to 
compromise and work together served to undermine the GDR’s attempts to distinguish 
themselves as a genuine state. In addition, the FRG’s efforts grew even more alarming because 
of the GDR’s fears of isolation and being left out of the diplomatic loop by Moscow. The GDR 
also watched the growing centralization of the FRG’s foreign cultural policy efforts with 
concern. This could be seen in the “even greater centralization of the entire system of Bonn 
foreign propaganda; the search for an even closer co-operation of press, propaganda and cultural 
work abroad” under the authority of the Foreign Office. 25  
 The GDR had to contend with more than just the issues surrounding a developing West 
German foreign cultural policy because the image of East Germany as the “peace-loving” 
German state lost purchase after the NVA participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia to put 
down the Prague Spring. A series of documents referred to the “recent actions” assisting 
Czechoslovakia and how the GDR’s military involvement had hurt the image of the GDR. This 
necessitated the development of new image-building campaigns to help convince readers of the 
need to recognize the GDR. For instance, in August 1971, a report advocated adopting a new 
strategic presentation of the GDR:  
It is important to propagate the new social changes in connection with the development of 
the developed socialist society in the GDR. The juxtaposition of the constantly evolving 
socialist society in the GDR, on the one hand, and the general crisis, the liability and 
morbidity of capitalism, on the other hand, increases the appeal of the socialist example. 
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According to this report, “Imperialist propaganda, especially in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
represented the American way of life as the ideal of capitalist society, which also had a strong 
attraction for our people (golden west). This ideal has been transformed into the repulsive 
spectrum of all capitalist countries and infirmities.” Because “the attributes of the consumer 
society (car, refrigerator, washing machine) are no longer the ultimate social blessings of 
capitalism,” the GDR was also able to lay claim to a productive and advanced society equal to 
the West. As far as long-term strategy was concerned, this meant that the GDR planned to 
demonstrate “our socialist democracy, our socialist way of life, our everyday life, our 
development and our achievements vividly and by concrete example, our foreign information 
does not simply uphold the reputation of our GDR, or only promote sympathy for our state. It 
directly influences the struggle of the progressive forces for social progress in the capitalist 
countries.”26 The presentation of everyday life and the social progress would thus be shown in 
tandem with the economic advancements of the GDR to establish it as the superior German state.  
 Beyond new challenges, the GDR also worked to operate within existing structures to 
improve their foreign cultural policy and information work. Funding shortfalls and strains within 
the GDR’s economic system precluded a massive expansion of new efforts and centers in the 
same way the FRG worked as the 1970s went on. In a report for the Advisory Council on 
Foreign Information to the ZK, the council emphasized, “in the field of foreign information [it is 
necessary] to intensify, to increase the effectiveness” because “we cannot erect new facilities, 
newspapers, series of titles, cultural centers, broadcasters etc. without limits.” Instead, the 
council argued, “It's about enforcing the principle of focusing more on key issues and major 
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countries, and mobilizing reserves through the quality of our agitation and propaganda 
materials.”27  
To fulfill this goal, a number of organizations within the GDR began to work on 
improving several aspects of GDR foreign cultural policy, including magazines like GDR 
Review. For magazines after 1973, the report wanted to continue to show “socialist integration” 
but to make it more human. As it said, “Certainly numbers and facts have their raison d'être, but 
should we not be more convincing in focusing on people in the integration process?” In the 
future, coverage would not be “limited to the construction of pipelines and power plants. Priority 
is given to the political-ideological growth of citizens in the socialist community of states.” For 
GDR Review specifically, the task was to focus “primarily on the increased representation of the 
GDR as part of the socialist community of states. Their offensive peace policy and common 
actions with the brother countries have priority in reporting and information.” Additionally, the 
efforts and events of the friendship societies were to be presented in greater detail. The struggle 
to maintain a consistent message, but allow for sufficient variety in message, meant that the 
Advisory council had to walk a difficult middle ground. On the one hand, they wanted “to 
implement the new task more precisely and convincingly, so-called standards could be set up 
under which the main complexes are published.” At the same time, it argued these standards 
“should not be ‘corset poles,’ the necessary scope for the journalistic ‘freedom of movement’ 
must be preserved; but standards have the advantage that the editors do not lose sight of their 
main tasks and on the other hand readers find the specific problems in the same place.”28 The 
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GDR’s foreign cultural policy thus sought to maintain a flexibility on an article level, but also to 
continue hitting themes it wanted to emphasize. 
The GDR developed a number of important themes for their media plan of 1972/1973. 
These included several that focused more on presenting the GDR as a lived experience, in 
addition to the traditional presentation of achievements. The themes showing the more human 
side of the GDR included: “a normal day in the life of the family,” “the youth of the GDR,” 
“culture belongs to the people,” “the socialist village in the GDR,” and “Berlin – capital city of 
the GDR.” These subjects operated alongside the ongoing attacks against the imperialism of the 
FRG and the presentations of the growing economic success of the GDR. They also showed an 
effort to solve some of the problems in the GDR’s presentation that some argued looked too 
much at numbers as opposed to showing people. 
By the middle of the 1970s, the GDR had continued to develop some of these thematic 
presentations and worked to centralize control over the political presentation in periodicals, as 
well as to make sure that the message was sufficiently differentiated based on the targeted 
audience. In a 1975 report of the meeting of editors of GDR magazines to coordinate political 
strategies, the LfV announced a number of planned campaigns. For instance, the peace, security, 
and coexistence narrative remained a central tenet of GDR self-representation, but in the 
assessment of existing periodicals, the LfV leadership apparatus found them wanting based on 
the standards established by the ZK. For instance, “in ‘DDR Revue’ hardly any attempt is made 
to establish the legal context of convincing socialism and peace.” And for the GDR Review 
issues sent to India and other parts of Southeast Asia, this was somewhat more convincing 
because the tangible relations between India and the GDR were used “to vividly portray the need 
for an active peace struggle.” With respect to more general self-representation of the GDR, the 
192 
 
report argued that the “the magazines for capitalist European countries [are] as a whole too easy, 
too smooth, often still strongly black and white.” The ideological nature of the presentations also 
hurt their presentations, because “the dialectic of universal laws and national peculiarities is 
presented too little concretely.” Most importantly, however, the report argued, “in all periodicals, 
the information about the demarcation of the GDR from the imperialist FRG and the emergence 
of the socialist nation in the GDR must be strengthened.” Tactically, the magazine also continued 
using certain rhetorical strategies such as differentiation (for regional differences) and presenting 
articles and information through foreign eyes known as “others about us.” For materials sent to 
capitalist countries, the report suggested continuing to rely on “indirect” methods that avoided 
spelling out precise meanings, but nonetheless gave the reader a clear impression of the dangers 
of imperialism or West German revanchism.29 
A subsequent report from later in 1975 showed that the LfV was working to figure out 
which kinds of articles foreign audiences found most convincing. To determine this, the 
organization primarily relied on letters from readers, but also on their own evaluation of the work 
presented thus far. For instance, some of the statements simply stated, “the combination peace, 
security and peaceful coexistence with the imperialists’ exposure succeeded better than in the 
first issues of the year.” At other times, the report was more specific such as when it said, “in 
general, DDR Review finds a good rating among our partners” or “the overall positive and good 
assessment of GDR Review in the recipient countries of South and Southeast Asia, especially in 
India, continues and is confirmed by numerous letters to the editor.” Article series were also 
evaluated for how effectively they conveyed the political goals of the GDR. Some topics were 
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regarded as well done, such as when the report stated, “the preservation of anti-fascist traditions 
in the GDR is well and vividly portrayed.” Others, such as those discussing West German 
imperialism, needed work because “the number of such articles seems too small, and the direct 
exposure of the neo-colonial practices of the FRG is still missing.” Articles discussing social 
progress as a means to demonstrate political superiority were also deemed successful, such as 
“the coverage of the GDR with contributions such as ‘care for pregnant women’ or ‘working day 
of a student.’”30  
The GDR’s effort to identify themes and topics that would appeal to broad swatches of 
foreign audiences led them to examine what topics so-called “multipliers” would bring up when 
discussing positive attributes of the GDR. These topics included:  
The socialist state of the GDR - free of capitalist crisis and inflation, stable prices 
The high labor productivity (compared with other socialist countries) 
The social-political measures for working women and mothers 
The qualification possibilities and the high level of education of women 
The steadfastness of the mass of the population against the ideological diversion of the 
opponent 
 The big sports achievements31 
 
One of these topics in particular, the “social-political measures for working women and 
mothers,” found particular resonance in the 1970s because 1975 was declared International 
Women’s Year by the UN.  
 The opportunity for the GDR to present itself on the world stage and to leverage its new 
membership in the UN meant that it placed a great deal of emphasis on the celebrations for 
International Women’s Year. The core of the argument in GDR Review and other foreign cultural 
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policy productions was that “the socialist countries are the only ones who consistently realize the 
equal rights of women in all areas of social life.” The first rhetorical claim linked women’s rights 
with a broader GDR narrative of peace and human rights. Accordingly, the plan was to argue, 
“the fight for peace can only be victorious if it involves women - half of humanity.” At the same 
time, there was a distinct effort to qualify the progressive claims of the GDR by saying “the 
realization of equal rights does not mean that we already have all the problems solved. With all 
that has been achieved, it is still not easy to meet the demands of employment and motherhood.” 
Citing a litany of statistics, the argumentation plan showed how “In 1955, 58 percent of women 
of working age were employed, today, 84.5 percent work and study. Every second employed 
person in the economy is a woman. The principle of equal pay for equal work has long been 
realized.” A number of social improvements for childcare and education was also added to this 
list. The final point, of course, was to show that the socialist countries like the GDR had found 
better ways to have women participate in their society. Thus, the plan quoted a letter from Karl 
Marx to Kugelmann in 1868 with the line, “The progress of society can be measured exactly by 
the social position of the fair sex.”32 Though it was long an important lever to pull for the GDR, 
the position of women in society in 1975 reached new heights with the dual pressure of the UN 
celebration and the competition with the FRG. 
 Structurally, the efforts of the GDR in foreign cultural policy changed fairly little in the 
1970s. The massive reorganizations and construction of the foreign cultural policy apparatus that 
occurred in the 1950s and 1960s did not continue into the 1970s. Similarly, the efforts of the 
FRG to improve their foreign cultural policy was met with alarm by officials in the GDR, but 
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their response was to work within their existing frameworks and improve their message. The 
overwhelming focus in the early years for the GDR was to receive international recognition, but 
after the Basic Treaty and admission to the UN, the sense of insecurity, while somewhat abated, 
still remained in place. Fears of being absorbed in to a general German culture fueled efforts of 
demarcation in East German foreign policy, and they took careful steps to continue attacking the 
Federal Republic and promoting themselves as the progressive German state. 
Women, Gender, and the Family in the GDR and FRG 
 In 1975, the UN declared an “International Women’s Year” to celebrate women around 
the globe. The German states’ mutual admission to the UN in 1973 spurred each state to 
demonstrate its commitment to this ideal, but their ideologies inflected their approaches 
differently. The opening to the March 1975 issue of GDR Review declared, “In our socialist 
country… the implementation of equality for women is one of our finest achievements.”33 In 
January 1975, Scala International published their own article commemorating “The Young 
Mother,” offering frank criticisms of West German childcare and culminating in the statement 
that “The scope of every young mother’s personal freedom depends on the couple’s readiness to 
work together.”34 These two statements demonstrate the alternate East and West German 
approaches to discussing the role of women in society, intersected with the broader rhetorical 
divergence of the two magazines. The GDR, lacking in many ways the more tangible economic 
and technological successes of the FRG, utilized its portrayal of women and family life as a 
weapon to demonstrate socialist progressivism and criticize the inequality and retrograde 
attitudes of its Western neighbor. The FRG, in its own right, seemed to adopt narratives on 
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women’s empowerment only reluctantly and to a lesser extent than the East, instead relying on 
rags-to-riches stories of migrants to provide its own social welfare bona fides. 
 As was shown in the previous chapter, the focus on women’s equality did not begin in 
1975, but had been a consistent subject in the magazines. The GDR focused much more on this 
issue and it tended to pop up earlier and with greater frequency in GDR Review, particularly in 
March when the celebrations for International Women’s Day took place (March 8th). GDR 
Review developed three narratives surrounding women and the family in the 1970s. The first 
demonstrated the intimate, natural relationship between socialism as a lived ideology and the 
reality of women’s equality. The second was an explicit focus on the family and family planning, 
including the legalization of abortion, marriage in the GDR, and the redevelopment of the Civil 
Code.35 The third narrative was an anti-FRG critical approach that sought to delegitimize 
Western, capitalist society through the lens of women and women’s rights. 
 At the 8th Party Congress of the SED in the Spring of 1971, Erich Honecker declared “It 
is indeed one of the greatest achievements of socialism that in our country the equality of women 
has become a matter of law and that it is very largely practiced in reality.”36 In March 1973, 
GDR Review published the article “Enquiry into Equality” which profiled and interviewed five 
women to ask what their life was like in the socialist GDR and to evidence Honecker’s claim. 
The rhetorical device of interviewing regular GDR citizens and of using everyday life as a 
political and ideological tool was consistent with the typical approach of GDR Review in this 
period. The five women—Gisela Haufe, Brunhilde Martin, Brigitte Herfurth, Waldtraut Sztuk, 
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and Hildburg Pfintzer—were all employed or studying, four were married, and three had 
children. The questions for each varied in topic and substance from key issues in how they lived 
their lives such as “How do you manage to divide your responsibilities between your family and 
your vocation,” to more quotidian topics such as “Should a woman use cosmetics?”  
 The profiles provide demonstrable anecdotal evidence for the GDR to claim that women 
in the GDR lived fulfilling lives, balanced between family and work. For instance, in response to 
the question about dividing work and family responsibilities, Brunhilde Martin replied “When 
my husband and I happen to be at home together we share the work.” Similarly, Waldtraut Sztuk 
responded with typically socialist flavor, “We have an exact plan for the housework. On days 
where I am away on public duties after working hours, the biggest part of the household chores is 
done by my husband.” Gisela Haufe, a mother of four children, refined her position to convey 
that perfect balance was not always possible, “During my third pregnancy I stopped working. 
Later I looked up a job enabling me to bring up my children under the best possible conditions,” 
she clarified. The upshot of these arguments was that family and work life were compatible for 
women and that even when a GDR woman had to forego one for the other, the idealized helpful 
husband picked up the slack or fulfilling employment was found shortly afterwards.37 
 The tasks of the article “Enquiry into Equality” required a variety of questions whose 
answers could provide justifications for a society whose inefficient economy demanded near full 
employment of its population while claiming a moral high ground. Thus, when showing the 
superiority of the socialist system, the women would respond to soft-pitch questions like “Would 
you rather be a man?” with a triumphant “No” while touting socialist equality, “Today women 
have every opportunity to learn and get on.” At the same time, there were some attempts to offer 




a more nuanced and qualified perspective, though they fell quite short of genuine critique. For 
instance, one question asked “Where, [sic punctuation] do you think there are still too few 
women in evidence?” The women tended to identify the lack of women in leading positions in 
their particular field including “In the management committee and other leading bodies of our 
cooperative farm” and “very few women are chief accountants. I find this surprising and worth 
changing.”38 
 Graphics accompanying the article reinforced two key features: photographs of each of 
the women profiled buttressed both the appearance of truthfulness and tangibility of the article 
and infographics offered statistical support for women’s equality in the GDR. The photographs 
of each of the women offer relatively little opportunity for in-depth analysis, but the infographics 
seen below clarify much of the article’s intent. The first graphic shows the percentage of the 
population “gainfully employed” thereby setting the standard by which society should be judged, 
which is the percentage of people that work outside of the home. At the same time, the next 
graphic provides a success story, showing that women’s “gainful employment” had reached 77% 
by 1970. Similarly, the increasing chart of women with university or vocation degrees tells a 
similar story of progressive, incremental improvement. The graphic depicting “Women in 
leading positions” lends further credence to the sparse complaints regarding the paucity of 
women in managerial 
and higher-up 
positions. The 
portrayal of “women as 
deputies” offers a soft 
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counter to the prior infographic by demonstrating, at the very least, the higher percentage of 
women in the government of the GDR. The reader of this article would naturally be led to 
assume that a great deal of progress had been made in the GDR in women’s equality, in 
particular vis-à-vis developing countries and even less-progressive Western capitalist societies. 
 GDR Review committed to demonstrating the GDR’s achievement of gender equality in a 
two-fold rhetorical move to demonstrate ideological and social superiority to West Germany and 
to demonstrate commitment to the UN’s directives. As a new member of the UN and still facing 
a degree of diplomatic insecurity, the GDR picked battles it could feasibly show they were 
winning. Thus, in a March 1975 article entitled “UN Resolutions – A Reality in the GDR,” GDR 
Review set up a structure to show “we are comparing measures for implementing the equality of 
women in our republic, which have already been carried out, with relevant UN decisions.” At the 
same time, a large-font quote of Honecker at the top again claimed the GDR had achieved 
gender equality, but “No capitalist country on earth can claim the same.”39 This article, relatively 
predictable in content, beat upon the same refrain to each UN resolution regarding gender 
equality, stating that the GDR had already achieved the goal by establishing a society and laws 
that achieved universal equality according to socialist ideology. While this particular article’s 
presentation is somewhat stale, it nonetheless provides important rhetorical clarifications for the 
                                                             
39 “UN Resolutions – A Reality in the GDR,” GDR Review, 3/1975, 45. 
Figure 25 No caption, GDR Review 3/1973 
200 
 
GDR Review’s general campaign regarding gender equality: women were presented in such a 
way that they could be and were both mothers and workers in the GDR. 
 While many of the socialism and women’s equality articles tended to be macro-level 
analyses, sometimes they involved a closer profile. For instance, the March 1974 article “ESDA 
and its Girls” took a deep dive in to the ESDA Hosiery Works in Auerbach of the Erzgebirge 
Mountains in order to articulate a vision of a socialist factory commensurate with the GDR’s 
ideological ideals. The article intersected the economic development of the GDR, its 
commitment to gender equality, its progressive views on education and training, and the great 
progress it had made since 1949. The profile of the factory’s personnel manager, Liesbeth Hänel, 
reinforced the notion that in the GDR women could rise to leading positions in their field and 
provided a starting point for the closer analysis of factory life for women in the GDR. 
 At the hosiery factory, Liesbeth Hänel, described as “small of build and in her mid-fifties 
she was, evidently a resolute personality and commanded respect,” outlined how far the factory 
had advanced with the advent of the GDR and 
socialism. Early in its development, workers 
were poorly paid, as Hänel experienced as an 
apprentice worker in 1934. By 1974, 
however, “the younger generation [knew] 
nothing of this from personal experience.”40 
Instead, figures like Hänel had facilitated the 
implementation of the GDR’s pro-worker 
efforts by offering paid apprenticeships, 
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education programs, and above all, a good wage. Hänel, a SED party member, was offered the 
office of personnel manager, but remained “unpretentious, self-assured, and conscious of whom 
she works for.”41 Images of the director of the factory, Elisabeth Walter, portray a mixture of 
authority, care, and good nature. The caption reinforces this impression with her quote 
highlighting the equality of women in GDR society: “It is no rarity in our socialist society to find 
a woman in a position like mine.” At the same time, she emphasized the largesse of factory life 
towards women workers where “special attention is paid in our group – as indeed in all factories 
and institutions – to the working and living conditions and the development of the personality of 
the women workers.”42 
 Unsurprisingly, women factory workers were the primary focus of the article and the 
growing employment numbers from 1,400 in 1970 to 1,800 in 1974 with a projected 200 more 
on the way showed the prosperity, gender equality, and good working conditions of the GDR. At 
the same time, the everyday problems of individuals did not disappear. For example, Christa 
Oestreich faced a scheduling challenge where her electrician husband worked the opposite 
schedule of her. In fact, 
“Only on the work-free 
weekend and on Sundays, 
or when their shifts fall 
favorably, are they able to 
look after their four 
children together. At other 
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times they divide the household chores and the care of the children, between them.”43 The largest 
image in the piece shows the Oestreich family together with their children in their apartment in 
Auerbach. According to the caption, the Oestreichs live in “a modern three-roomed flat in 
Auerbach” where they pay 33.80 Marks a month, which was less than five percent of their 
monthly income. The image serves to convey the opposite impression than the article about the 
family. Firstly, it shows the family relaxing together, when the text largely referred to how work 
kept them separate. The message of cooperation and mutual childcare is also undermined 
because Christa Oestreich cares for the infant child and the other young child while the father, 
Dieter Oestreich reads the paper and one child looks passively on. At the same time, the message 
of economic prosperity and leisure comes across well in the image. The flat does appear modern, 
with the television, nice furnishings, and decorations. Thus, the presentation of a prosperous, 
working, but also loving family comes across in the photograph, which softens the negative 
presentation of their lives in the text even as it undermines claims to an equal gender division of 
labor. 
 Family planning and childcare formed another key and highly personal inflection to state 
policy, which was another crux to the GDR’s claims of superior achievement of gender equality. 
In the article, “Before a Child is Born…” GDR Review presented the prenatal care of the GDR in 
terms of state largesse. For example, the woman being profiled in this short piece, Gerhild 
Hartranf, claimed “there are maternity centres in all the towns and larger villages of our republic. 
They are there, and all women use these facilities without so much as paying a penny.”44 At the 
same time, however, the article argued that women in the GDR wanted to return to work once 
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they could. Generous social welfare provisions such as state grants for childcare and a twelve-
month holiday after the birth culminated in Hartranf’s plan to return to work once the child could 
go to kindergarten. She clarified pointedly that this was “not because I have to earn money; my 
husband’s income - he’s a civil engineer – is sufficient for the three of us. But I like my work 
and need the exchange of ideas with colleagues.”45 This brief article showed the general 
narrative of family planning and gender equality wherein women were cared for by state-run 
clinics before they had the child, during birth, and then afterwards for a time. In the end, the 
women wanted to return to work for greater fulfillment, echoing the “gainful employment” 
concept in the infographic from “Enquiry into Equality.” 
 The reforms of Erich Honecker and the SED in an effort to generate a better standard of 
living and to enter the stage of “real-existing socialism” generated an even greater focus on 
social welfare programs and on the higher production of consumer goods. In October 1972, this 
transition found expression in an article about the life of workers at the Ernst Thälmann heavy 
engineering factory in Magdeburg. One portion of the broad spectrum of social welfare programs 
that was particularly important for the inefficient GDR economy was the support for young 
couples who formed the bulk of the workforce and also produced children for the next generation 
of the GDR’s workforce. The provisions for these young couples, upon marriage before the age 
of twenty-six, included an “interest free credit of up to 5,000 Marks to help them set up a home 
of their own” and another “5,000 Marks for furniture and other household equipment within 
three years of getting married.”46 Most importantly, these loans could be partially repaid via 
credits upon the birth of children, with a scaling payment of 1,000, 1,500, and 2,500 Marks for 
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the first, second, and third child respectively. Providing these incentives to serve as a 
counterpoint to making abortion legal, the GDR hoped to encourage young marriages, especially 
by prioritizing young couples for new apartments in a state short of housing, even as it 
encouraged population growth necessary for the stimulation of the GDR’s economy. 
 On the other side of the family planning coin from state grants for marriage and 
childbirth was abortion. On the front-page of the article, “A Decision in the Interests of the 
Family” the caption for a full-page 
picture of newborn infants in a 
maternity ward stated “On March 9, 
1972, the People’s Chamber of the 
GDR approved a law on the possible 
termination of pregnancy.”47 In this 
article, Dr. Helga Rayner of the GDR’s 
Ministry of Health answered ostensible 
reader questions about the new law. 
The questions varied in form from 
questions about how the law would 
affect the sexual responsibility of young people to more structural questions about the declining 
birthrate in the GDR. 
 When asked why the GDR introduced the law, Dr. Rayner framed her response in terms 
of women’s emancipation. Rayner echoed Honecker first, “One of the greatest achievements of 
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socialism is that the equality of women is not just law, but that it is practiced in daily life.”48 The 
law, according to Rayner, enabled a woman to make choices timing her pregnancies and to be 
able “to develop her personality in her vocation and in the family without conflict.”49 At the 
same time, however, she worked to show the law in relation to the earlier legislation in the GDR, 
even referring directly back to the article from April 1972 “All from the Same Mould.” In this 
view, “the pregnancy termination law and the social welfare measures form an entity and serve 
to create a healthy and harmonious family life and promote the love of a wanted child.”50 
 When asked about the effects of the law, Rayner clearly argued the GDR implemented it 
successfully to reflect the progressive goals of socialist society. Rayner articulated the laws’ 
deployment as representative of the “contemporary trend [which] was all in favour of the law, its 
humanist concern, the welfare of the family and, above all, the protection of women’s health.” At 
the same time, the numbers of women getting abortions, which spiked initially, had already 
started falling off after a few months. Attributing this largely to the GDR’s emphasis on 
prophylaxis, Rayner also claimed that the law provided greater individual rights to women 
because it “grants a right of which women can avail themselves, under their own responsibility 
and as they see fit, within the first three months.”51 Health clinics in the GDR provided abortions 
at no cost due to the socialized health care system, and the article took the opportunity to 
demonstrate the generosity of the GDR’s health insurance program. It further argued that one of 
the key benefits of the legalization of abortion was the end of illegal abortions that were highly 
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dangerous. The article indirectly attributed these dangerous procedures to those states, such as 
the FRG, which had not yet legalized abortion.  
 The article demonstrated fears of the social effects of the law, such as “easy-going and 
reckless” men and a lack of “a sense of responsibility among young people” were unfounded. 
Special courses offered with the cooperation of schools and parents were designed to fill the gap 
where “moral concerns of the older generation often prove unsuitable for the desired education 
of children in the matters of sex and ethics.”52 At the same time, while emphasizing the rights of 
women, the article took care to focus on the responsibility of the male parent, by stating that the 
woman’s right to choose “in no way detract[s] from the attitudes and responsibilities of the man. 
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If the woman desires the child and refuses to have an abortion against the wish of the man, this in 
no-way exempts him from the duty of maintenance of the child.”53  
 The falling birth rate in the GDR, and in Europe more generally, made the question of 
abortion even more important structurally. According to the GDR’s narrative, the problems of 
the falling birthrate were due in part to the war (lack of “women of child-bearing age”), “the 
number of people in the other age groups” (read older people, due to “the high standard of 
medical care”), and the fertility rate. This somewhat disingenuous claim was framed as a matter 
of coordinating the desires of individuals and the society. This ideological framework led to the 
dual process of GDR law creation that “made it possible for women themselves to determine 
when they want a child, and on the other hand we have launched an impressive programme of 
social welfare measures which will be extended still further in the future.”54  
The images accompanying the article exemplified the duality of family and economic 
well-being juxtaposed with pregnancy termination. The article focused almost entirely on the 
issue of abortion, with some qualifications that this would lead to more productive and happier 
women and families. The images instead show nothing but happy couples, families, children, and 
the interviewee. The impression from the images, as well as the pointed lack of the term 
“abortion” throughout the article, gives the feeling that this is truly a positive development for 
families and for society more generally. The first image showing the infants in the maternity 
ward demonstrates that women were still choosing to have babies in the GDR and that perhaps it 
is true that “The GDR is a country where everything is done for the children.”55 The caption 
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accompanying the image of the interviewee, Rayner, provided credentials for her capacity to 
respond to the variety of questions she was asked and also softens her image. She was a mother 
of two children and was thus an excellent embodiment of the maternal figure that could 
successfully balance a demanding career and raising children. The final image of a mother with 
her infant child also gave a stronger indication of GDR Review’s intent in the article. The mother 
appears smartly dressed, complete with heels, earrings, and stylish hat. The central point of the 
image, however, is her nuzzling the child, demonstrating the affection that GDR mothers were 
capable of if, presumably, the 
pregnancy came at the desired time. 
In addition, it showed that just 
because a woman had the choice to 
terminate a pregnancy this did not 
mean that she would choose not to 
be a mother. The interaction 
between women’s equality in the 
state and the developing family 
planning programs of the GDR 
were arguably consistent and 
persuasive if shown in such a way 
that the society developed programs 
for both. However, GDR Review 
remained somewhat cautious in its 
presentation by opting to present Figure 30 No caption, woman with infant, GDR Review 4/1973 
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softer images emphasizing children and couples rather than independent women separate from 
traditional social structures such as marriage and child-rearing. 
GDR Review avoided alienating more traditional audiences and trumpeted their own 
ideological concerns by emphasizing the ongoing importance of traditional social insitutions like 
marriage. In the August 1977 article, “When Young Couples Say ‘I do’” the author Manfred 
Gebhardt celebrated the large number of young marriages, the rising birthrate, and the equality of 
partners in the GDR. While many of the GDR’s efforts were to break with the German past, 
certain aspects endured, and so the article stated, “Marriage is encouraged in the socialist state 
and young people do not question this.”56 The departure from the seemingly revolutionary claims 
of the early to mid 1970s with this much-more traditional outlook demonstrated the pervasivness 
and endurance of some traditions, but also the practical concern of the GDR to encourage as 
many births as possible, especially in the stable environment of marriage. 
The average age for marriage in the GDR for women was 19-21, while for men it was 21-
23. The prevalence of young marriages was encouraged by state-run programs including “creche 
facilities at the universities, cheap married quarters in the halls of residence” and of course the 
interest-free grant from the state to set up their own households.57 One of the confounding 
variables here that the article addressed only obliquely was the difficulty in obtaining housing in 
the GDR and the desire for young couples to marry and thus hopefully move up the list in 
priority. Gebhardt did concede that “although many new flats are built daily in the GDR it is still 
not possible to provide every young couple with a flat.”58  
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According to the article, young couples marrying led to an increase in the birth rate in the 
GDR, but was shown to not infringe on the equality of women both inside and outside of the 
home. The article claimed that this was “all the more astounding when it is known that since 
1972 the contraceptive pill has been available free of charge to every woman over the age of 
sixteen and that abortions are also free and involve no wage loss.”59 As a result, in the GDR, 
“usually only children who are really wanted are born.” Simultanesouly, the “whole character of 
married life has undergone something of a revolution. Little by little a new sort of partnership 
based on equality has developed bringing with it higher expectations – and demands.” The article 
did take a somewhat self-critical turn when it admitted “No-one tries to hide the fact that the 
GDR has one of the highest divorce rates in the world, among them many young marriages.” 
Gebhardts attributed this development to the shifting dynamics and roles within the household 
wherein the “typical male-female roles of the past are dying out.” 60 Thus, young marriages were 
supported by the state, but ended due to friction created on an individual basis when some young 
couples entered in to marriage “too hastily” or had more arguments because each person had 
different opinions on issues like politics or the economy. 
The images in the article emphasize the mutual work in both household and childcare in 
the GDR. Some images give the impression of rather simplistic and friendly relations between 
the young couples, while others demonstrate that women work in the GDR and that causes 
housework to be shared. The captions next to each provide further context advocating for 
equality, but are also somewhat contradictory given that they contradict arguments that GDR 
Review had published previously regarding the already existing equal partnership between men 
                                                             
59 Ibid., 8. 
60 Ibid., 8. 
211 
 
and women in relationships. Instead, this 
article argues that this is a developing 
process such that “becoming ever more the 
rule rather than the exception.”61 Other 
points in the article reinforce issues that 
young couples can face, such as the parting 
on the train platform, but in general the tone 
is highly positive. This tone was particularly 
directed at the women in the GDR, who by 
virture of having trades, guaranteed jobs after 
childbirth, and now equal housework were 
portrayed to be the beneficiaries of a superior 
socialist lifestyle. On a more pragmatic level, 
GDR Review deliberately worked to present 
babies and young women as much as possible because they were considered more photogenic. 
The distinction between constitutional and de facto rights became particularly important 
in the competition between the German states, both of which had equal rights enshrined legally. 
The GDR, facing a flagging economy vis-à-vis the West turned to women’s equality as a target 
with which to criticize a “free” FRG. For instance, a March 1972 GDR Review article, “Heavy 
Penalty for Being a Woman in the Federal Republic,” described FRG women as “subordinate 
beings at work, in political life and in the family.”62 However, according to the article, the 
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situation could be gradually shifting in the FRG because of the increasing socialist agitation and 
“the fact that equality for women has become reality in the GDR and the other socialist countries 
and that this equality is steadily improving and extending can no longer be kept secret by even 
the cleverest propaganda methods.”63 The bulk of the support for the GDR’s claims about the 
lack of women’s equality in the FRG centered on the high unemployment rates for women in the 
FRG and the lack of a social welfare net capable of supporting working-class women in 
particular. For example, GDR Review cited two sections of the FRG’s Civil Code. The first, 
Paragraph 1356 stated: “The wife is fully responsible for the management of the household. She 
has the right to take employment in so far as that is compatible with her martial and familial 
duties.”64 The next, Paragraph 1360, stated the wife is “duty-bound to engage in gainful 
employment when the labour power and the income of the husband are insufficient to sustain the 
family.”65 In this manner, the GDR’s critique of the FRG managed to simultaneously portray the 
FRG’s narrative of freedom and prosperity as somewhat hollow using the words of their own 
civil code. The ongoing problems of not quite reaching full equality or women still finding 
themselves doing the majority of the household work in the GDR, much like the criticized FRG, 
was attributed to “ingrained habits” of the “centuries-on assertion that ‘housework is the 
woman’s affair.’”66 
 The GDR’s campaign to show themselves as the haven of women’s equality found 
largely weak responses from the Federal Republic that only gradually picked up steam. An early 
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example of the Scala’s efforts to show women’s advancement in their society included virtually 
no references to broader social trends and was instead a simple profile of the prominent female 
architect, Sigrid Kressman-Zschach. The article, “A Woman of Tomorrow,” showed Kressman-
Zschach in a variety of poses, stylishly dressed working at building sites and also cycling, her 
preferred leisure activity. Her twenty building projects throughout the Federal Republic included 
the construction of apartment buildings, skyscrapers, and her own building in West Berlin. The 
only indication that Kressman-Zschach should be considered as represenative of shifting 
attitudes is the title “A Woman of Tomorrow,” which could in part indicate her building projects, 
but based on the intense focus on her highly successful career and hard-working attitude instead 
indicated that a professional woman was both highly regarded and accepted in the FRG. 
At the same time, other articles in Scala indicated that the FRG was struggling with how 
to interpret new generations of young women. In the article “Eva 70,” Scala offered a 
“photographic declaration of love to the fairer sex, the girls of today, who are so self-confident, 
so matter-of-fact and so free from illusions and at the same time as kittenish and romantic as 
their grandmothers.”67 The young woman of the FRG lived a leisurely life, liberated by the 
modern conveniences of a prosperous capitalist economy. According to the article the FRG 
woman “lives in a prosaic age between office and kitchen, supermarket and satellite town” and 
“while the battery of machines washes clothes and the dishes and does the cooking she spends 
her time in front of the television.”68 Further, she was independent by virtue of “the pill, she has 
only as many children as she wants and is herself sexually free.” At the same time, these women 
embraced the capitalist consumer society because, “never before have women spent so much 
                                                             




money and ingenuity on being beautiful and desirable.” The young women showed that the 
“seventies belong to the young, to the generation of 16-year-old girls. They live among us not 
like shy gazelles but in a state of protest: the teenagers are rehearsing the revolution.” 
Furthermore, the young woman was portrayed as “involved in life, she is aggressive and 
ambitious. She has thrown the corset of dependence in the dustbin to be free at last.”69 
“Eva 70” marked a slight shift from the traditional articles about modelling in the Federal 
Republic. Traditionally several issues per year had some kind of article referring to women in the 
Federal Republic who 
had adopted careers in 
modelling. Often, these 
women had started their 
careers in Munich, but 
then later worken in 
international fashion 
centers like Paris and 
New York. The key 
wrinkle in this article, 
however, is that in focusing on women in fashion, it undermined the other thread that took into 
account young women’s activism and protest as well as the rise of Second Wave feminism. The 
images focus on the fashions of the women and are modelled glamour shots that did not try to 
portray everday young women living their lives in the liberated fashion described. Instead the 
images remain fixated on the fashion and modelling aspect of the article.  
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The Federal Republic, much like the GDR, claimed to have achieved gender equality in 
their state, but unlike the GDR did not define their progress with respect to the German other. 
Instead, they tended to focus on international topics and issues, such as with the December 1970 
article “Give Us Equality: Demands of the International Alliance of Women.” In this article, the 
FRG placed the prerequisites for equality along the lines of industrial and educational 
development. In a resolution passed by the Congress (of the International Alliance of Women), 
the group laid out their concern that they were “aware that far greater efforts are necessary to 
achieve genuine equality between the sexes in household, industry and profession and that many 
women are not in a position to develop and exploit all their abilities because their education is 
inadequate.” 70 The article acknowledged the difficulties of resolving this issue on an 
international scale and sought to confirm the FRG as exactly the kind of developed, 
industrialized, and educated society which had legally enshrined equal rights for women. Critical 
voices still emerged at points, however, such as when Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, the State 
Secretary of the Federal Ministry for Education and Science argued, that a great deal of progress 
remained to be made “in a world which still very largely bears the imprint of male dominance.”71 
Scala continued to externalize and internationalize domestic issues, including women’s equality, 
and managed to place itself at the forefront of progressivism, even as it demonstrated the FRG’s 
remarkable economic and educational success.  
Much of the remainder of the early 1970s lacked explicit reference to women’s equality 
in the Federal Republic, but this changed with the UN’s announcement of 1975 International 
Women’s Year. Starting in December 1974 and running until May 1975, Scala introduced a new 
                                                             




recurring article section entitled, “Women in Germany,” which temporarily replaced the section 
“People in Germany.” The first appearance of this topic profiled “The Female Worker” and 
offered a grim and highly critical presentation of working women in the Federal Republic with 
heavy implicit attacks on the GDR. The article profiled two women. Evelin Weiss from 
Hamburg was discussed in the text, while Adelheid Hundt was the focus of the images and 
captions. At first the article focused on how irreverent and youthful Weiss was with respect to 
her family and clearly identified that “She hates her work. And none of her workmates like it 
either, although the firm does a lot to make life more pleasant for its female workers.”72 The high 
expenses of life due to the desire to purchase consumer goods that would furnish a two-bedroom 
apartment—including “a refrigerator, a griller, a juicer, a stereo sound system, a new colour 
television set and the little sports car”—made life difficult for young couples. These expenses 
also precluded having children for at least a couple of years. Thus, “it is obvious that one person 
cannot always manage that much alone. So wives work as well as husbands. Of the 25 million 
employed persons in the Federal Republic close to ten million are women.”73 
According to the article, women in the FRG worked because they wanted to raise their 
standard of living. In fact, “several analyses carried out by German sociological institutes reveal 
that a large majority of women work only because they need the money.” Supposedly, 80-85% 
of women fell in to this camp. The article framed the phenomenon of working after marriage as 
due to “‘maintenance or enhancement of the standard of living achieved with husband,’” because 
for 35% of women in the FRG, their income was necessary for “subsistence.”74 Social 
                                                             





advancement for working class women was limited, according to the article. In addition, women, 
like Weiss, though supposedly modern still maintained traditional values: “though they may ride 
on bicycles or motor scooters in jeans or mini-skirts, girls today want to get married most of all.” 
Working-class women, according to the article, lacked motivation to seek out educational 
advancement via trade schools, and also had no push from parents who thought they would 
simply get married anyways. Instead, Scala pushed half-day and part-time work as a solution for 
young women. Though part-time work was not yet fully accepted in the FRG, according to the 
article, “scientific studies have shown have shown that a woman who works only four hours a 
day shows a better hourly output than all others, including trained personnel.” However, 
“employers still shy away from the higher social burdens and the risk which female employees 
represent for them” because women employees continued to be seen as unreliable.75 
While young, unmarried women found themselves in difficult employment positions and 
endured prejudice, married women tended to be highly respected, according to the article. The 
conferring of respect to married women led to social pressure compounding the already existing 
economic concerns of young, single people that pushed early marriages. In an interestingly 
mirrored fashion to the GDR, Scala complained of “one of Europe’s highest divorce rates” such 
that a woman “who has no skill to fall back on is in an unenviable position.”76 The article further 
criticized women for protesting against working conditions “in a male-dominated society” while 
not participating in the German Trade Union Federation. The author argued that women failed to 
join the union both because they relied on their male counterparts to represent them and because 
“German female blue-collar workers are the most tradition-bound group in the Federal Republic, 
                                                             




even when they are smart dressers.” Finally, the article argued that women lacked the solidarity 
of male workers, wherein Oliver (Evelin Weiss’s boyfriend) took the side of Weiss’s father 
admonishing her “You shouldn’t be so bitchy to your father, Evelin” because the father “was 
working overtime again today.”77 
The article “The Female Worker” sought to portray young women workers in the FRG as 
capricious, melancholy, backwards, and subject to serious structural disadvantages. Evelin 
Weiss, serving as a stand-in for the 
general social commentary, was shown 
to be disinterested in politics, work, and 
education while being fixated on her 
relationship and upcoming marriage to 
Oliver. The social status conferred by 
marriage offered an escape from the 
monotony of factory work and held an 
elusive escape to a fulfilling life with a 
“prince charming.” At the same time, the 
article held out part-time work as a highly efficient and effective use of female labor, in keeping 
with the attitudes of the FRG. The supposed conservatism of working-class women served to 
undermine generations of working-class women’s activism in German labor history and to 
counter accusations of the GDR that the FRG was not a good place for the working class. The 
presentation of explicitly working-class women in the FRG placed it in specific opposition and 
comparison to the women of the GDR, the so-called “workers and farmers’ state.” In fact, the 
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article is almost inconceivable without juxtaposition to the GDR. If women were truly unhappy 
working, then the women in the GDR who worked full-time after marriage were unenviable. 
Further, women’s presence in political life that the GDR somewhat falsely advertised was either 
a lie or a flawed social construction. At the same time, the article had a degree of self-criticism 
for the FRG, where not everything was sunshine and daisies for working women. The high rate 
of divorce, lack of educational opportunities, and the paucity of employers willing to embrace 
female workers set up the FRG as the “male dominated society” the article conceded it was. 
Thus, while embracing stereotypes of women and their goals as dictated by the ideological 
preconceptions of the FRG, the article nonetheless allowed for a degree of thoughtfulness and 
progressive embracing of nascent feminism. 
The images accompanying the article focus on Adelheid Hundt and tell a very different 
story of careful planning and agency. According to the caption, Hundt worked at an “electrode 
assembly section of a Mainz factory” 
where her work “demands good eyes 
and special dexterity” leaving her “at 
home in her firm” and happy.78 In 
juxtaposition to Weiss, Hundt carefully 
considers her decisions and does not 
wait on her “prince charming” despite 
being happily engaged, as shown above. 
Hundt’s story changes the narrative 
somewhat, and while this partly appears 
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to be due to individual personalities, the images and captions also suggest this is the result of 
greater political engagement (she is a member of the trade union) and the nature of her more 
specialized labor. This issue, placed once more in relationship to the GDR, sets up the more 
advanced and technical economy of the FRG as a more fulfilling workplace for women rather 
than the drudgery of more basic factory work. Furthermore, the indications are that a more 
bourgeois family, as pictured in the bottom right photo below, has happier and better prospects 
than those of the working class. 
The second article in the series “Women in Germany” concerned “The Young Mother.” 
The balance between career, children, and housework facing young mothers in the FRG 
presented difficulties, particularly when they were faced with retrograde social attitudes. For 
example, Gerlinde Schreiber, the woman profiled in the text of the article, endured neighbors 
who said she “pays far too little attention to her baby” because she placed her elder son in 
childcare at the local church.79 While the article described generous social welfare provisions for 
pregnancy leave, it also acknowledged the lack of creches and the high cost of childcare such 
that it was unaffordable for most young families. Husbands, such as Mr. Schreiber, were 
sometimes able to help pick up slack, “while she was still working they used to take it in turns to 
do the washing, the shopping, and vacuuming and looking after their son.”80 This sets up one of 
the key arguments of the article, which is that “the scope of every young mother’s freedom 
depends on the couple’s readiness to work together. As long as her children are small, a young 
mother will always try to avoid going out to work.”81 
                                                             





In a new development to the series, and Scala more generally, the magazine began 
presenting different political parties’ proposed solutions to social problems like the scarcity of 
affordable childcare. For example, Social Democrats proposed a law where women who do not 
go out to work would be paid to care for working women’s children, while the Christian 
Democrats proposed “rearing allowances” for women to stay home and care for children while 
earning an income. In Germany, according to the article, “mothers have become not only a 
political but also a substantial consumer factor.” This transition made their views increasingly 
important for political and economic advertising, which had led to some alterations in their social 
standing. The article agreed that a young mother was “a tremendously hardworking and heavily 
taxed person.” At the same time, Scala cited polls showing “in defiance of charges to the 
contrary by revolutionary theoreticians, these women are contented, do not regard themselves as 
slighted, and do not regard their marriages as a burden.”82 The article did acknowledge, however, 
the profound role of class in shaping the experiences of young mothers and their children. For 
instance, while the gap between a family of a teacher and a worker had narrowed, “[working 
class children’s] mothers continue going out to work more than others, proof that it is a question 
of money.”83 As in the previous article, the solution was part-time work. But the trends in FRG 
society, according to Scala, were that young women still want to get married and “a job is to 
most of them of secondary importance,” and only after marriage and the children start school do 
they “begin to want to get out of the house.”84 These kinds of arguments indicated Scala 
                                                             
82 Ibid., 15. 
83 Ibid., 15. 
84 Ibid., 15. 
222 
 
International’s efforts to obtain greater credibility by engaging more critically with actual 
problems. 
Scala portrayed mothers in the 
FRG on a different timeline and with 
different priorities than GDR Review 
presented mothers in the GDR. The 
trajectory for young women in the FRG 
was to work some, maybe pick up a 
trade, and then to marry, have children, 
and only after those duties had been 
fulfilled should they pick up part-time 
work in addition to their household obligations. This articulation also offered implicit critiques of 
the GDR, where women very quickly returned to work and left childcare to state-run creches and 
thus had less of a role in facilitating the education and raising of their children. At the same time, 
both states continued to rely on an idealized image of shared household responsibilities where 
modern and younger men helped to alleviate the domestic burdens of women that worked either 
full- or part-time. The FRG further emphasized technology as the labor-saving miracle that made 
housework leisurely. The transition from this kind of generalized profiling in the early and 
middle 1970s to a clearer focus on activism, and women’s emancipation as a movement, took 
place on a separate timeline from the GDR which had adopted these narratives as early as 1971. 
In a stark tone departure, Scala International published an article in June 1978 entitled 
“What a Rare Piece of Luck it is to be a Man.” The article opened with a quote from Simone de 
Beauvoir regarding the UN declaration of 1975 as the International Woman’s year, “one has 
Figure 35 A Happy Family, Scala 1/1975 
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fooled and humiliated us. Next there will be a Year of the Seas, then the Year of the Horse, the 
Dog and so on…in other words we women are still considered worthless in the world of men, to 
be taken seriously for one year only.” In this article, the writer Erika Schork, the author of the 
book A Woman is Not a Man – The Limits of Emancipation, provided a history of the German 
women’s movement, heavily criticized “radical” feminism, and while deploring the lack of 
equality, ascribed it to fundamental differences between the sexes. The rhetoric of the article 
challenged the notion that women protesting could and should expect equality and that 
revolutionary (rather than evolutionary) progress was obtainable or even desirable. Challenges 
such as the campaign against Paragraph 218, which outlawed abortion in the FRG, or the 
movement led by feminist leader Alice Schwarzer were flawed, according to the author. The 
Figure 36 No caption, family in the FRG, Scala 6/1978 
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feminist movement, “had set itself the task of destroying the existing form of patriarchal social 
structure, to revolutionize and replace it with a matriarchal form. Her [Schwarzer’s] aim is not 
the equality of man and woman but the domination of the woman over the man.”85 To provide 
evidence that this path should not be followed, the article argued that the suffragettes of the “The 
Association of German Women” (Allgemeinen Deutschen Frauenverein) had achieved great 
success with their incremental and equality-focused approach. Furthermore, it was the “moderate 
women, and men, too, in journalism, Parliament and in the unions, women and men who are 
trying to improve the woman’s lot in an ‘evolutionary’ way.” For example, the Marriage and 
Family Act of 1977 finally “establishes the common responsibility of both partners as far as 
earnings and the bringing up of children is concerned” as opposed to the former civil code which 
set up roles where the “woman is responsible for the home, the man for his profession.”86 
Schork did acknowledge the problem of “a burden of household and family which she 
has to bear – even when she pursues a paid job outside the home.” This term “in the specialist 
jargon of the feminists…is called ‘double load.’” The project “Day Mothers,” first espoused by 
the SPD in the mid-1970s, was meant to solve some of the childcare burdens for working 
women, but still fell short of the desired effect. The added problem of the economic downturn of 
the late 1970s caused by the oil shocks added another wrinkle to feminist goals. Because women 
tended to be more vulnerable to being laid off, they faced special challenges in turbulent or 
recessive economies. The article also acknowledged that women tended to find themselves 
employed in the realm of “social services” where she “at least gets paid for a job she normally 
                                                             




does at home.”87 And while some legislation had been enacted to outlaw wage differentials 
between men’s and women’s work, practical barriers still existed to translate this legislation “still 
only to be found on paper, not in the wage packet.” In the end, Schork argues that “these few 
examples taken from the everyday life of the German woman in her home, with her family and in 
her profession clearly show that the female half of the Federal Republic of Germany’s citizens is 
in the process of taking steps to achieve equality.”88 
The hostility of the article towards feminist movements like those of Schwarz 
demonstrate a consistent ideological commitment to incremental progress. Revolutionaries, 
found quite easily (at least in name) across the East German border, were more of a threat and 
were to be discouraged. Instead, gradual legislative and political progress should be prized, and, 
in particular, it should be emphasized that it was most successful when men joined the campaign. 
The article, when juxtaposed with the material coming out of the GDR, showed a much more 
conservative approach to women’s equality. At the same time, however, in and of itself criticism 
for the lack of sufficient progress in the FRG as well as the existence of protest movements 
indicates a freer society. The capacity for self-critique distinguished this article from the 
triumphant claims of the GDR, who alternately argued they had nearly or already had achieved 
women’s equality. 
The images were somewhat asynchronous with the tone, if not all of the content of the 
article. The first, and most powerful image showed one man sleeping and another casually 
reading the newspaper, while a harried looking woman takes care of two young children. The 
                                                             




image, similarly in some ways to the images from GDR Review, continued the trope of the 
responsible mother with the relaxing and newspaper-reading male figure (presumably father). 
The image, when paired with the title “What a Rare Piece of Luck it is to be a Man,” indicates 
that the article is certainly taking the side of the female protagonist who is overworked. At the 
same time, the next selection presents a narrative of remarkable progress and advancement for 
women in the FRG. From bourgeois “women of society” seeking husbands to independent 
women protesting against paragraph 218 (Anti-Abortion Law) does demonstrate a profound 
transformation. At the same time, the text of the article indicates that this very movement goes 
too far along the path of women’s emancipation and instead aims to set up a matriarchy. This 
claim was hinted at further due to the lack of men in the bottom picture. The deliberately 
sardonic clothing choices of the women in the bottom picture, however, serves to offer a sense 
that they are tired of being silent housewives 
lacking in control and options. For instance, the 
aprons, head scarves, cooking pot and utensil all 
indicate this. The most profound aspect, however, 
is the tape over some of the women’s mouths, 
indicating that they were muzzled and prevented 
from speaking their mind and having a voice in 
their own affairs. This kind of protest image 
would be unimaginable in GDR Review, both 
because the GDR espoused a vision of itself as so 
progressive as to not need these protests and 
because it is a fundamentally negative impression 




of a society when individuals are this unhappy. The capacity of Scala to not just absorb these 
impressions, but to use them as a tool with which to show the free and democratic nature of the 
FRG makes a profound claim of honesty and transparency to internal issues that much of the 
developed world had begun experiencing.  
Later in 1978, Scala International published a follow-up to the June 1978 article arguing 
that more and more women “‘wanted to do something natural, like bring up a child.’” This 
article, entitled “Back to Child and Kitchen?” argued that women were in general not unhappy 
with life in the home, and that they, above all, enjoyed being mothers and taking care of the 
home. Citing a number of studies from various sources, the article makes much more claims to 
scientific accuracy than the profiles of the early 1970s. For instance, “according to an 
investigation by sociologist Helge Pross, it was established that on average non-working married 
women between the ages of 18 and 54 are now ‘generally quite content.’” Furthermore, “the 
miserable and grey life of a housewife as depicted by a truly enormous flood of progressive 
Figure 38 No caption, woman with infant, Scala 9/1978 
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female literature is apparently not at all true” because 75% of housewives “do not feel lonely at 
all.” Finally, the article argued that “in spite of the emancipation movement some forty per cent 
want to be, even today, and above all “‘motherly.’” The author furthers this claim even more 
with a quote of Esther Vilar, a “much reviled medical doctor,” who claimed that “women are 
lazy, they let the men work for them, let the man do all the thinking.” While Scala indicated, 
“this picture too, is rather one-sided,” it continued to stake out a position showing that women’s 
emancipation was legally achieved, and only some relatively minor progress remained to be 
claimed.89 
In an explicit challenge to the GDR, Scala established an alternate definition of women’s 
freedom according to the iconic freeness of driving a car. In 1960, “only 600,000 women dared, 
mocked by men, to take up driving.” By 1978, four million women “enjoy this feeling of 
freedom at the driving wheel.”90 The article claimed that “driving alone is no proof of women’s 
being emancipated, but it is nevertheless a symptom for an increased self-awareness which is by 
no means confined to only women 
earning their living.”91 As was 
shown above, the GDR relied 
heavily on women’s employment 
statistics and on their ability to rely 
on state-run creches and 
kindergartens to obtain “gainful 
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employment” outside of the home. It was also, on a subtler level, a claim to greater and 
increasing prosperity because women had more experience driving their own personal 
automobiles, which were far scarcer in the GDR. The key battleground of housework was also 
clearly identified in the article. As the small aside indicated, “keeping house is no longer simply 
a woman’s task. At least most people think this. 65 per cent of married men consider share and 
share alike in housekeeping as something quite natural. In 1964 it was only 25 per cent.” The 
legalistic side to this story also showed that the new civil code was working because “a court of 
the Federal Republic of Germany passed judgment forcing a husband who had considered 
washing up as being below his dignity to share the household duties with his wife.”92 The images 
largely corroborate the theme of the article, which is to say that they show happy and caring 
mothers, one with an infant and another in the kitchen with three children. In Scala’s articulation, 
women, like Dorothee Kirchenberg who was a twenty-eight-year-old profiled at the beginning of 
the article, would find work pointless and unfulfilling. They could, however, find happiness with 
two children while being “fully involved in housework, and in spite of a washing machine and 
dish washing machine, does a sixty hour work week. She says she is satisfied.” While this 
sounds astoundingly unlikely, the article claimed it was true in that she was “at least more 
satisfied than I [Kirchenberg] was at the advertising agency.93  
The definitions for what it meant for women to be equal differed between the German 
states. In the GDR the rhetoric proposed economic and educational opportunities and the 
liberation from burdens like childcare to offer women a path to becoming fulfilled humans. The 
FRG, by contrast, focused on the labor-saving technology offered by a consumer capitalist 
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society, the burdens of a working life, and the boons of “natural” divisions of labor where 
women could find their calling as mothers and homemakers, who should consider part-time work 
if need be. Of course, these definitions were articulated due to the economic needs of the states 
and were resolved differently due to the profound ideological distance between the German 
states. For instance, the GDR needed as much labor as possible, so they turned to full “gainful 
employment” of women, while the FRG turned to guest workers, another major feature of 
Scala’s articles. Intriguingly, much of the arguments about migrant workers, including 
educational opportunities, the equality of their pay and ultimately in the political process, 
matched the rhetoric that GDR Review pushed for the women of the GDR. At the same time, key 
ideological differences dictated that the presentation of the issue of women’s equality would be 
framed quite differently. In fact, the FRG tended to not use the idea of women’s “equality” when 
discussing the issue, and even published an article “Keyword: Emancipation” critiquing the use 
of the term in reference to the woman’s movement. Instead, the FRG tended to show women in 
the FRG were happy with the incremental nature of their progress, other than a few man-hating 
radicals. The GDR, unsurprisingly, also emphasized the happiness of women in their society, but 
due to the terms of full employment opportunities and the lack of shackles binding them to 
household drudgery. 
The timeline regarding the issue was offset between GDR Review and Scala 
International. Although, as was shown in the previous chapter, these debates were already raging 
in the 1960s, they reached a fever pitch in the 1970s. The GDR, with its new constitution and 
focus on the standard of living of its population, embraced radical Marxist egalitarianism 
regarding women in their self-presentation. Scala International only very gradually shifted its 
rhetoric to articulate issues like women’s equality in the later 1970s and tended to be highly 
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critical of certain movements, such as the legalization of abortion, which the GDR had approved 
in 1972. Overlap remained, however, because of the ongoing burden of housework in addition to 
career responsibilities, both magazines adopted claims that the men in their societies picked up 
their own efforts for a more equitable division of household labor. Men were framed somewhat 
as hapless figures only now realizing that their aid was needed in the home due to either socialist 
egalitarianism or sympathy for overburdened wives and mothers. Though the narratives of each 
German state and magazine diverged a great deal, the relationship endured. GDR Review 
explicitly criticized the FRG for its lack of female emancipation and its commitment to a binary 
working relationship between men and women. Scala responded in the late 1970s with new 
definitions of women’s freedom in keeping with their ideology that embraced more standards 
than “gainful employment.” 
A Generation of Divided Germans: Youth and the New Germany 
 “The oldest of these young people who are determining the image of the people as of 
1970, were five years old at the end of World War Two.” These words introduced the new article 
series produced in Scala International from 1970-1971, “The New Generation.” According to 
the article, the growing youthful generations had fundamentally altered the character of the 
Federal Republic of Germany because the country no longer had a majority population “whose 
central experience was that of the National Socialist dictatorship.”94 In the GDR, this “new 
generation” had also departed from the past, but in a decidedly different direction. They had been 
socialized and educated in a socialist system fundamentally different than what had existed for 
their parents. In short, the prospect of presenting new generations of Germans offered a profound 
opportunity for each state to stake a claim on which system was better because the people born 
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after or shortly before the division of Germany would know nothing other than the current order. 
Furthermore, as the Scala article quoted, this younger generation would be free of the taint of 
Nazism for foreign audiences. 
 The group of individuals referred to as the “youth” within a society is a moving target. 
While there could be some general overlap in 1970 for young people born during the Second 
World War and those born with the foundation of the FRG or GDR, by the late 1970s, the 
“youth” are clearly no longer the same category. The category of youth, including people in their 
twenties, also at times included those commonly referred to as adolescents in this period.  95 
Dorothee Wierling wrote that of a distinct generational split between the “1929ers” and the 
“1949ers” which she has also referred to as the “Hitler Youth Generation” or the 
“Aufbaugeneration” and the “1968ers.” Here I use her general definition of generation “as an age 
group with ‘shared patterns of experience.’”96 As Wierling showed for the youth in the GDR: 
Those actually born in 1949 became more specifically the object of politics. The GDR 
began to celebrate itself as a personalized project, first in 1959, at the occasion of its 10th 
‘birthday’, and much more optimistically and self-assuredly in 1969, at the height of its 
economic and political success – then as an innocent child of ten, now as a beautiful 
blonde of twenty. The 1949ers were encouraged on these occasions to identify with the 
state and think of themselves as a biographical project, as part of building a utopian 
future combining technological with social progress.97 
 
In addition, there was no real public sphere discussion of “generation” in the GDR, as Wierling 
stated, “‘generation’ with capital letters was not a legitimate social or political category in the 
                                                             
95 See John R. Gillis, Youth and History: Tradition and Change in European Age Relations, 1770-Present, (New 
York: Academic Press, 1981). 
96 Dorothee Wierling, “How do the 1929ers and the 1949ers differ?” in Power and Society in the GDR, 1961-1979, 
ed. Mary Fulbrook, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 205. 
97 Ibid., 208-209. 
233 
 
GDR, nor was generational conflict”98 because class was the only category which mattered. For 
the Federal Republic, things were somewhat different because “in the West ‘generation’ was 
regarded as a useful tool to understand social change and social conflict.”99 While this social 
conflict would culminate in a determination that West Germany was a modern Western 
democracy, the challenge was nonetheless potent. For those governments observing these 
protests, “the cultural youth rebellion of the 1960s came unexpectedly.”100  
Instead of choosing a single generation to profile, however, this section attempts to 
construct, through its articulation in both Scala International and GDR Review, what the 
different designations of “the youth” or the “new generation” meant in the different points in 
time where they were shown, how they were articulated, and why they were instrumentalized for 
particular purposes. Furthermore, with the benefit of comparison between East and West, it is 
also possible to see how different ideologies and government systems could stake claims on what 
it meant to be young, how this generation represented the best (or worst) of each society, and 
ultimately what all of this meant for the future of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic. 
The issue of the “youth” appeared quite early in Scala International, but it began 
becoming a major topic of focus in the mid-late 1960s. Provoked in particular by the student and 
youth movements of the 1960s, many of the articles tried to capture youth style, political 
awareness, and concerns. The youth of the Federal Republic, according to the article, were 
“critical and openminded” and they “want[ed] to determine their own lives and how to live 
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them.”  For example, “They have dreams but not 
illusions. They have set themselves goals. But their 
wishes are not utopian. The young people of 1969 think, 
and they think realistically, honing their wits on political 
realities.”101 Thus, while they might protest or pick social 
issues and campaign for change, the young generation 
nonetheless did not have utopian illusions (read 
communism) on their minds as a genuine alternative. 
They were not aimlessly shuffling around, and they still 
cared a great deal because they did not “simply live for 
each day as it arrives, without planning ahead” and “the 
founding of a family is still a matter of basic importance for most girls and young men.”102 
The issue of youth rebellion was a key sticking point for the FRG given that it opened 
them up to potential communist subversion (in the government’s eyes) from within and to 
criticism from the GDR without. GDR Review also ran a series on the youth in the late 1960s 
setting up an explicit comparison to the FRG. It was, in fact, the GDR that first began a youth 
series entitled “Youth 68” in an attempt to show how the youth in their society were happy, 
fulfilled, and importantly not protesting in the same way that caused increasing convulsions in 
much of the rest of the world. In “Youth 68,” GDR Review presented how the youth of their 
country found fulfillment and enjoyment in their lives. Some, like shepherdess Katharina 
Rossberg, had evidently decided “at the age of thirteen her mind was made up, for nothing 
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seemed more alluring to her than to be able to deal with dogs.”103 Katharina had to undergo 
extensive training for three years at a cooperative farm. According to the article, however, “in 
traditional shepherd’s attire with a hat and a self-carved crook Katharina Rossberg is an 
imposing appearance among her herd, a girl that invites admiring glances, and from whom 
nobody would believe that she has to work hard, Katharina, however, loves her profession and is 
able to cope with it.”104 At other times, such as the July 1968 article, “Youth 68: Sizzling 
Summer,” reality mixed with fiction. DEFA produced the film “Heisser Sommer” (Sizzling 
Summer) as a musical with roughly twenty young people who sing, dance, and fall in love. 
While “nothing stands in the way of filtration and, finally – love” the film “right up to the end 
never strays away from true-to-life realism.”105 The actors were largely amateurs, and “most of 
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them will take up the professional career they had mapped out for themselves long before 
‘Sizzling Summer’ was even conceived.”106 
 The “Youth 68” series in GDR Review attempted to capture both the spirit of youth with 
playful singing around campfires and beach excursions with the dutifulness of participation in a 
communal socialist society. While it did not directly state what kind of music was playing, the 
nature of a campfire song with an acoustic guitar was a far cray from the rock concerts and 
electric guitar-driven music popularized in the West. Rossberg, for instance, chose a passion 
early and found a way to explore it that benefitted society. While certainly not showing a 
glamorous profession, the images in the article about Rossberg give the impression of a photo 
shoot of a stylish, if rustic, model. Her capacity to stay fashionable and content as a worker 
embodies the GDR’s attempt to show that its use funneled their ambitions and harmless fixations 
(like fashion) in a productive way. The article on the “Sizzling Summer” follows suit, if on a 
somewhat more meta level. While it advertised for the DEFA film, it also laid out an allegedly 
truthful rendition of a playful and loving youth culture that was simultaneously carefree and 
profoundly responsible. Individuals that were this happy certainly had no reason to protest. 
 The juxtaposition of Scala’s series with those of GDR Review shows a slight mirroring of 
title, stylized font, and fashion-shooting focus, but with very distinct narratives. GDR Review 
mentioned nothing about politics in the articles profiling youth. Scala, due to the protests of 
1968, was forced to acknowledge that there was at least a degree of disquiet among its youth. It 
also needed to respond to the GDR’s youth. While activism was a key distinction, some features 
remained the same. Both states prioritized presenting the youth as having a clear direction and 




 plan for their careers and lives. At the same time, they worked to present the experience of 
youth, if not the individual young people, as enjoyable, free-flowing, and, most importantly, 
responsive to the young people’s choices. This early articulation developed a great deal over the 
1970s as “the youth” became co-opted as representative of the state, oftentimes framed along 
with anniversary celebrations, such as the twenty-five- and thirty-year anniversary of each state’s 
founding in 1949. 
 In the first installment of the series “The New Generation,” Scala International profiled a 
young male engineer and building superintendent living in West Berlin, Uwe Neidhard. A 
twenty-five-year-old, Neidhard evidently “wears a beard to look older,” but he already had 
significant experience even before this most recent project. Although he did not always intend to 
be an engineer, Neidhard appeared happy in his profession despite having “complexes” early on 
Figure 42 Multiple captions, youth in the GDR 1968, GDR Review 3/1968 
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because he was so much younger than the individuals he supervised. His wife of two years, 
Marion Neidhard, worked as a “part-time secretary to a lawyer, and intends to give up working 
altogether as soon as she has her first child.”107 Their relationship is one of balance, according to 
the article, where “not only their flat is a combination of different tastes and temperaments. Their 
whole life together is an exciting compromise.” While happy with Marion, Uwe Neidhard had to 
find ways to be around other people with similar views to his own, “since he is surrounded at 
work by people who think differently from him.” This was especially due to his political views, 
in which he framed himself as “a bit of a ‘left-winger’” but at the same time the article clarified 
“he does not believe blindly in any ideology, he is skeptical, where skepticism is indicated.” He 
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simultaneously found himself in a bind however, because he identified as anti-authoritarian, but 
was “becoming an authority himself in his small way.” The article concluded with the 
determination that the couple lives at the heart of contradictions. They “have established 
themselves…but have not lost their mobility,” they are very different and very similar, satisfied 
and dissatisfied at the same time.” They reached this by having “taken their lives in their own 
hands.” Thus, the article portrayed West German youth, at least at the outset, as struggling with 
common issues like finding their place in the world, contrasting style, and finding their 
happiness.  
 The images accompanying the first iteration of the series “The New Generation” follow 
Uwe Neidhard first at work and then later at leisure with his wife Marion. The images of him at 
work tend to demonstrate competence and focus in his environment. Those of Neidhard at leisure 
show a fashionable young couple happily making their lives together. The image of them 
conversing in their apartment gives the impression of homey bohemian style. The cover photo 
also shows them relaxing together on a couch in their flat and reverses the speaking individual 
from the photographs in the second portion of the article to be Marion, rather than Uwe. In 
general, the portrayal is one of equal partnership, even as the article described profoundly 
different familial roles for the individuals. 108 
 The next part of the series was prominently featured on the cover of the magazine and the 
follow-up article profiled a young woman training to be a draftswoman (technische Zeichnerin) 
at an aircraft factory in Hamburg.109 The article, entitled “Certain is Certain,” profiled Renate 
                                                             
108 Ibid. 
109 Peter Heuer, “Die Neue Generation: Sicher ist sicher,” Scala International, 8/1970, 10-14. The 8/70 issue was 
only found and available in the German language. All translations are the authors. 
240 
 
Herzog, a sixteen-year-old girl training on 
a rigorous schedule with difficult work 
involving much of the same tasks as 
mechanics. The article emphasized 
Herzog’s discipline to get up early and 
work in such challenging conditions each 
day. She also had time for hobbies, such as 
competitive dancing. Her boyfriend, whom 
she met at the firm where she worked to 
train for her future career, volunteered for 
three years of service in the Bundeswehr, 
but they were still able to meet on the 
weekends. Renate chose deliberately to be 
a draftswoman rather than her preferred job 
as a mechanic because she wanted to step 
away from her career once she married and had children. Going back to be a mechanic after “five 
or six years” was untenable given that aircraft models changed with such rapidity. That said, 
Herzog “absolutely wants to return to work – when her still unborn children are old enough.”110 
The career as a technical draftswoman offered security in this career environment, and it was 
clear that Herzog valued this. 
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 The images in the article, as well as the subject of a female worker, match up more 
closely with themes from the GDR than those of the FRG. Training in a vocational career path 
through blue-collar work rather than the white-collar management work of the previous “New 
Generation” article shows the endurance of class distinctions. While the images served to 
reinforce this impression, complete with paternalistic training images of an older male guiding 
the education of the young female worker, the text offers wrinkles to this impression. For 
instance, while Herzog planned to return to work after having children, the timeline was 
dramatically different than the one proposed by GDR Review in similar articles, such as “ESDA 
and its Girls” in which women returned to work roughly a year after childbirth and could take 
advantage of state-run creches. The concern about employment after the initial childcare hiatus 
Figure 45 Multiple Captions, youth apprenticeship in FRG, Scala 8/1970 
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tapped in to one of the GDR’s major appeals, which was guaranteed employment both society-
wide and for those women who had children, who were guaranteed a spot at their old job upon 
their return. The ideological distinction here regarding the concept of security and certainty. In 
the GDR, security ruled the day because the state ensured it. In the FRG, no such safety net 
existed, and instead young people had to plan their future pragmatically for themselves. While 
this offered a degree of freedom, it also placed a great deal of individual responsibility on young 
people. One of the key arguments in this article, thus, was that young people could handle and 
were handling this responsibility in an intelligent manner. 
 In the third installment of “The New Generation,” Scala International offered a look at 
Bremen architect, Jan Störmer, who considered himself an “individualistic European” rather than 
Figure 46 Jan Störmer and girlfriend, Scala 9/1970 
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and “individualistic German.”111 Under the title “Cosmopolitan with a touch of romanticism,” 
Störmer was presented as a stylish rogue. He eschewed life at a large architecture firm to pursue 
his passion projects. He stated that “his principle is to stay as free as possible” and to not be 
stuck “building ghettos for the middle class.” In keeping with true capitalist principles, Störmer 
started his own firm with some like-minded individuals to better shape the environment “‘so that 
it gives the optimum freedom to those who live in it.’” That said, the article clarified to claim 
“what is involved here is not the revolutionary and impracticable idea of rebuilding the world but 
of making the world as it already exists usable.” In this direct juxtaposition to the rebuilding of 
the GDR, Scala showed that capitalism had the capacity to embrace the individual’s design 
wishes, but also had architects who wanted to improve the living situation to better fit the desired 
environment. Additionally, it demonstrated the rugged Western individualism inherent in starting 
one’s own business. Störmer, presented as a kind of Frank Lloyd Wright individualist, argued 
that “every new task demands its own learning process” and he had been “freeing himself from 
all the clichés he had learned” in his extensive schooling. In juxtaposition to some more radical 
members of his generation, Störmer did not wish to live in a commune, but preferred the idea of 
communal living where individuals had their own private areas.112 
 The article, though it was somewhat ideological in its presentation of opening businesses 
and freedom of travel with Western European countries, tended to focus on different objectives 
than previous iterations. Rather than showing a young couple, or young workers, this article was 
about style, feel, and individuality. The numerous glamorous photographs of a travelling Störmer 
                                                             





gave the reader a sense of curiosity, of international connection, and the sense that young 
Germans were different from those Germans who had come before them. Störmer was the more 
confident, collected, and modern vision of Germans entering the 1970s. Depicted in the captions 
as “by his very nature [he] is not very likely to be conventional” because he did not “care for 
exaggeratedly correct clothes” and due to his profession. At the same time, the trope of 
“unconventionality” dominated a great deal of the discourse on youth and it seemed that with 
this presentation of Störmer, Scala was working to tap into that international current of the 
counter-culture, but to portray it in its attractive and productive form by highlighting style. 
 In the fourth installment of the “New Generation,” Scala International published an 
article profiling aspiring mother and homemaker Maren Schütte in “There’s No Place Like 
Home.” This article matches up with much of the other material regarding women in the 
magazine during the early 1970s, such as in the articles “Eva 70” and “The Female Worker” 
discussed above. According to this structure, women in the Federal Republic could express their 
self-confidence, sexuality, and goals, but all tended to want to become mothers and to stop 
working. Schütte embodied much of this portrayal. For instance, her description opened 
describing her as a “femme fatale” because “whenever she walks she seems to be walking along 
an invisible runway. She is a mannequin in the raw state, a photographer’s model just before she 
is discovered.”113 However, according to the article “behind Maren’s elegant mannequin façade 
there is a little housewife. Her job is a means of making a living and not the most important thing 
in her life.” She deliberately did not take her job too seriously because she did not want to 
become “an unconscious cog in the machine.” 
                                                             




 The article pursued the issue of Schütte’s attitudes towards work and her desire to be a 
mother beyond simple introductions, however. She was characterized as “not an ‘ideal 
secretary’” because “work is not the be-all and end-all for her.” Furthermore, she was unhappy in 
her current position. She was quoted as saying, “I find life too complicated , and I wish it were 
simpler. What I like best is to just lie in the sun and not have to worry about anyone’s feelings 
and not see anyone. Children, animals, flowers – that’s all I understand.”114 Characterizing 
herself as “immature,” despite being twenty-one years old, Schütte described the simpler life she 
wanted even as she stated that she wanted to have challenges and to engage her mind, but most 
importantly to “‘have the say’” in any relationship. This installment further reinforced the 
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ongoing trend of showing the youth and new generations of German as engaged in a number of 
contradictions. In this vein, “Maren wants life to be simple – but complicated. She wants it to be 
hard – but it must be a breeze.”115 To find her happiness, Schütte identified her path as one of 
wife and mother. According to the article, “Maren wants three children – and then stop working. 
She wants to devote herself entirely to her family. Making cakes, cooking, shopping.” In 
conjunction with the images, the article gives the impression that Schütte highly valued her 
leisure time and such activities as shopping in local boutiques looking for fashionable clothing or 
wildly impractical bicycles. This did not preclude, at the same time, a maturation process rooted 
in finding a husband, setting up a home and having children, as was shown in the flirtatious pose 
taken in the dominant image above. She stated, “‘I wouldn’t mind at all being a real housewife.’” 
Thus, while “she is still full of contradictions, melancholy and ‘immature,’” “it won’t be long 
now, she will be a completely new type of housewife - up-to-date, self-confident and really in 
tune with the times.” 
  The fifth installment of the “New Generation” had little of the same kind of appeal of the 
earlier articles. Instead, it focused on the highly technical and difficult work of a young German 
doctor. This article appeared to shift its audience focus from more developed Western countries 
to developing countries. The profile of a young couple, but primarily the husband and doctor 
Manfred Runge (29), showed the highly advanced state of German medical technology. Dr. 
Runge worked in the Hamburg University clinic in the Intensive Care Ward. Here, Dr. Runge 
“makes use of almost every technical device known to modern medicine.”116 According to the 
article, “Dr. Runge and his colleagues do everything humanly possible” to help their patients 
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who are close to death. Though earning a salary of 1,300 DM per month, Dr. Runge had a 
somewhat miserable work-life balance given that he could no longer pursue his hobbies—
including tennis, film, and photography—due to the workload at the clinic. His wife, Ilona 
Runge, originally had aspirations to also be a medical doctor, but was discouraged from doing so 
by her father so “that at least one person in the family has time for a normal private life.”117 This 
young couple was portrayed quite a bit differently in Scala, and rather than being contradictory, 
capricious, and countercultural, they were “more adult than their coevals even when they were 
young, people who did not have to exert themselves to appear serious, because they were 
serious.”118 
 The final installment of the series “The New Generation,” entitled “Location the Whole 
Wide World” profiled a young couple and their son. Gero Ehrhardt, who worked as a travelling 
cameraman, was “at peace, for success makes you relaxed” in spite of his hectic work schedule. 
The mutual raising of the Gero and Jutta Ehrhardt’s son portrayed a permissive family focused 
on allowing the child’s personality to develop organically. The article juxtaposed Gero and 
Jutta’s experience with their son’s by saying “for the generation of those who are 20 to 30 years 
old had to fight for their freedom and their independence against considerable resistance on the 
part of their school, for example, or society in general.”119 According to the article, “almost all 
those we have interviewed for this series still suffered from a kind of subliminal education 
designed to make them afraid of life, something which is perhaps one of the byproducts of World 
War Two.” This young generation, and the couple profiled here, however, had managed to 
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overcome this upbringing to raise a carefree child, demonstrating that the transition to new 
generations of Germans was taking place on multiple levels. In other words, there were now 
“hip” Germans. 
 The series “The New Generation” offered a profile of young Germans that were coming 
to increasingly dominate various aspects of economic, political, and cultural life in the Federal 
Republic. This generation showed Germans were more than just overly serious and efficient 
workers, as many stereotypes conveyed. The stereotypes that were embraced, however, show 
that the Federal Republic was challenged to navigate the shifting attitudes of the younger 
population. For instance, the article about Maren Schütte emphasized the importance and 
desirability of traditional homemaking and motherhood in contrast to a growing independence 
and career-mindedness of many women. Others, like Störmer, tapped into the zeitgeist of the 
Federal Republic and showed that young and independent figures (men) could and did find their 
own ways to make their society work for them. The development of the impressions of this 
generation, emerging from the upheavals of the 1968 youth rebellion without explicitly 
referencing them, meant a great deal for the present and future of the Federal Republic and as 
such, the presentation of the youth was a key tile in the West German mosaic. 
 In 1974, the FRG celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of their state in 
a special May issue of Scala International. The issue had a number of special articles, including 
travel discussions of Berlin and Bonn, but also an exploration of the young generations in the 
Federal Republic. The first two in this segment were entitled “1 I Was Just Born” and “2 I am 
Twenty-Five.” These two articles discuss the lives of two ends of the “new generation” born 
after the fall of fascism and the division of Germany. The first article profiled an older 
generation of the Peukert family in which Walter Peukert was born in 1938. The Peukert family, 
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just had a fourth child, named Jürgen, who was the subject of much of the article which oriented 
itself towards the future. The second article, “2 I am Twenty Five” instead profiled the younger 
end of the post-fascist generation who were born with the founding of the Federal Republic. Both 
groups were asked about their feelings about the Federal Republic, and the reader was given 
information about their income, standard of living, and how they felt about these conditions. 
 When asked how he felt about the “Fatherland” metal worker and Ruhr resident Walter 
Peukert stated, “Fatherland? Well, yes, you can live very nicely in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. But I don’t need any high-sounding phrases about that.”120 Despite facing inflation 
and price increases as well as new “wage tariff,” Peukert felt the Chancellor121 was correct in his 
identification that “On average all citizens are better off than they were a year ago and certainly 
better off than they were ten years ago.” As a Social Democrat, Walter Peukert argued that there 
was much that could still be changed in society, such as “co-management, land ownership 
legislation, tax reform, and capital accumulation,” but he pointedly wanted nothing to do with 
younger socialists. In his view “I don’t need any of these longhaired fellows at the universities to 
tell me what socialism is. They don’t have to tell me and they don’t have to tell Brandt either.” 
Walter Peukert argued that despite the challenges facing the FRG’s economy and society, he still 
had faith in progress. He argued, “Of course, there’s progress. At least during my lifetime and in 
this state. Hitler almost destroyed Germany. But we made something out of what was left. And 
so did the Germans over in the GDR, under even worse working conditions.”122 
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 While Walter Peukert and his (unnamed) wife had much to say 
about their thoughts on conditions in the FRG, the key figure in the 
story was the new child Jürgen and his future. Jürgen brought with 
him family allowances from the FRG of 60 Marks per month as the 
fourth child in the Peukert family. Mrs. Peukert’s goal for Jürgen was 
that he would work, but that he “and his brothers and sisters should be 
better off than we [the Peukert’s] are.” Mrs. Peukert was born during 
the war and so she demanded “Above all there must never be another 
war. And there ought to be social justice.” At the same time, the article emphasized that Jürgen 
had dramatic political and social changes to look forward to. For instance, it proposed that “the 
skies above his hometown in the Ruhr will be cleaner again by 2000.” Further, the article 
questioned if Jürgen would be a “citizen of the United States of Europe” voting for the 
Bundestag or European parliament. While lamenting the decreasing birthrate of young people in 
the FRG, GDR, Japan, and Sweden, the article simultaneously argued that massive population 
growth globally would be a problem. Looking even further ahead, the article discussed Jürgen’s 
life expectancy in the FRG, he could expect to live to the age of sixty-seven. Though, if Jürgen 
had been born a girl, his life expectancy would increase by seven years, showing, the article 
claimed, “the equality of the sexes does not even exist in the cradle.”123 Beyond a European 
community, however, Jürgen could also expect to be helping developing countries around the 
world such that “he will probably have to sacrifice a considerable part of his income for 
development aid for the world’s distressed areas.” While Jürgen’s mother decried that such a 
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condition would exist, demonstrating what the article referred to as “his mother’s skeptical 
realism” in juxtaposition to his father’s “socialist sense of responsibility.”  
 The images offer a mixture of narratives in relation to the text of the article. On the one 
hand, there is the basic and immediate image showing a father with his child contented, which 
warrants relatively little attention. From there, however the images engage with the difficult 
topic of the Ruhr region in Germany. Faced by challenges of pollution and energy debates, it was 
clear that the face of the Ruhr would shift. Figures like Walter Peukert fit with those workers 
shown in the bottom photo of the first photographs page because he was a classic industrial 
worker and SPD member. The industrial landscape above it sends an ambiguous message. While 
on the one hand it celebrates the productivity of the German worker, it also shows smog, steam, 
and smoke emitted into the air when pollution was increasingly identified as a hazard. This 
characterization is even more exaggerated in the following panel, which shows a wasted 
landscape replete with dry and dead soil and dominated by industrial sprawl in the background. 
Figure 49 Coal and steel, the Ruhr district, Scala 5/1974 
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The lone worker carrying a shovel gives the reader a sense of abandonment and loneliness in 
clear juxtaposition to the gathering of workers on the previous page. The next photograph over 
shows a scientist appearing deep in thought and tired as he tried to solve the challenges facing 
West German industry. According to the caption, “Industry devours the land. There is little 
enough of it. In the Federal Republic of Germany, there are 250 people to a square kilometer. 
Survival depends on the intelligent quotient here.” The theme of a transition from standard 
worker and industrial activities to that of a highly technological and developed economy guided 
by scientific discovery matched many of the other articles on technology, whether medical or 
industrial, published in Scala International. The sense of respect for the workers in the GDR, 
expressed by Walter Peukert, furthered this impression. The GDR’s economy could not and 
would not undergo the same changes that were occurring in the West, but remained respected by 
socialists like Peukert who found value in hard labor, even as white-collar workers like the 
scientist above worked to find new paths for the West German economy.124 
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 In the second part of this series, “2 I am Twenty-Five,” Scala International profiled two 
younger members of the post-fascist and post-division generation. The article begins with the 
overriding question: “Has everything their mothers and fathers worked for fallen into their 
laps?”125 The follow-up to this question outlined the remarkable prosperity of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, including “one of the world’s most stable currencies,” “the strongest 
economic power in the European Community,” “practically no unemployment,” and “twenty 
million cars on the roads.” These qualities, along with the per capita income of the FRG and its 
extensive social welfare benefits established the baseline for examining the position of Heidi and 
Dieter, two twenty-five-year-olds. Heidi was a teacher while Dieter was a student studying 
biology. The article format continued to use questions to frame responses and asked, “Are Heidi 
and Dieter happy?” In response, the article stated, “they have been living together for several 
years, recently got married, still get on very well with each other, have furnished a pretty little 
flat” and go on vacations skiing and in the Mediterranean.126 Their parents had given them 
modern conveniences like a color television and a washing machine.  
 The article set up consumption as the standard by which to judge happiness and gratitude 
for their state and what their parents had given them. In response to a third question, inquiring 
“Are they glad over the prosperity and the security which have accrued to them?” both Dieter 
and Heidi express a highly critical attitude, but with differing manifestations. Dieter, a highly 
politically active student complained that socialist aspirations in the FRG were mis-characterized 
as communist sympathy. In his words, “then popular indignation boils over and you can hear 
people saying: those long-hairs are all red, give them free a one-way ticket to the GDR. Yet 
                                                             




those who would like to turn the Federal Republic in to a second GDR are only a small 
minority.” Heidi, on the other hand was a conscientious teacher in the FRG lacking much time 
for political activism. She worked a great deal, but “we share the housework, at least to some 
extent. But we also need time for each other and with each other. Besides I need time for myself, 
time just for me alone, otherwise I start to fall apart.”127 These contrasting attitudes in the same 
household serve to show two profoundly different currents of youth life in the FRG, wherein 
some, like Dieter, would find fulfillment in their political goals while not finalizing their own 
private education or developing their profession, while others like Heidi would be more practical 
and focus responsibly on their career.  
 Generational conflict between young people and their parents found expression in the 
article through a common refrain of the youth pushing an agenda and the parents ignoring it. 
Heidi stated her parents “don’t make trouble, but because they’ve given up, if anything. A real 
discussion is impossible. So controversial matters are avoided when we are at home.” Dieter on 
the other hand complained about the foundational narratives of the FRG, “I’m always being told 
at home we’ve never had it so good. But I want to know why we’ve never had it so good and 
what does ‘good’ mean. The energy crisis shows that we could slide overnight into world 
economic conditions such as existed 40 years ago. Fascism was one of the consequences of that.” 
By challenging the prosperity narrative of the FRG, Dieter showed a highly critical attitude 
towards progress in the society and challenged it to see what could be further improved. 
Furthermore, the boogeyman of fascism stemming from the instability of market cycles in a 
capitalist economy echoed many of the criticisms proffered by the GDR in their anti-FRG 
propaganda. At the same time, the quotes of Dieter and consistent references to the cost and 




length of his education serve to undermine his point and reinforce that such highly critical 
impressions are the privilege of a non-serious and non-working young elite. Dieter could spout 
slogans of the generation rebellion by saying that he finds questions like “Are we happy and do 
we love the Federal Republic?” as “obtrusive, if not insulting. They reveal an expectation of 
gratitude and conformity. I can’t be bought and that includes repressive tolerance, consumption 
and production obligations.”128 But, while a soft critique of FRG consumption and prosperity 
narratives, Dieter’s opinions nonetheless reinforced another foundational narrative of freedom 
and independent expression that allowed for social and political critique. Furthermore, despite 
the at-times antagonistic approach of the couple to the FRG, the article closes with positive 
summary. According to the article, “if in the 25 years of its existence in the Federal Republic of  
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Germany has produced nothing beyond such well-informed, critical and adult citizens as Heidi 
and Dieter, then this period, this quarter of a century in the history of a people has not been 
wasted.” 
 The images accompanying the article show the same diversity, yet trope-filled 
stereotypes of youth experiences in the FRG. Some, such as those in the top picture above, 
gathered in solidarity and protested for social change. Other, and oftentimes even the same, 
young people also studied and worked hard to learn and better society. The FRG’s self-image, 
although partly rooted in the prosperity and productive narrative of the economic miracle, was 
sufficiently flexible to adapt to these social challenges, and chose to embrace them as 
demonstrative of the rootedness of democracy in the Federal Republic. Furthermore, if 
complaints were rooted in making the good better, then protests further reinforced prosperity as 
Figure 52 Maria Weisrock, display artist, Scala 5-6/1979 
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well. For instance, Dieter’s quote that “It is, however, true that economic security, for example, 
is only a precondition of personal happiness and not a guarantee of it.”129 
 In May 1979, Scala International celebrated another anniversary, this time of thirty years 
and once again profiled a number of young people who had been born around the time of the 
FRG’s founding. The article, part of a double issue, entitled, “The Critical Generation” 
130celebrated the group “as old as the constitution of the state in which they have grown up.”131 
Emerging from “the post-war period of reconstruction,” this generation was “too young to 
experience the dictatorship, but its consequences were still to be seen.” Rather than cover up this 
past, according to the article, parents and teachers in the FRG “encouraged them to keep their 
eyes open and not to be acquiescent citizens  - not to be mere consumers politically, but to infuse 
life into democracy.” This generation’s attitudes, according to Scala, were embraced by the term 
“critical sympathy” promulgated by the President of the FRG, Gustav Heinemann. While critical, 
this young generation, saw “by far the greater part of the young critics are favourably disposed to 
democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany. The good faith in which they put their finger on 
abuses is altogether conducive to the development of this democracy.” 
 The article follows eleven thirty-year olds and asks them how they feel about life in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Most expressed at least a somewhat critical attitude towards the 
FRG even as they stated that they enjoyed their lives there. On the one hand, Luzie Paunovic, for 
instance, complained that while running a kiosk and taking care of four children, she had no time 
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to think or consider the Basic Law. Elisabeth Grothe-Sökfled, on the other hand, is “saddened by 
her current observation: pupils on their best behavior in conscious pursuit of good marks and one 
of the limited university places.” She participated “in the controversy over emergency 
legislation, during the student revolt, by attending demonstrations, in her contacts with the 
feminist movement.”132 At the same time, she supported the Basic Law. Others, like Manfred 
Birk, were far less politically active and instead complained about things like military service in 
the Bundeswhr, which he referred to as “‘a necessary evil’” although it remained “‘not bad living 
in the Federal Republic of Germany.’”133 Some, like SPD member Günther Neumann, deplored 
“that women should be discriminated against when doing the same work as men, and also that 
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widows should get only 60 per cent of the husband’s pension.” Chief Secretary Doris Götzl did 
not blame the structural inequality Neumann identified for not being promoted higher in her 
firm. Instead, she “blames this neither on social conditions nor her sex, but on her lack of 
certificates and diplomas.”134 Others had completely different ideas, such as CDU member and 
master baker Lothar Welz, who complained only that his taxes were too high. In general, these 
stories convey a population either ignorant of or largely content with the constitution and path of 
their state. Concerns like too-high taxes, women’s inequality, or overly-conscientious students 
were portrayed as somewhat serious but not existential crises. The youth could then be 
characterized as critical and aware, but not as fundamentally opposed to the direction of the 
regime. 
 The “new generation” was presented quite similarly in GDR Review as it was in Scala 
International, but the transformation of the youth into loyal and active socialists remained a 
dominant theme. Much as in Scala, the analysis of the youth and the “new generation” in 
particular tended to cluster around anniversary celebrations, such as the twentieth anniversary of 
the founding of the GDR, the thirty years since the liberation from fascism, and the thirty-year 
anniversary of the founding of the GDR. Youth issues in the magazines included political 
concerns and social matters such as early marriage. 
 In December 1969, GDR Review published an anniversary article entitle “On the Right 
Path.” While the purpose of the article was to highlight the GDR as a whole, it dedicated large 
sections to the participation of the youth of their society in the festivities. For instance, on the 6 th 
of October 1969, during the celebration, 250,000 Free German Youth (FDJ) members paraded 
down Unter den Linden (the most famous street in Berlin leading up to the Brandenburg 
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Gate).135 Eerily reminiscent of the Nazi Hitler Youth parades, “the light from thousands of 
flaming torches illuminated the red anoraks of the girls and the blue ones of the boys.” Rather 
than echoing the Hitler Youth, however, this moment was meant to hearken back to “twenty 
years earlier another torchlight procession of young people had passed along the same route to 
honour the newly-founded Republic: tens of thousands of them demonstrated their determination 
to build up a new life in this state and with this state.”136 Furthermore, the article emphasized 
how the new generation had changed, such that “now a young generation marched through the 
streets of Berlin self-confident and deeply committed to our common socialist cause. This 
generation not only demonstrated its determination, it also presented the results of its efforts.”137 
According to the article, the youth of the GDR needed to be thanked for was “their work in 
giving our towns and villages a face-life, their cuts in the use of materials in industry, their 
excellent study results and many other items.” The youth, somewhat younger than the immediate 
post-war and post-division generation, were nonetheless portrayed as having adapted and 
changed in accordance with the GDR’s values.  
 In July 1972, GDR Review published a follow-up article based on reader questions on the 
youth experience in the GDR. The article, “Give Your Opinion Frankly,” offered responses from 
a number of young people varying in age from their teens to late twenties. The four key 
questions asked: “Participation in government – how do you do it?” “How useful is your work – 
or your future vocation?,” “How close is Angela Davis to you?,” and “What makes you feel 
happy?” These questions were in response to readers’ “undiminished interest” and the selected 
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answers supposedly “represent[ed] typical answers.”138 In response to how they participated in 
government, young people from the GDR cited participation in organizations like the Free 
German Youth, where twenty-four year old electrical fitter Jürgen Bernhard “pass[ed] on the 
problems of the young people in my group and help solve them.”139 Others, such as twenty-nine-
year-old graduate agro-engineer Holger Wiese, participated directly by being “a member of the 
village council and also of the county and district council of agricultural production.” These 
responses attempted to demonstrate that young people in the GDR felt involved and integrated in 
the political process, such that they were not disaffected and protesting as was seen in the FRG. 
Unsurprisingly, the articles in GDR Review glossed over the generational disappointments 
Dorothee Wierling identified in her pioneering work. She argued: “after the first wave of upward 
social mobility in the 1950s, from which the Hitler Youth generation had profited, a flattening 
curve in the 1970s restricted the post-war cohorts to only modest career positions, an experience 
which stood in stark contrast to the expectations which had been built up by the state in the 
1960s and promises which were linked to the high level of education this age group had 
reached.”140 
 The next question asked about young people’s work and whether they found it “useful.” 
Most young people responding in the article identified their work or planned profession to be 
highly useful, sometimes articulated through the vein of training even younger generations. For 
instance, twenty-one-year-old aspiring teacher Angelica Knocke stated, “later on I’ll be teaching 
children, and that means laying the foundations for the year 2000. The way I educate the children 
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and work with them will influence their attitude to work when they are grown up.” This 
influence went beyond simple subject training, however, and instead also referred to ideological 
conditioning, wherein she stated, “the extent to which I succeed in gaining their support for our 
ideas will determine how far they will one day be able to put them in to practice. But this is a 
task no teach can accomplish on his own, he needs the help of all members of society.”141 Others, 
like twenty-one-year-old engineer Hans-Joachim Reiter, articulated their professional goals 
through GDR tropes of work “to strengthen and protect peace, promote progress, and cater to 
Man’s needs.”142 Similarly, twenty-seven-year-old economist Günther Ditschker stated “in doing 
my job I help to put the 8th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party into practice.” Finally, twenty-
one-year-old agro-engineer, Holger Wiese, subtly critiqued the capitalist economy of the FRG by 
arguing “one’s attitude towards work plays a big role. If one works only to earn money, it can 
happen that the work loses its real value.” The section about Angela Davis appeared somewhat 
more tacked on, but nonetheless offered a good critique of the USA, such that nineteen-year-old 
theology student Peter Brückner could state, “I watch with sympathy and admiration the non-
violent struggle of the American Negroes for equal rights. I admire the courage of Angela and 
her staunch fight for the equality of Black and White.”143 
 The final section was perhaps the most illuminating in regard to youth attitudes that were 
at least minimally less inflected with political overtones. In response to the question “what 
makes you happy?”, most responses emphasized the community aspects of GDR society. For 
example, eighteen-year-old office worker Karin Kühlemann stated, “It makes me happy when I 
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hear about the successful outcome of a space experiment by our Soviet friends or about a win by 
GDR athletes abroad,” but more importantly “all that helps to make my life and our society more 
attractive – including my own contributions – are good reasons for me to feel genuinely happy.” 
Others, like twenty-nine-year-old chairman of a cooperative farm, Volker Wiede, were happy 
about the increase in milk production from the previous year, but also “feel delighted when our 
football team ‘Traktor Roska’ has won a match.” Finally, the Free German Youth is referred to 
again when twenty-four-year-old electrician Jürgen Bernhardt celebrated that he was chosen to 
serve on a committee for the FDJ because his colleagues thought him “worthy.”144 It was unclear 
whether this was a genuine dedication or rather simply meeting political expectations.  
As a follow-up to these interview questions, GDR Review published an article discussing 
the Youth Law of the GDR entitled “Public Control: How is the Youth Law being 
implemented?” The article argued that “the Youth Law is a guarantee by the state that the 
abilities and talents of every young GDR will be fully promoted as a constitutional right.”145 
However, GDR Review argued this “is not simply a statement of principle without binding force” 
and it is practiced in the GDR. Youth “enjoy[ed] special promotion in regard to social 
development and vocational training. All paths are open to it to play a responsible role in 
forming the socialist society.” While the first Youth Law of 1950 initially gave basic protections 
such as “equal pay for equal work” and set up the FDJ organization as a component of every 
political party in the GDR. However, after 1964, the GDR expanded the law to “cover all spheres 
of interest to the young generation.” For instance, the Law afforded GDR youth the opportunity 
to participate in the “construction of socialism,” “the all-sided promotion of its initiative in the 
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managing of the affairs of the national economy and the state,” and the “development of all its 
talents at the place of work, in school, in cultural activities and in sports.” The transfer of 
responsibilities to young people from factory managers and institutions was also ostensibly put 
into place by the society. 
In general, between the youth interviews and the Youth Law, GDR Review attempts to 
give a conflicting impression of an ordered yet free society. The consistent references to the FDJ 
seem to offer a path for young people to find representation for their interests. Despite claims 
that the FDJ had representation in all of the political parties of the GDR, the fact that the state 
was a one-party dictatorship with a committed youth organization meant that these claims were 
unlikely to be thought of as remotely accurate. At the same time, the attempt to portray GDR 
society as one making a gradual transition to a younger population served to demonstrate not 
only the ideological commitment of the younger generation, but also their capacity and 
willingness to accept responsibility that their disaffected Western counterparts regularly 
protested against. Instead of being portrayed as highly critical of their society even as they 
became functional members of GDR society, these young people were portrayed to embrace the 
goals and plans of the regime that ostensibly held their interests close to their hearts. 
 People married quite young in the GDR, and the state sought to find ways to justify this 
reality, and even to support it in an effort to foster child birth and population growth. In a May 
1973 article entitled, “We Like Each Other – Do Our Parents Like This?” GDR Review explored 
young people growing up around each other and entering relationships. On the one hand, the 
article regarded increased relationships among young people as due to gender egalitarianism 
having filtered down to the youngest members of GDR society. For instance, “Today mixed 
groups at kindergarten, mixed classes at schools and apprentice training centres, boys and girls 
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enjoying outings and celebrating together are the most normal thing in the world.”146 The rest of 
the article, however, tended to emphasize the importance of youth taking their work and 
educational responsibilities seriously. Thus, while Klaus Schlesinger worked hard at a wholesale 
trade and had been active in the FDJ growing up, he was frustrated with his son Ulli’s work ethic 
and lack of care. He “likes to argue” and “looks for conflicting opinions-wants to form his own 
picture of the world.”147 Klaus stated, “I grew up in my FDJ work. I expect my son to develop a 
similar activity in this direction, an activity that we in those days regarded as something quite 
natural.” Despite Ulli’s efforts at organizing in the Young Socialist Meeting, it was evidently not 
enough for Klaus Schlesinger, who saw it as insufficiently ambitious, and at least obliquely not 
properly socialist. The tone of concern regarding Ulli’s grades and his blasé attitude towards his 
poor marks at his apprenticeship further concerned his father, but also his evidently more mature 
and conscientious girlfriend, Marina Schubert. Marina had told Ulli she was also concerned 
about his grades, given that they were both enrolled in the same apprenticeship program. In 
response, Ulli criticized Marina for being overly friendly with other boys.  
Despite the soap opera overtones of the young people’s relationship, GDR Review in this 
article and others about youth lifestyle failed to develop an organic portrayal of the youth that 
felt convincing and not merely a canvas for ideological presentation. The trope of the 
conscientious young working woman paired with politically and socially disaffected young man 
echoed across both GDR Review and Scala International, however, as was seen in the “New 
Generation” series. More interestingly, the presentation of Ulli’s lack of political and youth 
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involvement provides an interesting and soft critique of the GDR’s inclusive youth system. 
Inflected as a personal problem of motivation and attitude, the oblique language nevertheless 
indicated similar youth concerns between the FRG and the GDR. The dropping out of programs 
and schools as the response of the young generations was an indirect criticism of the German 
states. The FRG chose to address this problem head on with articles referring to a skeptical and 
critical generation that had identified shortcomings in FRG society. In a curious reversal, the 
FRG took a communal generational approach, while the GDR was forced to define youth 
problems on an individual level to avoid broad systemic challenges. Thus, Ulli’s lack of 
engagement with the FDJ or other socialist organizations, as well as his lack of enthusiasm in his 
worker career, could pose a fundamental challenge to the GDR’s aspirations conveyed in the 
Youth Law and expose hypocrisy in their heavy criticism of the youth protests going on in the 
FRG. 
Ulli’s attitudes towards work and life could have posed a challenge to the GDR’s self-
conception, but GDR Review attempted to neutralize it. In an ironic similarity to the efforts of 
Scala when portraying frustrated youth, GDR Review worked to show that Ulli was not too 
revolutionary. His embrace of the Grimm Fairy Tales (as well as the works of Karl Marx) was 
shown to romanticize, but also delegitimize his approach. The article tries to put a positive spin 
on his life by stating “He is still trying to find his ideals, reaching for the stars and falling over 
the cobble-stones in the street; full of impatience he wants to have everything at the same time 
and up till now has mastered nothing properly.”148 The article claimed, Ulli, however, “finds it 
hard to accept that fiery action alone is not sufficient to change the world, that a young 
revolutionary needs knowledge, lots of knowledge and vocational proficiency.” This profoundly 
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pedestrian take on revolutionaries demonstrated the ossified nature of the GDR’s leadership. The 
claims to be promoting a revolution even as “real existing socialism” stultified genuine criticism 
and change. 
 The images accompanying the article do little to alter the meaning and instead reinforce 
the key aspects of the article, including the mixture of youth work and leisure culture. For 
instance, the image of Ulli working at a technical machine shows that he is working and learning, 
even if he is not excited about it. Marina is shown somewhat more happily in her working group 
looking on with an amused expression. The image showing youth leisure time also demonstrates 
the GDR’s effort to portray that, in their society, youth did more than work and volunteer for the 
FDJ. 
 In May 1975, GDR Review published an article explicitly addressing the post-fascist and 
post-division generation entitled “Those Who are 30 Today.” This article stated, “thirty years 
Figure 54 Multiple captions, youth in the GDR, GDR Review 5/1975 
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have passed since the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. In this time a new generation has grown up 
which knows fascism and war only from books, films and narratives of older people.” The 
primary question posed by the author was to ask, “what has this generation in the socialist 
countries learned from history?” and “How do these thirty-year-olds fulfill their present tasks 
and what are their ideas about the future?” Some of the young people profiled in the article were 
from other socialist states, like Poland and Czechsolovakia, but most were East German.149  
 The first person profiled was Elisabeth Merklinghaus, a cooperative farmer from Priemen 
in the GDR. Merklinghaus was born in August 1945 shortly after the death of her father. In an 
attempt to portray the positive embrace of collective farming in the GDR, it presented 
Merklinghuas’s early trials and then later success. For instance, “her mother had to cope with 
four children, about 14 acres of land and all the difficulties of that time.” At the same time, the 
“children had to lend a hand at home, in the fields and the animal housings.” These years of 
struggle, in the early postwar period meant Merklinghaus’s “back ached at school” and made her 
think “how hard it had been to put pen to paper.”150 The development of the GDR, however, 
offered a solution to these problems. In a one-sided and rose-colored depiction, the collective 
farm arrived to ease the burdens of an individual family lacking sufficient labor to run the farm. 
And while not all labor was gone, Merklinghuas felt “the work there gave her pleasure, perhaps 
because it was easier to tackle the difficulties and problems of which there was no lack 
collectively.” The GDR also gave Merklinghaus the opportunity to finish her primary education, 
and then later become a skilled agricultural worker through a course years later, all while she 
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was married and a mother. Her efforts did not go unnoticed by the state, because in February 
1974 she was nominated for a “high state decoration” the Patriotic Order of Merit in gold along 
with five other women who were considered “the best from the combine harvester team.”151 This 
reward showed the standard model of achievement in the East which relied on public praise and 
premiums, while in the West there was emphasis on higher pay. In the end, Merklinghaus 
represented a transition to a new kind of society where communal living and work benefitted 
both individuals and the whole. The article stated “it became quite clear to her just how 
profoundly her life had changed, how richer it had become with the development of the new 
country.”  
 The next East German profiled in the article was Wolfgang Fonfara, a crane operator 
working at the construction site of the Palace of the Republic in East Berlin. This site was a point 
of pride for the GDR regime, and was known colloquially as Erich Honecker’s lamp shop where 
the SED wanted to show off. At the construction site, Fonfara worked to replace “palace of the 
Prussian kings…until it was destroyed in the Second World War.”152 According to the article, 
this new construction project “symbolizes, so to speak, the great changes that have taken place in 
the last thirty years” including that now “it will be open to citizens and also accommodate the 
People’s Chamber (Volkskammer).” Described as looking more like an “engineering worker or a 
watchmaker,” Fonfara nonetheless contributed to heavy labor at the construction project. The 
article emphasized the GDR’s communal values because of the intensity of the work, which 
necessitated “a great willingness to work from everyone” and good cooperation. Fonfar would in 
the near future join the other workers and spouses in a special reception in the building they 
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built, showing how valued workers were in GDR society. Finally, ongoing educational 
opportunities in the GDR received yet another plug because Fonfara planned to obtain more 
training in search for higher qualifications, and in the GDR “this is no daydream and that the 
time he needs for realization of his plans depends only on him.” The place of workers in GDR 
society were thus emphasized, alongside the predictably egalitarian discussion of class and 
access to opportunities like education. 
 The final profile of a GDR citizen in the article focused on Hannelore Domski, a 
headmistress of a school in Cottbus. Like the other people profiled in the article, Domski was 
born in 1945 and was brought up by her mother alone due to her father’s death in the war. At the 
same time, the article clarified she had the benefit of “security of a humane social system” and 
“with each year of her life peace became more stable and life easier.”153 Clearly a convinced 
socialist, Domski joined the Thälmann pioneers over the objections of her mother, who “had not 
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forgotten past disappointments and suffering, and had little confidence in the new social order.” 
Domski did not share this lack of faith, and the article argued she leaned on her fellows in the 
FDJ and the SED party group at teaching college to help her learn to better assert herself. Her 
ideological commitment bore itself out in her focus as a teacher. For instance, when teaching 
German language and history, Domski also worked to “make them [her students] understand that 
humanism and socialism are an inseparable unity. Only in socialist society can an individual 
develop his ideas and ingenuity to the full.” Domski also heavily encouraged her students to 
participate in organizations like the FDJ. Unsurprisingly, this presentation was the most directly 
ideological, but it also showed how the generations had changed in the GDR. Domski’s mother 
had resisted her daughter’s participation in party youth programs, but they had led to Domski’s 
success, and by 1975, her mother was “today extremely proud of her daughter.” In other words, 
acceptance of and participation in the social programs created by the GDR offered paths to 
success and fulfillment for the new generation that then trickled both down to the younger 
generations (Domski’s students) and up (to her mother) if young people bought in to the 
ideological project and joined party organizations. 
 In the following year, GDR Review published an article tackling the youth problems of 
the GDR. The article, entitled “Our Youth – what governs their thoughts, behavior and actions?” 
tried to address what problems the youth faced in the GDR and how they could be solved by the 
state. The youth problem, according to the article, was not due to generational conflict, but 
rather, “social questions, while the solutions offered by society can, of course, either inhibit or 
promote young people’s interests.”154 Problems that young people faced outside of the GDR, 
such as unemployment, were what caused turmoil, according to GDR Review. For example, 
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nineteen-year-old chemical engineer Peter Lerbs lived in the FRG and had been unemployed for 
the last year. He was quoted as saying, “‘You can never tell what next year will bring. Neither 
the federal government nor the employers offer an alternative. Unless you pull yourself together 
you begin to get desperate and tend to thrown in the sponge.’”155 In contrast, the article claimed, 
“in the GDR the younger generation is distinguished by its self-confidence.” The policy of the 
SED (this issue celebrated the IX Parteitag of the SED) “is definitely focused on youth” because 
it “helps to realise the dream of all parents that their children may have a better time of it.” 
Furthermore, GDR society ostensibly empowered the youth because it gave them “trust and 
responsibility,” and more practically because the young tended to be more ideologically 
conformist with the SED. 
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 The GDR simultaneously tried to emphasize that there are youth problems in every 
country at all times, but to frame these as exterior problems experienced in lands lacking 
socialism. And the youth in the GDR evidently understood that “it is almost self-evident that 
good production achievements provide the best point of departure for opening up the 
opportunities and advantages of socialism.”156 In this quite unconvincing articulation, GDR 
Review argued that young people would care about economic production and the fulfillment of 
the plan as a means of improving their own lives. In an effort to show the equality inherent in the 
GDR’s system, the article discussed how workers and the intelligentsia had much to gain from 
each other. For instance, the young intelligentsia when working alongside workers develop “new 
patterns of behavior and a fresh mental approach” and “qualities such as candour, sincerity and 
commitment, and a greater understanding of the practical implications of their work.”157 
 The images accompanying the article appear less organic than youth photographs in other 
issues of GDR Review. Because of the celebration of the IX Parteitag, and the emphasis on the 
FDJ, the colors of red and blue predominated and young people were shown at rallies, working, 
or participating in a community event. Unsurprisingly, in all the photographs they appear to be 
content. Additionally, rallies were also seemingly not protests, but rather supportive assemblies. 
For instance, the young people wearing FDJ jackets with FDJ flags in the background were 
unlikely to be protesting the SED. 
 The Free German Youth (FDJ) was a common point of pride for the GDR as shown in 
GDR Review. Several articles mentioned them, and youth life tended to be oriented around 
membership and participation in the organization. Thus, the FDJ operated in a difficult 
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contradiction because it worked to regiment youth life heavily even as it fought the youthful 
desire for independence. In May 1979, the article, “The Story of a Young Generation” 
commemorated the National Youth Festival where 100,000 young members gathered “to 
celebrate a youthful festival and to report on their activities in the republic’s thirtieth year.”158 
According to the article, GDR Review had received requests from young readers about the 
history of the FDJ and so they documented it with images and captions. The FDJ was founded on 
March 7, 1946, and the earliest image shown is that of the FDJ’s Second Parliament in Meissen 
in 1947. The slogan, “Forward for our Future” (Vorwärts für unsere Zukunft), as well as the 
confident image of young people bravely pressing onward, demonstrates the ethos of the 
organization from its founding. This image was complemented by the caption identifying the 
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Youth Laws of 1950, 1964, and 1974, which guaranteed the four basic rights of the young 
generation.159 The largest and only color photograph showed a June 1976 meeting of the FDJ in 
the newly constructed Palace of the Republic in Berlin. At this meeting, the FDJ gave “their 
support to the decisions adopted at the Ninth Congress of the SED” and “accepted the 
assignments to help build up the capital city of Berlin.”160 The project was to send “10,600 
young people from all counties of the GDR” who “will be working in Berlin, particularly in the 
new borough of Marzahn, at present the largest construction site in the GDR.” An even more 
potent demonstration of the GDR’s values could be found when GDR Review juxtaposed the 
1950 youth festival in the ruins of Berlin and the 1954 rally in the same, but newly reconstructed 
area. 
 In sum, the GDR’s plan for the “new generation,” born at or after the end of the Second 
World War and the division of Germany, was to idealize them as a new kind of socialist youth. 
In a fundamental departure from the FRG’s presentation of young people, the GDR could not 
and would not accept challenges to their order by young people. Thus, instead of skeptical or 
critical, the GDR’s young people were devoted, hard-working, and involved. Rallies, a classic 
sight for young people in the late 1960s and in to the 1970s, were controlled demonstrations or 
positive gatherings for the FDJ. When a case popped up where the individual was less than 
stellar in terms of their community involvement, the GDR attributed it to youthful malaise and an 
individual’s problem, in opposition to Scala’s recognition of a generational issue. The incapacity 
to accept this challenge generated a flatter image for the GDR’s new generation, and one that 
was, frankly, not really believable. Societies that had experienced their own youth revolt in the 
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late 1960s were highly unlikely to buy in to the presentation of a devoted and conscientious 
communist youth. Furthermore, the continued and rote emphasis on the Free German Youth 
added further fuel to the fire that showed an inevitable kinship with the Hitler Youth, particularly 
when the FDJ members participated in torchlight parades. 
 Scala International and the FRG had the capacity to embrace a degree of criticism and to 
use youthful attacks on their society as a means to reinforce a separate narrative of openness and 
freedom. In doing so, Scala made a much more convincing argument that its New Generation 
had embraced the values of freedom and democracy and then worked to apply it to their own 
lives. The attempt of the GDR to bottle up protests and present a nearly monolithic image further 
played into their own negative (and accurate) stereotypes of an oppressive dictatorship. The 
“new generation” was used as a public relations tool to demonstrate how new Germans defined 
themselves and understood their society. The GDR tried to show how opportunity and stability 
created an ideal space for young people to be content. The FRG accepted that young people 
wanted more radical change and, following the reformist impulses of the empowered Social 
Democratic Party, used that as a way to show youth involvement and commitment to explicitly 
West German values. 
 The images of the new generation oftentimes seemed somewhat standard, showing a 
mixture of work and leisure. The attempt to show happy and excited young people in a public 
relations magazine was unsurprising, but Scala at times went beyond this to show the concern 
and thoughtfulness of young people. The images themselves further played in to the self-
constructions of the states and the magazines based on facial expression. Thoughtful young 
people in the FRG could and did criticize its policies, and while this was always framed as non-
revolutionary, it was a capacity that the GDR fundamentally lacked.  
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 The rhetorical structure of the “new generation” articles tended to focus on profiles. 
These human-interest stories tapped into the minds and lived experiences of their subjects for 
tactical audience purposes, such as providing a simple narrative context and structure to which a 
reader could easily relate, but also set up a position where individuals could simultaneously 
represent and depart from the whole. A given individual in a profile article from the GDR or the 
FRG was shown to exemplify certain characteristics as a kind of symbol for their society. At 
other times, this individual’s characteristics were presented as exceptional. The exceptions 
served as a way to see what was considered remarkable and a departure from the norm, whether 
positively or negatively. These exceptional attributes also serve as a framing for the exemplified 
characteristics and can even reinforce them. For example, a highly politically active young 
student in the FRG who was not as conscientious about their work and styled himself a socialist 
was explicitly shown to not exemplify the population of even his own demographic in the FRG. 
That said, his exceptions could and did exemplify the diverse, tolerant, and democratic values of 
the FRG. In this manner, the exceptions in the profile could serve as both framing for the norm 
of the given society and reinforce the exemplified characteristics that the magazine article sought 
to pull out and emphasize. 
Conclusion 
 The late 1960s through the 1970s were a profoundly transitional moment for the FRG and 
the GDR. If reconstruction dominated the 1950s and confrontation the 1960s, then the 1970s was 
a mixed period of rapprochement, antagonism, and development. With mutual admission to the 
UN and de facto recognition of the GDR, the SED had achieved their primary goals by 1973. 
Magazines like GDR Review no longer had to find back doors into society to win support for 
recognition, knowing that the Hallstein Doctrine would no longer be enforced and that their 
278 
 
international position had changed. However, instead of changing tactics and embracing new 
lines, the efforts of GDR Review remained somewhat static. Attacks on the FRG for being 
revanchist and tacitly accepting resurgent right-wing groups continued. There was a mild 
modification to focus somewhat less on political issues and to present more on people’s lives and 
lived experience, in keeping with the new constitution of 1972. In contrast, the FRG underwent a 
review of their foreign cultural policy (Enquete Kommission), and under Willy Brandt as foreign 
minister and then Chancellor, the funding for foreign cultural policy increased dramatically. 
Finally, the FRG’s emphasis on foreign cultural policy had reached parity with the GDR, even if 
their funding had exceeded it for some time. 
 The criterion of each state and their respective image-creation campaigns of the 1970s 
was the capacity of each state’s image to absorb criticism. The GDR, as an early champion of 
women’s equality (at least in word), attempted to demonstrate that in their society women could 
live fuller lives as workers, mothers, and wives. Enabled by generous social welfare programs 
and state-funded creches, GDR women could theoretically “have it all.” At the same time, the 
ongoing presence of a “double burden” was merely a remnant of retrograde capitalist attitudes. 
Any GDR family that experienced this problem clearly had an individual rather than a social 
problem and thus it was only slightly, if ever, addressed. Women’s equality was presented as an 
achievement in GDR Review rather than an aspiration. In some ways this was true, as in the 
legalization of abortion well before the FRG, but in many others it was performative. As with the 
identification of an unsatisfied young person, the problem of women having to do both 
housework and work outside the home was framed as an individual’s problem, while the state 
had solved all the problems it could. The FRG, by contrast, acknowledged the criticism of the 
women’s movement and that there were still serious gaps in equality. Scala’s presentation was 
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largely dismissive of the broader women’s movement, choosing to characterize them as 
unsatisfied with equality and pushing for domination. At the same time, it still acknowledged 
there was a need for some change in their society and that women worked towards it with 
protests. 
 Global phenomena, such as the Prague Spring or the youth revolt of 1968, shook the 
perceived and presented stability and progressively stronger economies of the GDR and the 
FRG. The end of the economic miracle, the acknowledgment of environmental degradation, and 
youth rebellion provoked shifts in the FRG and the GDR’s self-image. Their responses to these 
challenges manifested in discussing the benefits of their economic systems, but also doubling 
down on their articulations of a “better” German society. Thus, questions of dating, marriage, 
leisure, and work became political backgrounds for a more nuanced presentation of German 
society. While less explicit than articles profiling the Berlin Wall or former Nazis, these articles 
still contributed to an all-encompassing ideological contest that defined itself via the other. And, 
while their perspectives differed fundamentally, there was also a simultaneous narrowing of 
distance between them. Thus, when the GDR claimed women’s equality on both a de jure and de 
facto level, the FRG was forced to reckon with their own presentation of the women’s movement 
and how it was best to show what had been done in their society. The youth protests of the 1960s 
and 1970s were, in some ways, a fundamental challenge to the FRG’s capacity to accept 
criticism and change course democratically. Scala’s presentation of a “skeptical” and “critical” 
youth embraced this challenge, even as GDR Review admitted there were some slight issues with 
young people, but that most had found fulfillment in the stability of the economy and the planned 
social movements of the FDJ. Each state’s image had to absorb some level of domestic and 
international criticism and development in the 1970s, but despite their earlier lead in emphasis 
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and focus, the GDR proved increasingly inflexible in regard to their presentation. This lack of 
flexibility and responsiveness to criticism fed an ossified construction wherein the stalactite of 
the GDR’s image could gain drips of nuance and alter slightly with time, but still remain 
































THE PAST, PEACE, AND PROSPECTIVE ENTANGLEMENT: 
NAVIGATING A DIVIDED GERMANY IN THE 1980S 
 
 In the 1980s, the German states seemed to grow even further apart. The spread of bi-
nationalism as the way to interpret divided Germany served to harden the division further and to 
undermine Willy Brandt’s claim of two states in one nation. The prospect of reunification 
appeared even less likely due to the recognition of the GDR in the 1970s by many countries and 
broad swathes of the political left and center in the FRG. These factors pushing greater division 
met countervailing forces working to bring the two Germanys closer together, such as the GDR’s 
economic dependence on credits from the FRG and the crossover relationship between the peace 
movements on either side of the Iron Curtain, until a mixture of domestic protest and 
international upheaval led to the fall of the SED in the GDR. 
In foreign cultural policy, the two German states had begun to historicize themselves 
separately in the 1980s. For example, the two German states created museums to their individual 
histories in an effort to develop a usable past and to claim their antecedents in German history. 
The East in particular cultivated a new method of historicizing itself by discovering Prussian 
culture and history. This move shifted GDR historical policy away from “a so-called dual-line 
theory of history in which East Germany had inherited all the ‘progressive’ elements of 
Germany’s national history, while West Germany had inherited all of the ‘reactionary’ 
elements.”1 Instead, the GDR “sought to broaden its own legitimizing national narrative by 
                                                             
1 Jon Berndt Olsen, Tailoring Truth: Politicizing the Past and Negotiating Memory in East Germany, 1945-1990, 
(New York: Berghahn, 2015), 137. For more on historicization, memory, and Geschichtspolitik in divided Germany 
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moving into the ‘progressive category’ a growing number of historical subjects that had 
previously been deemed ‘reactionary’ and cleanse them of their previous negative 
connotations.”2 Through this logic, the GDR’s foreign cultural policy began to claim historical 
figures like Martin Luther and to celebrate longer histories, such as the 750th anniversary of 
Berlin. The FRG, for its part, continued to develop its history in a highly contested political 
public sphere, but it was one that increasingly set itself apart from the East. 
The legacy of the German past resurged in the 1980s as each state confronted new 
challenges of militarism. The narrative of the GDR as the state of peace focused on preventing 
resurgent international tensions from causing conflict inflected virtually all aspects of GDR 
Review’s presentation in the 1980s. Most notably, the GDR focused on the rise of the peace 
movement in Western Europe due to concerns about American medium-range nuclear missile 
placement. These protests took a particular turn in GDR Review to demonstrate that Western 
governments did not respect the will of the people and that they were warmongers. The GDR, by 
contrast, was a state of peace, as seen in their state-sponsored, highly organized marches and 
demonstrations. 
The FRG and Scala, by contrast, did not shy away from discussing the protests, though 
they dedicated far less time to them than was given in GDR Review. The peace and protest 
narrative was instead used to show the presence of a vibrant and active civil society committed to 
being heard, even as the articles decried Eastern Bloc hypocrisy due to the presence of Soviet 
missiles. The key, and also uniquely German aspect to this particular narrative, was in the issue 
                                                             
see Konrad Jarausch and Martin Sabrow, eds. Verletztes Gedächtnis: Die Erinnerungskultur und Zeitgeschichte im 
Konflikt, (Berlin: Campus, 2002) and Konrad Jarausch and Martin Sabrow, Die historische Meistererzählung: 
Deutungslinien der deutschen Nationalgeschichte nach 1945, (Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 2002). 
2 Jon Berndt Olsen, Tailoring Truth, 137. 
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of obligation to the past. Both German states awkwardly danced around the militaristic German 
past, but the GDR worked to weaponize it against the Federal Republic in a manner more similar 
to GDR Review’s efforts from the 1950s than the later 1960s and 1970s. Scala, for its part, 
worked to show that their participation in NATO and the very existence of the Bundeswehr 
exemplified a different kind of citizen solider not found in the German past or across the border. 
 After the resurgence of Cold War antagonisms in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
German states and the Cold War superpowers reached a new period of détente shown most 
clearly at the Rejkjavik Summit and culminating with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty. Though this new period of détente reduced the emphasis on the German states’ 
obligation to avoid war, it did little to stop the competing renditions of Berlin and divided 
Germany more broadly. Scala and GDR Review articulated their different views on German 
division in the later 1980s that showed stark differences. This phenomenon was seen most 
clearly in the competing renditions of the 750th anniversary of Berlin celebration.  
Scala celebrated a unique West Berlin history that emphasized freedom and democracy, 
but also that worked to much more strongly condemn the ongoing German division and the 
repression of the GDR. Eschewing more veiled references, or “critique by absence,” that had 
characterized much of Scala’s earlier discussion of the GDR, in the 1980s Scala grew 
increasingly overt in their criticisms of the East German state and society. In GDR Review, the 
celebration of Berlin became the celebration of the achievements of socialism in the GDR and an 
attempt to promote its self-image as anti-fascist and the true inheritor of the German progressive 
tradition. This marked an interesting reversal wherein the discussions of West Berlin in Scala 
preoccupied themselves at least partially with German division and the neighboring other, while 
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discussions of Berlin (there was no East Berlin in their articles) in GDR Review ignored the 
Western other and promoted its own positive vitality as the capital of the GDR.  
What would come from these two campaigns showed that the early 1980s was a period of 
greater confrontation than the 1970s, and that these conflicts had become much more overt. The 
GDR retreated once more to the redoubt of the moral high ground, while the FRG sought to 
undermine international appeal of the GDR through increasingly harsh renditions of the Berlin 
Wall and the lack of “human rights” in the GDR. The transitions of the 1970s in foreign cultural 
policy method reached a degree of fruition in the 1980s as the FRG sculpted a more nuanced and 
sophisticated narrative that the GDR, despite its efforts, could not match. Furthermore, it 
demonstrated that Scala was more capable of absorbing criticism to its potential sore spots and 
was willing to engage these critiques, such as resurgent militarism. GDR Review could not 
adequately respond to accusations of responsibility for German division or provide a genuinely 
believable set of arguments to undermine the West’s accusations that the GDR built a wall to 
keep their own people in.  
Institutional Developments 
 If the 1960s were the period of development most central to the reorganization of the 
GDR’s foreign cultural policy apparatus, and the 1970s were the same for the FRG, it appeared 
as though in the 1980s both sides stayed the course. Through efforts to diversify messages, 
provide better narratives, and to cultivate believability, the foreign cultural policy of the FRG 
became increasingly potent, while that of the GDR remained consistent. At the same time, the 
magazines Scala and GDR Review lost some of their luster. The magazines had only barely 
emerged from a series of severe funding battles in the 1970s, and over the course of the 1980s 
both had their issue numbers restricted until they were coming out once every two months. 
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Though the files are lacking on this issue3, it is likely that there was a profound shift in emphasis 
from such prestige magazines, which were perceived as so essential in the middle of the 
twentieth-century, to more technologically advanced media. In addition, by virtue of obtaining 
stability for both German states, the competition between them in illustrated magazines was 
believed to be less important, at least by those involved in funding decisions. This did not mean 
that the magazines ceased their efforts to maintain relevance, gather new audiences, or to one-up 
the other. But it did show that times were changing and that foreign cultural policy programs, 
though robust in both states, no longer needed to focus as much on glossy print magazines like 
Scala and GDR Review. Their time was passing, but not yet over. 
Obligation to the Past and Peace  
In the early 1980s, GDR Review sought to inflame other countries’ fears of an ascendant 
West Germany and to present the GDR as a bulwark to peace amidst flaring Cold War 
antagonism. The placement of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe emerged as a 
dominant issue of the period, and these retaliatory measures from the U.S. garnered the 
combined ire of West and East German protests alike. Consequently, the GDR sought to 
maximize publicity of strife in Western democracies even as it presented its own nominally 
peaceful agenda via a mixture of state speeches, organized youth rallies, and fearmongering. At 
the same time, the FRG—in keeping with their tactics of the 1970s—covered youth protests and 
rallies, but diminished their importance and subsumed this narrative under more conventional 
topics. The fact remained, however, that the FRG maintained the moral advantage by being able 
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to continuously point to the Berlin Wall and other parts of the fortified border of divided 
Germany as demonstrable proof of the GDR’s hypocrisy. 
Peace and Protest in the GDR 
 GDR Review inflected the overarching peace narrative with a number of different 
approaches. These included a focus on the German past and obligation towards peace, a 
presentation of state-sponsored peace rallies, coverage of international protests, calling for 
universal appeals for the preservation of human life, and finally an articulation of peace as a core 
aspect of the GDR’s identity. The first of these topics focused on the profound tragedies and 
crimes of the German past including the Second World War and, less emphasized in the East, the 
Holocaust. The commitment to peace due to the German past was articulated through three key 
narratives: the legacy of the concentration camps, the destruction of the Second World War, and 
antifascism as the founding ethos of the GDR. 
 In the 1980s, GDR Review profiled two particular concentration camps that were central 
to the GDR’s self-conception, including 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. The 
appearance of articles commemorating Jewish 
victims also made a first appearance in GDR 
Review as a part of Honecker’s broader effort to 
gain approval from the West to visit the United 
States. The first article, published in April 
1980, was entitled “Buchenwald – Homage to 
the Dead, A Reminder for the Living.”4 The 
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article, which also served as the cover of the 
issue, cited the Oath of Buchenwald as a 
foundational moment for the GDR. The 
pledge asserted, “We shall not cease our 
struggle until the last guilty person has been 
placed before the tribunal of the peoples! Our 
watchword is the eradication of Nazism. Our 
aim: the construction of a new world of peace 
and freedom.”5 The prominent photograph of 
the monument at Buchenwald opposite the full 
quote further confirmed the GDR’s founding 
myth that sought to simultaneously express 
gratitude to the Soviet Union for their liberation while also claiming a stake in their own freedom 
rooted in the successful communist uprising at Buchenwald. The grouping of individuals in the 
monument also celebrated the unity of various nationalities in antifascism and, unsurprisingly, 
communism. According to the article, “The Buchenwald National Memorial calls on everybody 
to never slacken in the struggle against fascism wherever it rears its ugly head.”6 Furthermore, 
the article emphasized this memorial represented the state’s commitment to antifascism more 
broadly, but warned that “we must not shut our eyes to a renewed threat of war.” This threat was 
ostensibly coming from West Germany. The article framed it as more than a simple provocation, 
however, instead it was about nascent Nazism returning to the FRG. According to the article: 
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Only a few kilometers from Weimar our country borders on that part of Germany where 
the murderers of Buchenwald, Auschwitz, Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, Dachau, and 
Maidanek are still at liberty; that part of Germany which is a member state of the 
reactionary NATO military bloc whose representatives voted in favour of the deployment 
of medium-range missiles in Europe.7 
 
The conflation of fascism and West Germany was certainly not a new tactic in the GDR’s 
arsenal, but the co-opting of the past (Buchenwald) to fit current event issues (the deployment of 
missiles) and mingled with the foundational GDR myth of ant-fascism was a mixture of tactics 
that would define GDR Review’s narratives of the 1980s. The images serve to convey the 
heroism of the GDR and the international solidarity that would come to define the external 
presentation of the Eastern Bloc. The follow-up images related to the interview of former 
prisoner, Richard Kucharczyk, emphasized the ongoing commemoration and memorialization of 
the camp. The dual presentation of heroism amidst a grim landscape and confirmation of 
memorialization served to give the reader the impression that the GDR was willing and ready to 
accept the German past as well as a clear obligation to avoid its repetition. Other articles 
continued in a similar vein. For instance, in another article from September 1981, GDR Review 
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documented the prisoner’s experience at the camp Sachsenhausen and further emphasized the 
horrors that emerged out of fascist militarism in Germany. 
 Jewish victims of the Nazi regime gained a new status in the 1980s. A few articles in 
GDR Review attempted to modify, or at least give the appearance of modifying, the regime’s 
standard approach to Jewish victims, which was to categorize them as passive victims in explicit 
juxtaposition of the active resisters such as the communists at Buchenwald. These articles 
attempted to portray an image of the GDR that accepted that Jewish victims had suffered under 
“fascism” rather than explicitly Nazism. This careful selection of terminology allowed for a 
subtle dig at the supposed fascists that remained in the FRG. In a December 1985 article entitled, 
“Honouring the Memory of Jewish Victims of Fascism and War,” GDR Review discussed a 
commemoration of the 47th anniversary of the Kristallnacht pogrom. According to the article, the 
events commemorating Kristallnacht were coordinated by the Association of Jewish 
Communities in the GDR. This served to both signal the overarching narrative (that Jews were 
victims worth commemorating) and show that the GDR, despite its anti-Israel stance, was not 
anti-Semitic (because of its state-sponsored Jewish organizations).  
 The article focused quite clearly on the Kristallnacht pogrom, and only obliquely hinted 
at the broader suffering of Jews under Nazism. For instance, the single time the word 
“holocaust” appeared was in reference to the Soviet Union’s efforts to promote peace and to 
avoid a “nuclear holocaust.”8 Instead of focusing on the particularity of the Jewish experience, 
GDR Review co-opted this opportunity to present a historical argument for the preservation of 
peace in Europe. Representing the few hundred Jews left in the GDR, Helmut Aris, the President 
of the Association of Jewish Communities in the GDR, stated, “We who went through cruel 
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times love peace and we will work with all our strength to ensure that peace reigns forever 
throughout the world and that the peoples live together in harmony.”9 The defeat of fascism, 
according to Vice-President Rotstein, could be appreciated in the GDR because “we live in a 
socialist state which we have built up and further developed together with anti-fascists and 
humanistically-thinking people as citizens with equal rights and equal duties.”10  
The achievements of the 1970s (admission to the UN and the Basic Treaty with the FRG) 
had granted the GDR a degree of confidence. At the same time, structural economic problems 
strained the GDR’s comparatively meager resources in the 1980s, and thus GDR Review worked 
to distinguish itself in other ways. The classic strategy from the 1950s was to tap into fears of 
West German militarism while setting itself up as a benevolent buffer. The intermingling of 
antifascism, socialism, peace and the GDR—as juxtaposed with revanchism, neo-fascism, 
militarism, and the FRG—should be unsurprising to those familiar with GDR self-conceptions, 
but the addition of performative victim-raising added a new wrinkle to GDR Review‘s tactics. 
Furthermore, the narrative in this particular article operated with a heavy amount of subtext. 
First, it laid claim to commemorating Jewish suffering through the presentation of the Jewish 
organization. Next, by consistently referring to Jewish suffering along with anti-fascist (read 
communist) suffering, it reified pre-existing GDR narratives of antifascism as a justification for 
both the founding and ongoing existence of the GDR.11 By presenting the GDR as the German 
state dedicated to antifascism and the preservation of peace, GDR Review created an unwritten 
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juxtaposition to the FRG, which was then ostensibly fascist and aggressive. GDR Review argued 
“the German Democratic Republic has developed into a respected state in the world whose 
highest aims are the maintenance and safeguarding of peace and the wellbeing of the people” 
because “in the GDR the memory of all those killed in the struggle against fascism and war is 
held in high esteem at all times.”12  
The GDR’s commitment to honoring victims of fascism gave the regime a thicker veneer 
of humaneness and concern for citizens’ well-being to counter the negative international 
impressions of the Eastern Bloc after the violent suppression of Solidarity in Poland in the early 
1980s. This article contained few images, but the image of the memorial at the former site of the 
Dresden Synagogue of the Jewish Communities offered an impression of the solemn 
commemoration ongoing in the GDR.13 At the same time, the plain memorial, black-and-white 
photo, and paltry attendance at the memorial serve to undermine the impression that the GDR 
genuinely cared about the commemoration of Jewish victims or the Jewish community in the 
GDR, which was quite small. Thus, the image 
undermined the impression the article meant to 
provide, even as it demonstrates a degree of 
commemoration. 
The GDR knew they had a major public 
relations problem when it came to their stance on 
Jewish victims of Nazi Germany. For instance, in 
the article “East Germany and the Holocaust,” GDR 
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Figure 61 In Dresden flowers and wreaths were laid 
at a memorial stele erected on the former site of 
the synagogue of the Jewish communities which 




Review attempted to provide damage control for an attack stemming from an editorial in 
Yiddische Kultur, entitled “Writing Jews Out of History,” which charged the GDR with anti-
Semitism and willfully obscuring Jewish suffering. The editorial quoted a GDR booklet entitled 
“Upholding the Antifascist Legacy.” The passage cited in the editorial directly referred to the 
death and suffering of Soviet people, Poles, Yugoslavs, French people, U.S. citizens, and 
Britons, but made no mention of Jews at all. As a result, the editorial claimed, “this East German 
document has therefore deliberately omitted…the entire subject of the nazi [sic] racial policies, 
the singling out of the Jewish population for complete extermination…only because they were 
born Jews.”14 GDR Review attempted to counter these claims by stating that the booklet referred 
to “nazi [sic] racism” quite a bit and claiming that the booklet equated “‘the fight against Nazism 
and fascism’” with “‘opposition to racial intolerance, hatred, and terror.’”15 The article justified 
this indirect approach by doubling down on the pre-existing rhetoric that established a dichotomy 
between victim and resister. For instance, GDR Review argued, “everyone in East Germany and 
most of the world knows that the principal victims of Nazi racial persecution and genocide were 
the Jews, they are, indeed, not mentioned by name in this booklet” but this was because the 
booklet focused “on the fight against the Nazis rather than their crimes.”16 
Additionally, the GDR Review article emphasized that “the nationally [GDR] 
standardized curriculum requires teaching about the Third Reich to include what happened to the 
Jews.” Other somewhat dismissive or minimizing language was also used in the article, for 
instance, referring to the “‘special’ treatment of the Jews” or the “experience of Jews who lived 
                                                             
14 “East Germany and the Holocuast,” GDR Review, 3/1986, 30. Alfred J. Kutzik, originally published in the USA in 
Morning Freiheit. 
15 Ibid., 31. 
16 Ibid., 31. 
293 
 
through the Hitler years.” The term “Holocaust” was used to refer to West German fascists who 
protested outside a trial of a Sobibor SS guard about the “Auschwitz Lie,” which GDR Review 
rightly equated with “denying the Holocaust.”17 In general, the article attempted to deflect the 
arguments being made against the GDR for its stance on Jewish victimhood to the FRG. This 
somewhat transparent effort did little to alter the impression that the GDR cared relatively little 
about the Jewish experience as opposed to its own antifascist founding narrative. 
The Second World War provided another key backdrop for the GDR’s attempt to call 
upon the memory of suffering from the Nazi era as a way to show how the GDR had learned 
from their legacy and to caution against the supposed revanchism of the FRG. In a series of 
articles throughout the 1980s, GDR Review approached this issue by celebrating the victory of 
the Soviet Union in particular, and the “Anti-Hitler Coalition” generally from May 1945 even as 
the article criticized the FRG for their aggression in claiming that they sought to protect 
themselves from a threat from the East. For example, in May 1980, GDR Review published an 
article entitled “May 8th 1945/May 8th, 1980” celebrating the liberation from fascism by the 
Soviet Union. “Liberation-Freedom! Nobody in the world shall violate it again! This was the 
oath taken by the peoples of the Soviet Union” according to the article.18 Furthermore, the article 
claimed that the memory of oppression and liberation created a profound basis for the GDR to 
develop a peaceful mentality. Solidarity and peace went hand in hand, thus the article claimed of 
the GDR, “We are at one with all people of good will. Never again, death and ruins, never again 
a mother’s tears.”19  
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The celebration of peace and remembrance was not, however, merely commemoration. 
As with all material presented in GDR Review, there was a clear purpose in its usage here: to 
critique the FRG, stir up memories of German aggression, and to deflect those negative feelings 
to the German other. Thus, the periods where war seemed possible were “caused by the attempts 
to ‘roll back’ socialism” even as “a decade ago we saw the promising beginnings of détente.”20 
The problem in May 1980 was that “circles who for profit reasons are more concerned about 
creating tension than détente…have once more been publicly campaigning against an alleged 
‘threat from the East.’”21 Profit incentives, inherent in the liberal democracy of the capitalist 
FRG, was thus the archetypal reason for the FRG’s accusations of Eastern aggression.  
The “threat” from the East, which the article claimed the FRG sought to exploit, was 
defused both by the narrative of the article and by the compelling image of Russian soldiers 
comforting a (presumably German) woman. The image conveys a powerful impression of relief, 
care, joy, and 
gentleness, which 
certainly clashed with 
much of the images, 
public memories, and 
narratives 
accompanying the 
final stages of the 
Soviet invasion of 
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Figure 62 No caption, Soviet liberation East Germany, GDR Review 5/1980 
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Germany. The central point of the image is that of the woman resting her head gently on the 
chest of a Soviet soldier who is comforting her while also holding the flowers, which were likely 
a gift. The paternal image was further emphasized by the other Soviet soldier on the right who is 
gently resting his hand on the woman as well, seemingly as a reassuring and comforting gesture. 
The open hand and tentative resting of the hand conveys that this was not meant as a policing 
gesture or as one meant to guide the woman. Instead, it conveyed a gentle touch meant to 
comfort or support as seen in the light touch the soldier has. The meadow flowers in the image 
further softened the impression of the soldiers who were presumably gifted them by the woman 
or other civilians. Furthermore, the gendered nature of the image gives the impression of a 
gentle, but strong male protector in the form of the Soviet Union, assisting the innocent female 
civilian in the form of Germany that was reflected in the relationship between the two states after 
the war. 
GDR Review framed the “aggression” of placing medium-range nuclear missiles in 
Western Europe as akin to fascist expansionism. For example, in June 1980, the magazine 
criticized the US even as it commemorated the victims imprisoned at Marienberg Hill in 
Brandenburg-Görden, including Erich Honecker. The article, entitled “True to the Historical 
Pledge: We owe it to the dead! We owe it to the living!”, celebrated the 90,000 visitors to the site 
who paid respects to the fallen. Honecker argued that the “unscrupulous policies the aggressive 
forces of imperialism, especially in the USA, are striving to effect a shift from détente to 
confrontation.”22 According to the article, the USA and NATO aggravated the world situation by 
working to gain military and economic spheres of influence. Furthermore, GDR Review 
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criticized NATO for their “use of blackmail and force against independent countries.”23 In an 
effort to appeal to other states via recalling their common victimization under Nazism, the article 
also covered the commemorations taking place at Sachsenhausen while highlighting the 
attendance of Frenchmen and Poles in particular. 
References to the FRG and less-than-subtle juxtapositions of West Germany and the Nazi 
regime peppered the article as well. By employing a strategy of deliberate obfuscation combined 
with seemingly accurate claims, GDR Review attempted to inculcate fear of the FRG amongst 
their audience. For example, Horst Sindermann, president of the GDR’s People Chamber, 
“reminded his listeners that German fascism had begun with an endless stream of anti-
Communist smear campaigns at home and had attempted to justify its terrible war of aggression 
with an equally endless stream of anti-Soviet propaganda.”24 The FRG, NATO, and the US 
argued that the Soviet military and the GDR already had nuclear weapons in place as well as a 
preponderance of conventional weaponry. The GDR tried to flip this narrative to be jingoistic 
paranoia designed to provide a pretext for war. The images accompanying this article, this time 
in color, presented a much more powerful message than those referring explicitly to Jewish 
suffering, and they also gave the reader a sense of the pageantry that accompanied such events in 
the GDR. The first image provides a curious twist to the peace narrative inherent to the article’s 
argument. The victims of the Nazi regime shown in the first row in front of the memorial, 
including Erich Honecker, lined up facing an armed NVA soldier. The inclusion of flags in the 
background showed the commitment to communism because the flags were all red, as symbols 
of the general movement, the flag of the GDR, and the flag of the Soviet Union. At the same 
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time, they, along with the arrangement of the visitors at the memorial, nonetheless hearken back 
to the pageantry of National Socialist rallies. Although it was not nighttime, and the leaders look 
more like civilians, the politicized nature of the rally as well as the display of military power 
further the impression that the state emphasizing peace was nonetheless still wrapped up in 
military power and force, especially given that the most prominent image in the foreground of 
the picture is the soldier. The calls for internationalism fall somewhat flat here, but were more 
emphasized in the following pages of the article, which focused in particular on France. France 
was seen by some GDR officials as potentially more susceptible to the GDR’s use of the nascent 
Nazi boogeyman and had shown it was willing to pull out of some of NATO’s commitments. 
In March 1984, GDR Review preemptively celebrated the thirty-five years since the 
founding of the GDR. According to the article’s title, this momentous event was “A Turning 
Point in History” that assured “Everything for People’s Wellbeing, Everything for Peace.”25 The 
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article commended the GDR because “it grew and gained in strength as a result of the activities 
of millions which helped it to increasing [sic] international recognition and respect.”26 The basis 
for this international recognition included a commitment to “human rights” as understood by the 
socialist dictatorship, 27 the improvement in living conditions, and centrally the creation of “the 
first German peace state” due to the pledge that “a war must never again start from German 
soil.”28 In a dramatic turn of phrase, the article amplified the danger of the current situation by 
claiming, “The pledge is particularly valid now since the world has entered a new, perhaps the 
most dangerous, period of postwar development. We are therefore fighting even more resolutely 
for peace, for our country, our continent, our earth must not be destroyed in a nuclear hell.”29 
The fears stemming from the FRG and NATO ostensibly threatened the “approximate strategic 
balance of military forces between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO” which had 
“preserved peace” to that point.  
The attempt to show that the GDR would not be the source of a war while pointing the 
finger at the FRG by GDR Review developed a clear Cold War narrative recapitulating classic 
Marxist rhetoric claiming that capitalist forces provoked wars via profit incentives. At the same 
time, the GDR did not resort entirely to fear tactics. Instead, they presented a narrative that 
promoted the positive agenda of the SED. For example, according to the article, the “GDR is the 
first German state in which the social and economic bases and the causes for war policies and 
war have been eliminated.” Furthermore, “the GDR is the first state which raises no territorial 
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demands on other states, which recognizes the existing frontiers without question and which 
works for the solving of all problems using exclusively peaceful means.”30 And finally, the 
article claimed that “the GDR is the first German state in which the pursuance of a policy of 
peace is anchored in the Constitution and thus state policy as a matter of principle, in which there 
are laws protecting peace and prohibiting all activity hostile to peace.”31 The GDR thus relied on 
the highly public stances such as the constitution and presented itself as committed to the status 
quo, which favored states that had reason to fear territorial changes, such as Poland. 
Unsurprisingly, in addition to the overt digs at the FRG for its “aggression,” the GDR also 
loaded all of their positive attributes in this section with implicit criticisms of the FRG.  
The images accompanying the article emphasized the dramatic transformation of daily 
lives for GDR citizens. For instance, the image of a child along with the caption referring to 
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“ten-year comprehensive polytechnical school and vocational training” promoted the high level 
of education for GDR citizens. Other images, such as the one showing a nurse handing a new 
mother her child, emphasized the soft side of the GDR as well as the boons of free health care. 
The peace narrative was not as directly stressed in the images as it was in the article, but the 
implicit connection showed that this was what a society could earn and afford if it focused on the 
well-being of its citizens rather than on building up weapons, thus confirming the sub-heading 
“Everything for People’s Wellbeing, Everything for Peace.”32 
Popular Protest in the GDR 
Another key feature of the 1980s was the resurgence of mass public protest. As they did 
in 1968, GDR Review embraced the portrayal of broad public protest movements in other 
countries. Inside the GDR, there were youth rallies and gatherings, but they were controlled, 
state-sponsored, and planned. A series of articles starting in 1980 attempted to reveal the extent 
of the protests in Western countries. The two most frequently seen article series were “In the 
Name of Life Stop the Arms Race” and “Warnings, Protests, Actions.” In both of these series, 
GDR Review presented a rational, pragmatic GDR seeking to commit the world to a peaceful 
resolution of the crisis surrounding the placement of nuclear missiles in Western Europe. By 
comparing mass protests in Western Europe to organized rallies in the GDR, the magazine also 
attempted to demonstrate the extent to which each society’s government represented the will of 
the people. 
In February 1980, GDR Review published an article criticizing “the NATO decision to 
deploy new types of medium-range nuclear missiles” through a presentation of oppositional 
rallies. The article, entitled “Anti-Rocket Rally in Brussels,” cited the “biggest and most 
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representative mass demonstrations against the Pershing-2 and Cruise Missiles” as evidence of a 
public rejection of NATO’s decisions.33 Though the article focused on the protests in Brussels, 
similar protests in Copenhagen, Utrecht, and Washington served to further GDR Review’s points. 
To demonstrate the broad swathes of the population participating in these protests, the article 
claimed “the march through Brussels was headed by leading figures from all the parties” because 
they “took their orientation from the conscience and true interests of the peoples of Europe.”34  
GDR Review pursued two complementary goals with this article series: to garner public 
support for the protests and rallies and to undermine the legitimacy of NATO and the FRG. The 
claim was that protests, such as the one that took place in Brussels, made it such that “NATO 
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military circles have not succeeded in pushing through their fateful decision in silence and 
without complications.” In fact, the public pressure and protests supposedly made the “regimes” 
in Western Europe “apply pressure and make threats.” The hope of these forces was that “the 
peoples had forgotten the lessons given by two world wars.”35 GDR Review claimed forcefully 
that they had not, and in fact portrayed a number of photographs showing a variety of locations 
and people involved in the protest. The protesters in the photographs were not simply youths, 
and some showed older individuals providing their support. A few also showed posters and 
banners opposing the placement of nuclear missiles and also emphasized the importance of peace 
and cooperation. It was evidently a rainy day, as seen by all of the umbrellas, and despite few 
shots of large groups, the implicit message here appeared to be that the inclement weather did 
not diminish the size of the gathering. It was also pointedly a rather dreary collection of 
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photographs. Some individuals were shown to be happy, such as the top right man who appeared 
to be laughing somewhat, but many others were shown as somewhat more serious and 
concerned. The photographs themselves were also somewhat grainy and gave an impression of 
gloom to the gathering. While this could be attributed in part to the weather, it also gave the 
reader a sense of foreboding and concern both for the overall issue and for the protesters. This 
sense was an important element of the coverage of Western protests. That said, only the next 
page showed an image of the full protesting group. The photograph was not of great quality, but 
it did serve to show that it was a large-scale gathering and that the protest was significant. 
 The complementary series, Warnings-Protests-Actions, and “In the Name of Life Stop 
the Arms Race,” served to highlight international protests, discuss dangerous rearmament, and to 
promote a socialist vision of peace. In August 1981, the article gave short blurbs on 
developments in Tokyo, Brussels, Paris, Rome, the Hague, Washington, Copenhagen, London, 
Bonn, and Moscow. Some, such as the Tokyo section, discussed protest marches in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki against nuclear weapons. Others, like in Paris, attempted to show common cause 
between local groups and the views of the Eastern Bloc. For example, The Republican 
Association of War Veterans in Paris and the Committee of Anti-Fascist Resistance Fighters of 
the GDR “issued a joint declaration backing the Soviet proposal for a moratorium and for 
immediate talks on the limitation and reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons.”36 When 
considering the German other, the article highlighted internal political division. According to the 
article, “Social-Democratic members of the Bundestag and representatives of FRG youth and 
student organizations with Social-Democratic leanings…advocated a moratorium on the 
                                                             
36 “Warnings, Protests, Actions,” GDR Review, 8/1981, 14. 
304 
 
stationing of missiles.”37 Unsurprisingly, the events in Moscow highlighted the commitment of 
the Eastern Bloc to peace. Thus, scientists in Moscow “appealed to their colleagues throughout 
the world to spare no efforts in preventing a nuclear world war.”38 
 The other portion 
of the article began a 
long-running pattern of 
visuals which 
demonstrated the physical 
cost of weapons in the 
West. In the August 1981 
edition, GDR Review 
compared the cost of a 
KC-10A transport and 
refueling plane to health 
care costs. Thus, the 
$34,000,000 price tag of 
the planes could equal 
2,720 “jobs in the health 
services.” Instead of the 
public benefiting from health care, the article claimed it was the “shareholders of the US 
McDonnel Douglas Company” who stood to gain. The images pushed this issue as well by 
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showing the plane complete with a prominent US Air Force emblem immediately above a health 
care provider sympathetically examining a child. This narrative fit closely with both the GDR’s 
self-conception and the characterization of the West. The socialist vision of society portrayed in 
GDR Review presented a caring society focused on the welfare of individuals. At the same time, 
the portrayals of the West, and most often the US, showed a capitalist society focused only on 
profit and the expansion of markets through military expansion and neo-colonialism. 
 GDR Review painted marches in the GDR with an entirely different brush. For instance in 
October 1981 an article entitled “Halt the NATO Warmongers! Stop US Nuclear Arms 
Escalation” celebrated World Peace Day in the GDR. The article attempted to show an even 
greater level of ground support and public engagement than existed in the West. Indeed, it 
argued “Throughout the country, citizens gathered at meetings in which they declared: Together 
with all peace-loving people, we will devote our strength to forcing the repeal of the ominous 
Figure 68 No caption, world peace marches, GDR Review 10/1981 
306 
 
NATO missile decision.”39 The marchers portrayed in this brief article were to convey that the 
“population of the GDR [was] shoulder to shoulder with fighters for peace throughout the world 
in the cause of security, disarmament and détente!” In the dominant image, a cheerful populace 
gathered and marched through a town’s street and were cheered heartily by flag-waving 
bystanders. The flags of the GDR and the Soviet Union along with signs and flowers showed the 
mutual relationship between socialism and peace. The photograph was much brighter than the 
earlier Brussels portrayal and the images were much more open, showing crowds. By using a 
wider presentation, they created less of an ominous, closed-off feeling. The people appear 
generally happy, and the FDJ members in the bottom right show the multi-generational 
commitment to the aims of the GDR towards peace and, of course, socialism. 
 Concern over the end of détente and rising tensions between Cold War antagonists also 
included the boogeyman of the “neutron bomb.” This weapon, capable of ending lives while 
preserving property and infrastructure was the presented in GDR Review was the ultimate 
weapon of the capitalist powers whose appetite for markets was insatiable. Thus, in another 
article profiling international protests in December 1981, GDR Review showed that “Millions of 
People Protested at the Missiles Decisions and the Neutron Bomb.” This article, “For a Secure 
Peace – Against NATO’s Intensified Arming,” showed protests throughout much of the Western 
world, from Stockholm to New York. The Potsdam rally supposedly “manifested on this day the 
new humanist spirit which governs the life of its citizens just as those of all people in the German 
Democratic Republic.”40 At this rally, the gathered citizens produced a “Message of Greeting,” 
declaring, “Europe and humanity need no new medium-range nuclear missiles that have been 
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made in the USA, no neutron bombs, but constructive and successful negotiations.” Furthermore, 
it stated, “Humanity needs a stabilization of peace, the protection and continuation of détente by 
means of armaments limitation and disarmament.”41 The equation of the GDR’s efforts to assure 
peace by limiting the placement of weapons to human rights issues demonstrated how narrowly 
the GDR attempted to define “human rights” in opposition to Western definitions. 
 According to GDR Review, protests in Bonn on October 25 and 26, 1981 were follow-ups 
to the largest protest in the history of the FRG on October 10 in Bonn. At these protests, around 
300,000 citizens met in the West German capital. 
There, seventeen speakers “outlined the different 
viewpoints of the peace campaigners in their joint 
activities for peace and disarmament and again the 
life-endangering policy of intensified arming 
instigated by NATO.”42 The contrasting images of 
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the two protests have some clear similarities due to the simple reality that they protested the 
same issue, had posters written in German and were large gatherings. Thus, the wide-open image 
in Potsdam with young people on bicycles in the front had a somewhat more whimsical air than 
the crowded street in Bonn full of protesters walking through it. 
 The portrayal of protests in NATO countries by GDR Review sought to undermine the 
democratic legitimacy of these states. Prior to a meeting in Geneva between the Soviet Union 
and the USA, GDR Review published an article in February 1982 exhorting further protest and 
celebrating the success of them in bringing the USA to the negotiating table. Importantly, the 
magazine tried to clarify that the protesters were not communists and should not be considered 
illegitimate in the eyes of their home countries. The key point in the argument, however, was the 
dig at the NATO countries lack of responsiveness to the protests. According to the article, “it 
would, however, be quite erroneous to assume to assume that NATO and the Pentagon will 
voluntarily give up their armaments plans which are as dangerous as they are profitable because 
millions of people in all countries want peace and détente.”43 Instead, so the story went, the 
NATO countries began a coordinated propaganda campaign, wherein the “mass media controlled 
by them opened up a barrage of misleading information: building up the fact that the majority of 
people in the western world know little, and in many cases nothing at all, about the concrete and 
far-reaching proposals for peace and détente made by the Soviet Union.”44 This somewhat bald-
faced effort to undermine western media and dismiss it as propaganda appeared somewhat 
feeble. GDR Review, to that end, was clearly relying on at least a minimum of sympathy from its 
readership. Readers of GDR Review were already positively predisposed towards the GDR, and 
                                                             




could thus be willing 
to accept a degree of 
bias towards Western 
media. While the 
article only alluded to 
Western media 
attacks, the clear 
implication was that 
these sources argued 
the Soviet Union had 
established missiles 
and other forces in the 
East, which 
necessitated a NATO response.45 For example, the article stated, “the mass media of the West do 
their utmost to convince people that the Soviet Union is responsible for the armaments spiral and 
that the biggest danger threatens from the East.”46 
 While the attacks on the Western media’s version of events continued, the GDR called 
for ongoing protests. GDR Review argued, “the latest bluff of the NATO strategists and their 
opinion-makers is that the peace movement should stop its activities for an indefinite period of 
time in order to not disturb the Geneva talks between the USA and the USSR.”47 Instead, GDR 
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Review encouraged protesters to continue because the “powerful campaigns were decisive in 
getting the USA to the negotiating table.”48 The peace movement should continue pushing for 
the repeal of the Brussels armament decision was the “dictate of hour” in the “name of life.” The 
photographs of the various protests through the Western world further demonstrated the power of 
the peace movement. Some were also deliberately chosen to fit other messages important to the 
GDR’s agenda, including the image of the poster demanding, “We want economic democracy 
not neutron bombs.” These images felt somewhat less claustrophobic than earlier renditions, and 
while some were close-up profiles of serious looking young protesters, others showed the large 
scale of the protests. None, however, looked anything like the more orderly, sunny, and cheery 
images of the GDR rallies. The irony of GDR Review’s arguments in the article came across in 
this contrasting image trope. The GDR wanted to show the spontaneity and community-based 
action in the West as both a positive for the peace movement and a negative for the regime, 
while their own planned and orderly demonstrations were meant to be a positive for both the 
peace movement and the regime. Of course, there was no direct mention of the state-sponsored 
nature of these protests, but the nature of GDR society, the orderliness of the campaigns in the 
photos, and the involvement of organizations such as the FDJ nonetheless culminate in a clear 
impression of state involvement. Furthermore, the accusations of propaganda and the distortion 
of the truth in western media betrayed a degree of hypocrisy that was astounding in its audacity.  
The Past and Protest in the FRG 
 In the Federal Republic of Germany, Scala worked to present the tragic German fall to 
autocracy and the triumphant rise of democracy (in the West) as a foundational narrative. At the 
same time, the ongoing provocations of the early 1980s placed the FRG in a difficult defensive 




position with respect to a missile build-up. The narrative in the West thus became a matter of 
portraying a German past of dangerous totalitarianism transitioning to safe liberalism. The 
totalitarian presentation provided similarities between the GDR and the Third Reich while the 
democratic promise of Weimar was shown to be fulfilled in the FRG. In terms of contemporary 
issues, the missiles raised renewed fears of German militarism that the FRG worked to combat 
with renditions of “citizen soldiers” and soldier of democracy arguments. The key distinction, 
however, was the profoundly different portrayals of the peace movement in West German 
productions from those that the GDR had so dramatically described in the early 1980s. 
 Weimar Germany provided a blank canvas surrounded by slowly descending black 
curtains for GDR Review and Scala. Both sides could map their own history and portray the 
looming death of democracy and assumption of power by Nazism. They could claim the disaster 
was due to either the desperation of monopoly capitalism or political extremism respectively. 
Thus, in a June 1980 article entitled, “Toil Hope Tragedy: The first German Republic between 
1918 and 1933” attempted to show how the Weimar Republic had been saddled with an 
impossible situation and fell victim to illiberal political extremes. The article starts with the 
quote: “It could scarcely have had a worse start, began under conditions that were deliberately 
made humiliating, was immediately hit by the first major inflation that brought Germany to the 
brink of economic disaster, was practically torn apart by attempted uprisings or coup d’état by 
extreme leftists and rightists.”49 Weimar Germany faced a number of crises due primarily to 
international issues, such as the floundering economy and the peace treaty, which opened the 
country up for exploitation. Thus, the Great Depression of 1929 led to “a social catastrophe of 
hitherto unknown dimensions, caused by the international economic situation, a situation that 
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supplied the enemies of democracy, whether on the extreme left or the extreme right with plenty 
of arguments.”50 The earlier catastrophe of the First World War, which had set the stage for the 
burdens of the Weimar Republic was discussed only as a mutual European conflagration. In fact, 
in an effort to extricate itself from the double burden of guilt for the First and Second World 
War, Scala argued that with respect to 1914, “nobody apart from historians cares about the 
details any more.”51 Of course, the article then immediately proceeded to discuss the details of 
1914. Citing Stefan Zweig’s concept of “a feeling of surplus energy,” imperial competition, the 
long peace of the nineteenth century, and the incompetence of German foreign policy, the article 
argued Germany had “unknowingly played into the hands of the opposing side.” Consequently, 
Germany had ended up in a situation where “more and more countries turned against Germany in 
the course of the war.” In a bizarre twist, the article portrayed Germans’ war effort in the First 
World War as heroic in their “ability to suffer such losses almost alone for such a long time” 
even as “everyone was convinced that they were defending themselves.” The resurgence of 
German nationalism in the postwar period was also due to the “infringement of this principle [of 
self-determination of peoples] by the so-called ‘Peace Treaty’ of Versailles.” 52 The resulting war 
guilt clause and reparations further damaged Germany’s capacity to respond to the economic 
crisis and thus opened the path for “fanatics,” according to the article. 
 The heroes of the article, Walter Rathenau and Gustav Stresemann, worked to restore 
German respectability and achieve a lasting peace and place in the international community. 
Instead, both died young, and hope for a reasonable, democratic Germany ostensibly went with 
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them. Ironically, Rathenau, the foreign minister and industrialist, was celebrated for his role in 
breaking German diplomatic isolation after the First World War with the Treaty of Rapallo. This 
treaty, signed with the Soviet Union, notably established covert arms and military training for a 
severely limited German military, which would later be used in the Second World War. Thus, 
Rathenau’s goal of proving “the need for international common sense by demonstrating the 
senselessness of the way in which Germany was being treated” largely failed, ending in his 
assassination in June 1922 by “young men who regarded themselves as nationalists.”53 
Stresemann, another famous advocate for fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty, was also 
celebrated for the great achievement of the Locarno Treaty along with Aristide Briand in 1925. 
Their negotiations, according to the article, confirmed the Treaty of Versailles and the eventual 
withdrawal of French troops from the Rhineland. Their efforts, however, met with opprobrium at 
home, causing them “to face greater difficulties at home than during their negotiations with each 
other.” Stresemann’s untimely death shortly before Black Friday of 1929 sadly diminished hopes 
of continuing down the path of fulfillment. The upshot was that the Allied powers had also 
ostensibly learned the lessons of the 
problems of the Versailles Treaty and 
were willing to change after the Second 
World War. Finally, the article argued, 
“the foreign politics of the first German 
Republic are today regarded as a tragic 
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failure of men of good will against overpowering 
odds.”54 
 The images accompanying the article showed 
the efforts of famous statesman, such as Rathenau, 
Stresemann, and President Friedrich Ebert, to keep 
the Republic together and to establish its position 
abroad. For instance, the picture of the 
demonstrations after the assassination of Rathenau 
showed a commitment among regular German 
citizens to the ideals Rathenau ostensibly espoused, 
and also to peace. seen in the sign stating “Never 
Again War (Nie Wieder Krieg).”55 The celebration 
of Rathenau, who faced profound challenge from 
right-wing nationalist groups during his time in 
power, was meant to show how responsible, reform-
minded democracy had strong roots in German 
history that could and did allow for connections with 
countries, like the Soviet Union, that were former 
enemies and were ideologically opposed. Furthermore, it eroded some of the GDR’s efforts to 
lay sole claim to martyrdom from right-wing nationalist groups. On the following page, the 
article showed the involvement of important leaders in both domestic and foreign politics 
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working desperately to salvage Germany’s position at home and abroad. The image of 
Stresemann at the League of Nations [the second image above] was particularly important, 
because it showed the early commitment of a democratic Germany to international cooperation. 
When viewed from the lens of the 1980s, this showed that the Federal Republic had a powerful 
heritage of democracy which was morally upstanding, if ultimately a failure. Furthermore, it 
worked to undermine the GDR’s narrative that capitalist liberal democracy was a blight on 
humanity that inevitably caved to fascism. 
 The follow up to the June 1980 article was released in the next combined July/August 
issue of that year. This article, entitled “the Road to Disaster,” emphasized domestic politics 
more so than international conditions in the lead-up to 1933. When describing the transition from 
the German Empire to the Weimar Republic, Scala offered a very limited perspective. Arguing 
the “transition to a republican form of government – so unparalleled in Germany’s own history 
that it was referred to as the ‘Revolution’,” the article presented a clear narrative of political 
fragmentation at the extremes. The real revolution and fighting taking place in Germany in 
1918/1919 included “communists...aiming to transplant the revolution which continued unabated 
in Russia to German soil” and “the remains of the old military clique formed an alliance with the 
new social democratic movement.”56 The actions of the Freikorps, a right-wing paramilitary 
group composed of First World War veterans, were diminished in this narrative because the 
necessary goal was discussing the rise of a democracy, even if it was remarkably fragile. 
Additionally, the key issue was to show that the dangers facing Weimar democracy came from 
both the Left and Right totalitarian schools. By showing the Left as a key danger, Scala sought to 
demonstrate a less triumphalist narrative for the communist movement than the GDR claimed. 
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The glossing over of right-wing movements that were not explicitly National Socialist, such as 
the Freikorps, did demonstrate the FRG’s own version of historical self-censorship designed to 
appeal to foreign audiences. In other words, the GDR did not have a monopoly on half-truths. 
The article showed a classical structural weakness of the Weimar Republic. While 
celebrating “the most liberal constitution known to man” the article contended that Germans 
were insufficient to the task of embracing the liberality of the constitution. Because Germans 
lacked an “extremely highly-developed political consciousness and competence” with respect to 
democracy, the constitution proved something of a burden. In fact, many Germans, according to 
the article, remained wary of democracy and “unable to come to terms with their nation’s defeat, 
continued to dismiss ‘all this nonsense.’” Some Germans came to terms with being a republic, 
such as Friedrich Meinecke and Gustav Stresemann, and while the article praised them, they also 
came across as clear exceptions. The two central weaknesses of the Weimar Republic 
constitution itself, however, were decisive. The first weakness was that the government could be 
deposed at any time and new elections could be held for the Reichstag. The second was that the 
President could rule by emergency decree and thus become “Emperor in all but name.”57 
Accordingly, the second of these weaknesses “pave[d] the way for dictatorship” in 1933. The 
splintering of political parties during the Weimar period was also blamed. These “30 often 
minute splinter groups…constituted a serious threat to the functioning of the democratic 
processes.”58 The threat emerging from the right and left in the Weimar Republic included coups 
by both groups, citing 1920 in Berlin and 1923 in Munich. Curiously, the article cited the 
Reichswehr, the army of the Weimar Republic, as “the only reliable weapon in the hands of the 
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elected government.”59 The attempt to salvage the image of the German military when under the 
control of a civilian and democratically elected government was meant to demonstrate another 
close relationship between the Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
1980s. 
According to the article, the collapse 
of Weimar democracy came from internal 
extremism and external economic 
depression. The text sought, with 
magnanimous hindsight, to explain how “the 
liberal provisions of the constitution and 
their practical interpretation and application 
went so far as to allow the (literally) deadly 
enemies of all genuine personal freedom to 
continue their demagogic activities.”60 This 
fatal mistake, born of a general German 
ignorance of democracy, was “one of the 
pitfalls which the First Republic can teach us 
to avoid.” The article constituted a corrective 
narrative wherein the modern FRG could 
look to the Weimar Republic to avoid 
political extremism and toleration of parties 
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seeking to undermine democracy. The hyper-inflation of the early 1920s and the fallout from the 
Great Depression further exacerbated the situation of the Weimar Republic. The “National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party eventually became the strongest party in the Reichstag” with 
their “anti-democratic, anti-liberal, anti-western and anti-Semitic ideas.”61  
The upshot of this experience was that West Germans had learned the lessons of the 
Weimar Republic. For example, the constitution of the FRG placed the basic human rights 
provisions from the Weimar constitution from the second position in the document to the first 
position. One of the key writers of the FRG Constitution, academic and SPD member Carlo 
Schmid, stated “the basic human rights were placed first in order to demonstrate that they are 
intended to be the heart of the Second Republic, the hub around which the entire state revolves, 
indeed its whole raison 
d’etre.”62 Finally, the article 
concluded by acknowledging 
that the “Second Republic 
has learnt from the errors of 
the first and from the 
disastrous consequences.” 
The images accompanying this article conveyed the gloom of the period of political 
chaos. For instance, the extremist street fighting which characterized the tumultuous Weimar 
Republic was shown in the meeting room brawl pictured on the previous page. The image just 
below it showed President von Hindenburg’s visit to the Rhineland after the French ceased their 
                                                             
61 Ibid., 59. 
62 Ibid., 59. 
Figure 75 National Socialist torchlight procession, Scala 7-8/1980 
319 
 
occupation. Together, the images serve to confirm the narrative that Weimar democracy was 
beset by foes from within and without. It shifted the blame for the collapse of Weimar 
democracy from “normal” Germans to extremist political elements that lacked democratic 
legitimacy and to international problems like the shame of the Versailles Treaty and the 
Depression. These narratives provided a basis of “lessons” that the FRG had clearly lived up to, 
both explicitly through the creation of a stronger constitution and implicitly via the construction 
of European camaraderie and economic success. The clear juxtaposition, though never explicitly 
mentioned, was East Germany. The GDR was the inheritor of the leftist extremist tradition 
decried in the article. It lacked the fundamental democratic legitimacy and was pushed out of a 
legitimate inheritor status by the FRG’s claim in the article. Finally, the implicit narrative 
established the extreme left of the Weimar Republic as an equal threat to Weimar democracy as 
the extreme right (Nazis). Clearly, the lessons of the Weimar Republic had been lost on the 
GDR, but the FRG, as the successor state, had learned them. 
The depictions of the military in the FRG required careful manicuring to avoid fulfilling 
GDR accusations of revanchist militarism. In an April 1981 article, Scala demonstrated the 
FRG’s commitment to a civilian military. The article, entitled “The Specialists,” contained a 
number of key narratives that culminated in a presentation of a cooperative, civilian, highly 
trained, and loyal military dedicated to peace. Rhetorically, the challenge was to dance around 
the unpopular issue of mandatory service in the Bundeswehr, while showing its effectiveness and 
dedication to the state. The careful language describing the role of the military in FRG society 
reflected the tensions one of the first portrayals of the Bundeswehr could have. For instance, 
Minister of Defense Hans Apel stated the “armed forces are an expression of our people’s will to 
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stand up for themselves.” Furthermore, “‘It is therefore a sign of good citizenship that hundreds 
of thousands of young men perform their national service conscientiously and reliably year for 
year.’”63 The specialists, trained for specific tasks in the armed forces, obtained qualifications 
“recognized in over 200 civilian trades.”64 The image accompanying this initial description of the 
armed forces betray a simple fact, however, that the article worked to couch with its softer 
language: the military’s 
profession is violence. The 
dramatic image of the 
German-made armored 
personnel carrier, the 
“Marder,” splashing through a 
river emphasized power and 
technological fortitude. 
Although it is a rearward 
photo, which served to 
diminish the threatening 
image of the gun and an 
approaching vehicle, it 
nonetheless evokes the speed, 
power, and violence of 
German armored exploits 
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from the Second World War. The caption did little to help, despite its effort to emphasize 
technological and industrial development. The statement that the APC “demonstrates how 
quickly it can get across a river” conveys a dynamic impression characteristic of an offensive 
rather than a reactive defense. A defensive posture would certainly have been more palatable to 
international audiences.  
The article emphasized the role of men as civilian soldiers via the articulation of the 
“modern man.” These men were “citizens in uniform” meaning that they needed to maintain 
order and discipline, but had these features balanced with a focus on civics. For example, “every 
young soldier learns that his human dignity is respected and his rights are protected.” The 
soldiers can “decide what club, what trade union, what political party he intends to play an active 
role in later.” The behavior of these soldiers, additionally, was indistinguishable from those not 
serving. In fact, “he will learn to voice his opinion on what is going on in the world – just as he 
would at home or in the discotheque in the evening where he dances to hard rock in blue jeans 
and is never recognized as being a soldier.” The explicit blurring of the lines between being a 
citizen and being a soldier fit the FRG’s narrative, which sought to show an inclusive space, 
dedicated to international alliances, where German militarism would no longer be the rule. 
Rather than contributing to GDR accusations of an ongoing dedication to the old Prussian officer 
class, the FRG sought to show how large a departure had been made from the old ways. These 
“modern men in a modern army stand for an old idea: securing peace and freedom and backing 
up a policy that concentrates on reconciliation, understanding and disarmament.”65 However, the 
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images once again do 
not corroborate the 
“modern man” ethos. 
Instead, they tended to 
show traditional 
military photographs of 
troop maneuvers, 
missiles firing, and 
heavy machinery. 
While the inclusion of 
soldiers from different 
Western countries did 
facilitate the impression 
of the commitment of 
the FRG to NATO, it 
nonetheless failed to convey the impression of a carefree young soldier in jeans listening to rock 
music. Like the GDR, the FRG still struggled with how to present a renewed military force to the 
world without conjuring fears of German tanks sweeping through the landscape. The difference, 
however, was that in the text of the articles, the FRG gave a somewhat more convincing 
portrayal of soldiers in a democracy working to maintain international cooperation. Bolstered by 
the simple fact that the tanks of the Warsaw Pact had invaded the GDR in 1953, Hungary in 
Figure 77 Soldiers from different countries, Scala 4/1981 
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1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and then Poland in the early 1980s, the FRG also had, quite 
frankly, an easier row to hoe.  
The Bundeswehr and its portrayal in Scala tapped in to domestic debates about service in 
the military, which had become increasingly contentious. As a part of the broader West German 
rejection of the military, large-scale protests emerged as a result of the debate over the placement 
of medium-range nuclear weapons. GDR Review’s articles above focused rather overtly on this 
issue, but Scala did not shy away from addressing it, despite the significantly reduced space 
dedicated to it. In a far less shrill fashion, Scala published an article in March 1982 entitled 
“United is their Aim” addressing “the new peace movement in Europe.”66 Using extraordinarily 
broad and vague language, Scala stated that “the new mass phenomenon, expanding visibly, has 
been described as a new kind of pacifism; its supporters classify themselves as a peace 
movement.”67 Though it seemed somewhat dismissive in tone, the crux of the article was to 
show how the peace movement was organized politically within the context of a civil society and 
to provide clarity regarding how the decision was reached to place the Pershing-2 missiles in 
Western Europe. All military decisions regarding the stationing of the missiles was 
contextualized within the NATO alliance to avoid impressions of an independent German 
decision to bring the missiles in. For example, in 1979, the “Western defence alliance passed its 
two-part resolution, the ‘talk-and-deploy decision.’” This decision, made “by NATO was taken 
as a response to the installation of Soviet ‘SS-20’ missiles which was began at that time [1979] 
and has been continued ever since.”68 
                                                             





The arguments of the article were mixed. On the one hand, Scala worked hard to show 
that the placement of the Pershing missiles was a legitimate exercise in maintaining the balance 
of power in Europe. On the other, it showed how the demonstrations of the peace movements 
were not akin to the convulsions of 1968 and were instead, organized and coherent expressions 
of a democratic society.  
The protests, which emerged in the early 1980s ahead of the scheduled 1983 installation 
of the missiles, steadily increased in number. Staring with 25,000 protesters in Bonn in 1982, the 
numbers steadily grew to 250,000 in the following fall. These protests, according to the article, 
did not represent a critique of German militarism. Instead, protesters “championed world-wide 
disarmament.”69 This idealistic and thus innocuous goal served to distance the FRG government 
from the protests because it became about an impossible goal that was not subject to the will of 
ruling officials in West Germany. The air of naiveté surrounding the protests thickened in the 
article as it matter-of-factly explained the Cold War imperative of missiles. Stating that the 
public had been aware of this decision since 1979, the article clarified that the timing of the 
protests was about missiles. In its words, “parts of the background of what is for many this 
surprising emphasis and concentration on the subject of peace is the approach of a date, the year 
1983.” The placement of explicitly “American missiles” in “the European NATO countries” 
further reduced impressions of German responsibility by crediting the US with ownership of the 
missiles and spreading the burden of geographic location to Europe rather than German soil. The 
article also characterized the NATO effort as “modernization” rather than as an arms build-up. 
The protests of the early 1980s presented an opportunity for Scala to spin the positive 
attributes of a politically engaged population. Simultaneously, the article decried the lack of 
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critical engagement with the East’s placement of their own missiles. The split with the majority 
of the political establishment and those in the “pacifist” movement was surprising, but the 
engagement of the churches was framed as a “spectacular development.”  The church discussions, 
culminating in a meeting in Hamburg of 150,000 Protestants, led to the development of slogans 
that were then exported to other churches throughout Germany shifting from “Fear not” to “Fear 
– Resist” and “Creating peace without arms.”70 Lay Catholics developed their own discussion of 
peace at a meeting in Düsseldorf, but lacked the overt demands of the Protestants. Beyond the 
church, however, was the “ideological left, also represented by members of the Bonn 
Government, by trade unions, the youth organizations of the Social Democrats and Liberals, by 
conscientious objectors and Communist parties and associations,” which supposedly suffered 
from a “malaise” of traditional pacifism.71 The “malaise” dated back to the introduction of the 
Bundeswehr which these groups had opposed. The less organized “idealists,” were primarily 
composed of young people outside of the traditional political structures. While somewhat critical 
of this group’s tendency to be isolated from society, it also celebrated that their efforts towards 
pacifism, indicating that “the new pacifism, however, makes even those silent people join in, 
provide them with communal life they have been hankering after and gives them an aim they 
have long been seeking.”72 Furthermore, these people now had embraced a “desire to be taken 
seriously, to state one’s position openly, to adopt ideals.” 
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The article claimed the FRG 
government worked to take the 
peace movement more seriously 
after initially ignoring them. 
Politicians, confused by the 
outpouring of protests, also sought 
to understand the movements. At 
the same time, the article clarified 
that “the major political 
parties…cannot and refuse to 
accept the situation when the 
protest is directed unilaterally 
against the West while the 
armament policies of the Eastern 
superpower are often hardly 
mentioned.”73 That said, the article concluded by describing the ongoing negotiating process 
between the superpowers and state that as a result of these discussions, the protest movement has 
taken a “wait and see approach.” Thus, the article attempted to show the careful consideration of 
the FRG’s government both with respect to international negotiations and in engagement with 
protesters.  
The images accompanying the article echo the internationalist arguments of the text even 
as they serve to demonstrate the scope of the protests. The collection of images showed protests 
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in Paris, Brussels, Bern, Amsterdam, Helsinki and London. It pointedly did not present the 
protests ongoing in the Federal Republic, which served to demonstrate that there were large scale 
international protests and diminished impressions of a domestic German opposition. These 
images of massive crowds and dummy rockets demonstrated the broad swathes of people 
committed to raising the alarm about the placing of nuclear missiles Europe. There was also a 
careful balance of images, however, as seen in the caption referring to “peace demonstrations 
against nuclear arms in East and West.”74 The top left image shows figures in skull masks and 
skeleton costumes near a mock missile labelled USA. The top-right image, by contrast, shows 
figures walking alongside mock missiles labelled SS-20, referring to the medium range missiles 
already deployed in the Eastern Bloc. This dual placement echoes one of the goals of the article, 
which was to demonstrate the tit-for-tat nature of the missile debate. The other images show 
somewhat more generic protests with a variety of languages, but further pushes that this is a 
general European phenomenon. The image of Coretta King, the widow of Reverend Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr., showed a further internationalization of the issue. King was shown speaking on 
stage conveying the support of the American peace movement and was joined onstage by 
Heinrich Böll, Nobel Prize winner in literature, Erhard Eppler of the SPD, William Born of the 
FDP, and former Lord Mayor of Berlin Heinrich Albertz.75 This mixture of figures emphasized 
American involvement in German affairs and in the peace movement as well as the cooperation 
of FRG political figures in the proceedings. The legitimacy of the movement was thus reinforced 
and was shown to be part of a general international democratic community. 
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The Third Reich and the Weimar 
Republic offered distinct memory 
trajectories for GDR Review and Scala 
International to use in showing the separate 
lessons of the past. GDR Review showed 
how antifascism and anti-war sentiment had 
permeated their society via peaceful protests 
(carefully curated by the state) and in the 
reconstruction of war torn cities like 
Dresden. This legacy met with the concerns 
over the Federal Republic’s acquiescence to 
the placement of medium-range nuclear 
missiles and opened room for widespread 
critiques of a new militarism supposedly 
emanating from the West. Protests in the 
West were juxtaposed with those in the East 
and the West consistently appeared much more ominous, chaotic and widespread. GDR Review 
presented a Western society disconnected from their people even as they presented the protests 
enjoying massive support. The reckoning with the past that the GDR had ostensibly conducted 
on both a populist and state level had evidently not occurred in this presentation, and thus a 
disconnect was inevitable. Rhetorically, this alarmist strategy appeared somewhat successful, but 
also lacked a degree of persuasion given the presence of Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe. The 




GDR claimed accusations regarding these missiles were misdirection from a revanchist West set 
on conflict and the end of communism.  
The GDR’s arguments rang somewhat false, and Scala felt somewhat pressured to 
respond to these allegations. As seen in their presentation of the Weimar Republic, the FRG 
attempted to show that they had learned their own civic lessons from the fall of democracy in the 
1930s. This experience differed from those of the GDR, however, in that it was not so much an 
explicitly anti-war message as it was a warning against the political extremism that characterized 
the Weimar Republic. This argument functioned somewhat similarly in the FRG to the 
antiwar/antifascism argument rooted in the Nazi era for the GDR. The FRG was able to both 
show how it had solved these issues via a new constitution and criticize the GDR implicitly for 
the state’s continued commitment to an extremist political ideology and dictatorship. The more 
defensive claims emerging from Scala focused on the peace movement and presentations of the 
Bundeswehr. Though the article celebrated the Bundeswehr and its new “modern man” ethos as a 
replacement for old German militarism, this article was largely unconvincing. Weighed down by 
glamorous photographs of military speed and prowess, the FRG did little here to reassure readers 
of the lack of German focus on military prowess. It did, however, manage to embed the German 
military within NATO and thus continued the tactic of neutralizing via internationalizing.  
The protests in the FRG were handled much differently in Scala than in GDR Review. 
Scala did accept that these protests demonstrated a degree of disconnect between the goals of the 
government and the feelings of significant parts of the general population. This was 
demonstrated in the pointed examples of how these protests emerged in various forms outside of 
pre-existing political parties. The depiction of church movements, and those of a less centralized 
youth movement, did seem to show how much the political parties of the FRG did not represent 
330 
 
the peace movement. At the same time, this pointed depiction of a flourishing civil society 
capable of mobilizing in favor of its goals within the purview of FRG society offered a depiction 
that the party dictatorship of the East could not hope to match. This was, in many ways, the 
distinct advantage of Scala’s argumentation. It was accepted that parts of FRG society would 
disagree, but that the society could bear these criticisms and discord in ways that the GDR could 
not. Though at times petulant in their “whataboutism,” Scala was able to maintain credibility in 
ways the GDR could not. 
German-German Relations and Division 
  The rivalry between the German states accelerated again in the early 1980s as détente 
and Ostpolitik disintegrated. Divided German relations, often symbolized through the shared 
space of Berlin, was used by both magazines to advocate for their visions of the future and to 
show the flaws in the opposing other’s system. Later in the 1980s, however, the celebration of 
the 750th anniversary since the founding of Berlin in 1237 offered a clear opportunity for the two 
states to celebrate their own vision of the city in past, present, and future. This was, in particular, 
a departure for Scala International, which had certainly discussed Berlin, but typically only 
slightly more than other West German cities like Cologne, Frankfurt, or Bonn. In this period, 
however, Berlin took a new focus. 
Division, Berlin, and the FRG 
 In September 1981, Scala published an article entitled, “Berlin and Freedom” about the 
division of Berlin by the allies, the construction of the Wall and the Four Power Agreement of 
Berlin in 1971. The presentation of the division of Germany in the article showed that the Soviet 
Union had decided to administer the Eastern Zone separately from the other powers in 1948, and 
it was only “after every attempt to find a common political structure for all four zones had 
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proved fruitless” that the FRG was formed.76 Berlin during this period of transition was held 
apart. In the article, Berlin maintained separate governments, where “people could move around 
freely” and the border “was no more than a dotted line on the map.” The next section set up the 
construction of the wall due to the “refugees from the GDR.”  
 The political structures dividing the two halves of Berlin contained “a parliamentary 
democracy and a free market economy” and “an unpopular communist regime.”77 Furthermore, 
according to the article, the system in the FRG “led to a rapid economic revival and national 
recovery from the ravages of the war” while in the GDR “there were no openly contested 
elections, and the economy was beset with problems.”78 The natural outgrowth of this lack of 
satisfaction in the East was the June 1953 uprising, which was quashed by Soviet troops. The 
construction of the Berlin Wall grew out of the “mass exodus” of East Germans to the West via 
public transportation to “the other half of their own country, where they soon settled down and 
found a well-paid job.”79 While the “GDR was bleeding to death,” the Soviet Union blockaded 
West Berlin in 1958, but this ultimately failed to stem the flow of East Germans to West Berlin, 
which remained the last open point in the border where individuals could cross. Ultimately, this 
led to the closure of the border in West Berlin on August 13, 1961. 
 The construction of the Wall stopped the flow of GDR citizens to the West, which 
according to the article would have constituted 300,000 people, or 2% of the population of East 
Germany, by the end of 1961. Of course, the article criticized the GDR’s propaganda terming the 
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Wall the “fortification against the fascist.” The argument of the article was that this started “the 
fiction that the wall was there to prevent western aggressive acts against the GDR” despite the 
fact that the wall could not reasonably stop any attack for long.80 This article focused its images 
primarily on the Wall, rather than the prehistory and showed a number of images demonstrating 
the looming threat of the Wall and its shadowy guards. The images in this article appear in black 
and white and deliberately focus closely on the wall, its barbed wire and its stark and harsh 
exterior. The presence of a child riding a bicycle near the wall also serves to demonstrate how 
the wall disrupted the normal lives of the citizens of Berlin and was a profoundly unnatural 
addition to the urban landscape. The angle of the main photograph showed the wall in addition to 
the “death strip” constructed by 
the GDR, which was noted in 
the caption. This gave further 
credence to the threat of the 
wall and served to further 
undermine arguments that it 
was a protective feature against 
the FRG given that the death 
strip appeared on the far side of 
the wall, rather than the side 
facing the West. The selection 
of this section of the Wall, 
which was a piece of the 
                                                             
80 Ibid., 43. 
Figure 80 Berlin Wall, GDR “death strip,” Scala 9/1981 
333 
 
original construction in 1961, served the historical purposes of the article and also the rhetorical 
goals of showing the disjointedness of its construction and placement in the city. As the article 
stated, the wall “has been modernized, smoothed down, painted white, partly replaced by tall 
fences. But the inhumanity remains.”81 Even more poignantly, the article presented statistics 
showing that large numbers of GDR citizens (5,000) had still managed to escape to the West 
despite the border wall. The violence of the East German regime was also demonstrated because 
roughly 3,000 citizens had been arrested for attempting to cross, fifty-five were killed trying, and 
112 were wounded. Other images, such as that of shadowy GDR soldiers putting up barbed wire 
during the night of August 12-13, proved menacing and fear-inducing for those reading the 
article. It also served to undermine East German claims at being the state of peace given this 
overt display of threatening violence. These figures took the place of other nameless and faceless 
GDR border guards that had killed or wounded citizens attempting to flee. 
 The article did not include only references to discord and division between the German 
states, but hinted at a 
degree of cooperation 
via the conclusion of 
the Four Power 
Agreement in 1971. 
The article reaffirmed 
the reality of the wall 
because “the regime in 
the GDR does not 
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change and people continue to have a reason for wanting to leave the country.”82 Accordingly, 
the article argued, “politicians in the West have consistently worked towards making the wall 
less hermetic [impenetrable]” via negotiations with the East. Culminating in the Four Power 
Agreement of 1971, these attempts showed the progress of détente and Ostpolitik. The changes 
in the lives of West Berliners included visits to the GDR, telephone communication between the 
halves of the city, and preventions of arrests for West Berlin citizens outside of criminal activity. 
This otherwise positive development was marred, however, by the new attempts of the GDR to 
raise the mandatory currency exchange quota in an effort to increase its reserves of foreign 
currency and to thus buoy the failing GDR economy. The doubt about the “continuing viability 
of détente” between the countries nonetheless was shown to not have overly affected Berlin. And 
diplomatic negotiation was shown to have succeeded in at least partially opening up the Wall. 
 The Berlin Wall was unsurprisingly a major focus in Scala as the iconic site of German 
division, but the magazine also sought to explore other areas of German division. For example, 
in May 1986, Scala published an article entitled “Divided Homeland: Life on the ‘border.’” This 
article profiled the small town of Herleshausen on the border between the West German region 
of Hesse and the East German region of Thuringia. In this article, Scala painted a picture of 
traffic jams, border controls, and a border town dying economically due to the division of 
Germany. Bridges had been torn down, railway stations had closed, and large numbers of young 
people were abandoning the town for areas with more opportunity. The title itself implied a 
strong slant to the article that articulated a vision of a united German “homeland” suffering from 
a division imposed by life at the “zonal border.”83 The “homeland” of united Germany suffered 
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from this division and, using this town as a microcosm, Scala 
showed that “living there is not easy.” 
 The town of Herleshausen was presented in a highly 
uncomplimentary fashion. It was unusual for Scala to speak so 
critically of a West German city, but it fit 
the broader narrative showing that the 
hard wall constructed by the GDR had 
consequences on both sides of the border. 
The town, famous as the site for 
exchanges of spies from both sides of the 
Iron Curtain, was otherwise sleepy. 
Images confirmed this impression via 
their presentation of the rural landscape 
showing border regions restricted to 
travel. Others showed gates, dilapidated 
roads and torn down bridges to convey 
the sense of disconnect between the 
regions engendered by the border. Still more showed an idyllic, if highly provincial, existence 
complete with a non-functioning train station, horse farms, and burlap sack races. For young 
people, the only attraction was the local disco named the “Red Movie.” In general, local 
politicians struggled with the migration of young people leaving the town due to unemployment, 
which in turn caused the overall population to age a great deal. The 20% unemployment rate of 
the town certainly did not correspond to the broader prosperity of the Federal Republic. 
Figure 82 Impressions of a border landscape, Scala 5/1986 
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Businesses, such as a local textile factory, saw mill, and a moulded plastic business, had all 
failed recently in the town, further depressing the local economy.84 Still, older residents seemed 
to have found a degree of contentedness in their society as seen in the images showing happier 
residents who, according to the caption, “defied all the upheaval” and embraced “hope” as their 
way of life.  
 Despite the attempts to portray a struggling bucolic ideal, the 
article gave a rather grim impression of life on the border. 
Juxtaposed with the antipathy towards the GDR at this time, this 
article provides a window in to how explicit German division 
affected communities less in the public view than West Berlin. The 
ongoing implication in the magazine as well, was that if life was 
struggling this much on the FRG side of the border, which had 
consistently demonstrated its superior standard of living, then life 
on the other side would be that much worse. At the same time, 
however, this was a critique of West German society in some areas, 
which had struggled with unemployment and structural effects of 
urbanization and de-industrialization. The article told a believable 
story of rural decay that the Federal Republic attempted to engage 
with, but also shift the blame from their social/state/economic structure to being caused by 
division. This was rather convincingly demonstrated by the fact that the most dramatic and 
largest image was not that of the scenes of life in the town, but rather of the entrance to the 
border with the GDR. This entrance to the GDR was shown replete with a number of pieces of 
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GDR state iconography that stood out starkly in an otherwise rural landscape, further reinforcing 
the unnatural and inorganic nature of German division. This crossing, presented in the article as 
“the road to freedom” and the “road of open hearts,” offered a homecoming to the West for 
German POWS returning in the 1950s and 1960s. The geographic location of Herleshausen 
resulted in a great deal of traffic from those travelling in a North-South direction in Europe, 
including roughly 800,000 cars and 250,000 trucks per year. Of course, the border with the GDR 
meant that this traffic did not proceed in an East-West direction. The upshot here was that the 
artificial border with the GDR hurt the economy, the local population, and travel, but this was 
out of West German administrator hands. 
 The resurgence of the Cold War in the 1980s worsened German-German relations. As a 
result, Scala became increasingly overt in its criticism of the GDR. For example, the author of 
“Berlin and Freedom,” Joachim Nawrocki, a moderate Social Democrat, wrote another article 
Figure 84 The crossing at Herleshausen – one way into the GDR, Scala 5/1986 
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entitled “The Wall Through the Middle of Berlin” with a subtitle stating “Its only purpose: to 
prevent people fleeing to the West from the GDR.”85 The text of the article mirrored the 
inflammatory language of the title, stating that West Berliners “will never accustom themselves 
to this inhuman border, this monstrous structure.”86 Through a series of rather repetitive 
statements, Nawrocki emphasized that the Wall was built to keep GDR citizens trapped in the 
GDR, but had further consequences of cutting off Germans from each other in Berlin. 
Consequently, Nawrocki argued that the GDR was violating the basic human right of “freedom 
of movement” for its citizens. In fact, the argument was that the wall had endured for twenty-five 
years because “the fear of the GDR leaders that otherwise too many GDR citizens would leave 
their state for good is the only reason why the wall is still standing.”87  
 The alarmist and repetitive language about the Wall served to attack the GDR in ways 
that earlier descriptions of the Wall in the 1960s and 1970s had failed to do. The juxtaposition of 
the wall as viewed from the West and viewed from the East showed the profound differences 
between the two states. In Nawrocki’s words, “the Wall is a border barrier to prevent the 
inhabitants of the GDR from fleeing to the West,” but also “a wall for playing ball games 
against, a wall for artists and writers of graffiti for painting and drawing on.”88 To push the 
juxtaposition of the West from the East further, the article showed how the Wall served as 
military object in the East and as a painter’s canvas in the West. The Eastern portion had “294 
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observation towers, 63 bunkers, 260 dog runs” while in the West, it was “one big happening 
comic strip, object of study for students of graffiti.”89 The actual image included along with the 
article showed a tantalizing nearness between the part of divided Berlin, but also the disruption 
caused by its placement. It gave the sense of being unnatural, shoddy, and a poor environment, 
which fit with much of the narrative presented in the article. Notably, however, it does not look 
overly dangerous from the angle presented in the article. No guard tower loomed with ominous 
NVA soldiers staring down. Instead, the primary sense is the grey resignation of a city 
accustomed to unnatural division. 
One key point in the article was how it framed international responses to the Berlin Wall. 
First, one of the more compelling aspects in the piece was the explanation that it was illegal for 
any GDR citizen to photograph the wall without the GDR government’s consent. Nawrocki 
argued this was because “throughout the whole world the Wall – irrespective of all the attempts 
by the GDR to justify it – is regarded as constant proof of the fact that the GDR saw no other 
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chance of keeping its citizens in their own country, and that in the GDR there is no such human 
right as the freedom of movement and the right to leave one’s own country.”90 Despite the 
GDR’s attempts to brand the Berlin Wall as the “anti-fascist protection wall,” it remained a 
highly indefensible point in the GDR’s international image. Another example in this vein was 
how tourists to Berlin perceived the Wall. Nawrocki claimed most “just stand there and stare, 
react with uncertainty and shyness.” Others, such as a woman visiting Potsdamer Platz said 
“‘Watch out that they don’t shoot your head off.’” Less fearful observers, such as a Dutch visitor 
nearby, instead wrote on the Wall itself as an act of protest. These actions show an understanding 
from international audiences that the GDR was a violent and repressive state embodied in the 
creation of the Wall. 
These somewhat more hostile presentations of life in the FRG and the repressive regime 
in the GDR were balanced by more positive presentations of West Berlin in particular. For 
instance, the celebration of 750 years in Berlin in Scala included articles like “Metropolis 
Berlin” which highlighted the cities culture and tourist sites. The article’s description begins 
from a perspective of a tourist flying in to the iconic West Berlin airport of Tegel, and shows 
Berlin at night. It highlights landmarks including the River Havel, Pfaueninsel International 
Congress Centre, the Victory Column, the Reichstag, the Wall, the Brandenburg Gate, and 
Alexanderplatz. The articles describe then the taxi ride which briskly sweeps the rider through 
the city, where “the streets really are swarming with life” in places like Kurfürstendamm.91 
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From there, the article roots Berlin within German history. Surprisingly, this was a highly 
negative rendition of German history from Berlin. The Brandenburg Gate had “been deprived of 
its original function: the road no longer passes through the city gate.”92 Other points like the 
famous “Unter den Linden” faced similar disruption from the Berlin Wall. Opera houses 
remained open but were matched by buildings from the Third Reich that remained hauntingly 
present, such as the former Gestapo headquarters. The renewal of Berlin, however, could be seen 
in areas where “in the immediate vicinity of the centres of National Socialist power institutions 
of great cultural and intellectual eminence have been erected,” referring to the Philharmonic and 
the Museum of Musical instruments. In this way, the tragedy of the Nazi past could be subsumed 
by the cultural development of the FRG.  
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 The dual function of showing tourist attraction and providing coverage of sites hazardous 
to German international image fit the general narrative that Scala worked to demonstrate. In this 
articulation, Scala stated 
that “the history of 
bygone days, the glory of 
Prussia is most in 
evidence in the East, 
while it is what might be 
called ‘Republican 
Berlin’ which comes 
over most strongly in the 
West.”93 The article 
argued this was the case 
because buildings like 
the Philharmonie, the 
State Library, and the 
National Gallery “are 
emphatically conceptual 
buildings utterly devoid 
of any function as a reflection of state power.”  
The end of German militarism was also highlighted in the article which argued that “at 
the age of 750, Berlin is no longer a city associated with conquest.” Furthermore, the author 
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claimed that Berlin lacked “the ethos of imperial power which still lingers on in other cities.” 
The end of this imperialism, according to the article, came in May 1945 with the defeat of 
fascism. At this point the article explicitly shifted to describe how West Berlin “has been a city 
whose existence is not bolstered by political power.”94 Though the article conceded that the 
military presence of the western allies did serve an important purpose as a “counterbalance” to 
the military of the “Soviet bloc.” Instead, the foundations of West Berlin were said to be 
fundamentally cultural and diplomatic. The most potent example of this, according to the article, 
was Berlin’s Jewish community. Supposedly, the “atmosphere of freedom to be yourself” had 
“reawakened a degree of trust in that section of the population which had suffered the most at the 
hands of the Nazi barbarians.”95 Though it conceded that contrition for the Holocaust in the early 
postwar years had been perfunctory, Jews nonetheless returned and played an essential role in 
rebuilding the city and in “creating that climate of intellectual and artistic liberalism which has 
since become a characteristic of the city.”96 The article, as well as the rhetoric behind it, could be 
found in the final paragraph, which quoted FRG President Richard von Weizsäcker stating “The 
entire history of Europe in our century could be written from the vantage point of Berlin. As a 
hub it exerts its own attraction, and it helps us to understand the major challenges of our time: 
honouring and fostering freedom, implementing it with a due sense of responsibility and at the 
same time building bridges to the other side.”97 
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 The images accompanying this article tended to focus on illustrating the central claims of 
the article, such as when they showed the National Gallery, or on showing the positive cultural 
life of the city. Some aerial images gave the strong impression of a tourist visit to the city. For 
instance, the image of the Victory Column related to the description of the tourists arrival in 
Berlin and driving quickly past such landmarks. The images accompanying the Victory Column 
highlighted the 
militarized nature of the 
border. The image of 
the Brandenburg gate 
offered a clear 
demarcation from the 
flowers of West Berlin 
to the stark Prussian 
militarism and wall of 
East Berlin. Although 
the caption offered no 
translation of the sign stating “Attention! You are now leaving West Berlin!,” it is not 
unreasonable that contemporary observers interested in a magazine about West Germany would 
be able to read this text. The highly abstract nature of the art in the images outside the National 
Gallery further reinforced the argument that West Berlin was a center of cultural innovation and 
freedom. Finally, a number of other images highlighted the relaxed life of West Berliners as 
assured by Western allied military aid and the existence of international agreements assuring its 
continued existence. The article’s images rarely attacked East Berlin or the GDR, despite the 
Figure 88 Between 1895 and 1933 the Reichstag was the seat of the German Empire’s 
parliament. Scala 5-6/1987 
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text’s frequent allusions, instead choosing to maintain a positive impression of West Berlin in 
what was largely a celebratory article. This showed the dual nature pursued by Scala in the 
1980’s, which was to be more aggressive in critiquing the GDR but to focus on providing the 
most positive impression of their own society possible. Images were, in fact, dominant in this 
piece over text in terms of size dedicated to it, which was different from some of the more 
aggressive approaches in previous articles. This further indicates that Scala editors were careful 
to keep the more skimmable and obvious images on the positive message. 
Division, Berlin and the GDR 
 How did the GDR respond to FRG critiques of ongoing German division and the obvious 
weak point of the Berlin Wall? In general, they stuck with positive renditions of the city of 
Berlin, which served as capital and thus centerpoint for the SED regime. The GDR’s efforts to 
respond on these issues were largely limited to the mid-late 1980s, and like Scala, GDR Review 
picked up steam in describing Berlin and German division closer to the 750th anniversary. Some 
articles attempted to offer tourist portrayals, while others focused explicitly on having foreign 
observers write up their visits to the city. This effort to gain credibility clashed with the FRG’s 
approach which was to continue having professional journalists write the articles without the 
attempt to appear unbiased. The GDR, lacking the luxury of built-up legitimacy of the FRG, had 
no choice but to do so. Furthermore, it faced higher stakes in the depiction of Berlin, because it 
played such a more important role in GDR society as the capital. 
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The series, “Impressions of the Capital” was a highly image-based article campaign 
intended to get reader feedback on “Berlin, the capital city of the GDR,” with no references to 
East Berlin at all. For instance, the initial call for readers to participate in this campaign came in 
August 1986. The article asked its readers who had “been acquainted with Berlin” via the 
magazine or through personal trips to write to GDR Review so they could learn “what pleased 
you or attracted your attention here in the heart of our republic.”98 These statements would then 
be put in the article series entitled “Readers’ Forum 750.” Unsurprisingly, GDR Review adopted 
a narrative somewhat similar to that of Scala with respect to Berlin. It even used similar 
language to claim that Berlin was a “blossoming metropolis” which had “arisen from the ruins of 
the Second World War.” Pointedly, however, both the images and the relatively small amount of 
text in this initial article said nothing about German division or the existence of West Berlin. 
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 Following the call for reader responses, GDR Review began publishing letters from these 
visitors to Berlin in 1987. The letters, which supposedly came from readers of the magazine and 
tourists from the West, read like a blatant list of GDR talking points. The extent to which they 
are useful is that they do continue to show GDR Review’s priorities in their portrayal of Berlin 
and GDR society more generally. In the first article, entitled “Enthusiasm and Appreciation,” 
Enrico Rosini from Italy wrote that he was very enthusiastic about the GDR due to his repeated 
visits to the country and the “achievements of which many other countries still dream.”99 As a 
fourteen-year-old, Rosini had visited the GDR both as a private tourist and as part of a youth 
group participating in the “‘Heinrich Rau’ Young Pioneers’ Camp in Gross Köris.” It can be 
intimated form these details that Rosini was fond of the Left-Wing ideologies espoused by the 
FDJ, the youth organization of the GDR that sponsored such events. The key point emphasized 
in 
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Rosini’s narrative, however, was that the GDR had rebuilt Berlin remarkably well. This matches 
a key talking point of the 1980s in GDR Review which was to show how the GDR was 
renovating and rebuilding housing for its citizens despite the ongoing issues stemming from the 
destruction of the Second World War. The effort to present GDR modernism also fit with the 
broader image-building campaign to show that the GDR was on a “world level” (Weltniveau). 
Furthermore, it fit with the ongoing effort in GDR Review to appeal to younger segments of the 
international public, continuing on its campaigns from the 1960s and 1970s that had emphasized 
the supposed vibrancy of youth life in the GDR. For instance, the creation of the “large and 
modern Sports and Recreation Center and the Young Pioneers’ Palace” were particularly 
appealing to Rosini. 
 In another article, a young woman from France, Cecile Robin served as the mouthpiece 
for another GDR talking point. GDR Review even clearly flattered itself with the opening 
statement, saying, “Since I knew the GDR and its capital Berlin only from the numerous articles 
and photos in GDR Review I decided last year to go and see for myself how people in this 
country live.” This not only offered a clear vindication of GDR Review’s role in attracting 
foreign interest but also emphasized a key point that Western media productions should not be 
trusted, and that the only true impression of a city can be gained from firsthand experience or 
from a truly reliable source like GDR Review. The letter furthered this impression with a critique 
of foreign mass media renditions of Berlin, which, while not named, certainly included 
impressions of divided Berlin from Scala. Robin wrote, “I now see the information spread by our 
mass media in a completely different light. They claim for example: ‘Berlin is a sad place, 
people are inhospitable and suffer under the partition of their city…’”100 By contrast, she 
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claimed, “in reality Berlin is a thriving and bustling capital which attracts lots of visitors.” The 
tourist sites, such as the Museum of German History and the TV Tower were supposedly 
highlights. The inexpensive books and large number of bookstores in the GDR also were a 
highlight according to Robin, which demonstrated both the intellectual chops of the GDR and its 
egalitarian concern with the spread of technical knowledge. 
The people of Berlin also served to highlight key aspects of life in the GDR. According 
to Robin, the people she saw included “many young people, children and also pregnant women.” 
Though she was “really surprised at the latter” (pregnant women), Robin served to confirm that 
the GDR’s future was bright with its large number of young people, and to also deflect a self-
conscious concern and foreign attacks over the legalization of abortion and declining birth rate. 
The relationship between domestic politics and concern for the welfare of the people was also 
supposedly matched by the people’s and government’s concern for peace. Thus, Robin stated 
that GDR citizens’ concerns about peace was “corroborated by the government’s policy as well 
as by the many campaigns initiated by different circles.” This clear juxtaposition with the 
independent peace movement and missile protest in the FRG served to reinforce the GDR’s 
claims that the SED dictatorship focused on the needs and wants of the people. The talking 
points then continued including the lack of unemployment in the GDR, the robust social welfare 
programs, educational opportunities, housing reconstruction conducted mindfully with socialist 
community goals. Robin dedicated a separate paragraph to emphasize that “women have a broad 
choice of occupations- and this is not only in jobs that are typical for them. And they receive 
equal pay for equal work, just like their male colleagues.”101 Robin concludes by making the 
main purpose of her letter explicit. She stated that “people should not let themselves be biased by 
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prejudices but rather see for themselves what reality is like.”102 Thus, GDR Review attempted to 
offer an alternative vision of Berlin that did not emphasize the history of the place in so much as 
it discussed the present. These examples show how preoccupied the GDR was, and frankly, its 
much more difficult job of justifying a society whose regime had to build walls to keep them 
from fleeing to the ever-present Western alternative. 
In May 1987, GDR Review published an article at the front of the magazine celebrating 
the antifascist legacy of the GDR. The article, entitled “Berlin – A City with Antifascist 
Traditions” attempted to link the 750th anniversary of Berlin with the antifascist foundational 
myth that had been resurrected in the 1980s to serve as a moral justification for German division 
and East German superiority. Thus, the article opened with the claim that “for centuries the city 
was an arena of conflicts between progressives and reactionary forces and, in the more recent 
past, between the forces of peace and war.”103 In the articles articulation, the landscape of Berlin 
was inflected by this conflict between the opposing political and cultural forces, as seen in the 
Memorial to the Victims of Fascism and Militarism. The article claimed that the memorial 
“reminds them [foreign and domestic observers] above all of the courageous women and men 
who died fighting fascism.” Finally, it claimed that Berlin “was not only the centre of German 
militarism and fascism, which had unleashed two devastating world wars, but also of active 
resistance to the fascist dictatorship and war.”104  
The article, however, largely ignored Berlin as a landscape and chose to focus primarily 
on antifascist resistance fighters whose residence had been in Berlin. The first of these figures, 
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unsurprisingly the former KPD leader Ernst Thälmann, was murdered by the Nazis, but served as 
key figure in the GDR’s foundation myth because the SED claimed he “urgently called for the 
Communist and Social democratic workers to jointly fight fascism.” Berlin, did however, serve 
as an important site of resistance, according to the article. While giving communists the majority 
of the credit for “active resistance” against fascism, the article carefully credited a broader 
swathe of the German population. These individuals, ostensibly “concerned about the destiny of 
the German nation…were resolved not to allow everything to be destroyed and to help end the 
war as quickly as possible.” The groups were composed of “socialists, communists, Christians 
and middle class antifascists” and were centered in Berlin, but also went elsewhere in support of 
their goals. In an assertive, if unconvincing, reversal of the most common narrative on German 
resistance, which tended to focus on the July 20, 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life led by Count von 
Stauffenberg, the article looked at resistance under the Schulze-Boysen/Harnack group. This 
group, composed of individuals with “different social backgrounds, political and ideological 
Figure 91 Multiple captions, Berlin – a city with antifascist tradition, GDR Review 5/1987 
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views,” had given information to Moscow about Germany’s impending invasion of the Soviet 
Union. The upshot of these various stories, however, was that “even though the German 
antifascists were not strong enough to put an end to the fascist terror and the war on their own, 
their contribution to liberation was indispensable. Their legacy is still alive in the GDR and its 
capital.”105  
 The conclusion of the article, as well as the large number of articles resituated the article 
to the present day. For instance, the article stated that “many schools, streets and institutions in 
Berlin bear the name of former resistance fighters. Girls and boys tend countless memorials and 
graves of antifascist heroes.”106 The 
young people in the GDR, shown in 
two of the three largest photos 
accompanying the article, 
demonstrated the commitment of the 
future of the GDR to the 
memorialization of the heroic and 
honorable past of which the GDR 
saw themselves as the inheritors. 
The first image showing young 
people in the GDR showed Nikolaus 
Riedmüller, an antifascist resistance 
fighter, visiting the Albert Kuntz 
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Comprehensive School and talking with teenaged students. Another image showed an even 
younger group laying flowers at the memorial for fallen Soviet soldiers, thus honoring the 
GDR’s commitment to the Soviet Bloc and the struggle against Nazism in the Second World 
War. Certain tropes were also inescapable in articles like this, such as the full-page color 
photograph showing a newly married couple, still in wedding clothes, placing flowers on a 
memorial to the victims of fascism. The language on the tomb (pictured in German and Russian) 
stated “The homeland will not forget their heroes.”107 While not referred to explicitly in the 
article, the clear flipside to the GDR honoring their past, to promoting peace, and having 
consistent references to antifascist heroes was the FRG. Memorialization in the FRG was less 
overt in productions such as Scala, and this was the GDR’s attempt to subvert the narrative of 
dictatorship and oppression espoused by the FRG in this new wave of aggressive confrontation. 
Conclusion 
 The 1980s showed a renewed high point in international tension between the Cold War 
superpowers and divided Germany. The GDR, lagging economically and unable to provide the 
same standard of living to their people, scrambled for new narratives to positively present 
themselves. The articles about the rebuilding of German cities and new housing programs 
reminiscent of the 1950s and early 1960s continued to be produced through 1989 by GDR 
Review, showing that GDR lacked the fundamental capacity to adequately house all of its 
citizens. This lack of legitimacy precipitated a return to moralistic arguments about antifascism 
and about the dedication of youth to this cause. Furthermore, pointing fingers at the West again 
returned as a viable strategy, particularly with the protests occurring throughout much of 
Western Europe in the early 1980s. The celebration of Berlin and the antifascist commitment of 
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its people united a contemporary and old strategy in East German foreign cultural policy. The 
attempt to show a modern, cosmopolitan Berlin worked to an extent, but suffered from the 
inevitable comparison to a technologically and economically superior Federal Republic. The 
antifascist rhetoric was a return to some of the more confrontational efforts of the 1950s and 
1960s, but also had diminished in purchase by the 1980s. Furthermore, the GDR had staked their 
legitimacy on their capacity to provide an attractive life to their citizens, which the existence of 
the Berlin Wall and the rising body count of those killed attempting to flee destroyed. 
Scala, however, showed a capacity to engage criticism from the GDR and from domestic 
audiences that the GDR lacked due to its absence of political and ideological flexibility. When 
engaging with the past and the importance of peace, Scala showed a commitment to a narrative 
that favored incremental adaptation and condemned ideological extremism. Protests were 
criticized in Scala as hypocritical attacks on a reasonable response to the dangers of Eastern Bloc 
conventional forces and missiles. Most importantly, however, the FRG showed genuine protests 
and identified groups in their society that were unsatisfied with the FRG’s policies and politics. 
This was a highly believable narrative that was not inherently positively disposed towards the 
FRG. This could be overstated to show that the FRG was committed to solely provide the “truth” 
of events, but as was shown in the 1970s reorganization of foreign cultural policy, the 
fundamental issue was believability. On the protest front, and the division of Germany and 
Berlin, Scala was significantly more believable. Over the course of 1989/90, the issue of 
believability would eventually be addressed by GDR Review as it dealt with the dissolution of 











“LIVING IN A SPEEDED UP FILM” 
 
The November-December 1989 issue of Scala 
celebrated the opening of the border with the GDR. The 
cover showed a pair of East Germans with West German 
passports smiling and kissing with the headline “Flight to 
Freedom.” This article came out before the wall had been 
opened for travel, and most of the GDR citizens arriving 
in the FRG had moved through the open borders in 
Hungary by claiming refugee status in Warsaw, Prague, 
and Budapest. According to the article “They were events 
which moved the whole world: Never before have 
Figure 93 Brandenburg Gate fall of the Wall, Scala 2-3/1990 
Figure 94 Cover Scala 11-12/1989 
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refugees been so warmly welcomed as those tens of thousands of Germans who arrived in the 
West from the other part of Germany, the GDR.”1  
 Scala’s presentation of GDR citizens flight to the West conveyed a narrative that 
contained common threads. The article first discussed the large numbers of GDR citizens waiting 
in Eastern Bloc countries to flee to the West. West German condescension for East German 
engineering came through when in Switzerland “members of the fire service and the automobile 
club…took care of the overburdened ‘Wartburgs’ and ‘Trabants’ with their two-stroke engines.”2 
On the whole, however, the presentation was that of West Germans welcoming East Germans 
with open arms. Scala quoted The Times of London, stating, “‘They were welcomed like exiles 
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Figure 95 Overcome with joy: GDR refugees on their arrival in Bavaria, Scala 11-12/1989 
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who have returned to the country of their birth.” FRG spokesman Hans Klein remarked, “human 
feelings of solidarity which we had already almost forgotten’ came to the surface.” According to 
the article, GDR citizens had been able to escape through Hungary because it opened its borders 
during the summer of 1989. In a condemnation of the GDR’s response to domestic upheaval, the 
article cited Hungary’s decision, stating, “human rights, declared the politicians in Budapest, had 
priority.” The happy crowds, however, dominated the article. The refugees, as the article called 
them, “were welcomed like old friends who were being seen again for the first time after a long 
absence.”3  
Referring to the pictures of 
the momentous events, Scala 
described them as “images of elation, 
jubilation, tears, a feeling of 
happiness which is almost impossible 
to express, pictures of people 
jumping for joy and embracing each 
other.” More specifically, it 
described them as they “proudly 
showed their brand new Federal 
German passports” and how “they 
painted over the GDR signs [on their 
cars] with felt-tip pens.” One East 
German who was interviewed, 
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twenty-two-year-old Sylke Behrendt of Potsdam, described the “incredible feeling of no longer 
being afraid, the end of a continual feeling of oppression, of the fear that someone is listening 
and the fear of an omnipresent state.”4 The article showed how these citizens had left the GDR 
and were celebrating their return to a free Germany. In addition, the images accompanying the 
article largely seemed to correspond with what was contained in the article. In some cases, there 
was direct overlap, and this was a highly convincing presentation. Furthermore, the images were 
high quality, in color, and had a higher number in the article than what was presented in GDR 
Review. 
 Life in the FRG for those that had fled the GDR offered more than freedom, according to 
the article, while providing many of the benefits the GDR trumpeted, like employment. Though 
trained in the GDR, those that had fled to the West “include a large number of good, above all, 
ambitious and enterprising skilled workers.” In addition, they “are said to have a pioneering 
spirit” which enabled them to “find work very quickly in the reception camps.”5 The article 
expressed solidarity between the two German peoples, stating that “special formalities, such as a 
residence or work permit, are not required as Germans from the GDR are German nationals just 
like their relatives and friends in the Federal Republic, they are German with a German passport, 
with the same rights including the right to vote.” In addition, Scala highlighted the FRG’s social 
welfare largesse, by touting how “in the same way as if they had worked in the Federal Republic 
of Germany they also have a right to unemployment benefit, housing benefit and children’s 
allowances.”6 At the same time, Scala acknowledged that there were housing difficulties for 
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refugees that were harder to solve than employment, but stated the housing ministry planned to 
construct 50,000 apartments in “the near future.” The opportunities for those GDR citizens who 
fled to the West became apparent in 
the FRG. Having generated a decisive 
edge in technology, economic 
productivity, and standard of living, 
the FRG had a great deal of appeal 
over the GDR. In addition, Scala 
presented the freedom in the daily 
lives of FRG citizens. This narrative 
co-opted the last defenses of the GDR, 
who in the 1980s increasingly turned 
to moral arguments as opposed to 
economic measures to demonstrate its 
superiority. The images once again 
corroborated the claims of the article 
as they demonstrated industry offers 
of employment to refugees from the GDR and showed the young, “enterprising” families that 
had fled for freedom and opportunity. The inclusion of this group in the images offered a clear 
presentation of the hope for a better future and better life that was offered in the West. 
 Scala brought up the potential of German reunification during the upheaval, a topic 
towards which GDR Review remained allergic. The refugees and disorder in the GDR had caused 
a leadership change and “the question of German unity also suddenly reappeared on the 
Figure 97 Multiple captions, GDR refugees, Scala 11-12/1989 
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international agenda.”7 Even more stridently, the article claimed, “the world became aware of the 
fact that Germans see themselves as one nation – and it has shown understanding for this, also 
for the right of self-determination, a right to which Germans are as equally entitled as all other 
people in the world.”8 The future of the GDR remained uncertain, but Scala called for changes. 
The article quoted Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister of the FRG, who warned against 
“schadenfreude”9 with respect to the troubles of the GDR. He said, “we do not want to 
destabilize anyone,” but the article hinted this was inevitable without changes on the part of the 
GDR because “a refusal to carry out such reforms could have unforeseeable consequences.”10  
In November 1989, no issue of GDR 
Review appeared to its subscribers. What 
arrived in January 1990 was a special 
November/December double issue with the title 
“GDR in Upheaval” complete with a full image 
of serious East German woman wearing peace 
pins. Lore Uhlmann, editor-in-chief of GDR 
Review mixed classic GDR obfuscation with a 
degree of contrition. She informed readers of 
her and the people of the GDR’s struggle with 
their own role in the dictatorship. In her words, 
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“along with most people in our country, we are struggling night and day for answers, 
explanations, admissions or rejections of guilt. What seemed valid yesterday is what we 
ourselves put in question today.”11 In Uhlmann’s words, she admitted that 275,000 
“predominantly young people” had fled the GDR to the West. These young persons, “who have 
trained or studied in our state, who have known no unemployment, but who nonetheless felt 
themselves treated like 
children, and who did not 
feel because most of us in 
the older generation, who 
really did wish nothing 
but the best for them did 
not allow them enough 
leeway for what they 
understand as quality of 
life.”12  
Finally, Uhlmann 
engaged the all-important 
question of these and 
other events in the 
socialist bloc for the 
validity of GDR Review. 
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“We who have described to you the GDR in word and picture for years and in some cases 
decades, are now faced with the painful question: Have we deceived you, our readers, our 
friends, those who have placed their hopes for socialism specifically in our country, have we 
willfully spread lies?” In responding to her rhetorical questions, she said, “I can and must 
respond with a clear conscience and a straight answer: No. But is this and can this be allowed to 
be everything? Within the scope given to us we painted a picture of the GDR which did not 
encompass all aspects of the reality.”  
 The topics, according to Uhlmann, where not all “aspects of the reality” were covered, 
included building construction and restoration, unemployment and economic viability, and 
worker participation in management. In each of these areas, Uhlmann laid out a dichotomy. For 
housing reconstruction, she stated that the GDR provided “New homes at low rent? – Yes, for 
millions of people, above all from the working class.” At the same time, however, there was “the 
increasing dilapidation of buildings, particularly in the old town centres, of which only a few 
have been restored.” There was no unemployment, but also “weeks and months when working 
time has not been used to capacity in many enterprises…because fossilized economic structures 
prevented a feasible and necessary increase in work efficiency.” Finally, in the most strident 
indictment of the GDR system, Uhlmann stated that while there was participation from workers 
and employees, there was little “use of attested rights when bureaucratic, ossified and geriatric 
leadership would recognize only what it wanted to hear.”13 When evaluating her participation in 
promulgating these partial truths, Uhlmann stated “We recognize our guilt in the acceptance of 
our condemnation to journalistic immaturity and speechlessness concerning the stated issues and 
many, many more.” In addition, she promised from then on “to supply you with unvarnished 




information, to exercise the journalistic self-determination which the GDR people – including 
ourselves- have won for us in the last two weeks.” The next issues would demonstrate the self-
liberation of the media according to Uhlmann and show that “we are capable of learning.”14 
 The images showing the mass exodus of people fleeing the GDR, an open wall, and flood 
of cars belied the message in Uhlmann’s editorial. Friendly images of police officers showed 
how they supposedly “in a swift and unbureaucratic operation, issued over four million visas” to 
East Berliners seeking to crossing the border. At the same time, the images of the two mayors of 
Berlin, Walter Momper (West Berlin, SPD) and Erhard Krack (East Berlin), meeting in 
Potsdamer Square was accompanied with an admonishment from Momper warning “against 
succumbing to dreams from the 1950’s concerning a reunification of the two Germanies.”15 
These visual renditions, in addition to the caption, contradict the reassuring language present in 
Uhlmann’s editorial. In fact, they showed that huge numbers of people were flowing out of the 
GDR to the West, and they weren’t all the children she described. In addition, despite the 
positive spin attempts Uhlmann provided, such as those about the police spontaneously and 
unbureaucratically opening the border, the simple fact remained most of the flow of people was 
out of the East and into the West and not the other way around. 
 The mass exodus and demonstrations of 1989, culminating in the fall of the Wall, showed 
a decisive resolution to the Cold War competition between the FRG and the GDR. The future, of 
course, remained in doubt, but the East Germans had increasingly spoken with their feet by 
seeking exile or by marching in demonstrations. Foreign cultural policy mirrored some of the 
trends of these uncertain times. For instance, GDR Review did not disappear after the special 
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issue where Lore Uhlmann criticized the magazines journalistic “immaturity.” Instead, it 
continued in to the early 1990s. 
“A Cordial Welcome”: Scala in 1990 
 Scala triumphantly announced the fall of the Berlin Wall in the January/February issue of 
1990. The cover headline read “Germany: Wall Demolished After 28 Years” and showed a 
content Helmut Kohl looking to the sky surrounded by other Germans in front of the 
Brandenburg Gate. To Scala’s credit, it did not celebrate the fall of the Wall as a victory of the 
FRG alone. Rather, it credited the people of the GDR: “the people in the streets of the GDR and 
citizen’s movements gained by force of a nonviolent revolution: freedom and a parliamentary 
democracy, human and civic rights as well as a rule of law.”16 While complimenting the GDR 
citizens for their actions, Scala was also implicitly demonstrating that West German values and 
structures had ultimately won the battle for the hearts and minds of Germans, if not yet the 
world.  
 Many articles in Scala gradually built up to German unification in the 
November/December issue. Scala’s narrative conveyed first the jubilance of the end of GDR 
oppression and the opening of the border, then began to examine how the lives of GDR citizens 
would and should change, until culminating in a celebration of reunification. The most 
prominent article on the fall of the wall, entitled “Open Border,” showed how East Germans 
worked together to achieve freedom and to change their government. According to the first lines, 
“Through sheer defiance the people of the GDR – from Saxony, Mecklenburg, Thuringia and 
Brandenburg – had won the right to travel freely after the Communist SED regime had kept them 
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caged in for 28 years and deprived them of their 
political rights.”17 They had pressed through the 
Berlin Wall, the “monstrous concrete edifice, 
secured by the military and guarded like a front 
line, had cruelly divided the old German capital.” 
To convey the crumbling past of the Wall, the 
article included informative snippets shown as 
artfully torn corners in the article. The first 
showed the confrontations of tanks at Checkpoint 
Charlie, but the text discussed the construction of 
the wall on August 13, 1961 attributing it directly 
to Erich Honecker. The next image showed 
further construction and demonstrated that it was the NVA guarding the wall. Finally, it included 
images of the tragic murder of Peter Fechter in 1962 when NVA border guards open fired on him 
as he tried to cross to the West. Together these images show the dark history that also ended 
when the Berlin Wall was opened up. It also provides a very convincing reason for the grand 
celebrations of the citizens of the GDR fleeing to the West. 
 Scala gave a great deal of credit to East German protests and upheaval in finally breaking 
down the barriers between the two states. For instance, the article “Open Border” described how 
“those [people] on the Eastern side ignored the barriers, strolled through the arch and, 
unhindered by GDR border guards climbed onto the Wall where large numbers of West Berliners 
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were already waiting for them.”18 In another article entitled “Risk and Chance,” Scala showed 
how East German protests had pushed the regime to allow for the triumphant moment of the 
border’s collapse. The dominant image accompanying the article showed East Germans openly 
protesting for causes like free elections, which threatened the core of socialist, and thus GDR, 
legitimacy.19 The powerful chant “We are the People!” accompanied the caption, which stated 
that it was protests such as this one that led to the “revolution” in the GDR and free elections in 
the East German Parliament (Volkskammer). 
 
Figure 101 Multiple captions, Berlin Wall 1961-2, Scala 1-2/1990 
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While the joy on the part of East German visitors was clear, the article was also cautious 
about the new arrivals. It stated, “they really were visitors as only very few of them expressed a 
desire to stay permanently.” The dominant image on the first page of this article showed a 
number of young East German men running across the border, one flashing the double peace 
sign as he beamed. Regardless of such delighted individuals’ long-term plans, the article was 
careful to demonstrate that West Germans were welcoming their long-separated East German 
counterparts. This topic was also handled in the article “A Cordial Welcome” in the first issue of 
Scala in 1990. When East Germans arrived from trains, they were met by West Germans with 
“flowers in their hands and small presents for the children.” According to the article, this was 
“meant to be a friendly gesture, a cordial welcome which makes clear: you are German like us 
and you can count on our help.”20  
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Most of the article emphasized how East Germans could find readily available 
employment opportunities and argued that any discomfort with changing lifestyles and location 
would shortly be overcome. Dr. Peter Seifert embodied this development. He had applied for 
emigration from the GDR after being blackballed for demanding “improvement in the field of 
environmental protection” and was allowed to leave for the FRG in 1984 with his wife and two 
children. Though it was difficult for him to set up a practice initially, he received a great deal of 
support from the small-town mayor where he settled as well as the local political officials. He 
“rolled up [his] sleeves” and worked hard to get where he ended up, which was as a successful 
doctor in a rural West German town. This narrative and many like it served to show that West 
Germany was a land of opportunity for skilled and ambitious East German workers, even as it 









 The lightning process, beginning with the flight of East Germans to the FRG followed by 
mass protests and the opening of the border, culminated with the reunification of Germany in 
Figure 103 Inconeivable only a short time ago: All along the German-German border the barriers and barbed wire are 
torn down and Germans celebrate together. Scala 1/1990 
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October 1990. Though careful to avoid the language of “reunification” and instead choosing to 
refer to German unity, the political process subsumed the five former East German states into the 
Federal Republic of Germany. In its presentation of these momentous events, Scala published 
two major articles. The first was a celebratory piece discussing “Unification Day,” and the other 
was a more informative and cautionary article entitled “German Unity.” 
 The first article, replete with joyful images of black, red, and gold t-shirts and flags with 
exploding fireworks showed that many Germans were delighted to reunite on October 3, 1990. 
The article identified “joy” as the word of the day as the country gave a “tearless goodbye” to the 
GDR. In an effort to make this moment as innocuous as possible, the author argued, “not a trace 
of nationalist triumphalism was evident” but that the celebration felt like “‘a good-natured 
atmosphere of a German village fair prevailed.’” The article assuaged foreign observers, 
particularly those who may have been wary of an ascendant Germany, by citing t-shirts and 
souvenirs with the slogan “One Berlin, One Germany, One Europe.” At other times, it also cited 
Figure 104 Covers, Scala 2-3/1990 and 10-11/1990 
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foreign press, such as Le Monde, which stated, “It should be borne in mind that the Germany of 
today is not that of our fathers and grandfathers.”21 
 When celebrating reunification more broadly, the article “German Unity” presented a 
narrative of German cooperation in bringing about the end of division. The speedy transition left 
“fences, watchtowers and fortress-like border installations” as “sombre haunts of tyranny, malice 
and fear … still largely in place.”22 The article philosophically decried the fraught duality of 
German nature seen in the triumph of freedom or of unity. It stated, “two generations had learned 
and internalized the concept that one could only be had without the other: there could only be 
freedom without unity or unity with intolerable restrictions on freedom.” In 1990, however, this 
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division fell apart and Germans had achieved “unity in freedom.” Though some international 
observers were nervous about a united and ascendant Germany, the article said the “federal 
government must receive the historical credit for allaying these fears.” It did not shy away from 
crediting East Germans as well. The East Germans had “considerably accelerated the process of 
unification and as a result negated the counter-arguments held by their vacillating neighbors.”23 
 The burdens of the future loomed after the joy of unification. Though the article claimed 
Germany had paid for the Third Reich both financially and more significantly via “a third of its 
former territory.” After unification, this burden extended to the newly accepted federal states 
because “it has now become very clear that the situation…is more serious than had been 
assumed.”24 The noble FRG’s willingness to accept this burden to help restore the environment 
in the GDR and ability “to provide those in the east with similar living standards within a 
reasonable time as the Basic Law prescribes” showed both the uphill climb and the gap that 
existed between the two states. In the words of the author, this process was much more complex 
than making simple economic adjustments. According to the article, “forty years of socialism 
also represented forty years of intellectual and social isolation” and a lack of trust in the 
government system. East Germans struggled because “the past was too brutal, too repressive, too 
corrupt for the former victims to now easily be able to forgive and forget.” In a nod to the 
wrestling with the past that had come after the Third Reich, the author said, “the past cannot 
simply be amnestied, it has to be assimilated and come to terms with as part of a painstaking 
process.”25 
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 Though somewhat fair-minded in its presentation, Western arrogance seeped through at 
times. The author claimed that the West’s efforts did “not involve a position of dominance” even 
as the East “frees itself from the hang-ups arising from the past which are reflected in feeling of 
inferiority, backwardness and vulnerability.” The article also concluded that East and West 
Germans were different. As a consequence, it argued, “it will take time before the Germans come 
together. Forty years of division have led to more alienation than might have been apparent in 
the jubilation of 9 November 1989. There are not only differences in life style and behavior, but 
also in values and their relative importance.” Ultimately, however, the author concludes that 
Germans will rise to the task of completing unification beyond the stroke of a pen.  
 In October 1990, Scala included quotes from foreign leaders celebrating German 
unification. These figures included French President Francois Mitterand, who said, “We have 
travelled along many paths together. We shall continue. The whole of Europe expects us to keep 
up the momentum.” U.S. President George H.W. Bush more warmly celebrated German 
unification with his comments, “Today a new era begins for the German nation, an era, in the 
words of your national anthem, ‘in unity and justice and freedom’. America is proud to count 
itself among the friends and allies of a free Germany. Our eyes are open for a new world of hope. 
The last remains of the Wall in the heart of Berlin are proof that no wall can ever crush the soul 
of a nation.” Others, like Mikhail Gorbachev and Vaclav Havel, similarly celebrated the 
unification of Germany and the events of democratization occurring throughout East Central 
Europe.  
The optimism springing from the international community buoyed the presentation in 
Scala that wanted to admit the challenges stemming from the problems inherent to the GDR’s 
governing system. The competition for the “better” Germany, though largely moot after the 
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dissolution of the GDR and the unification of Germany, was incomplete without the parting 
shots seen in the article. Presented as lacking in social, cultural, and political wherewithal, the 
former East German state and people were thus left without any clear claim to being the “better” 
Germany. The economic superiority arguments, which had given way to moralistic finger-
pointing, could no longer sustain a competition when one country’s population was openly 
fleeing to the neighboring rival West. 
“Unity with Dignity”: GDR Review in 1990 
 GDR Review lost its way in 1990. If editor Lore Uhlmann’s letter in the delayed special 
issue of November/December 1989 had not already demonstrated the wild uncertainty of the 
period, the ongoing series of articles with topics varying from the first Playboy playmate in the 
GDR to the rise of far-right movements in both Germanys showed that the transition was a 
period of confusion, fear, and contradiction. It was thus no surprise that in January 1990, a 
continuation of “GDR in Upheaval” said that people in the GDR felt like they were “living in a 
speeded-up film.”26  
What message could GDR Review hope to convey to readers whose faith was 
undoubtedly and justifiably shaken to its core? Contrite admission of wrongdoing and 
acknowledging the inefficiencies of socialism took some of the magazine’s space. Some articles 
continued on the path of business as usual, while others encountered the blatant gaps in the 
GDR’s history. Readers were seemingly incensed by Uhlmann’s “picture of the GDR which did 
not encompass all aspects of the reality.”27 To facilitate transparency and try to recoup some 
good will, GDR Review expanded their traditional mail call section to include reader opinions in 
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the “Post Box.” The readers feedback, when combined with a number of more critical articles on 
the state of the GDR, indicated a genuine attempt to be more honest with readers, even as some 
tone-deaf articles continued to tout the value of socialism. 
 GDR Review presented the opening of the border as a temporary holiday and a pleasant 
development. In an article optimistically titled, “Across the Border and Back Again: Reporting 
on the Opening of the GDR Frontier,” a number of GDR citizens and border guards gave their 
opinions on these new developments. Most said that they were happy with the changes to the 
border, but also indicated that they were returning home and that things were going back to 
normal. For instance, Klaus-Peter and Sabine Hansen both crossed the border, but planned to “be 
back at work again tomorrow.”28 Border guards, like Major Günter Kobsch, agreed that “the 
initial rush was enormous,” but also cautioned that “the numbers have dropped by around one 
tenth.” Border guards were excited that GDR citizens’ attitudes towards them had changed such 
that now “we feel the citizen’s sympathy is on our side. This hasn’t always been the case.”  
No interviewee wished to commit to a future reunification of Germany, however. Instead, 
they offered caution. For example, the Hansens describe their feelings with classic GDR speak: 
“the conditions of ownership and production are different” but perhaps this might change “if 
things start to happen within the whole development of Europe.” Major Kobsch feared “if it 
came to a reunification my job could be on the line” and he couldn’t “see it happening under 
present conditions.” Finally, in the words of Günther and Heide Stark, “there are two German 
states and it should remain that way” and “we do have our pride. We want to keep it, too. In spite 
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of the numerous problems which we have to solve 
ourselves first. For the moment reunification is 
not an issue.”29 Of course, jovial East German 
guards and images of people flooding over newly 
reopened bridges did little to convince that the 
exodus of people from the GDR was anything less 
than a condemnation of its social, political and 
economic systems, but it did hold potential for a 
reform of the GDR and a functioning “third way” 
between the repressive SED dictatorship and the 
liberal democracy of the FRG. 
After the opening of the border at the end 
of 1989, the GDR faced the public relations nightmare of the Berlin Wall all over again. The 
flow of East German citizens to the West flew in the face of any observers still willing to believe 
SED claims of an “anti-fascist protection wall.” Life continued, and many East Germans 
returned to their normal routines. The presumption of this article that nothing would change and 
that Germans were too different to unify was a caution of a different sort from that presented in 
Scala. While West Germans might have been arrogantly nervous about simple cousins arriving 
in wheezing Trabants, GDR Review presented a nervousness about the loss of a way of life.30 
Unsurprisingly, the magazines contended with far different circumstances of ascendance and 
uncertainty in West and East Germany, respectively, but the tone nevertheless mattered and GDR 
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Review never lost the edge of fear it had whenever it mentioned reunification. For instance, in the 
“Post Box” section in the January 1990 issue, readers wrote of their disappointment and 
confusion with GDR Review and the events of 1989. One reader asked about GDR citizenship 
because it seemed many who left for the West became West German citizens immediately. In 
response, the editor stated the FRG had “disregard for our [the GDR’s] citizenship” because East 
Germans arriving across the border were immediately issued West German passports. 
Though they opened up more avenues for criticism, it is highly unlikely that GDR Review 
editors ceased curating the “Post Box” sections. Some of the classic lines and justifications for 
the GDR persisted, albeit presented from readers around the world. For example, in March 1990, 
Roland Chan-Chi-Wing from Hong Kong wrote he knew “the wall actually serves to keep out 
Western drugs, addiction, pornography, criminal gangs, AIDS and spies out to destroy socialism 
in the GDR.” Others, like Kelly Wright from Vermont, argued, “if you [the GDR] create a 
genuinely democratic system and combine that with your existing socialist orientation, the GDR 
could become a model for the whole world.” Some letter-writers did praise the recent 
developments in the GDR, but tended to couch that in delicate terms. Bernard Krock of France 
“love[d] your country [the GDR] very much and hope that the GDR will not lose its identity in 
the course of this development.”31 In this period fraught with instability, GDR Review attempted 
to use reader feedback as it always had: to lend credence to ideas that seemed overly 
propagandistic. The narrative of some of the other articles included in GDR Review became clear 
through some of these “Post Box” responses as well, because articles about the immediate 
opening of the border showed GDR citizens returned, others would also go to show that the GDR 
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was making progress on its own terms with the problems in its society. Still more articles would 
show the dangers of an ascendant West Germany and non-socialist values. 
The GDR reckoned with a problematic past and an uncertain future in a new, short-lived, 
article series “GDR History Under Discussion.” The first installment asked “Stalinism – was a 
different path possible?” The article, in attempting to redeem socialism on German soil, claimed 
that both the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(SPD) did not want to follow the path of the Soviet Union. Citing the former SED pariah Anton 
Ackermann, the article claimed that there were those in the GDR advocating a “special German 
road to socialism.” The author claimed it was ultimately the fault of geopolitical forces outside 
German control and the pre-eminence of the KPD over the SPD in the SED. Ostensibly, the 
democratic impulses of the SPD “could have acted as a corrective against Stalinist 
indoctrination” that led to “the official subjugation of the state apparatus under the SED 
leadership’s claim to autocratic rule in 1960.” The article, while admitting these early pitfalls, 
also tried to redeem the general character of the GDR by stating “the agonies of the Stalinist 
system in the GDR set in in the 1980s.”32 Of course, anyone familiar with Stalinism or the GDR 
would be well aware that the “agonies” of Stalinism in the GDR began much earlier, but this 
narrative was necessary for excoriating Erich Honecker and his ilk for their misdeeds while 
simultaneously staking out a safe space for socialism in the GDR’s history. 
No fearful narrative of Western triumphalism and the collapse of German socialism 
would be complete without a discussion of the neo-Nazi movement of 1990. In April 1990, GDR 
Review published an article entitled “Is the Right Gaining Ground?” This article was an 
interview with Dr. Wolfgang Brück, a legal sociologist and criminologist at the Leipzig Central 
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Institute for Youth Research. According to the 
article, the opening of the border accelerated the 
revival of neo-fascist movements. Also, Brück 
stated, “if a country with a left-wing oriented social 
system loses its identity and undergoes a deep crisis 
a turn to the right is bound to occur.” At the same 
time, Brück was also willing to engage somewhat 
seriously in a reckoning with the GDR’s treatment 
of the past, saying it was incomplete because “to the 
vast majority of Germans antifascism was, so to 
speak, ‘bestowed’ upon them after 1945.” When 
asked if neighbors should be afraid of Germans because of the rise of right-wing movements, 
Brück answered in the affirmative. “In a nationalistic fervor there always arise dangers for the 
neighboring peoples. Even if the right-wingers are still cautious in their comments today, who 
knows whether they’ll be demanding the shifting of frontiers soon after conditions have 
changed.” Ominous images of book burnings and menacing skinheads accompanied the article 
and impressed upon the reader that this was a genuine threat. Book burnings hearkened back to 
some of the darkest periods in German history, 1933 in particular, and the above image was the 
kind of thing GDR Review tended to go to great lengths to avoid presenting to readers. 
This article and the expert’s responses present the kind of message that would not have appeared 
in GDR Review prior to 1990. Though there were slight attempts at self-criticism and 
introspection, the kind of trenchant discussion of fascism in the GDR, as opposed to a menacing 
force emanating from the FRG, showed a willingness to acknowledge that there was a darker 




side to the GDR. Furthermore, it challenged some of the fundamental preconceptions of the GDR 
under the SED’s leadership by undermining the historical presentation of East Germans as 
antifascists and by criticizing the SED who “declared themselves the victors of 
history…repressing the complex aspects of their courageous resistance.”33 
In May 1990, GDR Review finally engaged 
with the reality of German reunification with the 
article “Unity with Dignity.” The article glumly 
announced that the people of the GDR had voted 
for unity with West Germany. Though it quoted 
GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Malziere with his 
statement “the people have voiced a clear yes for 
German unity,” which appeared to give an 
unmistakable mandate, but it also announced “an 
end to the dream of finding a third way between a 
market economy and a planned economy.” The 
reckoning with history continued in this article, as 
de Maizière went on to say “the State Security Service was not the real disease of the GDR, it 
was only one of its morbid growths. The actual hereditary disease of the socialist society was 
dictatorial centralism, which, through Stalinist blindness, was erected in the place of 
democracy.” The Prime Minister further stressed that the GDR had much to offer to united 
Germany, including “our country and its industrious people, our material assets, our skills and 
our talent for improvisation.” In concluding, the article questioned if Helmut Kohl, who “was not 
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particularly well-disposed towards his counterpart in the GDR” would provide “the huge 
financial resources which can-but do not have to-begin to flow into the GDR.”  
The article thus continued to demonstrate that 
the path of socialism the GDR took was fraught with 
problems, but that the people of the GDR had much 
to offer. It attempted to deflect from simple blaming 
of the PDS (the successor to the SED) and 
encouraged introspection. The article pointedly did 
not celebrate unification. The author wondered about 
“Unity with dignity. Whether this is a realistic goal or 
only a pious hope remains an open question.”34 The 
images in GDR Review became steadily less 
interesting in 1990, and the article showed a simple image of de Malziere giving a speech. The 
black-and-white image reinforced the blandness of response in the article, which offered little 
other than a summary of the political events and some unease. The simple reality was that the 
end of the GDR offered little means for GDR Review to celebrate what had come before. 
Furthermore, many employees at GDR Review were facing unemployment with the reunification 
of Germany, so the tone of the article was unsurprising for those whose jobs would be lost in the 
near future. 
In the May 1990 issue of GDR Review, the “Post Box” section quoted Bertil Malm from 
Sweden, who decried the magazine because “there is no doubt that GDR REVIEW, along with 
all the other newspapers in the GDR along with GDR radio and TV, spread lies about socialism 
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in your country. GDR REVIEW bears a heavy responsibility.”35 This quote, along with the 
article “Turmoil at the Newsstands” in June 1990, were the closing salvoes of a soon-to-be 
defunct GDR Review. Wracked with concern about their journalistic integrity, and watching East 
Germany disappear before their eyes, the staff at GDR Review lashed out at Western journalism. 
Below the headline, the article stated opined “in Wild-West style FRG publishers have gained 
more than a footing in the GDR media scene. GDR newspapers and magazines are being 
crowded out in an unprecedented and unfair competition…German unification has already taken 
place on the newspaper market.” Complete with an image bearing a selection of various West 
German media varying from Der Spiegel to pornography, these magazines “are submerged in 
gorgeous colors” while “the GDR press looks 
drab which is why its better stories do not catch 
the eye.” The irony of presenting this 
information in a drab, mostly black and white 
article aside, the bitterness of GDR media facing 
its dissolution was profound. The flood of 
canceled subscriptions in the mail for Neues 
Deutschland, Für Dich, etc. showed a profound 
disinterest in East German media.36 
The article asked, “are they really always 
less good than the thick and glossy magazines 
form the West?” It went on to ask, “hasn’t the 
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political revolution also led to a revolution in journalism?” while lamenting “even fewer regular 
readers bother to find out.” This had profound consequences for those in the print journalism 
business, as the article pointed out “this practice is threatening the jobs of thousands of GDR 
printers, journalists, and technical staff. The majority of GDR readers surveyed on the matter 
replied: ‘this is not press freedom.’” Of course, the article also pointed out that people did not yet 
“realize that this unbridled influx of capitalism in the GDR may run amok in local industries as 
well.”37 The unwillingness of GDR journalists to accept that the public was not only turning 
away from Eastern media because it was unattractive, but also because it continued to 
misrepresent aspects of the GDR showed that a prestige magazine like GDR Review could only 
modify its course so far. The wall had fallen, Germans had voted to unify, and still articles in 
GDR Review pushed a narrative highlighting the difficulties and dangers of reunification. The 
possibility that a loss of faith in the institutions of the GDR could spread to most aspects of 
society seemed not to occur to the editors. 
What should be taken from Scala and GDR Review in 1990? Much of the presentation in 
the magazines fits known narratives of reunification. Scala showed that there was a profound 
mixture of concern and jubilation where West Germans greeted their Eastern counterparts with 
open arms. Indirectly, the opening of the borders, references to freedom, and images of delighted 
East Germans undermined forty years of GDR efforts to demonstrate their status as the superior 
Germany. The upheaval in the GDR also came across in GDR Review in 1990. To be fair to the 
editorial staff of the magazine, it found itself in a predicament. Their country, which they had 
just spend the last twenty-three years propagandizing, started crumbling around them. Messages 
like antifascism became destabilized, and West Germany could only serve as a half-hearted 
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boogeyman. In its death-throes, GDR Review railed against the influx of West German media in 
to the GDR and self-interestedly championed East German journalism. These presentations 
demonstrated fundamental pitfalls of the GDR system had continued through 1990 and that the 
middle path between socialism and the market economy was not to be found east of the Elbe. 
Conclusion 
 In 1949, both states stood at the precipice and feared that their German rival would gain 
precedence over them in the context of the Cold War. The GDR, as the smaller, weaker, and 
unrecognized new state, faced a much tougher road than the FRG. Consequently, it was the first 
to turn to foreign cultural policy/public diplomacy (Auslandsinformation). One of the key 
components in this campaign, developed by the MfAA, was the production of print media 
designed for consumption abroad. Targeting Western countries and non-aligned states, the GDR 
hoped to win over sympathetic public audiences who could pressure government officials to 
recognize the GDR and ultimately push it to parity and beyond with the FRG. GDR Review, 
produced by the publisher Zeit im Bild, formed a key link in this broader catalog of public 
diplomacy campaigns because it connected the various friendship societies under the leadership 
of the GKV and later the LfV to foreign audiences with a consistent monthly journal. 
 The FRG and its embassies read GDR Review with alarm. Over the course of the 1950s, 
many in the Foreign Office of the FRG saw little need to present the FRG favorably abroad, 
instead relying on favorable business relationships and general economic prosperity. The 
approach of officials at the Foreign Office changed as they conversed with the Federal Press and 
Information Office, who had wanted to produce something to rival GDR Review for some time. 
The pre-existing tourism magazines and laissez faire approach failed to match the GDR’s top-
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down approach. Thus, by the late 1950s, the Foreign Office and the BPA planned the release of 
Scala International, which arrived in 1961. 
 The various institutions contributing to the development of these magazines operated in a 
highly disorganized context in both states. The dual state and party structure severely limited the 
room to maneuver of new organizations like the GKV and Friendship Societies in the East. The 
SED maintained clear control over all aspects presenting the GDR abroad and between them, and 
the MfAA functionaries, there were several layers of censorship for GDR Review. The FRG 
lacked some of the same overlap of government roles, but power struggles between the Foreign 
Office and the BPA persisted for decades. The nominally independent Scala did have a great 
deal of freedom, but also cleared its planned articles with the BPA and avoided certain topics 
that could be too incendiary, like the shifting of German borders from 1870-1945. In the GDR, 
the state set policy for their image-building campaigns, established a dual layer of censorship, 
but also experienced a great deal of budget shortfalls and inefficiency. In the FRG, an 
interdepartmental rivalry emerged wherein the Foreign Office and BPA met repeatedly to 
hammer out responsibilities and differences, all while Scala International slowly began to 
challenge GDR Review. 
 In the 1960s, the image-building competition between the GDR and the FRG developed 
in earnest. The construction of the Berlin Wall polarized much of international public opinion 
regarding divided Germany. The GDR, in particular, faced yet another profound challenge to 
establishing its image abroad, while the FRG had an unprecedented opportunity to challenge its 
rival. Dueling claims of their competitor’s nascent and obvious authoritarianism emerged with 
the GDR claiming the FRG showed neo-fascist and revanchist tendencies. The FRG could 
casually point to the Berlin Wall as a blatant demonstration of GDR unpopularity and fear. These 
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opportunities counterbalanced the shared difficulties of the period for the German states. 
Circumscribed by massive public rejection of Germany in the wake of the Second World War, 
and by the destruction of German territory, both states cultivated similar themes about rebuilding 
German cities, housing, and industries. The magazines further focused on social progress, as 
seen in the role of women in their societies, which could demonstrate a rising standard of living 
and challenge their rival to defend their social structures. 
The magazines developed similar themes because of divided Germany’s parallel 
development.38 Furthermore, each state’s institutions consistently observed their rival and 
designed both offensive and defensive tactics to respond. The tactics that manifested in practice 
in GDR Review and Scala International demonstrated highly differentiated approaches. GDR 
Review articulated classic narratives of antifascism, rooted in heroic (and overblown) narratives 
of German communist resistance even as they attempted to show the socialist model’s 
superiority. Rebuilding the city of Dresden, firebombed by the Western allies in 1945, showed 
how the central planning of the GDR could be more humanistic because it reconstructed 
destroyed churches, museums, and cultural centers. Scala International unsurprisingly trumpeted 
the roaring industrial economy in areas like the chemical industry (Bayer) and the automobile 
industry. Rebuilding also took on a distinct tenor in the FRG, as Scala International worked to 
show that it had reconstructed the democratic traditions long rooted in German history. A subtle 
contrast to authoritarian traditions peppered Scala International’s articles on German history, 
serving to denigrate the GDR as well.  
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When articulating women’s roles in society, the GDR and the FRG began from 
profoundly different perspectives. A number of combined structural factors pushed the GDR to 
bring more women into the workforce. The death of large numbers of German men in the Second 
World War and then the flight of many young working-age Germans to the west left the GDR in 
a precious economic situation. Thus, ZK leadership utilized social progressivism as a tool to 
justify its mobilization of the workforce to include women. GDR Review tailored this narrative to 
show that women were not required to work by the GDR but were excited to do so of their own 
volition. Though this may have been the case for many women, the fact remained that the GDR 
developed these programs for a practical purpose. The FRG, at the same time, maintained a 
“single-earner” family model, and Scala International demonstrated this via a number of articles 
celebrating their views of the proper women’s professional life cycle. For example, Scala 
International presented articles showing a dismal view of young women working aimlessly and 
not living up to their potential, while others that worked for a time until marrying and having 
children found greater fulfillment.  
GDR Review and Scala International in the 1960s offered a close view to a highly 
confrontational set of self-images. Articles and images in the magazines frequently served to 
undermine their rival even as they presented a view of everyday life that affirmed each state’s 
ideological, economic, and political systems. The 1960s in particular were fraught with conflict 
on a fundamental level and the recruitment of postcolonial states required an assertive message. 
The GDR drove the development of foreign cultural policy between the two German states and 
the FRG looked to it to form their responses. This reversal of conventional narratives of divided 
Germany demonstrated that both German states did not simply look westwards. In other words, 
the FRG looked to the GDR at times. It would be easy to overstate this argument, and in many 
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ways, the GDR, in their production of material like GDR Review, looked to counter foreign 
media that negatively portrayed East Germany. This established a kind of loop wherein the GDR, 
FRG, and international audience opinions interacted in complex fashions.  
The end of the 1960s changed the presentation in Scala International and, to a lesser, 
extent, in GDR Review. Frustrated by the continuing battles with the GDR over recognition and 
participation in international organizations, new legislative actions by the FRG started a 
Parliamentary Study Commision (Enquete-Kommission) into foreign cultural policy. This 
movement, led by the ascendant Social Democratic Party, sought to establish a new process by 
which foreign cultural policy would allow for greater self-criticism and introspection in order to 
be more credible to a broader public. These developments came on the heels of a broader cultural 
reckoning in the FRG wherein the 1968 generation of younger people participated in the global 
youth revolt and challenged previous generations about their complicity in the Third Reich. 
Meanwhile, in the GDR, the challenges and the responses that the FRG contended with were not 
replicated. Instead, the GDR sought to challenge the FRG for its more conciliatory stance 
towards the Eastern Bloc. SED leaders feared this because of its suspicion of an Ostpolitik 
Trojan Horse and because any shift that made FRG narratives more convincing hurt the GDR in 
their zero-sum game.  
The themes that emerged in the 1970s because of shifting institutional priorities 
highlighted the age cohort that grew up in divided Germany and the social issues like childcare 
and abortion. The young people profiled in a series of articles beginning in 1968 and running 
throughout much of the 1970s showed that the GDR and the FRG were preoccupied with the 
youth revolt and wanted to show that in their country, young people were happy and well treated. 
The two states did so with varying levels of success. In a somewhat more honest approach, the 
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FRG showed that young people protested war and injustice, but carefully tailored the narrative to 
limit the West German state’s culpability. In the GDR, articles on the young generation touted 
antifascism and a commitment to peace in overly sanitized and state-organized rallies. The young 
people of this generation embodied the best each state had to offer, and the youth’s success and 
behavior reflected keenly back on the state in which they lived. At the same time, GDR Review 
and Scala International’s portrayal indicated divergent approaches to a fraught topic. Scala 
International attempted a more open, if still constrained, approach, while in GDR Review, there 
could be no tolerance of even mild dissent. Protests and rallies in the East remained state-
sponsored and pleasant, while images and articles of Western rallies provided proof of the 
instability of capitalism and the suffering of its youth. 
Social progress in the 1970s included particular emphasis again on the role of women in 
society. Prominent issues like wage equality, abortion, and concerns about the falling birth rate 
in both Germanys populated Scala International and GDR Review. In Scala International, 
articles offered a more positive view of women gradually obtaining equality and undercut the 
women’s movement in a series of highly critical and sarcastic articles with titles like “What a 
rare piece of luck it is to be born a man!” GDR Review maintained that women had mostly 
already achieved equality, but that some retrograde attitudes persisted because of the legacy of 
capitalism and fascism. Abortion and family planning more generally provided an easier avenue 
for GDR Review to demonstrate GDR progressivism. The GDR, having legalized abortion in 
1972, attempted to curry favor with progressive Western audiences and, in particular, Western 
women.39 This particular topic set up a clear contrast with a more conservative FRG, who 
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continued to ban abortions. By choosing family planning as an area in which to stake a claim of 
superiority, GDR Review demonstrated that, after having achieved the political goals of 
international recognition and admission to the UN in 1972-1973, economic and political 
presentations of superiority required an ethical component as well. The moral superiority 
strategy morphed over time as the GDR’s “real-existing socialism” failed to meet overly 
ambitious economic growth and standard of living targets meant to supersede the FRG. In 
particular, it would return in the 1980s to attacking the FRG for revanchism and fascism in the 
Federal Republic and admit to minor shortcomings with the best of intentions. Put simply: when 
in doubt, GDR Review worked to raise the specter of fascism. 
By the 1980s, the institutions guiding foreign cultural policy and public diplomacy in 
divided Germany worked fairly well. The transitions begun in the late 1960s and conducted over 
the 1970s in the FRG softly moved Scala to be willingly critical of some aspects of the FRG 
while still presenting a generally positive impression. GDR Review, in contrast, only haltingly 
accepted very mild changes to its message and only grudgingly admitted to some small 
deficiencies. In terms of high politics, the superpower confrontations of the early 1980s ended 
détente, and the installation of nuclear missiles pitted the FRG and GDR against each other once 
more. Citing their long-term commitment to peace in Europe and the world, the GDR scrambled 
to stake its claim to moral superiority against the installment of medium-range nuclear missiles 
in Western Europe, while ignoring Soviet missiles. Once again images of mass protests in 
Brussels and the Federal Republic spawned attack articles in GDR Review trying desperately to 
show the lack of public support for Western governments. In contrast, Scala showed their own 
protests and discussed the struggle in German history between democracy and authoritarianism, 
while showing themselves as the inheritors of democracy and peace.  
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German division resurged to the public eye once more as glasnost and perestroika 
destabilized the Eastern Bloc. Consequently, Scala spent a heretofore-unprecedented amount of 
space to depicting the border separating the two states and the Berlin Wall in particular. In 
addition, the mutual celebration of the 750th anniversary of Berlin marked a point where the two 
Germanys could stake separate claims to their shared culture. FRG renditions managed to 
emphasize the tragic history of the city as well, by castigating the GDR for its construction of the 
Berlin Wall and for violently policing the border. 
Altogether, the 1980s marked a heightening of tensions in GDR Review and Scala, but 
also a marked increase in assertiveness for Scala. The West German magazine presented a far 
more confrontational analysis of Berlin and German division than had come before, and 
consistently justified the placing of missiles despite protests. Simultaneously, Scala held the 
capacity to admit there were active protests and that there were difficulties involved with an 
increase in conflict between the German states. GDR Review, in contrast, took to celebrating 
German history, and making desperate calls for peace and restraint that painted the West as 
unambiguous aggressors. When nuance did appear, GDR Review tended to present minor 
qualifications that did not detract from the overall message until November/December 1989 
when editor Lore Uhlmann admitted to presenting a heavily biased rendition of GDR affairs. 
The abrupt collapse of the house of cards built by GDR Review caused a highly 
discordant series of issues to be published in the first six months of 1990. While it attempted to 
redress the various wrongs of the SED narratives and to present a reforming path of socialism, it 
nevertheless continued to show the inability to reform the magazine’s presentation. Though 
articles pilloried leaders like Erich Honecker, the inherent promise of socialism remained 
unquestioned. The lack of celebration over German unity and the strident rejection of market 
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principles when it infringed on topics near and dear to the writers of GDR Review, such as 
journalistic monopolies, showed the character of the magazine lingered inescapably as a 
component of the East German system.  
Scala managed to skirt Western triumphalism with careful series of articles highlighting 
the success of East German protests and refugees in tandem with the warm welcomes of their 
West German counterparts. Though it contained a consistent tone of mild condescension, these 
articles painted a clear picture where Germans themselves chose the “better” Germany. 
Delighted images of Germans crossing the border underscored the excitement of the time, and 
the articles continued to emphasize joy as the overarching emotion of the period. Scala had won 
out, though not without its own changes. In 1994, it was renamed Deutschland and continued to 
contribute to united Germany’s robust foreign cultural policy. 
 Ultimately, international publics and readers of Scala International or GDR Review did 
not decide which German state should bear the title of the “better” Germany. East Germans, who 
protested before and after the fortieth anniversary of the GDR in 1989, voted emphatically with 
their actions and their flight to the West. In the end, the GDR forfeited the competition when it 
was absorbed into the West. The struggle between the two states and their image-building 
campaigns did, however, have consequences. The competition was a long struggle whose 
outcome was unclear until it became obvious. The magazines, and the foreign cultural policy of 
which they were an important part, spanned many critical and tangible issues like trade 
agreements, foreign aid, and international recognition. In addition, this competition showed that 
both German states looked to each other and to broader international issues when determining 
their themes. The GDR, which jumpstarted this struggle because of its fundamental insecurity, 
maintained the initiative for roughly two decades, achieving its primary political goals of 
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international recognition, admission to the UN, and the Basic Treaty with the FRG in 1972-3. 
The FRG, playing catch-up for a significant period, ultimately gained a level of self-criticism and 
consequently believability that GDR Review could not match. Shortly after its high-water mark, 
GDR Review steadily lost credibility through an unchanging and unreflective series of narratives.  
 This dissertation has shown that despite common assumptions of West German 
cosmopolitanism and sophistication, the FRG looked to the GDR for their initial foreign cultural 
policy. By following specific media campaigns over the course of German division, it also 
demonstrated that there was a close interaction between East and West German media as they 
approached similar problems and tried to show their superiority to their neighboring rival. At the 
same time, it has also shown how their methods, approaches, and campaigns diverged. After the 
1970s, in particular, the two states, despite working with similar issues, nonetheless profoundly 
diverged in their strategies. 
The role of the government in the production of foreign cultural policy was significant in 
both the GDR and the FRG. While it is unsurprising that the GDR’s work was largely guided and 
regulated by a bureaucracy subservient to the SED, it is interesting that they attempted to 
disguise this by using non-state organizations to run magazines like GDR Review. The Federal 
Republic’s much-vaunted part-private, part-state-driven programs show a version of foreign 
cultural policy less structured according to a single ideological view, but the struggle for funding 
and the constant need for approval on controversial articles indicated that the Foreign Office had 
significant power in influencing the direction of foreign cultural policy. 
 The institutions more directly responsible for the creation of the magazines, the GKV and 
the LfV for the GDR and the BPA for the FRG, showed a great deal of development from 1949-
1990. The GKV and later the LfV operated in an uncertain area in GDR foreign policy that 
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gradually became systematized and left very little room to operate outside strict ideological 
restrictions. Even the language used to describe issues in GDR Review used classic GDR 
language and terminology. Despite the dramatic changes ongoing in the FRG in foreign cultural 
policy in the 1970s, the GDR institutions did not change or adapt to meet the new circumstances. 
The BPA, as a government institution, maintained a great deal of influence in the creation and 
development of Scala, but its ideological commitment to a free press and free exchange of ideas 
resulted in a more sophisticated, credible, and appealing message in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
ideological capacity for genuine self-criticism established the means by which the BPA could 
work to develop Scala International. 
 Finally, the messages the states sought to convey changed over time. As each of the 
chapters has shown, certain messages gained purchase or faded away based on international and 
domestic concerns. Beyond the thematic developments, there was also the profoundly differing 
articulations of perceived universal goods. Thus, women’s rights—understood very differently 
by the two states—could be presented in both magazines, but with radically different meanings. 
Similarly, rebuilding democracy in a Marxist sense clashed fundamentally with reconstructing a 
liberal democracy in the vein of the Weimar Republic. Ultimately, these articulations, merged 
with the institutional commitment to either a hyper-idealized style or a more believable self-
critical style, combined to produce distinctly different results for the two German states. 
 It is possible that in the image-building competition to present the “better” Germany, 
Scala had the distinct advantage of selling a better product. When approaching Western 
audiences, and some developing countries, the GDR certainly had a tough row to hoe. 
Contemporaries in West Germany, however, were profoundly concerned about the sophistication 
and quality of East German public diplomacy and their zeal in deploying magazines like GDR 
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Review. This concern, and the broader story of dueling foreign cultural policies over the course 
of the Cold War, led to a profound focus on these policies for the FRG and later united Germany. 
In this way, it is possible to recognize that the competition for presenting a Germany better than 
the Nazi past succeeded for both states. What set the FRG’s efforts apart from the GDR, beyond 
ideological, economic, and political systems, was a willingness to push for more. The legacy of 
the competition endures as Germany continues to invest remarkable sums into foreign cultural 
policy as a cornerstone of its participation in the global community. The numbers of excited 
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